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Abstract 
 
For many manufacturers of fast moving consumer goods (FMCG), Middle Eastern 
markets are viewed as emergent economies with high growth potential. Some countries 
of the Middle East are witnessing a rise of modern trade channels such as hypermarket 
and supermarket formats, others are still dominated by traditional retailers such as 
wholesale and grocery store formats. Within this context, the decision to outsource the 
sales and distribution activities of a firm results in significant benefits but it also entails 
many dyadic risks between suppliers and their distributors. The purpose of this research 
is to understand how FMCG suppliers/manufacturers and distributors perceive relevant 
dyadic risks and how these risks are mitigated. The research examines the dyadic risk 
mitigation strategies adopted by both suppliers and distributors using relevant 
propositions based on transaction cost economics and agency theories. The propositions 
are explored by analysing 15 multiple dyadic cases which focus on the FMCG industry 
in three representative markets of the Middle East: Iraq, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(KSA), and United Arab Emirates (UAE). Semi structured interviews have been 
conducted with 30 experts from the FMCG industry in the Middle East, split between 
suppliers and distributors.  
 
The research shows that FMCG suppliers in the Middle East are affected by dyadic risks 
that hinder their ability to control their performance. Distributors also face dyadic risks 
that are due to their dependency on suppliers, which affects their future sustainability. 
Dyadic Risk Mitigation strategies include deploying a control system and reviewing the 
formal contracting structure, as suggested by agency theory, while another strategic 
approach relates to a partial or vertical integration of assets of high specificity, as 
proposed by transaction cost economics theory. The research shows that trust plays a 
pivotal role in the relationship between suppliers and distributors. From a practical 
perspective, the research contributes to proposing a transformation road map that 
encapsulates guidelines and tools that managers can use to diagnose their dyadic risks 
and map their optimal dyadic risk mitigation strategy.  
 
Keywords: Transaction Cost Economics, Agency Theory, Dyadic Risks, Dyadic Risk 
Mitigation, Control, Trust, Middle East. 
 
iv 
 
Dedication 
 
I dedicate this thesis to my family, namely to my mother Isabelle, who instilled in me 
the values of knowledge, hard work and self-confidence. This work could not have been 
realised without my exceptional partner, my wife Dyna, who always stood by my side to 
support me and motivate me during the course of the research. Her belief in my 
capabilities and the role she constantly played in boosting my morale is inexpressible. I 
also dedicate the thesis to my son Oliver, to whom I would hope that this work can be 
given as an example of determination and inspiration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I wish to express my genuine appreciation and recognition to my supervisors, Prof. 
Michael Bourlakis and Dr. Elizabeth Jackson.  Their guidance and support helped me 
structure my ideas and organise my thoughts. The learning I acquired from them is 
invaluable in the way they challenged me and oriented me during the research process.    
 
I would like to express my thanks to Mr. Nadim Tabet, president of NAT Consulting, 
for helping me frame the issues in practice, fine-tune the interview questions, and for 
giving me access to senior professionals in the FMCG industry in the Middle East.  
 
My grateful thanks also to Mr. Joe Tayard, Vice President of Group Bel, for giving me 
the opportunity to present the findings of my research to Group Bel's stakeholders and 
granting me the opportunity to drive the transformation in practice of Group Bel's 
distribution model in the Middle East. 
 
I would like to thank my sister Maya for her support. Lastly, I would like to thank all 
the senior professionals from multinational suppliers and distributors in the Middle East 
who agreed to participate in this research; their insights and inputs were important 
contributions. 
  
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................1 
1.1 Thesis Context ...............................................................................................................1 
1.1.1 About the fast moving consumer goods industry ....................................................4 
1.1.2 Fast moving consumer goods suppliers .................................................................5 
1.1.3 Fast moving consumer goods retailers ..................................................................8 
1.1.4 Typical fast moving consumer goods supply chain in Middle East .....................10 
1.2 Research Framework....................................................................................................13 
1.2.1 Purpose of the research .......................................................................................13 
1.2.2 Culture and cultural significance ........................................................................14 
1.2.3 Research approach ..............................................................................................15 
1.2.4 Research contribution ..........................................................................................16 
1.3 Thesis Structure ...........................................................................................................16 
Chapter 2. Literature Review .......................................................................................................18 
2.1 Overview of Dyadic Risks ...........................................................................................18 
2.1.1 The notion of outsourcing risks ............................................................................18 
2.1.2 Focus on dyadic/network risks .............................................................................21 
2.1.3 The notion of control ............................................................................................25 
2.2 Overview of Agency Theory........................................................................................33 
2.2.1 Agency theory assumptions ..................................................................................37 
2.2.2 Risk mitigation: agency theory perspective .........................................................40 
2.2.3 Summary of the agency theory .............................................................................46 
2.3 Overview of Transaction Cost Economics Theory ......................................................47 
2.3.1 Transaction cost economics theory assumptions .................................................50 
2.3.2 Governance structures .........................................................................................57 
2.4 Applicability of the Agency and Transaction Cost Economics Theories ....................60 
2.4.1 Applicability of the agency theory........................................................................60 
2.4.2 Applicability of the transaction cost economics theory .......................................61 
2.4.3 Critiques of the transactional approach ..............................................................63 
2.5 The Relational Approach - The Role of Trust .............................................................66 
2.5.1 The notion of relational contracting ....................................................................66 
2.5.2 Overview of trust and commitment ......................................................................68 
2.5.3 Trust within supply chain relationships ...............................................................72 
2.6 The Evolutionary Approach .........................................................................................74 
2.6.1 Overview of evolutionary theory ..........................................................................75 
2.6.2 Routine and dynamic capabilities ........................................................................78 
2.6.3 Evolutionary and transactional approaches ........................................................80 
2.6.4 Expected behaviour of the agent ..........................................................................81 
2.7 Gaps in the Literature ...................................................................................................83 
2.7.1 Context of the research ........................................................................................84 
2.7.2 Evolutionary perspective ......................................................................................85 
2.7.3 Agency law in the Middle East .............................................................................87 
2.7.4 Relational perspective ..........................................................................................89 
2.8 Research Propositions ..................................................................................................93 
Chapter 3. Research Methodology ...............................................................................................98 
3.1 Research Philosophy ....................................................................................................98 
3.1.1 Objectivism ..........................................................................................................99 
3.1.2 Constructionism .................................................................................................102 
3.2 Epistemological Stance of the Researcher .................................................................104 
3.2.1 The ‘where’ factor: the context of the research .................................................105 
3.2.2 The ‘when’ factor: the element of time ..............................................................106 
3.2.3 The ‘what’ factor: the objective of the research ................................................107 
3.2.4 The ‘who’ factor: the role of the researcher ......................................................112 
3.2.5 Researcher’s epistemology ................................................................................114 
3.3 Methodology ..............................................................................................................115 
viii 
 
3.3.1 Quantitative versus qualitative research ...........................................................115 
3.3.2 Discussion on qualitative research ....................................................................117 
3.3.3 Choice of relevant methodology ........................................................................118 
3.3.4 Focus on case study methodology ......................................................................122 
3.3.5 Research design .................................................................................................125 
3.3.6 Issues of reliability .............................................................................................128 
3.4 Research Methods ......................................................................................................131 
3.4.1 Data collection methods .....................................................................................132 
3.4.2 About semi structured interviews .......................................................................136 
3.4.3 Sampling strategy ...............................................................................................140 
3.4.4 Management process to gather the data ............................................................144 
3.4.5 Data analysis .....................................................................................................146 
3.5 Foreseen Practical Problems from Chosen Methodology ..........................................151 
3.6 Ethical Considerations ...............................................................................................153 
Chapter 4. Discussion of Results ...............................................................................................156 
4.1 Dyadic Risks Affecting Suppliers ..............................................................................156 
4.1.1 Issues of control .................................................................................................156 
4.1.2 Alignment on objectives .....................................................................................158 
4.1.3 Information sharing ...........................................................................................159 
4.1.4 Level of focus and dedicated capabilities ..........................................................160 
4.1.5 Capability of sales teams and quality of execution ............................................162 
4.1.6 Cases tolerating dyadic risks .............................................................................164 
4.2 Dyadic Risks Affecting Distributors ..........................................................................167 
4.2.1 Legal protection .................................................................................................169 
4.2.2 Market know-how and threat of substitute .........................................................171 
4.2.3 Scale and risk absorption ...................................................................................173 
4.2.4 Unpredictability of suppliers .............................................................................175 
4.3 Dyadic Risks Mitigation (Supplier): Agency Theory Proposition .............................180 
4.3.1 Basic control systems .........................................................................................180 
4.3.2 Advanced control systems ..................................................................................185 
4.4 Dyadic Risks Mitigation (Supplier): Transaction Cost Economics Theory 
Propositions-Partial Integrated Models ..................................................................................195 
4.4.1 Partially integrated model: similarities with a full outsource model ................195 
4.4.2 Integration of key account managers .................................................................198 
4.4.3 Integrated planning ............................................................................................199 
4.4.4 Information system integration ..........................................................................201 
4.4.5 Capability development ......................................................................................202 
4.4.6 Dedicated capabilities and focus .......................................................................203 
4.4.7 Governance structure of partially integrated models ........................................203 
4.5 Dyadic Risks Mitigation (Supplier): Transaction Cost Economics Theory Proposition-
Vertical Integrated Models ....................................................................................................207 
4.5.1 Vertical integrated models: similarities with partially integrated models.........207 
4.5.2 Governance structure of vertically integrated models .......................................213 
4.5.3 Critical themes that emerged from interviews ...................................................215 
4.6 Dyadic Risks Mitigation (Supplier and Distributor): Relational Approach-Trust .....221 
4.6.1 Cases where trust contributed to the evolution of the relationship ....................222 
4.6.2 Cases where trust led to the reassessment of the relationship ...........................231 
4.6.3 Cases where the lack of trust led to relationship failure. ..................................233 
4.6.4 Cases where trust had a neutral effect on the relationship. ...............................234 
4.6.5 Relational approach versus the transactional approach ...................................235 
4.7 Dyadic Risks Mitigation: Distributors .......................................................................239 
4.7.1 Dyadic risk mitigation distributors: Specialisation strategies ...........................240 
4.7.2 Dyadic risk mitigation distributors: diversification strategies ..........................248 
Chapter 5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................262 
5.1 Summary of Research Findings .................................................................................262 
5.1.1 Notion of dyadic risks in the Middle East ..........................................................262 
ix 
 
5.1.2 Dyadic risk mitigation strategies in the Middle East .........................................264 
5.1.3 Role of trust ........................................................................................................267 
5.2 Research Gaps and Findings ......................................................................................268 
5.2.1 Dyadic risks and supply chain ...........................................................................268 
5.2.2 Dyadic risk mitigation strategies: the mix prevails ...........................................269 
5.3 Research Contribution................................................................................................275 
5.3.1 Contribution of the research to theory ...............................................................275 
5.3.2 Contribution of the research to practice ............................................................279 
5.3.3 Focus on partially integrated models ................................................................291 
5.4 Research Generalisability ..........................................................................................295 
5.5 Research Limitations and Future Research ................................................................295 
References ..................................................................................................................................300 
Appendices .................................................................................................................................340 
 
 
 
x 
 
List of Tables 
Table No. Description Page 
Table 1.1 GDP per-Capita Evolution 3 
Table 1.2 Net Sales of Global Top 25 FMCG Suppliers 5 
Table 1.3 Net Sales of Global Top 25 Retailers 8 
Table 2.1 Industry Sectors  20 
Table 2.2 
Transaction Cost Economics in Contemporary Supply Chain 
Literature  
30-31 
Table 2.3 Investment Characteristics  58 
Table 2.4 Critiques of the Transactional Approach 65 
Table 2.5 Relational Norms 68 
Table 2.6 Opportunities of Outsourcing 85 
Table 2.7 Division of Marketing Responsibilities  86 
Table 2.8 Literature Review- Supply Chain Issues, TCE, and Trust 91-92 
Table 2.9 Dyadic Members 94 
Table 2.10 Research Propositions and Theory 96 
Table 2.11 Summary of Gaps, Research Questions and Propositions 97 
Table 3.1 Details about Dyadic Cases Explored 127 
Table 3.2 Case Study Tactics 129 
Table 3.3 Research Guideline Development 139 
Table 3.4 Key Informants Profile 143 
Table 3.5 Time Table of Interviews 146 
Table 3.6 Example of Data Display Table 150 
Table 4.1 Cases Highly Affected by Dyadic Risks 168 
Table 4.2 Foreign Experts Interviewed 172 
Table 4.3 Similarities and Differences - Cost Plus Contracting 186 
Table 4.4 Partial Integrated Models versus Vertical Integrated Models 207 
Table 4.5 Relationship Evolution Cases 230 
Table 4.6 Relationship Restoration Cases 233 
Table 4.7 Trust Development - Recurrent Themes 235 
Table 4.8 Trust Development Cases 236 
Table 4.9 Diversification Strategies and Relationship Evolution 251 
Table 5.1 Review of Research Questions 262 
Table 5.2 Dominant Dyadic Risk Mitigation Strategies 264 
Table 5.3 Partial Integrated Model - Similarities Between Cases 265 
Table 5.4 Research Contribution in Practice 279 
Table 5.5 Typical SWOT by Cluster of Cases 283 
Table 5.6 
Tool Kit - Dyadic Risk Identification Grid on Excel 
(Suppliers) 
288 
Table 5.7 
Tool Kit - Dyadic Risk Identification Grid on Excel 
(Distributors) 
288 
 
xi 
 
List of Figures 
Figure No. Description Page 
Figure 1.1 Contributors to World GDP by 2020  1 
Figure 1.2 GDP Growth Forecast 2020 2 
Figure 1.3 Oil Reserve Forecast 2020 2 
Figure 1.4 Population Growth: Middle East versus World and Europe 3 
Figure 1.5 GDP per-Capita Comparison (2011 Level) 4 
Figure 1.6 
Foreign Direct Investment Middle East - Arab Uprising 
Period 
4 
Figure 1.7 Sales Growth Fast Moving Consumer Goods Players India 6 
Figure 1.8 Consuming Class by 2025 7 
Figure 1.9 Consumer Spending Evolution 7 
Figure 1.10 
Sales Growth and Profitability by Region/Country Top 
Retailers 
9 
Figure 1.11 Hypermarket/Supermarket Growth Forecasts Gulf  9 
Figure 1.12 Hypermarket/Supermarket Growth Forecasts by Country  10 
Figure 1.13 Concentration of Food Retailers  10 
Figure 1.14 Share of Food Retail Sales 11 
Figure 1.15 
Fast Moving Consumer Goods  Food Retailers opportunity 
over the next 5 years 
11 
Figure 1.16 Typical Fast Moving Consumer Goods supply chain 12 
Figure 1.17 
Dyadic Relationship Fast Moving Consumer Goods  
Suppliers and Distributors in Middle East 
14 
Figure 2.1 Outsourced Services’ Share in UK Output, 2009  18 
Figure 2.2 Focal Company and Its Supply Base  23 
Figure 2.3 Impact of Supply Base Complexity on Focal Company 24 
Figure 2.4 Representation of Agency Theory Scope 35 
Figure 2.5 Informational Feedback in the Job Market 39 
Figure 2.6 Summary of Agency Theory 47 
Figure 2.7 Economics of Institutions  48 
Figure 2.8 Summary of Transaction Cost Economics Theory 60 
Figure 2.9 Organisational Routines as Generative Systems  78 
Figure 2.10 A Synthesis of Different Elements of Dynamic Strategy 80 
Figure 2.11 Framing Dyadic Risks 83 
Figure 3.1 Elements of a Research Process  98 
Figure 3.2 
Factors Influencing the Epistemological Stance of the 
Researcher 
104 
Figure 3.3 The Context - Modern Trade Channel Share 105 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
Figure No. Description Page 
Figure 3.4 Retail Evolution Trend - Simulation 107 
Figure 3.5 Basic Types of Designs for Case Studies  123 
Figure 3.6 Context of the Research 126 
Figure 3.7 Fifteen Dyadic Cases Explored 126 
Figure 3.8 Generalisation of Findings 131 
Figure 3.9 Allocation of Key Informants by Position  143 
Figure 3.10 Analytical Road Map 144 
Figure 3.11 Data Analysis Process  147 
Figure 4.1 Dimensions of Agency Theory in Dynamic Contexts 191 
Figure 4.2 Dynamic Nature of Trust Development 237 
Figure 4.3 DRM Strategies Middle East-Dyadic Network 256 
Figure 5.1 My DRM strategy versus My Competitor’s 281 
Figure 5.2 Dyadic Risk Mapping Matrix - Supplier UAE 289 
 
xiii 
 
List of Acronyms 
 
ACS: Advanced Control System 
AT: Agency Theory 
BCS: Basic Control System 
BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India, and China 
CPG: Consumer Packaged Goods 
CS: Control System 
DRM: Dyadic Risk Mitigation  
ERP: Enterprise Resource Planning 
ET: Evolutionary Theory 
EY: Ernst and Young 
FMCG: Fast Moving Consumer Goods 
FOM: Full Outsource Model 
KSA: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
MENA: Middle East and North Africa 
NME: Near and Middle East 
P&G: Procter and Gamble 
PIM: Partial Integrated Model 
ROI: Return on Investment 
S&OP: Sales and Operation Planning 
TCE: Transaction Cost Economics 
UAE: United Arab Emirates 
VIM: Vertical Integrated Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Although some countries like Syria and Iraq are among the most unsafe in the world, 
the Middle East region is viewed as an emergent economy with high growth potential. 
Growth opportunities in the Middle East are driven by positive socio economic 
indicators that encourage researchers and practitioners to explore the various issues that 
may block firms from capturing this potential. Before focusing on the issue that this 
research intends to explore, an economic and an industry outlook are presented in 
Section 1.1 to frame the context of the thesis. Section 1.2 presents the research 
framework, which covers the purpose, the theoretical approach and the contribution of 
the research.  Section 1.3 concludes chapter 1 by outlining the research map.  
 
1.1 Thesis Context 
Emerging markets like the Middle East and Africa are of increasing interest to many 
multinational firms wishing to expand their operations into developing economies. 
Positive demographic factors and optimistic economic projections are driving these 
firms to consider accessing certain emerging markets including the Middle East and 
Africa. Figure 1.1 (Frost and Sullivan, 2011) shows that the MENA (Middle East and 
North Africa) region and Asia will make a greater contribution to World GDP by the 
year 2020.  
 
 
 
This contribution is justified by aggressive GDP growth forecasts in most of the Middle 
Eastern countries, as illustrated in Figure 1.2 (Frost and Sullivan, 2011).   
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Figure 1.3 shows that 83% of global oil reserves are expected to be controlled by the 
MENA region. Oil prices are expected to rise as the demand for global energy in 
emerging economies like India and China is expected to grow by 36% from 2011 to 
2030  (BP, 2013). As a result, the economies that control the global oil reserves are 
expected to prosper.  
 
 
 
The favourable economic trend is supported by encouraging demographic trends. 
Compared to 1990, the population in the Middle East is expected to double by 2030, 
while the population in Europe is expected to decline, as presented in Figure 1.4 (United 
Nation Population Division Report, 2011). 
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Population growth in the Middle East is a major opportunity, especially for mass 
consumption industries like the FMCG. The population is also expected to be richer, 
which makes the demographic opportunity even more attractive. The GDP per capita for 
key countries in the Middle East is expected to accelerate by 2020, as illustrated in 
Table 1.1 (World Bank, 2012).  
 
 
 
Figure 1.5 (World Bank, 2012) shows that Qatar, UAE, and Kuwait have the highest per 
capita income compared to developed global economies. 
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This optimistic outlook has driven global investors to seek investment opportunities in 
the Middle East. Even in the midst of the Arab uprising in 2011, Middle Eastern 
markets remained highly attractive for foreign direct investments (Ernst and Young, 
2012), as illustrated in Figure 1.6 (Ernst and Young, 2012).  
 
 
 
Foreign direct investments in the FMCG sector represent 17.3% of the total number of 
projects and 41.4% in terms of value (Ernst and Young, 2012). Compared to 2003, a 
total of 1,098 projects in the retail and consumer product sectors have been introduced. 
The FMCG industry has positively reacted to these trends, which also confirms the 
appeal of such an environment. To further understand how the FMCG industry is 
affected by these trends, the following section focuses on the FMCG industry, its major 
global players, the key challenges faced, and the areas of concern of this research.  
 
1.1.1 About the fast moving consumer goods industry 
The Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG), also called Consumer Package Goods 
(CPG), industry is involved in the manufacturing of low priced products that are used 
with a limited number of consumption occasions (Baron et al., 1991). According to 
Euromonitor, the industry is also concerned with the distribution and marketing of food 
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and non-food FMCG products. FMCG food (consumable) categories are segmented into 
the following subcategories: baby food, canned food, chilled processed food, 
confectionery, dairy, dried and frozen processed food, meal replacement, noodles, pasta, 
ready meals and sauces, soups and beverages. Common non-food categories include 
pharmaceutical products, consumer electronics products, household, detergents, and 
soap and tobacco products. 
 
1.1.2 Fast moving consumer goods suppliers    
From the supply side, the industry is dominated by large multinational companies, 
illustrated in Table 1.2 (OS&C, 2013). These suppliers represent 80% of the total 
FMCG business with a combined net sale of US$ 857,626 billion according to OC&C 
(2013).  
 
 
 
The global position of each of the above 25 multinational suppliers makes them leaders 
in the categories they are participating in. The latest Merger and Acquisition trends in 
the FMCG industry shows that to strengthen their global category dominance, FMCG 
suppliers are seeking to acquire brands that fit within their total portfolio: Mondelez 
(previously Kraft) acquired Cadbury to strengthen its position in the confectionary 
category. Kellogg’s acquired Pringles from P&G to gain share in the snacking category, 
and P&G acquired Gillette to strengthen its position in the beauty and grooming 
category.  
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The global performance of FMCG suppliers shows a slowdown in their growth. 
According to research conducted by OC&C Strategy Consultants and The Grocer, the 
world’s growth of the top 50 FMCG suppliers decreased from 5.6 % in 2012 to 2.9% in 
2013, mainly due to slower growth rates in BRIC markets, which are witnessing rising 
trends of local FMCG players. Multinational FMCG players are thus losing share to 
local FMCG players. A report by Booz & co (2010) shows how large Indian FMCG 
players (see Figure 1.7) are growing at faster rates (dotted red line) than multinational 
ones.    
 
 
 
The deceleration in their growth did not have major implications for the profitability of 
multinational FMCG players. Gross margins grew by 0.7% in 2013 compared with 
0.1% in 2012 and EBIT margins are up by 0.9% (OC&C, 2013). The challenge of 
FMCG suppliers in BRIC and other emerging economies is offset by positive socio 
demographic trends, as presented earlier. One billion additional middle class consumers 
are expected to be added to BRIC economies by 2025 (McKinsey, 2013). Figure 1.8 
(Mckinsey, 2013) shows that consumption in emerging markets is expected to account 
for 47% (US$ 30 trillion) of global consumption by 2025 compared to 31% (US$ 12 
trillion) in 2010. 
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In line with the above, a study by A.T. Kearney (2012) shows that the share of 
consumer spending on FMCG products in emerging markets is expected to grow from 
17% in 2010 to 26% in 2020. Five countries in the Middle East (KSA, Qatar, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, and UAE) were included in the examined panel (see Figure 1.9, green bars).  
 
 
 
Consumer spending in the Gulf food retail sector is expected to reach US$ 106 billion in 
the next five years, with food accounting for 28% of the total spending, with KSA and 
UAE combined accounting for 75% of the total food market growth (Alpen Capital, 
2011). Whether suppliers or distributors, FMCG companies are not only facing an 
optimistic socio-economic environment, but also a dynamic channel environment at the 
same time. 
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1.1.3 Fast moving consumer goods retailers 
Faced with these positive indicators, multinational FMCG suppliers are facing the on-
going challenge of global retail power. The top 25 global FMCG retailers are nearly 2.5 
times bigger than the top 25 global FMCG suppliers as see in Table 1.3 (Deloitte, 
2014).  
 
 
 
 
The UK FMCG retail market is considered to be among the most concentrated in the 
world (Kuipers, 1999).  A major threat for FMCG suppliers is the retailers’ private label 
lines, which account for 23% of total retail sales in France and 44% in the UK (Battezati 
and Magnani, 2000). Although private label products may erode retailers' profitability, 
research shows that the use of retail brands to increase consumer loyalty may increase 
profits for retailers as consumers tend to shift from branded products to private label 
products (Ailawadi, 2001). This puts more pressure on the shelf space occupied by 
FMCG suppliers as retailers tend to allocate more space for their own products. Private 
labels are also priced lower, which negatively affects the margins achieved by FMCG 
suppliers, forcing them to invest more in promotions in order to reduce the price gap.   
 
In the Middle East, the situation is different as the evolution in retail is not very similar 
to the evolution in Europe. Private labels in the Middle East only account for 5% of 
total retail sales (Booze & co, 2011). However, retailers in the Middle East are gaining 
market share from the positive economic outlook, as well as the accelerating growth 
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trends. Figure 1.10 (Deloitte, 2014) shows that the growth rates of the top retailers in the 
Middle East are the highest in the world (red dotted line).  
 
 
 
 
The FMCG retail sector in the Middle East is composed of a mature modern trade 
channel that includes hypermarket and supermarket stores, and a fragmented traditional 
trade channel that groups grocery and wholesale retailers. Modern trade retailers, 
whether international or local hypermarket and supermarket chains, account for more 
than 50% of total consumption in the Gulf region, reaching approximately 70% in UAE 
(A.T. Kearney, 2013).  These retailers are growing in the Gulf at an average of 10% 
year on year, as illustrated in Figure 1.11 (Alpen Capital, 2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.12 (Alpen Capital, 2011) shows that the hypermarket and supermarket chains 
in KSA are predicted to grow by 13.2% between 2011 and 2016, which is above their 
average growth of 10.5% in the Gulf.  
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With the rise in hypermarket and supermarket formats in the Gulf, the modern trade 
channel is expected to become more concentrated, thus increasing competition among 
retailers and reducing prices to attract more shoppers. Although the modern trade 
structure is not as concentrated as it is in countries like the United Kingdom and France, 
the combined market share of the top three retailers’ amounts to 24% in UAE, and to 
12% in KSA, growing at accelerated rates as presented in Figure 1.13 (A.T. Kearney, 
2013).  
 
 
 
1.1.4 Typical fast moving consumer goods supply chain in Middle East 
These indicators have positive implications for FMCG suppliers.  The share of food 
sales from the overall retail sales in the Gulf countries is expected to increase from 47% 
in 2011 to 49.5% in 2016, as illustrated in Figure 1.14 (Alpen Capital, 2011), mainly 
driven by value-added food products, which are expected to outperform other food 
categories.  
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Over the next five years, the opportunity for food retailers is anticipated to surpass US$ 
23 billion, with a growing contribution from several Gulf countries, as shown in Figure 
1.15 (A.T. Kearney, 2013).  
 
 
 
The context of FMCG supply chains in the Middle East can be summarised as follows: 
they are facing favourable socio demographic trends (opportunity on the demand side of 
the chain) and an evolution of their retail environment (opportunity or challenge on the 
downstream side of the chain). A typical FMCG supply chain is composed of three 
interlinked rings, as illustrated in Figure 1.16 (Battezati & Magnani, 2000). 
1. The operations: include the external players operating in the ring, the suppliers and 
other third parties.  
2. The design functions: focus on the adjustment of to the variability of market 
demand. 
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3. The market components: include the distributive channel up to the final consumer.  
 
 
 
 
The difference between FMCG supply chains in Europe and the Middle East is not in 
the structure of the chain, but in the physical location of the upstream activities (mainly 
production) and in the role of the downstream activities (mainly distributors).  
 
 Physical location of production activities: Multinational FMCG suppliers in 
Europe have established numerous production sites in their main European 
markets. Although many FMCG suppliers in the Middle East (Mondelez, Mars, 
Nestle, P&G) have established factories in key Middle Eastern markets (KSA, 
UAE, Egypt), the reliance on international sourcing is still hindering these 
companies from fully optimizing their supply chains from the sourcing destination 
through to the local markets. It also makes them less flexible in adapting their 
products (design sphere) to consumer needs. With the increasing growth 
contribution of Middle Eastern markets, suppliers need to seek different sourcing 
alternatives to secure capacity and enhance their competitiveness across their 
upstream supply chain activities. Failure to do so may put these suppliers at a 
competitive disadvantage on the production front.  
 
 Role of the distributor: There is a major difference between Europe and the 
Middle East when it comes to the role of the distributor in the supply chain. A 
distributor in Europe can distribute two brands that are competitive in the same 
market. For instance, Intamarque in the UK distributes the brands of both P&G and 
Unilever. The role of a distributor in the UK is closer to a traditional wholesaler. 
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As a result, an FMCG supplier may deal with a wide number of distributors but the 
sales function is directly managed by the supplier. In the Middle East, distributors 
handle the logistics and the sales activities; they are protected by law and act as the 
exclusive agents of multinational suppliers in the market. A distributor in the 
Middle East thus plays the role of a buyer (buying or importing FMCG products), 
the role of a seller (selling to the different channels), as well as the role of a 
logistics provider (storing and delivering the products). Distributors in the Middle 
East are active supply chain partners. FMCG suppliers in the Middle East usually 
deal with one distributor in each country. Exceptions of suppliers dealing with 
more than one distributor may exist, however. The FMCG distributor in the Middle 
East has a strategic role in the effective execution of the downstream supply chain 
activities.  With the continuous evolution in trade and the growth potential of 
Middle Eastern markets, the way the relationship between suppliers and 
distributors was organised in the past may not be sustainable in the present or the 
future. The high dependency of suppliers on distributors may deter them from 
capturing the existing and future growth opportunities of emerging markets like the 
Middle East.  
 
 
1.2 Research Framework 
 
1.2.1 Purpose of the research 
Within the dynamic and growing environment presented above, the FMCG supply chain 
in the Middle East is affected by upstream challenges associated with the high 
dependency on international sourcing as well as downstream challenges associated with 
the high dependency of FMCG suppliers on distributors. The research is strictly 
concerned with the challenges across the downstream supply chain activities (see figure 
1.17), and more specifically aims at exploring the risks associated with the bilateral 
dependency of FMCG suppliers on distributors. The research refers to these risks as 
dyadic risks, as they concern two dyadic members of the chain (supplier and 
distributor). The research thus aims to explore how FMCG suppliers and distributors in 
the Middle East perceive the dyadic risks affecting their relationships and the strategies 
that could be adopted to mitigate them. The research focuses on the dyadic relationship 
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between two channel members, suppliers and distributors, highlighted in blue in Figure 
1.17. 
 
The questions addressed by the research are presented below: 
 
 How do FMCG suppliers and distributors in the Middle East perceive the dyadic 
risks affecting their relationships?  
 How are FMCG suppliers in the Middle East mitigating dyadic risks?  
 What role does trust play in dyadic relationships in the Middle East?  
 How are FMCG distributors in the Middle East mitigating dyadic risks? 
 
 
 
1.2.2 Culture and cultural significance 
Multinational FMCG suppliers like P&G, Nestle, Kraft, and many others started 
operating in the Middle East by exporting their products to local distributors. 
Distributors are often family businesses (Dunn, 1979) that have the financial means to 
import from international markets and distribute to local markets. Distributors who were 
the first to partner with multinational FMCG suppliers had major advantages over 
others: 1) they positioned themselves as exclusive representatives of FMCG suppliers in 
the market and 2) they were supported by local agency laws that obliged multinational 
companies (suppliers) to be represented in local markets by local firms (distributors). 
Such laws (Homsy, 1983) obliged suppliers to use distributors to access the Gulf 
markets of the Middle East, thus giving local distributors legitimate power to sustain 
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their exclusivity. Most multinational suppliers thus appointed local distributors in each 
of the markets of the Middle East. Suppliers with segmented portfolios even appointed 
more than one distributor.  
 
Most of today’s supplier distributor relationships were formed more than 40 years ago. 
The growth of their businesses in the Middle East and the growing importance of certain 
areas like KSA, Iraq, and the UAE drove FMCG suppliers closer to local markets. At 
this stage, cultural clashes started to occur between multinational suppliers who 
consider information sharing as normal behaviour in an exclusive supplier distributor 
relationship, and local distributors, who believe that information sharing might be a 
threat to their existence. Whilst some distributors embraced such legal protection and 
continued to feel threatened when asked for additional information, others directed their 
resources towards understanding their suppliers’ culture. By embracing a culture that is 
based on openness and information sharing, these distributors did not take their legal 
protection for granted and pursued firmer safeguards. Cases portraying these types of 
relationships show that distributors who succeeded in developing trust were able to 
build relationships with suppliers that still exist today. The research also shows that the 
failure to develop trust puts the relationship between supplier and distributors at risk. A 
transfer of culture has been identified through the exchange of know-how between 
suppliers and distributors.  
 
1.2.3 Research approach 
To address the research questions, several propositions were developed based on the 
transaction cost economics (TCE) and agency theories (AT). These theories were 
selected for their ability to explain the risks that affect firms when they decide to enter 
into contractual relationships. TCE focuses on the alteration of a firm’s governance 
structure as a means to mitigate dyadic risks, and is further explored in Chapter 2. The 
agency theory explores the different formal controlling mechanisms that suppliers can 
adopt to control the opportunistic behaviour of their distributors (agents).  The role of 
trust is explored not only to respond to gaps in the literature, but also for its importance 
in a social context like the Middle East.  
 
Fifteen multiple dyadic cases which focus on the fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) 
industry have been selected in three representative markets in the Middle East: Iraq, 
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KSA, and UAE. These markets differ following the evolution in the trade: Iraq is a 
traditional trade market, UAE is a modern trade market, and KSA is a mixed channel 
market. Data was collected by conducting semi structured interviews with 30 key 
informants from multinational FMCG suppliers and distributors, and then transcribed 
and analysed using NVivo software. 
 
1.2.4 Research contribution 
From an academic perspective, there is a scarcity of relevant work conducted in the 
Middle East. This research shows that TCE and agency theories provide adequate 
theoretical avenues to understand dyadic risks and to frame various risk mitigation 
strategies. The research also demonstrates the role of trust, which can complement the 
transactional approach in some cases. 
 
From a practical perspective, there is a need for suppliers in UAE and KSA to reassess 
their relationships with distributors when such relationships deter them from achieving 
their growth ambitions. To help suppliers and distributors mitigate dyadic risks, the 
research proposes a transformation road map that includes the tools and the guidelines 
that managers can use in practice to assess their dyadic risks and map their dyadic risk 
mitigation strategies.  
 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
 
The literature review chapter (Chapter 2) starts by presenting the relevant literature 
chosen for the research. Emphasis is given to outsourcing risks, the agency theory, the 
transaction cost economics theory, and the applicability of AT and TCE theories. The 
focus then turns to the relational and the evolutionary approaches as a complement to 
the transactional approach. The gaps in the literature are then presented and the chapter 
concludes with the propositions raised by the research.   
 
The methodology used to explore the propositions is discussed in Chapter 3, which is 
structured into four sections and starts by giving a brief overview on the research 
philosophy, followed by an emphasis on the reasons behind the epistemological stance 
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adopted by the research. The research methodology and the methods used to collect and 
analyse data are then respectively discussed.  
 
The findings are presented in Chapter 4, which discusses the evidence gathered from the 
field in relation to the literature review. Each proposition is individually examined, 
starting with the propositions that explore the risks affecting suppliers and distributors, 
followed by emphasis on the dyadic risk mitigation strategies adopted by suppliers, and 
distributors. 
 
Chapter 5 concludes by presenting a summary of the research findings. The academic 
and practical contributions of the thesis are then discussed. The chapter concludes with 
the generalisability of the research and the limitations of the thesis and the opportunities 
for further research. 
 
Material used in the research that can help the reader understand specific topics are 
presented in the appendix.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
This chapter covers the literature selected to address the research questions. The chapter 
starts with an overview of dyadic risks (Section 2.1), and then focuses on the relevant 
literature selected to understand the risk mitigation strategies. Emphasis is placed on the 
agency theory (Section 2.2) and the transaction cost economics theory (Section 2.3). 
Examples of the applicability of both the AT and TCE theories are then considered 
(Section 2.4). The theories have been criticised by relational and evolutionary theorists; 
the perspective of each is discussed in Sections 2.5 and 2.6 respectively. The chapter 
concludes with a focus on the literature review gaps (Section 2.7) and the propositions 
that the research intends to explore (Section 2.8).   
 
 
2.1 Overview of Dyadic Risks 
 
2.1.1 The notion of outsourcing risks   
The existing body of literature exploring supply chain risks is relatively mature 
(Johnson, 2001), mainly driven by the increase in globalisation and the increasing trend 
in outsourcing across the supply chain. Following a report published in 2011 by Oxford 
Economics for the Business Services Association, the turnover across the outsourced 
markets in the UK is estimated to be at £207 billion per annum, equivalent to some 8% 
of economy wide output. Figure 2.1 (Oxford Economics for the Business Services 
Association, 2011) shows that 28% of the outsourced activities take place in the 
manufacturing, the wholesale and the retail industries (highlighted in red).   
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In the Middle East, many international FMCG companies outsource the sales and 
distribution activities to local distributors. The volume of the business that goes through 
distributors in the Middle East is estimated at around US$43 billion (Booz & Co., 
2011). The local laws in the Middle East obliging foreign FMCG suppliers to appoint or 
partner with local distributors were originally formed to protect local companies from 
globalisation and to control the wealth generated by oil rich countries. As a result, the 
core sales and distribution activities (port clearance, logistics, sales and merchandizing) 
have been outsourced to well-established distributors.  
 
For suppliers, the outsourcing model might lead to benefits but can also engender many 
risks. Various definitions of risks are found in the literature, most of which agree that 
risk is associated with uncertainty and the probability that certain undesired events are 
likely to occur in the future. An undesired event is defined as a type of event, be it 
controllable or uncontrollable, that has a negative impact on performance. In 
epidemiology, risk is defined as the probability that a particular outcome will occur 
following a particular exposure (Last, 2001).  In operations management, risk is defined 
as the impact of unexpected events on business performance (Christopher and Lee, 
2004).  
 
As defined by Lindroth and Norrman (2001), supply chain risk management is 
collaborating with partners in a supply chain to apply risk management process tools to 
deal with risks and uncertainties that impact on logistics-related activities or resources. 
The collaboration between partners is not restricted to the management of logistical 
activities but can also incorporate other downstream activities such as sales and 
merchandizing. Given this definition, the unit analysed when discussing supply chain 
risks should focus on the relationship between sellers and buyers (dyadic forms of 
relationship or networks).  
 
Sellers and buyers view risks from two angles: the sources of risks and their 
consequences. Following a cross industry analysis presented in Table 2.1 (Christopher 
et al., 2003) that includes FMCG manufacturing companies (highlighted in red), 
Christopher et al. (2003) distinguish between the sources of the risk construct and its 
consequences. Sources of risk are defined as the environmental, organisational, or 
supply chain related variables which cannot be predicted with certainty, thus leading to 
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a possible negative impact on the supply chain outcome variables (Christopher et al., 
2003).  A risk consequence refers to the impact of the sources of risk on supply chain 
outcomes, such as the impact of fuel price volatility on transportation costs. 
 
According to Christopher et al. (2003), the sources of risk relevant to supply chains are 
organised into three categories: 
 Risks external to the supply chain: are uncontrollable and affect all members of the 
supply chain. Examples include political, natural, social, and industry/market risks.  
 Risks internal to the supply chain: can affect one member of the dyad more than the 
other.  Examples include labour strikes, cost inflation, machine failure.  
 Network related risks: mainly result from the interaction between organisations in 
the supply chain.  Examples include insufficient interaction, and lack of 
cooperation.  
 
The research explores network related risks associated with outsourcing the sales and 
distribution activities in the Middle East. Christopher and Lee (2001) differentiate 
between three types of network related risks: 
 Lack of ownership: resulting from distorting boundaries between buying and 
selling organisations. This is mainly driven by trends like outsourcing, and 
focuses on core competencies, the high dependency on manufacturing, 
distribution and logistics partners, which results in confused lines of 
responsibilities.  
 Chaos: resulting from over-reactions, unnecessary interventions, second-
guessing, mistrust, and distorted information.  
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 Inertia: lack of adaptation to environmental changes and market signals, which 
may deter organisations from reacting to competition and shifts in customer 
demands.  
 
Network risks have been given considerable attention in the literature with the 
increasing outsourcing trends and the need for companies to move to inter-firm 
cooperation to sustain their competitive advantage (Lindroth and Norrman, 2001).  
Failure to address these risks may lead to further vulnerability across the supply chain 
(Svensson, 2000). The understanding of dyadic risks requires a deeper elaboration of the 
notion of network risks, a dyad being a network composed of two members.  
 
2.1.2 Focus on dyadic/network risks  
Dyadic or Inter-organisational risks arise when two companies decide to enter into an 
on-going business relationship. Macneil (1974) identifies two types of economic 
exchange: transactional and relational. The transactional type is discrete in nature, and 
the concerned parties pay little attention to the impact of the transaction on future 
exchanges. Buying a chocolate bar from a grocery store during a holiday trip is an 
example. The relational type includes relationships that have a past and that are 
expected to have a future. The behaviour of the concerned parties affects the 
continuation of the exchange. This is why relational theorists have shown interest in the 
role of trust in organisational relationships. Trust can contribute to evolving the 
relationship and a lack of trust results in its discontinuation. The relationship between 
inter-organisational risks and trust has been underlined by many authors (Ring and Van 
de Ven, 1994; Zajac and Olsen, 1993; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995).  Das and Teng 
(2001) examine two types of inter-organisational risks in strategic alliances: relational 
risk and performance risks.    
 
Relational risk is defined as the probability of having unsatisfactory cooperation 
between the parties involved (Das and Teng, 1996). Relational risks arise because of the 
potential opportunistic behaviour of either one or both members of the relationship (Das 
and Teng, 1996). Firms seeking their personal interests are more focused on achieving 
their individual goals rather than achieving the relational goals. Misalignment on goals 
and a misappropriation of relational resources are important consequences of relational 
risks. This behaviour leads to a deviation from achieving common relational benefits 
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and an orientation towards achieving individualistic and private benefits (Khanna et al., 
1998).  
 
The opportunistic behaviour of distributors is mainly driven by their attempt to conceal 
information pertaining to their sales and distributions costs. Distributors consider that 
revealing outcomes pertaining to their performances or cost structures might lead to a 
loss of autonomy (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), which could 
potentially expose certain operational weaknesses (Abrahamson and Park, 1994). 
Divulging uncertain information might motivate the supplier to review the agreed 
trading terms, thus affecting the level of private benefits that could have been generated 
from those investments (Abrahamson and Park, 1994).  
 
Even when the relationship between a supplier and a distributor is satisfactory and 
somehow free from relational risks, the occurrence of performance risks is still 
probable. Performance risk is defined as the probability that alliance objectives are not 
achieved (Das and Teng, 1996). In an outsourcing relationship, the party who decides to 
outsource certain activities expects to achieve specific benefits. According to a 
comprehensive review conducted by Sanchís-Pedregosa et al. (2012), companies that 
decide to outsource the logistical services expect to achieve specific objectives:   
 Focus on primary activity. 
 Cost savings. 
 Improved flexibility. 
 Access to latest techniques and experience. 
 Improved customer service. 
 Improved return on assets. 
 Access to unknown markets. 
 Supply chain productivity.  
 Supply chain re-engineering. 
 Increased inventory turnover. 
 
According to Das and Teng (1996), performance risks occur if the objectives behind 
outsourcing are not met. If suppliers in the Middle East choose to outsource their sales 
and distribution operations to distributors to achieve cost optimisations or to transfer 
some risks and such objectives are not met, then performance risks are bound to occur. 
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This will lead suppliers to question and further scrutinise the objectives of their 
alliances with distributors.  
 
Dyadic risks fall into the category of network risks and they arise due to the bilateral 
dependency of two supply chain members.  A supply network is the network of 
companies that exist upstream of any one company in the value system (Porter, 1985). 
The structure of a supply chain network can be viewed as the pattern of relationships 
among firms engaged in creating a sellable product (Choi and Hong, 2002). A network 
as illustrated in Figure 2.2 (Choi and Krause, 2006) is composed of a focal company 
(supplier or buyer) and a supply base. A supplier base is the portion of the supply 
network actively managed by the focal company through contracts and purchasing of 
parts, materials, and services. The arrows illustrate the direction of influence, 
coordination and control, and the blue lines represent the relationships among suppliers, 
whether induced by the focal company or emerging autonomously (Choi and Krause, 
2006). 
 
 
Broader supply networks increase the level of complexity across the supply chain. 
According to Choi and Krause (2006), supply base complexity is a factor of the number 
of suppliers in the supply base, the level of supplier interaction, and the degree to which 
these suppliers vary in terms of organisational culture, size, location, technology, and so 
forth. The inter-relationship between the focal supplier (or buyer) and the various 
suppliers in the same network is viewed as a main source of supply chain risk. This risk 
is explained by the lack of coordination between the different members, the increasing 
number of interfaces to share information, and the misalignment on strategies and 
objectives. Supply networks are viewed as complex systems; and the degree of 
complexity varies with the increasing number of subsystems or with the level of 
differentiation of varied goals that compete in an organisation (Choi and Hong, 2002). 
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In two organisations of equal size, the one with the greater number of departments is 
viewed as more complex. If both organisations have the same number of departments, 
then the one with more varied goals locally is viewed as more complex (Choi and Hong, 
2002). The level of complexity also depends on the sturdiness of the linkage between 
organisations (supplier/supplier, supplier/buyer) belonging to the same network. Loose 
linkages, with high degrees of uncertainty, are viewed as more complex than sturdy 
ones with lower uncertainty levels (Choi and Hong, 2002). The way information is 
processed and managed determines the sturdiness of the linkage joining the various 
forms of relationships, whether dyadic, triadic, or other forms of relationships. 
Complexity thus refers to the applied load that requires coordination; the higher the 
differentiation and the loose coupling among the elements in the system, the higher the 
load required to coordinate the system (Choi and Hong, 2002).  
 
Supply base complexity depends on the number of suppliers in the supply base and the 
level of differentiation and inter-relationships among suppliers. When there are multiple 
suppliers involved, higher degrees of differentiation, and several inter-relationships 
among suppliers, the complexity of the supply base is deemed relatively high. Less 
differentiation, fewer inter-relationships, and/or fewer suppliers result in lower supply 
base complexity (Choi and Krause, 2006). The impact of supply base complexity on the 
focal company is conceptualised in Figure 2.3.  
 
 
 
Supply base complexity and transaction costs are positively associated with the total 
transaction costs incurred by the focal company as a result of interacting with the supply 
base (Choi and Krause, 2006). Broader networks increase transaction costs as 
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companies are obliged to incur higher costs to coordinate, control, and align with a 
greater number of suppliers.  
Structuring a supply network entails controlling various activities across the network, 
whether globally throughout the system or locally within a system (Choi and Hong, 
2002). Two types of control mechanisms are proposed to reduce the levels of 
complexities in supply networks: Formalisation and Centralisation.  
 
The research focuses on the dyadic risks affecting FMCG suppliers and their 
distributors. The network is composed of two dyadic members (a supplier and its 
downstream buyer: distributor) and is structured as follows: 
 Supplier: dyadic risks from the supplier perspective are referred to as buyer base 
complexity and are associated with the dependency of FMCG suppliers on their 
distributors.  
 Distributor: dyadic risks from the distributor perspective are referred to as supplier 
base complexity and are associated with the dependency of FMCG distributors on 
their suppliers. 
 
According to Choi and Krause (2006), the level of complexity in this type of network is 
assumed to be low as it is composed of two dyadic members, relative to other networks 
comprising a larger number of suppliers and distributors. The research challenges such 
an assumption as the loss of control in dyadic relationships may also have substantial 
consequences on the ability to optimise outcome and behaviour based performance. In a 
dynamic and growing context, the dependency of one dyadic member on the other 
might block the latter from improving its performance and adapting its capabilities to 
the needs of the market.  
 
2.1.3 The notion of control 
The deployment of a control mechanism to mitigate inter-organisational risks is a key 
factor that influences organisational structure. The organisational control issue is 
viewed as a lack of information flow between organisational members (Ouchi and 
Maguire, 1975). In this regard, Ouchi (1979) presents three different types of control 
mechanism: 
 Market control mechanism: involves perfect economies where prices are decided 
by the market. Minimal control is required as information is complete. Projects 
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that are contracted based on governmental tenders or outsourcing deals are 
examples of the market control mechanism.   
 Bureaucracy control mechanism: involves personal surveillance and direction 
from subordinates through a predefined set of rules. The bureaucratic 
mechanism requires administrative controlling resources, as the behavioural 
rules are expressed qualitatively. This mechanism is common to all forms of 
hierarchal structure where organisational layers are added to reduce information 
gaps.   
 Clan control mechanism: involves the creation of shared values and beliefs in 
order to build internal commitments congruent with the objectives of the 
organisation. A socialisation process that incorporates properties that are unique 
to the organisation is thus created. This process is referred to as a clan, where 
costly forms of auditing and surveillance can be avoided.  
 
The choice of control system is influenced by what is expected to be controlled by the 
organisation. A differentiation is found in the literature between the control of outcome 
based variables and the control of behavioural based variables.  
 
Outcome based variables are quantitative and can be controlled easily as the supplier 
can rely on measurable reference values, such as sales revenues, costs, and stock levels 
(Churchill et al., 1985). These variables give an indication of overall firm performance 
and may serve when monitoring alliance objectives. By controlling these variables, the 
supplier can track whether outsourcing objectives are met and can mitigate the 
associated risks accordingly.  
 
Distributors who sense that they are only controlled based on outcome based measures 
might concentrate their efforts solely on actions that maximise their outcome levels. 
This might lead to negative consequences such as overstocking situations, liquidations, 
and the failure of new product launches. Weitz (1981) and John and Weitz (1984) find 
that outcome based control systems are skewed towards the objectives of the 
salesperson, which does not always conform to the objectives of the firm.  
 
Outcome based variables focus on the objectives that need to be achieved (outcome) 
rather than the actions required to achieve (behaviour) such objectives. Behaviour 
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control might lead to better outcome, especially regarding the control of the sales and 
distribution activities.  
 
A behaviour based control system addresses the process of selling rather than simply the 
outcome (Anderson and Olivier, 1987). From a behavioural perspective, spending time 
and effort on setting the forecast and planning the sales drives the quantities expected to 
be sold.  The unit of measurement is not the dollar value but the sum of the inputs that 
positively influence the achievement of the dollar value. Sales process definition, job 
design, intrinsic motivation, and relationship developments are considered to be key 
advantages of behaviour based mechanisms (Eisenhardt, 1988; Ouchi, 1979; Weitz, 
1981; Anderson and Olivier, 1994). The following example given by Alchian and 
Demstez (1972: 4) illustrates the complexity derived from behaviour based control 
mechanisms in outputs that significantly depend on collective team work:  
 
“When lifting a cargo, how rapidly does a man move to the next piece, how many 
cigarette breaks does he take? (…) With team production it is difficult, solely by 
observing total output, to either define or determine each individual's contribution to 
this output” (Alchian and Demstez, 1972: 4). 
 
Questions addressed by behavioural based control systems include: how should tasks be 
evaluated, how long it takes for the task to be executed, what are the external variables 
that influence task performance, how effective is the execution of the task, how to 
measure effectiveness, and how to drive and measure customer satisfaction.  
 
Deploying a control system does not necessarily imply that the party to be controlled 
will comply entirely. For this reason, the literature emphasises the reaction of the dyadic 
member who is subject to the control system. Kelman (1958) presents this reaction 
based on three influence processes.  The compliance process occurs when an individual 
accepts influence in order to achieve a favourable reaction from another person in the 
group. Such behaviour is not based on belief or values, but on the expectation of gaining 
specific rewards and avoiding specific punishments. The satisfaction derived from 
compliance is due to the social effect of accepting influence. The second process 
examined by Kelman (1958) is the identification process which occurs when the dyadic 
member accepts influence because of a positive intention to establish or maintain a 
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satisfying self-defining relationship with the other dyadic member. The satisfaction 
derived from identification is due to the act of conforming. The third process presented 
by Kelman (1958) is internalisation, which occurs when an individual accepts influence 
because the content of the induced behaviour (the ideas and actions of which it is 
composed) is intrinsically rewarding. The induced behaviour is adopted because it is 
congruent with the organisational value system. The satisfaction derived from 
internalisation is due to the content of the new behaviour.  
 
The control of one channel member over the other across the supply chain can either 
take the form of tyranny, where one channel member insists on compliance from 
another, or the form of benevolent leadership, where the most powerful member 
manages the channel to enhance its overall performance (Stern, 1967).  
 
The choice of risk mitigation strategy is affected by what is expected to be controlled 
and by the reaction of the member who is expected to be controlled. If inter-
organisational risks are caused by the inability to control outcome based performance, 
then a system to control measurable objectives is sufficient.  However, if such risks are 
due to the inability to control behavioural based variables, then more advanced control 
systems are required. The theoretical avenues that are relevant to understand the risk 
mitigation strategies applicable to the issues raised by the research should conform to 
the following principles: 
 Core assumptions: the selected theories should acknowledge the existence of inter-
organisational risks and treat them as founding assumptions, and as natural 
phenomena that are bound to occur in any form of seller buyer relationships, 
strategic alliances, or outsourcing relationships.  
 Theoretical propositions: the theories have to provide clear direction on how inter-
organisational risks are mitigated. Mitigation strategies include controlling inter-
organisational risks by minimizing the probability of their occurrence (or 
elimination) by reviewing the structure of the relationship.  
 Contextual flexibility: the propositions raised by the theories have to be flexible 
depending on what is expected to be controlled. The fact that outcome based 
control systems might be sufficient in one context, but not so in another, 
emphasises the importance of the relationship between the environmental context 
and the strategy.  
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 Unit of analysis: the theories have to cover the dyadic relationship, looking at inter-
organisational risks from the angle of the supplier and the distributor. 
 
The agency and TCE theories were selected because they meet the theoretical criteria 
set for this research and are therefore used to explain the risks arising from loss of 
control situations in inter-organisational relationships. 
 
The assumptions of opportunism, bounded rationality, and uncertainty proposed by both 
theories are relevant to explain inter-organisational risks between FMCG suppliers and 
distributors in the Middle East. This has broadened the applicability of both theories in 
several domains in the literature. However, in a context where long term relationships 
are of strategic necessity, both theories lack the required relational dimensions.  
 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory examines the organisation of transaction 
whenever a good or a service is transferred across supply chain members. TCE 
considers the transaction as the basic unit of analysis; the theory is mainly concerned 
with the different governance structures that arise following different transaction 
attributes (Williamson, 1975; 1985).     TCE theory suggests the alteration of the 
governance structure by reducing or eliminating the number of intermediaries in the 
supply chain, while the AT focuses on resolving these problems through formal 
contracting. Both theories have been used, either independently or in conjunction with 
other theories, to explain the issues that arise between different members across the 
supply chain. Eisenhardt (1985; 1989) found that the agency theory and the 
organisational and institutional theories lead to the same results. Heide and John (1988) 
combine TCE with the dependency theory, while Gil and Hartmannn (2009) use TCE 
with the network analysis theory. Logan (2000) explains resource integration decisions 
by combining TCE with the resource based view approach.  
 
The contemporary literature that explores TCE and the AT show that authors who relied 
on both theories to explore supply chain issues focus their attention on the classical 
assumptions as originally defined by the theories. A summary of this literature is 
presented in Table 2.2.  
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The Authors Issues Methodology Activities Findings 
Middle 
East 
Countries
Evolution
Collaboration 
 and Trust
Outsource of 
Sales and 
Distribution 
Activities
Service companies
(Hospital, Insurance, Hotel)
and Family business groups
Supply chain
disruption
Supply Chain risk
 in small companies
Information System
SME partner
Complex dynamic
supply networks
Jacobs and Hall 
(2007)
Integration of port actors  
into global supply chains
Case study Dubai Port The theoretical contribution of this study lies in identifying the place specific and path 
dependent physical, institutional, and political factors that underlie the territorial 
embeddedness which enable or constrain the supply chain related strategies of port 
actors.
Yes No No No
The study highlights specific transaction, relationship and network drivers of 
information sharing in the export supply chain.
Trust is perceived to be part of the commitment relationship driver and the absence of 
formal contracts also seems to create possible opportunistic behavior in the examined 
agri-food ESC and, in turn, this drives information sharing.
Purchasing manager
(buyers direct material)
Indian manufacturing SME
Manufacturer
(Electronics sector)
Japanese
manufacturing firms
Table 2.2. Transaction Cost Economics in Contemporary Supply Chain Literature (1/2)

Contract coordination 
across supply chain
Ahmad and 
Daghfous, (2010) 
knowledge network In-depth interviews (13) Concept of KM is still not well received in the companies interviewed. It is viewed as a 
capital-intensive investment that requires more than just the availability of human capital 
and the requisite infrastructure. The companies do not show significant interest and 
focus on implementing new techniques or methods to create and generate new 
knowledge.
Yes No No No
Jraisat et 
al.(2013)
Case study Yes No Yes NoInformation sharing 
in export supply chain
Jordan
(producers and exporters)
NoTransaction specific risks 
exposure in supply chain
Dekker (2013) Survey The study provides empirical evidence on the use of management control practices in 
the context of SCM by Japanese manufacturing firms. The authors finds that  Japanese 
firms have the choice to collaborate with trusted supply chain partners and to use of 
multiple interrelated SCM practices to cope with transaction specific risks. 
No No Yes
Harland et 
al.(2003)
Case study Develop and test a supply network risk tool to increase the visibility of risk that actors in  
 a network are or might be potentially exposed to and to help in the assessment and 
management of that risk. The tool also helps in the provisioning of categorizations of 
types of risks and losses.
No No Yes No
Different tiers
topologies
Yes NoFaisal et al.(2006) Supply chain risk Modeling The authors find that the following enablers play a key role to counter risks in a supply 
chain: trust, collaborative relationships, information sharing and knowledge about risks. 
This classification provides a useful tool to supply chain managers and help them to 
focus on the enablers that are most important for effective risk minimization in a supply 
chain.
No No
Yes No
Ellis et al. (2010) Survey The study shows that both the probability and the magnitude of supply disruption are 
important to buyers’ overall perceptions of supply disruption risk. The authors also find 
that product and market situational factors impact perceptions of risk and decisions are 
based on assessments of overall risk.
No No No NoSupply chain  disruption
Ellegaard (2008) Case study Suppliers The study demonstrates that supply risk mitigation methods such as market intelligence, 
e-business, supplier development, contracting, holding reserves, and multi-sourcing are 
simply too resource and time consuming for the small company owner. Local sourcing, 
source loyalty, knowledge protection, and focus on fair, dependable, similar, and 
responsive suppliers formed the essence of these companies’ supply risk management 
approach.
No No
No No
Finch (2004) Case study Show that IS SMEs are affected by their alliance with large companies. By adopting 
strategies to mitigate these risks SMEs can improve the chance of long term survival.
No No Yes NoPartnering risks between 
large enterprises and SMEs
Craighead et 
al.(2007)
Case study Auto manufacturer Six propositions are derived explaining the severity of supply chain disruptions. The 
authors show how vulnerable a supply chain is to disruption risks, and what can be 
done to mitigate them.
No No
Hezarkhani and 
Kubiak (2010)
Modeling Highlight the key concepts, assumptions and methods to coordinate contracts in the 
supply chain.
No No No No
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The Authors Issues Methodology Activities Findings 
Middle 
East 
Countries
Evolution
Collaboration 
 and Trust
Outsource of 
Sales and 
Distribution 
Activities
Authors propose a model for upstream supply chain risk management linking risk 
identification, risk assessment and risk mitigation to risk performance.
The model also includes the effect of a continuous improvement process on 
identification, assessment, and mitigation.
Laeequddin et 
al.(2012)
Supply chain risk Review of different rust 
building models
Supply chain partners The research shows that trust and risk are interlinked and trust cannot be built as one-
dimensional phenomenon. Present an integrated conceptual model that suggests that, 
simple evaluation of supply chain member’s risks from characteristics, rationale and 
institutional control/ security perspectives and bringing them to within the bearable 
limits can lead to trust building.
No No Yes No
Lambert and 
Cooper (2000)
Issues in supply chain Case study 15 companies covering 9 
different supply chains
The authors show that the  successful integration and management of key business 
processes across members of the supply chain will determine the ultimate success of the 
single enterprise. Supply chain management involves the following interrelated elements:
- The supply chain network structure.
- The supply chain business processes.
-  The management components.
No No Yes No
Manufacturer:
(Nike and Dell, 
Nokia and Nortel
Ikea, Canon,IBM)
and Airline (Ryanair)
Survey: U.S
Sample 1: Buying firms (370) Manufacturing
Sample 2: Supplier firms (290) and Service industries 
Multinational
manufacturer
(agricultural equipment)
Contractor
Manufacturer: 
Ericsson
Table 2.2. Transaction Cost Economics in Contemporary Supply Chain Literature (2/2)

Supply chain risk issues
Supply and demand side 
risks
Nyaga et 
al.(2009)
Propose a model that highlights that buyers and suppliers have perspectives that are 
generally more similar than they are different when it comes to collaborative 
relationships. Results show that collaborative activities, such as information sharing, 
joint relationship effort, and dedicated investments lead to trust and commitment. Trust 
and commitment, in turn, lead to improved satisfaction and performance. 
No No Yes NoBenefits of collaborative 
relationships
Wever et 
al.(2012)
Modeling Develop different supply chain wide TCE models that show that when supply chain 
actors follow the recommendations from the traditional TCE model regarding the use of 
contracts, it may increase rather than decrease their exposure to transaction risks. A 
main difference of the new model is that it recognizes the interdependence between 
supply chain transactions unlike the traditional TCE model.
No No No NoThree different supply chain 
models
No NoLeavy (2004) Outsourcing risk Case study The authors find that outsourcing increases certain strategic risks such as losing skills 
key to compete for the future and the risk of making the outsourcing move at the least 
suitable time in an industry's evolution.
No Yes
Norrman and 
Jansson (2004)
Supply chain risk Case study This study stress on the “supply chain approach” in SCRM as a complement to more 
purchasing oriented studies, and to give a quite detailed description of how SCRM 
could work in practice. The study shows that risk management actions must be 
evaluated from a logistics perspective focusing on cost, time, quality, agility.
No No Yes No
No
Ritchie and 
Brindley (2007)
Supply chain risk Case study The paper develops a framework that explores the interaction between risk and 
performance in a supply chain context.The framework helps in integrating the 
dimensions of risk and performance in supply chains and provide a categorization of the 
risk drivers.
No No Yes No
The study provides insights on investment decision-making under uncertainty and risk 
in supply networks. Open information sharing, mutual dependence, and trust are 
important in helping to reduce uncertainty in investment decisions.
Ojalaa and 
Hallikas (2004)
Investment decision-
making risks in buyer-
dominating supplier 
networks
Case study No No YesElectronic and Metal 
sectors
NoKern et al.(2012) Mail survey Manufacturing No No No
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Ding et al. (2013) discuss how TCE characteristics (asset specificity, environmental 
uncertainty, and frequency) generate transaction risks that engender a need for control. 
The authors used the basic TCE assumption, as defined by Williamson (1985), to 
explore their hypotheses. Bourlakis and Melawar (2011) also referred to the traditional 
transaction cost paradigm to explore the factors that affect the outsourcing of the 
logistical functions. The authors relied on the classical transaction cost literature starting 
with the early work of Coase (1937) and extending to the developed work of 
Williamson (1975; 1985). Blome and Schoenherr (2011) also adopted the traditional 
TCE model to understand how companies manage supply chain risks in financial crisis 
situation.  
 
Another strand of contemporary literature focuses on extending the traditional TCE and 
agency theories. Wever et al. (2012) present different models that challenge the 
traditional TCE model regarding the use of contracts. The authors show that the solution 
presented by TCE may increase rather than decrease the exposure of supply chain 
members to risks and propose an extension to the traditional transactional approach. 
Other authors recommend the integration of the relational perspective to both the TCE 
and AT (Raised et al., 2012; Fayezi et al., 2012). 
 
Most of the contemporary studies presented in Table 2.2, used the classical assumptions 
defined by the originating authors of TCE and the AT to explore supply chain issues. 
These theories have been extensively used as traditional theoretical foundations in the 
field of distribution and logistics (Bourlakis and Bourlakis, 2005; Kamman and Van 
Nieulande, 2010). Table 2.2 also shows that there is a scarcity of research exploring the 
classical TCE and AT perspectives in the Middle East. There is also an opportunity to 
integrate both the evolutionary and the relational approaches to the classical 
transactional perspectives thus contributing to existing contemporary literature. 
 
Given these points of view, it is clear that the current research would not benefit from 
adopting the interpretations of contemporary studies to examine the risks affecting 
suppliers and distributors in the Middle East. Instead, the appropriation of the classical 
approach is germane to the establishment of a solid theoretical base for this research. 
The research refers to contemporary literature to propose the extension of the classical 
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transaction approach. To have a better understanding of the risk mitigation strategies in 
the Middle East, attention is paid to both the evolutionary and relational perspectives,  
 
The traditional literature associated with the agency and TCE theories is examined to 
understand the dyadic risks affecting suppliers and distributors in the Middle East. The 
exploration of the literature shows that the strategies proposed by both theories need to 
be complemented by other theoretical perspectives, given the role that trust may play in 
the Middle East and the dynamic nature of  the contexts where the research is taking 
place. 
 
The following section first examines the classical literature associated with the agency 
and TCE theories, and then explains why both theories have been chosen to understand 
the inter-organisational risks affecting suppliers and distributors in the Middle East. The 
exploration of the literature shows that the strategies proposed by both theories need to 
be complemented by other theoretical perspectives, given the role that trust may play in 
the Middle East and the dynamic nature of  the contexts where the research is taking 
place. 
 
 
2.2 Overview of Agency Theory 
Alchian and Demstez (1972), Ross (1973), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983) are considered to be the originating authors of the agency theory.  The 
key concepts examined by the agency theory are rooted in the theory of the firm. The 
rise of the firm, as noted by Coase (1937), is based on one member who is given the 
power of directing another member’s work, and the other member accepts this direction 
in return for specific guarantees. The result of the diverse specialisation of functions is 
the enterprise and wage system of the industry and its existence in the world is the direct 
result of uncertainty (Coase, 1937). Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm incorporates the 
key phenomena that gave birth to TCE and the agency theories. Some of these 
phenomena are internal to the firm, such as the conditional relationship between two 
entities whereby a fee is paid in return for the completion of a specific task, while others 
are external to the firm and are either related to the uncertain nature of the world, or to 
the uncertain nature of human beings. The agency theory is concerned with the problem 
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that arises under specific assumptions that are related to the opportunistic nature of 
human behaviour. 
 
Ross (1973), one of the originating authors of agency theory, considers the agency 
relationship to be one of the oldest in social interaction.   
 
“The relationship arises between two or more parties where one party, designated as 
the agent, acts for or on behalf of or as a representative for the other party, designated 
the supplier, in a particular domain of decision problems” (Ross, 1973: 134).  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) introduce the contractual dimension to the agency theory 
by defining the agency relationship as a contract under which the supplier engages the 
agent to perform specific services on his behalf. The contractual engagement includes 
delegating specific decision-making authority to the agent, who is bound to act in his 
own interest if both parties are utility maximizers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
above definition incorporates the key concepts based on which an agency problem 
arises and applies. Two dimensions that are core to the agency theory are inferred from 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) definition:  
 Contracting dimension: task and decision making delegation.   
 Behavioural dimension: utility maximisation and self-interest.  
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) focus their examination on the contracting, costing, and 
controlling dimensions. Agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and 
bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests.  
 
“Agency costs also include the value of output lost because the cost of the full 
enforcement of a contract exceeds its benefits” (Fama and Jensen, 1983: 304).   
 
Figure 2.4 below illustrates the relationship between a principal (P) (supplier in the 
research), and an agent (A) (Distributor in the research). The principal delegates or 
outsources a task, which is the produced outcome (T), to the agent in exchange for a fee 
(F). The fee (F) is the amount paid to the distributor in exchange for the task rendered to 
the principal (Ross, 1973). The task generally falls within the agent’s area of expertise 
(Ross, 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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Two types of information asymmetry are common to the agency relationship. The first 
type refers to the macro uncertainty that affects principals (suppliers) and agents 
(distributors), defined by Ross (1973) as the random state of nature. Examples include 
economic volatilities, insecurity situations, and competitive actions. The second type of 
information asymmetry is internal and relates to the opportunistic factors that result 
from the agent’s shirking behaviour (Alchian and Demstez, 1972). Only the principal is 
affected by this information asymmetry and thus incurs monitoring costs (C) to mitigate 
its impact. Examples of monitoring costs include investments in information systems 
and structures. The total cost incurred by the agent is a sum of the fee (F), which covers 
the cost of executing the service, and the cost (C), which covers the cost of controlling 
the execution of the service. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency cost as a 
sum of four types of costs:  
 Incentive costs: incurred to motivate the agent. The incentive theory of the firm 
focuses on the role of incentives in managing uncertainties (Berhold, 1971; 
Clark and Wilson, 1961). 
 Monitoring costs: designed to limit the agent’s shirking behaviour by imposing 
controlling norms, such as rules and regulations. Monitoring can also take the 
form of the exercise of power. Coercive enforcement entails the use of 
punishment, such as budget restrictions, and non-coercive enforcement entails 
the use of assistance and rewards. 
 Bonding costs: referred to as safeguard costs by the TCE theory (Williamson, 
1975; 1979; 1981), are designed to guarantee that the agent will not take actions 
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harmful to the principal and to ensure that the principal is compensated should 
such actions take place.  
 Residual costs: termed the costs of opportunism or opportunity costs, represent 
the reduction in the principal’s welfare due to a highly probable divergence 
between the agent’s decision and the decision that maximises the welfare of the 
principal.  
 
The assumption that suppliers and agents will maximise their utility functions is 
presented by the circling black arrows in Figure 2.4, where each member strives to fulfil 
his own benefit.  An example of the principal’s utility maximisation is when the 
supplier asks for additional tasks (T) for the same amount of fee (F) paid.  The agency 
theory assumes that suppliers are risk neutral as they are able to diversify the impact of 
uncertainties across several utility functions (Jensen and Mecking, 1976; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The agent can 
conceal some information pertaining to task implementation from the principal, and 
might also consider a number of optimisation actions by incurring fewer tasks or by 
investing less resources for the given fee (F), thus benefiting from the complexity that 
surrounds the control of behaviour to optimise his utility function. Agents are assumed 
to be risk averse as their risk diversification capability is limited (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  
 
Ross (1973) proposes that the supplier chooses a fee that maximises his expected utility 
taking into account the constraints raised by the agent and assuming that the latter will 
act in the supplier’s best interest. Although this is an ideal situation as it assumes that 
the supplier has full visibility over the behaviour of the agent, it contradicts the 
assumption of imperfect economies (Alchian and Demstez, 1972).  
 
To conclude, the agency theory is concerned with any relationship that involves the 
delegation of services between individuals or organisations. The entity who delegates 
(supplier) is assumed to be risk neutral and the entity that is expected to execute the 
service (agent) is assumed to be risk averse (Eisenhardt, 1985).  The agency fee paid 
includes the cost of the service, the cost of controlling the service, and the provision for 
residual losses that affect the supplier’s welfare.  The following section covers the 
details of each of the assumptions proposed by the agency theory.  
37 
 
2.2.1 Agency theory assumptions   
The agency theory aims at determining how information asymmetry influences the 
relationship between a supplier and an agent based on variations in the tasks assigned to 
the agent and the fee paid by the supplier. Agency costs integrate the cost of monitoring 
tasks and the opportunity costs resulting from the inability to monitor certain tasks. To 
better understand the agency theory, the research further examines the assumptions 
considered key in influencing optimal contracting in a supplier agent relationship. The 
agency theory is examined in a context of authority delegation where the task is 
delegated from a supplier to an agent in exchange for a specified fee. Such a context is 
subject to information asymmetry, which is representative of imperfect economies. The 
theory deals with the impact of this assumption on the supplier-agent relationship. An 
agency problem thus occurs when the welfare of the supplier is not maximised because 
the supplier and the agent tend to have different goals and divergent predispositions 
towards risk (Eisenhardt, 1989; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) 
 
The previous section covered the scope of the agency theory. Referring to Figure 2.5, 
the impact of information asymmetry is depicted in the black arrow (self-interest 
behaviour of P and A) and is mainly due to a lack of control over the fee (F) paid by the 
supplier for services expected in return for this fee. The following section covers the 
details of the information asymmetry assumption.  
 
Two types of information asymmetry are noted by the agency theory literature: moral 
hazard and adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970; Demiski and Feltham, 1978; Holmstrom, 
1979; Eisenhardt, 1988; 1989).  A moral hazard situation arises when either the supplier 
or the agent is motivated to take actions beyond those specified in the contract (Akerlof 
1970; Demiski and Feltham, 1978; Holmstrom, 1979). Adverse selection is the 
condition under which the supplier cannot ascertain if the agent accurately represents 
his ability to do the work for the rewarded fee (Akerlof, 1970). Information asymmetry 
through moral hazard occurs in the post contract phases, while adverse selection occurs 
in the pre-contract phase.  
 
An imperfect and incomplete economy is considered to be the source of information 
asymmetry (Alchian and Demstez, 1972) affecting all institutions operating in the same 
environment.  Institutional theorists relate information asymmetry to institutional 
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environmental factors that influence decisions pertaining to the separation of ownership 
(Alchian and Demstez, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1975).  The 
incentive to shirk, resulting from the limited information available before and after the 
contract, is a main consequence of moral hazard and adverse selection. This is 
applicable in labour and organisational contracting, accounting, insurance and any kind 
of delegation of decision making or separation of ownership (Holmstrom, 1979; 
Akerlof, 1970).  
 
Akerlof (1970) proposes that when the agent’s skills are not observable, the supplier 
might employ agents with lower skills who falsely claim to have the required skill level. 
The lack of information at the hiring stage is a common adverse selection issue that 
depends on the risk position of the supplier (neutral or averse), the wage/incentive that 
the supplier is willing to pay, the service required in return for this incentive, and the 
ability to acquire basic information with regard to the performance of the agent.  The act 
of hiring an agent is thus perceived as an investment under uncertainty. The supplier is 
not aware of the agent’s skills and capabilities and is consequently enduring a risky 
investment, where he is paying a fee (F) without having sufficient information regarding 
the agent’s capability/knowledge to execute the required task.  The hiring phase is 
emphasised to highlight the occurrence of the supplier agent problem before the parties 
enter into the relationship. Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) classify the information at the 
hiring stage into observable and non-observable information: 
 Observable information: or indices as referred to by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), 
constitutes personal information, references, and reputation that is available to the 
supplier and cannot be manipulated by the agent.  
 Unobservable information: termed signals by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), 
constitutes information observable solely by the agent that cannot be accessed by the 
supplier. Since the agent holds this information, he has the ability to manipulate it 
and alter it as needed.  
 
The model proposed by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) has significant implications for 
the understanding of the agency theory assumptions. Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) 
suggest that hiring is a learning process whereby, over time, the supplier gains 
information pertaining to the agent based on previous experience and actual 
productivity levels. Investment in education is an example; workers invest in education 
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as they expect a higher return for the information acquired.  Distribution companies 
invest in infrastructure and expect a higher fee to be earned in return. The agent is hired 
by the supplier based on indices within a context of uncertainty. Information is gained 
by the supplier based on the observation of the relationship between marginal product 
and signals. At this point, some of the uncertainty elements pertaining to the signals of 
the agent are uncovered. Is the agent making use of his education at work? Is the 
distributor fully utilising the assets of the agent based on market requirements? This 
step should also include an evaluation of the services of the agent. The probabilistic 
belief of the supplier is built based on acquiring part of the unobservable information. 
According to Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) this belief is adjusted in relation to the new 
entrants to the market with different skill levels that are uncovered based on the 
relationship between marginal product and signals at a given point in time (Figure 2.5). 
  
 
 
Skilled workers have the incentive to provide costly information, or information about 
signals that differentiates them from other skills in the market. However, this does not 
remove the probability of falsifying information. In the insurance industry, agents can 
mask some of the information they hold in order to achieve a better premium (Akerlof, 
1970; Holmstrom, 1979).  
 
Adverse selection and moral hazard issues are two forms of asymmetrical information. 
The agency problem caused by these issues has contractual implications pertaining to 
the control of behaviour and outcome. Both issues are considered as two faces of the 
same coin; adverse selection is caused by information asymmetry prior to the contract, 
whereas moral hazard is related to information asymmetry after the contract phase 
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(Eisenhardt, 1989).  The problem of information asymmetry negatively influences the 
supplier agent relationship and may also lead to market failure (Akerlof, 1970).   
 
A loss of control situation defined by information asymmetry is regarded as a factual 
risk affecting organisations.  The key questions that concern agency theorists are how to 
avoid market failure resulting from information asymmetry. 
 How can the impact of environmental uncertainty or a random state of nature be 
minimised? 
 How can shirking behaviour be avoided and absorbed, and can opportunism be 
limited? 
 What are the strategies provided by the agency theory to mitigate inter-
organisational risks?  
 
The next section presents the different alternatives proposed by the agency theory to 
mitigate inter-organisational risks.  
 
 
2.2.2 Risk mitigation: agency theory perspective 
Demski and Feltham (1978) examined two cases of information asymmetry: a partial 
case where it is too costly for the supplier (owner) to observe the efforts of the agent 
(worker), and a complete case where the supplier does not have full information about 
the behaviour of the agent. In either case, the agent takes the information asymmetry as 
an occasion to act opportunistically. Three sets of contracting propositions are proposed 
by the theory to mitigate the risk of shirking behaviour (Demski and Feltham, 1978):  
 
 Rental contract: assumes that the supplier is incurring a fee independent from the 
performance of the agent and is therefore indifferent to the efforts extended by 
the latter.  The agent is oriented to maximise his efforts in order to optimise the 
fee earned.  The agent assumes all the risk, which will be partially offset by 
insurance coverage. A complete insurance coverage cannot be obtained where 
significant levels of uncertainty exist (Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971). The rental 
contract is mostly concerned with discrete transactions, where the performance 
of the supplier is not correlated or affected by the performance of the agent. The 
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relationship is restricted to agreeing on the relevant fee and the period mentioned 
in the rental contract.  
 Mixed contract: assumes that the supplier pays the agent a lower rental fee in 
exchange for sharing the output. In this case, the supplier is risk neutral and the 
agent is induced to work more in order to maximise his return, taking into 
account that he is risk averse.  
 Budget based contract: is defined by a fixed wage and a behaviour based bonus 
scheme.  The supplier pays the agent a fixed wage when the outcome achieved 
exceeds a predetermined standard.  However, if the outcome is below this 
standard, then the mixed contract applies.  A budget based contract induces the 
agent to exert more efforts, while assuming lower levels risks.   
 
In the Middle East, the two most common types of formal contract between suppliers 
and distributors are fixed price contracts and cost plus contracts.  
 
A fixed-price contract is a contract where the payment made to the distributor is 
independent of the costs and resources deployed to implement the contract (Templin, 
1988). Suppliers following a fixed price contract oblige distributors to deliver the 
products to retailers at a predetermined price. The supplier usually fixes the distributor’s 
margin based on market benchmarks as protection from cost inflation risks in the local 
market. Any increase in the costs associated with the sales and distribution operation is 
thus absorbed by the distributor. Fixed price contracts do not completely shield 
suppliers from costs associated with the evolution of retail, since promotion and 
visibility costs are sustained by the supplier.  The agency theory assumes that these 
costs are subject to adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection is related to 
knowing the exact costs of performing the transaction, and moral hazard is associated 
with monitoring these costs. Fixed price contracts are most effective when the 
transaction is not complex. Bajari and Tadelis (2001) explored the effects of complexity 
on contractual choice and found that fixed-price contracts provide good ex ante cost 
incentives but impose high friction when ex post adaptations are required. Incentives are 
not the only means to drive performance, but can be used strategically to balance private 
and relational benefits (Burleson and Wilson, 2007).  
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Fixed price incentive fee contracts specify a target cost, a target profit, a price ceiling, 
and a profit adjustment formula. If suppliers have enough information pertaining to the 
transaction costs of distributors, they can use this information to negotiate a price 
ceiling paid to distributors against specific performance targets.  The agency theory 
assumes that distributors will tend to conceal this type of information from suppliers. To 
avoid such a situation, suppliers can either include an information sharing clause in the 
contract to control adverse selection, or deploy dedicated resources to monitor 
information and control moral hazard.  The agency theory accepts that information is a 
commodity that is purchased (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The effective performance of fixed 
price contracts depends on both the willingness of the supplier to incur additional costs 
to acquire and monitor information, and on the incentive structure adopted. 
 
Fixed price incentive fee contracts are effective when suppliers have full visibility over 
their sales and distribution costs. When distributors are efficiently encouraged to 
provide such information, fixed price incentive fee contracts might mitigate relational 
risks. Suppliers and distributors have to agree on an incentive structure that secures their 
private benefits while considering the relational benefits at the same time. Fixed price 
incentive fee contracts address neither market risks nor risks associated with 
environmental factors that are beyond the control of suppliers and distributors. Fixed 
price with economic price adjustment contracts adjust the price as a response to market 
volatilities.  
 
Suppliers following a fixed price contract should incorporate specific incentives 
associated with growth acceleration and transaction cost optimisation. These incentives 
are expected to curb the distributor’s opportunism when they consider the mutual 
interest of suppliers and distributors. The willingness of the agent to share performance 
based information is a prerequisite for an effective incentive structure. Even if the 
distributor does not share such information, a fixed price contract transfers all the risk to 
the distributor and is considered to be substantially effective.  
 
Fixed price contracts are considered effective in market-like transactions that involve 
low levels of complexity (Crocker and Reynolds, 1993; Templin, 1988; Goldberg and 
Erickson, 1987). According to Crocker and Reynolds (1993), they are considered 
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complete contracts when they incorporate specific incentives that adjust to uncertainties 
in terms of costs and market volatilities.  
 
As noted by Goldberg (1977), a major disadvantage of fixed price contracts is their 
inability to provide cost based information. Cost plus contracts or cost reimbursement 
contracts are contracts whereby the supplier reimburses the agent for costs incurred to 
perform the transaction and incurs additional fees representing the agent’s profits 
(Bajari and Tadelis, 2001). The main challenge associated with a cost reimbursement 
contract is the ability to identify the minimal agency cost required to perform the 
transaction, which requires sharing of transaction cost based information. Cost plus 
contracts can, however, reduce the gap of cost control caused by fixed price contracting. 
 
Successful application of cost reimbursable contracts should consider the supplier agent 
problem in the pre and post contracting phases.  In the pre-contracting phase, 
distributors might inflate their operation costs. When suppliers lack access to basic 
information allowing them to evaluate the cost competitiveness of distributors, they 
have no choice but to assume the soundness of the costs presented to them.  In the post 
contracting phase, distributors benefit from the suppliers’ inability to closely monitor 
their behaviour and tend to shirk by incurring an actual cost that is less than the 
committed cost.  Agents generally tend to resist cost reimbursable contracts to avoid 
exposing themselves to operational audits from suppliers.  Suppliers, on the other hand, 
want to ensure they are receiving the required services for the costs incurred. This 
entails comparing distributor costs to other alternatives in the market and estimating 
what percentage of the cost is fully dedicated to the supplier’s operations.  From an 
agent perspective, such information might lead to contract renegotiation, which in turn 
might trigger the supplier to reduce the initial committed costs to the actual costs 
incurred, thus transferring all the associated risks to the distributor.   
 
A major challenge facing cost plus contracts is identifying the benefits realised by the 
supplier from those realised by the distributor, which might hinder the general 
implementation of cost plus contracts in a context like the Middle East. Special cases 
might exist, however, particularly in modern trade markets where costs are expected to 
increase and where monitoring the behaviour of the distributor is difficult.  Outcome 
based compensation may not be sufficient to monitor the distributor’s behaviour.  
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Eisenhardt (1988) associates the compensation mechanism with task programmability; 
when tasks are not programmable, outcome based compensation is generally more 
effective due to the difficulty in observing the behaviour associated with these tasks.  
 
Suppliers and distributors should spend sufficient time in the pre-contracting phase to 
analyse the downstream transaction cost components, allowing them to adapt the 
contracts to task complexity, looking at various ways to resolve possible costing pitfalls 
before contract implementation (Sweet, 1994). Bajari and Tadelis (2001) show that cost 
plus contracts accommodate ex post adaptation better than fixed price contracts, but 
lack ex-ante cost incentives. The authors conclude that fixed price contracts perform 
well in non-complex tasks with few anticipated changes, whereas cost plus contracts are 
better suited for more complex transactions where many changes are anticipated. 
Performance based conditions can be incorporated in cost reimbursable contracts to 
account for ex-ante and ex-post contract adaption risks.  
 
Cost plus incentive fee contracts are contracts that entail awarding the distributor a 
higher profit fee when performance targets are overachieved or when the actual cost 
incurred is less than the committed cost.  Cost plus incentive fee contracts are directly 
associated with outcome based performance, but do not take behaviour based 
performance into account. 
 
Behaviour based incentives are more effective than outcome based incentives as they 
drive the salesperson’s intrinsic motivation (Anderson and Olivier, 1994) and positively 
influence his identification and commitment to the sales organisation (Anderson and 
Olivier, 1987).  Although salespersons are oriented towards financial rewards (Darmon 
and Rouzie, 1991), suppliers find it optimal to use non-financial incentives to mitigate 
dyadic risks. Some authors find that non-financial incentives have a minimal impact on 
sales performance (Piercy et al., 2004), whilst others note the opposite (Kuster and 
Canale, 2011; Baldauf et al., 2003). Outcome based incentives are objective and based 
on quantifiable measures such as sales value, profit share, and investment share. They 
are preferred over behaviour based compensation when measuring and observing 
behaviour based performance is difficult (Anderson and Olivier, 1987; Eisenhardt, 
1988).   
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There is strong evidence about the impact of behaviour based compensation on 
performance. Sharma and Sarel (1995) found that compensation systems based on 
customer satisfaction increase the customer service response of salespeople when 
compared to salespeople whose incentives are based on turnover. To specifically 
address behaviour based performance, cost plus award fee contracts have been 
introduced. An award fee is paid to account for the distributor’s sales force behaviour. 
This award is not based on quantifiable performance metrics, but on qualitative 
indicators. Cost plus award fee contracts drive the efficiency of the sales team as they 
aim at driving qualitative performance indicators.  Efficient sales teams are able to 
achieve higher outputs by incurring lower inputs (Sujan et al., 1988). Behavioural 
incentives can be subjective depending on the supplier’s perception. This is why the 
ability to monitor the distributor’s behaviour through direct presence within the 
distributor’s organisation is deemed essential.  
 
Investments in dedicated capabilities to monitor the distributor’s behaviour and to 
engage with his team may influence the implementation of behaviour based contracts. 
The highest costs incurred are monitoring costs and bonding costs.  
 
Suppliers ought to be vigilant when choosing between fixed and cost plus contracts, as 
they each have their advantages and disadvantages. Kuster and Canale (2011) found that 
companies with a compensation system based on fixed salaries use behaviour control 
more than companies with a compensation system based on commissions.   According 
to John and Weitz (1989), salary is important when team selling is used and when non-
selling activities are more important than selling activities in contexts of complex 
selling situations.  
 
Optimal contracting is achieved when the gains from behaviour control outcomes are 
balanced with the costs of monitoring (Williamson, 1975; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
In order to reduce the impact of information asymmetry, the agency theory establishes 
that suppliers should invest in financial incentives to prevent agents from behaving 
opportunistically. To absorb the risks of outsourcing, two types of costs are additionally 
incurred by the supplier on top of the fixed fee paid to the agent.  The first is the 
controllable cost, which represents the investment made by the supplier to control the 
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behaviour of the agent. These investments should encourage distributors to incur actual 
costs that are equal to the committed costs. The second is the uncontrollable cost, which 
represents the opportunity cost, or the possibility of agent shirking behaviour.  The 
uncontrollable dimension is related to the availability of alternative agents in the market 
that are willing to provide the same service at a lower fee, or a better service for the 
same fee. 
 
 
2.2.3 Summary of the agency theory 
The agency theory assumes that inter-organisational risks are caused by information 
asymmetry (moral hazard and adverse selection), driving agents to act opportunistically.  
 
Inter-organisational risks have important consequences for the ability of suppliers to 
control outcome and behaviour based performance. It is more challenging to control 
behaviour based performance as the measures are unobservable. This may also lead to a 
misuse of relational resources and the inability to track the way agency costs are being 
spent. The nature of the tasks and the complexity of the sales operation influence the 
choice of the control system deployed. According to Eisenhardt (1989), outcome based 
control systems are sufficient to control programmable tasks like logistics, whereas non-
programmable tasks like customer relationship management depend on behavioural 
competencies and require specific capabilities.  Optimal contracting, the alignment on 
incentives, and the investments in monitoring capabilities are the main dyadic risk 
mitigation strategies proposed by the agency theory. The research aims at exploring 
these strategies further in the context of dyadic FMCG relationships in the Middle East. 
A summary of the agency theory is presented in Figure 2.6.  
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2.3 Overview of Transaction Cost Economics Theory 
TCE theory focuses on the appropriate governance mechanism (vertical integration and 
market contracting) between supply chain members under the assumptions of 
opportunism, bounded rationality, and uncertainty.  The unit of measurement in TCE is 
the transaction. The transaction occurs when goods or services are transferred across 
technologically separable interfaces (Williamson, 1981). A fundamental issue that 
occupies TCE theorists relates to the factors that influence integrations and outsourcing 
decisions across the supply chain. Do the parties operate harmoniously, or are there 
frequent misunderstandings and conflicts that influence performance (Williamson, 
1981)? 
 
TCE examines the comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task 
completion under alternative governance structures (Williamson, 1981). TCE addresses 
the following questions:  
 What influences the choice of governance structure, and how are governance 
decisions made? 
 What are the various components of transaction costs and how are they influenced?  
 How can an optimal governance structure be defined and established? 
 
An essential principle of the TCE theory is the governance of contractual relationships. 
TCE assumes that governance is not an isolated phenomenon and is influenced by 
environmental shift parameters and individual behavioural attributes (Williamson, 
1975). TCE distinguishes between the institutional environment and the institution of 
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governance. The institutional environment describes the macrostructure whilst the 
institution of governance deals with the microstructure.  Any change in the institutional 
environment influences the comparative cost of governance, often in predictable ways 
(Williamson, 1991). Williamson (1998) presents four levels of social analysis, as shown 
in Figure 2.7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The top level (L1) is assumed to be the least changing one and is taken as given by 
economists. Institutional purpose at this level is non-calculative and it takes decades for 
any institutional change to occur. Religious institutions are an example of institutions at 
this level.  
 
The second level (L2) represents the institutional environment, which refers to the rules, 
policies, and property rights within which economic activities are organised.  Here, the 
institutional purpose is to ensure that the institutional environment is right. This is 
considered to be a first order economizing, focusing on the system of norms and laws 
that organise the ownership or the transfer of property rights. The bundle of rights 
includes the right to use the goods and to earn the associated income, the right to 
transfer the goods to others, and the right to enforce property rights (Klein and 
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Robinson, 2011). When managing property rights, governments can either follow a 
commanding approach, such as the implementation of quotas on inputs and outputs, or a 
market based approach, such as taxes or transferable quotas. The rules of the game are 
defined at this level (Williamson, 1998), and are only changeable in exceptional 
circumstances, such as changing competitive trends, financial crisis, wars, and the 
dissolution of regimes.  
 
The third level (L3) presents the field where TCE operates. TCE takes the rule of the 
game as shift parameters based on which the organisation adapts its economic activity 
by altering its governance structure. This is considered to be a second order 
economizing as it involves choosing the optimal governance structure, be it market, 
hybrid, or hierarchal, based on the contextual factors that the organisation faces in Level 
2.  
 
The fourth level (L4) requires achieving the right marginal conditions between the 
parties for each of the governance structures determined in Level 3. This level deals 
with the adjustment of the neoclassical variables with prices and outputs based on 
market conditions. The agency theory is directly involved in Level 4 as it covers the 
efficient alignment of incentives between parties with different interests and 
predisposition of risks.  
 
After exploring how TCE is positioned in social sciences, this section focuses on the 
institution of governance and aims at understanding how firms achieve the appropriate 
governance structure.  According to Williamson (1991), integrated structures are 
preferred over market structures for the following dimensions:  
 Incentive intensity: the high-powered incentives of markets give way to low 
powered incentives in firms.  
 Administrative controls: firms are supported by a more extensive array of 
administrative rules and procedures. 
 Adaptation: markets enjoy the advantage of autonomous adaptation in response 
to changes in relative prices, but the advantage accrues with integrated structures 
as more cooperative adaptations are needed.  
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 Contract law: the contract law of markets is legalistic and relies on court 
ordering, whereas the firm replaces court ordering by private ordering and settles 
disputes by fiat; the firm is its own court of ultimate appeal.  
 
The above dimensions assume that vertical integrated models are more effective than 
market contracting. Although TCE is inclined towards hierarchal governance structures, 
optimal governance decisions rely on the trade-off between cost and control. 
Williamson (1985) notes that vertically integrated structures are associated with high 
bureaucratic costs, which is not always the case for market structures. TCE is not 
restricted to one governance choice but to the optimal governance mode following 
specific assumptions that are proposed by the theory (Williamson, 1998).   
 
2.3.1 Transaction cost economics theory assumptions   
As noted above, TCE theory is based on two behavioural assumptions (bounded 
rationality and opportunism) and three transaction cost dimensions (uncertainty, asset 
specificity, and frequency). This section focuses on each of these assumptions, with the 
objective of examining the factors that influence governance choices. 
 
TCE assumes that an individual’s rationality is limited to the information available at 
the time when transaction based decisions are made.  Originally derived from Simon’s 
(1957a) examination, bounded rationality is defined as a behaviour that is intendedly 
rational but only limitedly so. The organisation man, as per Simon (1957a), is endowed 
with less analytical and data processing capabilities; he remains intendedly rational 
despite being limited in interpreting and solving complex problems.   
 
Bounded rationality states that the economic actor is capable of making rational 
decisions, but is not always able to do so. As noted by Simon (1996a), the decision 
process is composed of external environmental components pertaining to the human 
being’s response to incentives faced, as well as internal environmental components 
related to the human being’s internal make-up that leads to deviation from the demands 
of the external environment.  Rationality assumes the ability to specify the 
environmental incentives and to base decisions accordingly.  Howard (1966), 
considered to be the founder of decision analysis theory, defines a decision made as an 
irrevocable allocation of resources. The author does not view the decision as a mental 
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commitment to follow a course of action, but rather as the actual pursuit of that course 
of action. The decision analysis procedure illustrated by Howard (1966) is dependent on 
many factors that are subject to bounded rationality, such as the interaction of the 
decision making process with the values and objectives of others.  
 
Efficient decision making involves a series of steps that require inputting information at 
different stages of the process, as well as a process for feedback (Bayer et al., 2001). All 
eight steps of the ideal decision making process proposed by Bayer et al. (2001) are 
influenced by human cognition and subject to the limits of their rationality.  The eight 
steps are listed below: 
1- Define the problem 
2- Determine the requirements that the solution to that problem must meet 
3- Establish goals that solving the problem should accomplish 
4- Identify alternatives to solving the problem 
5- Develop valuation criteria 
6- Select a decision making tool  
7- Apply the tool to select a preferred alternative 
8- Check the answer to make sure that it solves the problem.  
 
Decision making is regarded as a cognitive process. Wilson’s (2002) view on embodied 
cognition gives an indication about the individual’s bounded rationality. Wilson (2002) 
notes that a cognitive activity takes place in the context of a real world environment; it 
involves perception and action. It is time pressured and the environment is part of the 
cognitive system. The information flow between the mind and the world is so dense and 
continuous that, for scientists studying the nature of cognitive activity, the mind alone is 
not a meaningful unit of analysis. The function of the mind is to guide action, and 
cognitive mechanisms such as perception and memory must be understood in terms of 
their ultimate contribution to situation-appropriate behaviour (Wilson, 2002). 
 
The evaluation between a good or a bad decision depends on the ability to interpret 
external and internal environmental components. A good decision is a logical decision 
based on the uncertainties, values and preferences of the decision maker (Howard, 
1966). The key question that is of interest to our research is how TCE explains the 
impact of bounded rationality on governance structure decisions. Bounded rationality, 
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as presented by Williamson (1975), involves neurophysiological limits on the one hand, 
and language limits on the other. Physical limits include the capability of storing 
information, and language limits include the capability of interpreting information.  
Williamson (1975) considers that bounded rationality arises when the limits of 
rationality are reached under conditions of uncertainty and/or complexity. Therefore, 
approximation due to uncertainty replaces exactness in reaching a decision (Williamson, 
1975). Bounded rationality cost is optimised in integrated models if the cost of 
adaptation is lower than it is in market structures (Williamson, 1975). TCE assumes that 
in most cases, this cost is optimised because the decision making process is more 
effective. The bounded rationality is more controlled as it is subject to legitimate 
organisational authority.  
 
The second TCE assumption is opportunism. From a TCE perspective, opportunism 
corresponds to the frailty of motive, which requires a certain degree of circumspection 
and distrust (Williamson, 1993). The three forms of opportunism suggested by TCE are: 
natural, subtle and blatant.  The natural form involves the embedded characteristics of 
human nature. Crozier (1964) defines this as the active tendency of human agents to 
take advantage, in any circumstances, of all available means to further their own ends.  
The subtle form is strategic and is described by Williamson (1985) as self-interest 
seeking with guile. The blatant form proposes that suppliers account for shirking 
behaviour, because of their awareness that agents have a tendency and a motive to shirk. 
Pre-emptive opportunism suggests the mitigation of opportunism by accounting for it by 
assigning a probabilistic value for its occurrence (Williamson, 1993). This is considered 
to be a cost effective way of minimizing the impact of opportunism on transaction costs.   
 
Opportunism, whether subtle, natural or blatant, negatively influences the relationship 
between exchange members regardless of the governance model.  TCE suggests that 
opportunism is better contained in integrated models than in market contracting, except 
when agents are fully trustworthy. Thus if agents were fully trustworthy through 
bounded rationally, comprehensive contracting might be feasible (Williamson, 1981). 
Trust is not paid sufficient attention in the TCE literature; this gap will be examined at a 
later stage in the research.  
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The third assumption is asset specificity, which is considered to be a significant 
locomotive of TCE, as expressed by Williamson (1998). The degree to which an asset 
can be redeployed by alternative users without sacrificing productive value is defined as 
asset specificity (Williamson, 1979). Asset specificity is determined by the level of 
investments incurred to execute a specific transaction. This investment is typical of the 
transaction, devoted to its objectives, and cannot be utilised for other objectives. 
Investments in asset specificity are referred to as sunk costs, transaction specific 
investments, or idiosyncratic investments (Williamson, 1975; Whyte, 1994).  
 
Asset specificity requires significant specialisation levels and is considered to be unique 
to the task, and therefore cannot be redeployed (Williamson, 1985). TCE suggests that 
investments in asset specificity are unilateral from the seller (supplier) to the buyer 
(agent). A high condition of bilateral dependency is associated with asset specificity, 
increasing the likelihood of opportunistic asset exploitation. A common example given 
is the investment in training to build human asset specificity. The supplier might not be 
able to control the effective application of such training, hence driving the agent to a 
probable opportunistic behaviour through other suppliers benefiting from the knowledge 
acquired.  
 
To avoid the misuse of transaction specific investments, TCE proposes the deployment 
of contracts to safeguard such investments (Williamson, 1975).  At this stage, the TCE 
goes back to the second institutional level in order to define how to protect the 
transferability and the usage of assets that are specific to the transaction.   
 
To avoid contracting complications pertaining to the safeguarding of assets, Williamson 
(1979) suggests that the choice of governance structure turns on the mode that involves 
low safeguarding levels. Asset specificity does not only elicit ex ante incentive 
responses, but more importantly gives rise to complex post governance structure 
responses (Williamson, 1975). These complex responses are mainly caused by the 
inability to control the related investments.  
The most common forms of asset specificity presented by TCE are site specificity, 
physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, brand asset specificity, and dedicated 
asset specificity, all of which are further discussed below. 
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Site specificity represents the geographical distance that affects the mobility of 
resources. In the case of distribution operations, site specificity includes all the assets 
deployed to move the inventory from the original source to the end consumer. A 
complex geography requires substantial site specificity investments. Site specificity is 
operationalised through the different costs associated with transportation and logistics, 
including outbound and inbound transport, stock holding points, satellite, and central 
warehouses.   
 
Physical asset specificity represents specific machines or technologies that are used to 
execute the transaction. Delivery vans, point of sale material, computer systems, and 
information systems are some examples of physical specificity investments.  
 
Human asset specificity represents the level of skills required to execute the transaction. 
Investments in human assets include the recruitment, development, and motivation of 
skilled sales resources.  
 
Brand asset specificity represents investments specific to the brand, either through 
media advertising, or through direct marketing, such as promotions and in store 
visibility. These investments fluctuate with the change in competitive pressures, the 
development of retail channels, and the sophistication of consumers. Brand category 
share is an indicator of brand asset specificity.   
 
Dedicated asset specificity represents customised investments that are customer or 
supplier specific. They can take the form of physical, human, or brand specific 
investments.  
 
Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994) suggest adding another type of asset specificity, 
referred to as procedural asset specificity, which includes information systems that are 
deployed to serve the need of a specific party or customer. Malone et al. (1987) 
proposed time specificity, considering that an asset is time specific if its value is 
dependent on reaching the specific user within a specified period of time. The 
distribution of consumable products with a short shelf life is an example. The logistical 
process has to take into account the life span of the product in order to make sure that it 
reaches the final consumer in good quality.  
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Asset specificity is operationalised based on its degree of specialisation to support a 
particular transaction; Williamson (1985) suggests classifying asset specificity based on 
the degree of specificity. In non-integrated governance structures, asset specificity is 
associated with different sets of costs that pressure transaction costs (Klein et al., 1978; 
Williamson, 1985):  
 Search costs: include the costs of gathering information to identify and evaluate 
potential trading partners.  
 Contracting costs: refer to the costs associated with negotiating and writing an 
agreement. 
 Monitoring costs: refer to the costs associated with monitoring the agreement to 
ensure that each party fulfils the predetermined set of obligations. 
 Enforcement costs: refer to the costs associated with ex post bargaining and 
sanctioning a trading partner that does not perform according to the agreement. 
 
Uncertainty, which is the fourth TCE assumption, represents the external environmental 
factors that affect the transaction and the reactions of individuals to such factors. 
Environmental factors are uncontrollable and include market volatilities, competition, 
and behavioural trends. Individual factors mostly concern the awareness and cognition 
of individuals relative to uncertainties. Individual factors are affected by the bounded 
rationality of the individual, which determines his ability to adapt and react to the 
environment (Williamson, 1975).  
 
Most of the definitions presented in the literature are congruent with the two dimensions 
of uncertainty: the external uncontrollable dimension affecting the set of organisations 
in an industry, and the internal reactive dimension representing organisational/ 
individual cognition and behaviour with respect to the environment.  
 
Some authors define uncertainty as a lack of information about cause and effect 
relationships (Duncan, 1972); others define it as the inability to accurately predict the 
outcomes of a decision (Hickson et al., 1971; Schmidt and Cummings, 1976).  The 
visibility and the predictability dimensions are at the core of the uncertainty construct. 
Koopmans (1957) describes uncertainty as a subjectively estimated probability 
distribution incorporating both dimensions. Primary uncertainty is of a state contingent 
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kind, while secondary uncertainty arises from a lack of communication or awareness. 
Secondary uncertainty has a negative intentional facet, the self-interest/opportunism 
reaction (Helfat and Teece, 1987).  
 
TCE considers that these behavioural assumptions arise due to incomplete contracting. 
Hazards are due to the behavioural uncertainties that arise when incomplete contracting 
and asset specificity are joined (Williamson, 1975). The mitigation of uncertainty 
through alternative governance choices necessitates further understanding of the 
measurement of the uncertainty construct and the relationship between the 
uncontrollable and the reactive factors.  
 
The two measures of uncertainty proposed by the literature are objective measures and 
perceptual measures (Downey et al., 1977; Tung, 1979).  The distinction between the 
two measures is derived from a gap in the literature pertaining to the measurement of 
environmental uncertainty (Milliken, 1987).  Objective measures describe the state of 
the organisational environment and the perceptual measures describe the state of the 
cognition of the individual relative to this environment. 
 
Milliken (1987) defines uncertainty as the perceived inability of the individual to predict 
something accurately. The author suggests three types of environmental uncertainty, 
each having its own implication for organisational behaviour (Milliken, 1987):  
 State uncertainty (or perceived environmental uncertainty): is the inability to 
assign probabilities to the likelihood of future events (Milliken, 1987).  
Administrators experience state uncertainty when they perceive the 
organisational environment, or a particular component of that environment, to be 
unpredictable (Milliken, 1987). Managers can be uncertain about environmental 
actions such as competition, government, suppliers, or about environmental 
natural conditions such as consumption trends, demographics, political, currency 
and price volatilities, developments in technology…etc.  
 Effect uncertainty: is the ability to interpret the impact of state uncertainty. 
Milliken (1987) defines effect uncertainty as the inability to predict the impact 
of a future state of the environment or environmental change on the 
organisation.  
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 Response uncertainty: is related to the reactive capability of the individual in 
terms of decision making. It is associated with attempts to understand the 
various response options available to the organisation and the value or utility of 
each (Milliken, 1987).  
 
Controlling state uncertainty is very difficult, and both effect and response uncertainties 
require significant coordination and monitoring skills.  Firms have to deploy the right 
skills to analyse the impact of effect uncertainty and the right knowledge to react to 
response uncertainty.  Williamson (1998) suggests that when the uncertainty and asset 
specificity levels are high, the coordination costs in market contracts can be greater than 
in vertical integration. A vertically integrated structure is therefore a better alternative if 
the cost of internal adaptation is lower than the cost of external adaptation.  
 
The last TCE assumption is the frequency dimension, which strictly refers to the activity 
of the buyer in the market (Williamson, 1985). Three frequency categories are presented 
by TCE: one time, occasional and recurrent. One time transactions are considered 
discrete; one stop transactions between a traveling buyer and a foreign grocer is an 
example. Occasional transactions represent different types of transactions between one 
or multiple sellers and multiple buyers. TCE focuses on recurrent transactions where the 
exchange members have a long term interest in the relationship.  
 
2.3.2 Governance structures   
TCE is especially concerned with the choice of the governance structure under specific 
behavioural and transaction cost dimensions. Each of the governance mechanisms 
suggested by TCE is influenced by assumptions of bounded rationality, opportunism, 
uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity. The governance structures examined are 
vertical integration, hybrid contracting, long term relational contracts, informal 
agreement, and franchising agreements (Williamson, 1985). Table 2.3 (Williamson, 
1985) is used in this examination.  
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Quadrants I and II in Table 2.3 incorporate investments that are not specific to the 
transaction. Prices are decided by supply and demand, and complete information is 
available (Alchian and Demstez, 1972). Market governance is represented in the 
relationship between the buyer and the seller of raw material, where prices are decided 
by the market based on tender deals. The parties in nonspecific but occasional 
transactions are less able to rely on direct experience to safeguard transactions against 
opportunism (Williamson, 1979). As the goods or services are standardised, the parties 
can refer to rating sources or to other dealers who have shared a similar experience. 
Market contracting of the neoclassical type does not involve many contracting 
complications. The relationship is discrete and the availability of alternatives in the 
market protects the parties involved in the exchange.  
 
Trilateral governance is concerned with occasional mixed transactions and substantially 
idiosyncratic transactions. This model entails the transfer of assets for a specified period 
of time. Once suppliers have entered into a contract, there are strong incentives to see 
the contract through to completion (Williamson, 1979). The substantial investments 
incurred and the specificity of the contracting necessitates the intervention of an 
intermediary to make sure that contracts safeguard against opportunism.  
 
When investments are specific to the transaction (customised purchase), they can be 
contracted to specialised agents, or internally integrated due to their recurrent nature.  
Three types of governance structure are common in the strategic management literature 
(Hill and Jones, 2010): 
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 Horizontal integration: refers to the process of merging with industry 
competitors. 
 Vertical integration: refers to backward and forward integration. Organisations, 
be they suppliers or agents, may decide to expand their operations by moving 
into the production of inputs through backward integration models, or the 
distribution of outputs through forward integration. TCE refers to integrated 
governance structures as unified or hierarchal governance structures 
(Williamson, 1979).  
 Strategic outsourcing: refers to the delegation of some value creating activities 
within a business to specialised agents. These are referred to as buy or market 
structures. Partial outsourcing/integration governance structures are denoted by 
hybrid/mixed structures.  
 
Assets of high specificity to the transaction require a high degree of specialisation in the 
case of substantially idiosyncratic investments. For mixed idiosyncratic investments, the 
firm chooses between bilateral governance and vertical integration based on transaction 
cost optimisation. A major challenge of bilateral contracting is the adaptation to 
uncertainties and the mitigation of opportunism. As suggested by TCE, a trade-off is to 
be made between the various components of agency costs in outsourced models and 
transaction costs in integrated structures. The trade-off should consider the indirect costs 
associated with contracting complexities to safeguard transaction specific investments.  
A summary of TCE is illustrated in Figure 2.8. The assumptions raised by the theory are 
opportunism, bounded rationality, uncertainty, asset specificity and frequency. 
Following these assumptions, it will be difficult to control performance and optimise 
transaction costs, leading to contract failure. To mitigate these risks, TCE proposes the 
integration of the assets of high specificity.  
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2.4 Applicability of the Agency and Transaction Cost Economics Theories 
 
2.4.1 Applicability of the agency theory 
The applicability of the agency theory across organisations is centred on one of the 
areas that are concerned with the mitigation of the problem of loss of control. Spence 
and Zeckhauser (1971) explored the application of the agency theory in insurance. The 
authors identified three monitoring cases: 
1. The supplier can monitor the state of nature: a full risk spread can be 
achieved without the need to concentrate on adverse incentives. 
2. The supplier can monitor the actions of the agent: adverse incentive 
problems can be avoided by structuring the insurance payoff function to 
enforce the choice of the appropriate actions taken by the agent.  
3. The supplier cannot control the actions of the agent: a signal that depends 
completely or partially on the action of the agent is employed.  
 
Anderson and Olivier (1987) used the agency theory to examine the effectiveness of 
sales control systems. The authors differentiated between outcome and behaviour based 
systems, but their propositions have not been empirically tested. Krafft (1999) bridges 
this gap, providing an empirical examination to analyse how the antecedents identified 
by agency and TCE theories (uncertainty and sales people effectiveness) affect the 
design of sales control systems (behaviour and outcome based control systems).  The 
findings are congruent with the suggestions put forward by Anderson and Olivier 
(1987).  Basu and Kalyanaram (1990) and Berhold (1971) have shown that in a context 
of environmental uncertainty, behaviour based compensation is preferred, as it is 
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difficult to predict outcome.  Suh and Kim (1989) found that monitoring investments is 
high in situations where outcome is low.  Abrahamson and Park (1994) found that 
corporate officers tend to conceal outcomes from shareholders when these outcomes are 
negative. A concealment strategy is often used by subordinates when the outcome does 
not meet the expectations of the shareholders (Goodman, 1980; Bettman and Weitz, 
1983; Salancik and Meindl, 1984).  Concealment is mitigated by enhancing 
coordination and closer management approaches between shareholders (suppliers) and 
corporate officers (agents).  
 
Bahli and Rivard (2003) used the agency and TCE theories as theoretical foundations to 
propose a scenario-based conceptualisation of information technology outsourcing risk. 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) examined the complexity of defining performance 
measures in job design, and found that performance measures may lead to conflicting 
results as they aggregate contrasting aspects of performance and omit other aspects that 
may be essential to the firm. This is a typical issue of outcome based control systems as 
they do not consider the effort expended to achieve the outcome.  
 
The universality of the agency theory is well noted by its originating authors. Studies of 
moral hazard and welfare maximisation explored in the economic literature, information 
flows, financial intermediaries, corporate companies, universities, and governmental 
entities are examples of the application of the agency theory (Ross, 1973; Demski and 
Feltham, 1978).  
 
 
2.4.2 Applicability of the transaction cost economics theory 
The TCE theory proved to be as universal as the agency theory. Monteverde and Teece 
(1982) emphasised investments in human specificity and used TCE to test the impact of 
know-how transfer in the automobile industry. They found that backward integration is 
an efficient model since the know-how asset is firm specific and is congruent with its 
internal system; the same result is confirmed by Masten et al. (1989).  
 
Crocker and Masten (1985) examined the cost associated with adapting contracts to 
hazard situations, and found permanent adaptation through court systems to be costly.  
Hence, unilateral governance can be an alternative governance mode as the parties 
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jointly account for exogenous events, increasing the duration of the contracts. Riordan 
and Williamson (1985) identified a positive relationship between production cost 
savings and vertical integration.  
 
Hierarchical governance is considered to be an optimal structure in the case of 
economies of scale. Liang and Huang (1998) used the TCE to test the marketing of 
products through electronic commerce. The authors found that customer choice is 
determined based on the transaction cost associated with the channel.  Kotabe and 
Murray (1999) used the TCE to understand sourcing decisions. The authors found that 
for high specificity firms, supplementary services should be sourced internally if these 
services are performed infrequently.   
 
Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) tested the TCE theory on the sales operation of 16 
recognised electronic manufacturers. Using survey analysis, the authors identified a 
positive relationship between high levels of asset specificity, performance evaluation 
systems, and integration choices. Frequency and uncertainty seemed to have little 
impact. In their analysis, outcome based performance is assumed to be a preferred 
choice over behavioural based performance, due to the issue of measuring behaviour 
performance. The analysis was restricted to a small sample using industry specific 
variables. Anderson (1985) examined the impact of TCE variables and sales 
performance evaluation on integration. A strong relationship was found between 
uncertainty and the difficulty of assessing sales behaviour and integration. However, a 
weak relationship was found between other environmental uncertainty conditions and 
governance choice. Travel requirements show no impact on integration, which might be 
related to the type of customers in the territory. Salespersons can rely on the 
performance of their own territory without the need to travel. Anderson (1985) explains 
the factors that influence integration; the study is considered a good basis to analyse 
sales force integration. The weak relationship between environmental uncertainty and 
integration is an important gap and might be related to the static non-competitive market 
condition in which the sales team is operating. The negative relationship between travel 
and governance indicates that the sales environment is somehow stable; a salesperson 
does not need to go beyond his territories as long as his performance is satisfactory.  
John and Weitz (1988) used a similar approach with industrial goods. They examined 
the impact of transaction cost dimensions on forward integration and found a positive 
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relationship between production costs (economy of scale) and integration. The authors 
present a macro measurement of uncertainty, incorporating environmental and 
behavioural dimensions. Heide and John (1988) argue that vertical integration is not 
feasible for small firms.  Hence, they introduced the safeguard of specific assets when 
long term contractual protection is not present. The authors found that agencies with 
specific assets safeguard their investments through offsetting investments with key 
customers.  Their findings support the extendibility of the TCE theory as they proposed 
an alternative to the integration safeguarding model. Klein et al. (1990) developed two 
types of uncertainties, environmental and diverse, and used pre-study interviews to 
define operational measures. They found that channel integration is a preferred choice 
when special knowledge and investments are needed to facilitate transactions. High 
volume production proves to be related to integrated channels. The relationship between 
uncertainty and channel integration requires further development; the authors suggest 
distinguishing between the volatility and the diversity dimension of uncertainty.  
 
The relationship between asset specificity and integration is well demonstrated 
empirically (Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Anderson, 1985; John and Weitz, 1988; 
Anderson and Coughlan, 1987; Klein at. al., 1990; Heide and John, 1988). There is a 
consensus that outcome based compensation is the optimal incentive mechanism (Ouchi 
1979; Krafft, 1999; Anderson and Olivier, 1987; Basu et al., 1985; Eisenhardt, 1985; 
1988). As defined by Alchian and Demstez (1972), metering presents an issue from an 
agency perspective, and internal uncertainty and monitoring complexity, as defined by 
Williamson (1981), present an issue from a TCE perspective. The mitigation proposed 
by AT is based on incentives, rules, information systems, and contract alignment. The 
TCE proposes either vertical integration when it is affordable to integrate (economies of 
scale), or safeguarding transaction specific investments through formal contracting and 
high coordination capabilities. Both theories are able to provide a universal logical 
description of how organisations adapt to behavioural assumptions, such as opportunism 
and bounded rationality, and to environmental assumptions, such as uncertainty, 
complexity, and diversity.  
 
2.4.3 Critiques of the transactional approach  
The agency and TCE theories clarify how suppliers might react to mitigate the supplier 
agent problem. The mitigation strategies considered by the transactional approach alone 
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may not be sufficient to understand the behaviour of suppliers and agents in the Middle 
East. Both theories have been criticised by social theorists (Granovetter, 1985; Ghoshal 
and Moran, 1996) for giving little importance to the role of trust in social exchange. The 
same uncertainty condition that leads individuals to behave opportunistically may lead 
others to trust (Jones, 1998). As noted by Granovetter (1985), economic actions are 
embedded in structures of social relations. In some societies, trust has critical cultural 
dimensions. TCE has also been criticised by evolutionary theorists, who consider that 
governance structures can evolve over time through learning processes and through 
changes in the environment. Langlois (1986) gives an example of how the auto industry 
has evolved in the US. In the early days of the industry, automobile makers outsourced 
for almost all the parts and were only assemblers. This has dramatically evolved 
(Langlois, 1986).  Another criticism of TCE is associated with the dichotomy between 
two types of governance structure: pure hierarchy and pure markets (Perrow, 1986). 
Although TCE suggests hybrid structures as an intermediary form of governance, not 
enough emphasis is given to this form (Hennart, 1993).  Other researchers have 
criticised the TCE for the difficulty of operationalising its variables (Klein & Shelanski, 
1995).    
 
Table 2.4 presents the main gaps that questioned the ability of the transactional 
approach to explain certain phenomena.  
65 
 
 
 
The research takes these critiques into account and assumes that the transactional 
approach cannot predict the risk mitigation behaviour of suppliers and distributors 
independently of the relational and the evolutionary approaches. The role of trust cannot 
be undermined, as trust is embedded in Middle Eastern society. The dynamic capability 
perspective can also not be neglected, as the research is taking place in a changing 
channel environment: retail evolution. 
 
If the strategies to mitigate dyadic risks in the Middle East do not take into account the 
social and institutional channel contexts, the research might be subject to severe 
criticism from academicians and practitioners for not shedding light on key areas that 
may be of critical importance for both theory and practice.  An extended literature 
review is thus required that aims at clarifying why the relational and the evolutionary 
approaches are important for the present research.  
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2.5 The Relational Approach - The Role of Trust  
The TCE does not differentiate between opportunism as behaviour and opportunism as 
an outcome (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). This differentiation is essential primarily 
because the level of opportunism can differ between firms (Bromiley and Cumming, 
1995) and secondly because opportunism as an outcome can be reduced by means of 
internalisation.  The TCE acknowledges the importance of trust (See Williamson 1993) 
but does not emphasise it, although the relationship between trust and partnership on 
one hand and trust and transaction cost optimisation on the other are well noted in the 
literature (Fukuyama, 1996). Noorderhaven (1995) examines this gap and introduces the 
concept of differential opportunism. Bromiley and Cumming (1995) and John (1984), 
also examined this gap in the context of normative and instrumental commitment.  
 
With the existence of different governance mechanisms, the transactional perspective 
alone is not sufficient to understand the relationship between suppliers and agents. The 
relational perspective plays a role and might take the place of the transactional 
approach. Looking at the dyadic relationship from the angle of trust will significantly 
contribute to both theory and practice, especially in a culture like the one that exists in 
the Middle East.  
 
 
2.5.1 The notion of relational contracting 
Formal contracts are important to legally safeguard a relationship and curb opportunism. 
Vertical integration eliminates opportunism, but comes at a high cost for the supplier.  
 
Informal contracts are oral and legally unenforceable agreements. They are 
operationalised through the commitment of volume, the promise of dedicated assets, 
and the guarantee of specified service standards, consequently providing some price 
flexibility helping to arrange, implement, and monitor contractual safeguards (Palay, 
1985).  
 
The relational contract theory emerged early in the 1960s with the exploration of 
Stewart Macaulay. Macaulay (1963) focused on how exchange members regulate their 
behaviour without relying on legal contracts.  In his interview with senior professionals, 
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Macaulay observed that exchange members are able to resolve their disputes without 
referring to signed formal agreements. Consequently, even in the presence of a legal and 
well planned contract, the parties prefer to negotiate a solution and achieve an 
agreement regardless of the existing contract. Relational contracts integrate the social 
behavioural perspective with the economic legal perspective as relationships cannot be 
isolated from their social contexts. Ian Macneil, considered to be among the founders of 
the relational contract theory, does not neglect the importance of the legal agreement, 
calling it the social glue of relational contracting. The theory is called a relational theory 
of contract but not a theory of relational contracts. Once relational members secure their 
relationship with formal contracting, informal contracts can come as a complement, or 
sometimes as a substitute. Macneil consequently focuses on the social dimensions that 
are naturally embedded in the relationship.  
 
“Contracts are relationships among people who have exchanged, are exchanging, or 
are expected to exchange in the future.” (Macneil, 1987: 274). 
 
It is important to explore relational contracting in the post formal contract phase and 
address such issues as how parties commit to the relationship, how they behave, and 
what drives their behaviour. Formal contracts are tools that can be used when necessary, 
but it is the relational parties’ behaviour and private intentions that determine what is 
defined by Macneil (1983) as relational norms, summarised in Table 2.5. 
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Following these norms, exchange relations occur “in various patterns along a spectrum 
ranging from highly discrete to highly relational” (Macneil, 1983: 342). Although 
Macneil’s norms were viewed as complex (Austen-Baker, 2009), what matters is that 
each of these norms is positively related to the development of trust and the mitigation 
of opportunism. For this reason, the sociological perspective is considered to be the 
founding base of the relationship marketing discipline, where trust is at the core of the 
exchange (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995).  
 
2.5.2 Overview of trust and commitment 
Building partnership relationships between supply chain members is a strategic need in 
today’s hypercompetitive environment. Proponents of relationship marketing 
concentrate on long term relationship building that focuses on the move from a 
customer capture tactic to a customer retention strategy (Kotler, 1991). Relationships 
developed over time are mainly built based on trust and commitment .The notion of 
relationship commitment and trust has been considered to be the key tenet of the social 
exchange literature (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959; Blau, 1964) and the organisational 
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behaviour literature (Becker, 1960; Reichers, 1985). In the service industry, 
commitment is considered the basis of exchange relationships and a main determinant 
of brand loyalty (Gronroos, 2006; Moorman et al., 1992). In channel relationships, 
attention is paid to the role of commitment and trust to enhance channel performance 
(Moorman et al., 1992) and to achieve a relationship-based competitive advantage 
(RBCA) (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). In relationship marketing literature, commitment is 
defined as an enduring desire to maintain a valued relationship (Moorman et al., 1992). 
This definition is further elaborated by Morgan and Hunt (1994), who consider that an 
on-going relationship is extremely important and therefore the parties involved should 
employ maximum effort to maintain it and ensure it lasts indefinitely. Dwyer et al. 
(1987) define commitment as an implicit or explicit pledge of relational continuity 
between exchange partners.  
 
Long term orientation is a common dimension found in most studies exploring the 
commitment construct (Dwyer et al., 1987; Moorman et al., 1992; Morgan and Hunt, 
1994; Anderson and Weitz, 1992; O’Reilly and Chatman, 1986; Ganesan, 1994).  Long 
term returns are achieved when there is an expectation of future exchange through the 
focus on the desire of the parties in this exchange (Noordewier et al., 1990). The 
expectation of a future interaction transforms the transaction from a discrete nature to a 
relational transaction that is repeated and accumulated over time (Macneil, 1983; Dwyer 
et al., 1987; Kaufmann and Stern, 1988; Noordwewier et al., 1990).  Anderson and 
Narus (1990) conclude that commitment to channel partners represents a long term 
orientation towards the channel relationship. This conclusion is mostly supported by the 
attitudinal component of commitment. Mowday et al. (1979) define the two components 
of commitment as attitude and behaviour. It is suggested that the attitudinal 
commitment of the retailer is a long term orientation to its relationship with suppliers 
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Anderson and Weitz, 1992). 
 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) examine the relationship between trust and commitment and 
propose that the former is a precondition for the latter. Cook and Wall (1980) explore 
the relationship between trust and confidence and define trust as the extent to which one 
is willing to ascribe good intentions to, and have confidence in, the words and actions of 
other people. From the same perspective, Moorman et al. (1992) define trust as the 
willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence. Mayer et al. 
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(1995) define trust as the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectations that the latter will perform a particular action 
important to the former, regardless of the former’s ability to monitor or control his 
actions.  Doney and Cannon (1997) examine five processes used to develop trust: the 
calculative process, the prediction process, the capability process, the intentionality 
process, and the transference process. The calculative process is extracted from the TCE 
approach (Williamson, 1991) and involves calculating the costs of staying in the 
relationship. The capability process focuses on the credibility dimension and is related 
to the ability of the agent to keep his promises. The transference process suggests that 
trust can be transferred from one party to the other through the intentionality process, 
with the objective of developing shared values and objectives. The predictability 
process enables each party to predict the future behaviour of the other party, thus 
decreasing the associated levels of uncertainty. 
 
Ganesan (1994) identifies four antecedents of trust: satisfaction, perception of 
transaction specific investment, experience, and reputation.  Each of these antecedents is 
positively related to the buyer’s perception of the benevolence and credibility of the 
vendor. Ganesan (1994) notes that trust is positively related to the seller’s perception of 
transaction specific investments made by the vendor.  
 
Due to its important role in the exchange, several authors propose that trust is a 
substitute for explicit contracts and vertical integration (Noorderhaven, 1995; 
Granovetter, 1985; Bernheim and Whinston, 1998; Dyer and Chu, 2003; Uzzi, 1997). 
Barney (1991) introduces the notion of the psychological contract, which is considered 
to be a fundamental commitment between exchange members, taking the place of 
formal contracts. 
 
Informal contracts depend on the development level of the legal system in each country. 
Existing literature on informal contracting shows that informal contracts are not only 
implemented when the relationship between the trading members is informal, but also 
when protecting the relationship through formal contracting proves difficult due to the 
absence of a well-established legal system. Hence, informal contracts are predominant 
in emerging countries. McMillan and Woodruff (1999a) examined informal contracts in 
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Vietnam, Allen et al. (2005) studied their application in China and India, while Bigsten 
et al. (2000) explored their application in the Sub-Saharan African countries.  
Grief (1993) shows that informal contracts can be effective even in well-established 
legal systems. Each member of the relationship, whether suppliers or agents, can 
maintain their cooperation as long as they are provided with credible promises that the 
long term relational returns achieved will exceed any potential profit generated through 
self-interested behaviour (Grief, 1993). 
 
Noorderhaven (1995) defines trust as the willingness of an agent to engage in a 
transaction in the absence of adequate safeguards. In this case, the supplier assumes the 
risk of incurring costs that outweigh the benefits. As noted by Noorderhaven (1995), 
differences in the degree of opportunism between economic actors can be associated 
with lower levels of safeguards based on reputation, personality, institutionalisation, or 
organisational culture. The general proposition formulated by Noorderhaven (1995) is 
that lower opportunism levels lead to higher trust levels and are therefore associated 
with safeguards that are less restrictive. 
  
The agency theory mostly focuses on extrinsic incentives that are driven by explicit 
rewards.  These rewards might lead to compliance, such as instrumental commitment, 
but will not induce a revolutionary change in the assumed opportunistic behaviour of 
the agent.  In addition to examining the impact of TCE and AT assumptions on 
governance structure, the research also considers the impact of trust on governance 
structure decisions given the social and culture context in which the topic is explored 
(Middle East). Such an exploration is inevitable, especially with the rise of relationship 
economies that are based on trust and commitment (Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  
 
TCE confirms that building trust between supply chain members may curb 
opportunism. Trust has a major role in economic exchange and in cooperative 
relationships (Smith and Van Langenhove, 1995).  In such a context, it is logical to 
examine the factors that most impact on governance decisions: do suppliers make their 
decisions based on transaction and agency factors, or do they take into consideration the 
history of their relationship with their agents to drive organisational change and mitigate 
the impact of uncertainties and opportunism?  
 
72 
 
2.5.3 Trust within supply chain relationships 
As presented in Section 2.5.2, trust has an important role in building sustainable 
relationships. This section focuses on the role of trust within supply chain relationships.  
Following a review of 614 articles covering supply chain topics, Burgess et al. (2006) 
found the largest grouping of articles in the operation management discipline, followed 
by strategy and purchasing, with only a few articles focusing on psychological issues 
such as power differentials, trust, and cooperation. This finding helped accelerate the 
pace of academic research on trust within supply chain relationships. Due to the 
contribution of many authors, attention has shifted within the supply chain discipline 
from the transactional view of supply chains to the relational view. Considerable 
significance has been given to the socialisation processes and long term relationship 
building between supply chain members. Socialisation processes enable partners to 
learn about the culture of others, establish the possibility of alignment, and adjust their 
behaviour to establish successful outcomes in some cases (Cousins et al., 2006). 
 
A collaboration based on trust is achieved, not through the exchange of goods between 
supply chain members, but through the exchange of information (Handfield and 
Nichols, 1999) and the exchange of know-how (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Transparency 
across the supply chain is associated with improved supply chain performance, an 
optimisation of supply chain costs, and a reduction in contractual complexities between 
supply chain partners. The term ‘lean supply’ was introduced based on these principles. 
Simons et al. (2004) show that trust and contract complexity are fundamental variables 
for lean supply. The authors use TCE to explain the likely behaviour of British food 
retailers to act opportunistically.  
 
Transparency and the elimination of information asymmetry are key drivers of trust 
between supply chain members. Supply chain transparency was metaphorically defined 
by Lamming et al. (2001) as the behaviour of the light as an analogy for the transfer of 
knowledge in relationships. Three situations may occur in a supply chain relationship 
(Lamming et al., 2001):  
 
 An opaque situation is when the light cannot penetrate the surface of the 
substance; in such a case no information is shared between supply chain 
members. Even the day to day operation information is obscured. 
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 A translucent situation is when the light can enter and exit the substance but with 
distortion. This is similar to a black box collaborative design, where only partial 
information is shared. 
 A transparent situation is when the light can enter and exit without any 
disturbance. Information is shared on a selective and justified basis. 
Development of information leads to shared knowledge and collaborative 
abilities. 
 
The relationship between supply chain members is also a relationship between 
individuals. Interpersonal trust plays an important role in integrated supply chains 
(Zaheer et al., 1998). If the people managing the relationship from both sides of the 
chain block the transfer of information (opaque and translucent situations) the level of 
friction will increase and will ultimately erode the levels of trust.  
 
High levels of trust between supply chain members should offset relational risks in 
transparent situations. As elaborated by Das and Teng (2001), higher levels of trust 
between supply chain members result in lower probabilities of opportunistic behaviour. 
Such an assumption cannot be generalised without accounting for the power 
relationship between supply chain partners. According to Cox (2001), there will be only 
a few power circumstances that will encourage collaboration in situations of buyer 
dominance or in balance of power situations to create interdependence. The dominant 
power of retailers in food supply chains in the UK and other similar contexts influences 
the level of collaboration between supply chain partners. Retailers abuse their power to 
act opportunistically. In the Middle East, and according to the agency theory, 
information is considered to be an important source of power for distributors which 
gives them the right to act opportunistically, thereby increasing the probability of 
relational risks occurring.  
 
In such situations and although the barriers to collaboration are high, the socialisation 
processes and their impact on trust development cannot be neglected. Socialisation 
creates a network of interdependent social exchanges, and increases the level of mutual 
trust in the relationship (Cousins et al., 2006). The sharing of critical information should 
comprise of joint goal setting and joint problem solving, which demonstrates that, 
irrespective of the size of the supply chain members and their respective bargaining 
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strengths, they are willing to work towards a mutually beneficial relationship (Sahay, 
2003).  Such interaction drives the members of a supply network to engage in learning 
processes (Hakansson and Ford, 2002) that also contribute to overcoming collaboration 
barriers.  
 
It cannot be assumed that trust has the same impact in multicultural supply chain 
networks. Sako and Helper (1998) use TCE to explore the determinants of trust and 
opportunism in the United States and Japan. The authors find an important difference in 
the conceptualisation of trust between both countries. Japanese suppliers were found to 
be more trusting than U.S. suppliers. Even if American suppliers such as General 
Motors have safeguarded themselves against opportunism, they are still perceived as 
distrustful customers indicating that they failed to convince their suppliers that their 
commitments are credible.  
 
Trust within supply chain relationships is also affected by the structure of the chain. The 
success of supply chain processes such as sales and operations planning depends on the 
levels of trust established with customers, strategic suppliers, senior managers, and 
internal functions (Carter et al., 2009).  
 
The literature on trust within supply chain relationships supports the notion of relational 
contracting explored earlier. Transparency, open culture, and the quality of the team on 
either side of the chain unlock the boundaries between supply chain members and 
enhance the levels of trust. The current research draws on TCE and the agency theory to 
show how trust mitigates dyadic risks.  
 
 
2.6 The Evolutionary Approach  
The agency and TCE theories relied on opportunism and information asymmetry 
assumptions, and neglected other avenues that are associated with contextual variations, 
organisational learning, and capability development. These gaps were addressed by the 
evolutionary perspective (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
 
The evolutionary perspective was introduced mainly to address the processes of 
economic growth and economic alterations driven by technological and other 
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environmental changes. TCE has been criticised for neglecting key assumptions raised 
by the evolutionary perspective, such as differential capabilities and market adaptive 
processes (Langlois, 1986). Some authors suggest that the evolutionary perspective 
complements the transactional perspective (Foss, 1996). 
 
According to the TCE, an efficient organisation is one that adapts its governance 
structure to optimise transaction costs and maximise production value. Although 
outsourcing can have positive implications for production value, organisations should 
not neglect the costs associated with outsourcing, including the hold-up problem 
(Williamson, 1985), coordination costs (Williamson, 1975; Radner, 1992), and agency 
costs (Alchian and Demstez, 1972).  The TCE favours vertically integrated structures 
because of these supplementary costs. TCE explains how the boundary of the firm is 
created, but does not explain how the firm transforms itself and adapts to a changing 
environment. The process of innovation, skills, and learning is excluded from the 
transactional perspective. TCE assumes that governance is not an isolated phenomenon 
and is influenced by environmental shift parameters and individual behavioural 
attributes (Williamson, 1975).  TCE thus assumes a static environment and does not 
place much emphasis on the process of evolution. Firms gain competitiveness by 
enhancing the specificity level of certain assets.  The enhancement process is activated 
through learning and experience and through interaction between the firm and its 
environment. Such interaction becomes a necessity for certain types of transactions with 
technological evolution and changes in the economic contexts.  
 
2.6.1 Overview of evolutionary theory 
Evolutionary economics criticised the theory of the firm for its reliance on market 
equilibrium and profit maximisation. The theory does not emphasise the learning 
maximisation and organisational adaptation to economic changes. For the founders of 
evolutionary economics, the firm is treated as being motivated by profit but the theory 
does not focus its analysis on hypothetical states of industry equilibrium (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982).  The evolutionary theory relied on the Darwanian principle to explain the 
adaptation of firms to changes in the environment. According to the Darwinian Theory, 
organisms that are best adapted to their environment are naturally selected and are the 
ones which will survive. These organisms transmit their genetic characteristics to 
succeeding generations. The key themes in Darwinian theory are adopted by Nelson and 
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Winter's (1982) evolutionary theory. Genes are equated with organisational routines, the 
cornerstone of the evolutionary theory, and industry is equated with the species and the 
firm with the organism.  
 
“Our general term for all regular and predictable behavioural patterns is ‘routine.’… 
In our evolutionary theory, these routines play the role that genes play in biological 
evolutionary theory. They are a persistent feature of the organism and determine its 
possible behaviour (though actual behaviour is determined also by the environment); 
they are heritable in the sense that tomorrow’s organisms generated from today’s (for 
example, by building a new plant) have many of the same characteristics, and they are 
selectable in the sense that organisms with certain routines may do better than others, 
and, if so, their relative importance in the population (industry) is augmented over 
time.”(Nelson and Winter, 1982: 14.). 
 
The two key concepts that dominate modern organisational theory and evolutionary 
theory are routine and learning (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
Routine describes organisational behaviour, and any change in this behaviour leads to 
organisational change (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Routines take the place of profit 
maximisation and agency contracts, and are positioned as the fundamental unit for the 
evolutionary theory. According to Becker et al. (2005), most of the literature on 
organisational routines falls into one of the categories below:  
 Collective behavioural regularities:  how to describe the transition between 
individual and collective behaviour in the context of heterogeneous firms, the 
behaviour of the organisation being the aggregate of the behaviour of its 
individuals. 
 Rules and procedures: focus on the potential rather than the actual behaviour that 
can be regulated and guided by rules.  
 Dispositions to behave or think the same way: focus on shared individual habits 
that help sustain the behaviour associated with following rules and procedures.  
 
A common definition of routine is the one suggested by the founders of the evolutionary 
theory. Winter (1964) defines routine as the pattern of behaviour that is followed 
repeatedly but is subject to change when conditions change. The characteristics of 
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pattern and recurrence are at the centre of the concept of routine. Starting with Winter 
(1964), most of the authors who have defined routine agree on this centrality.  
 
The four different terms used in the literature to denote the concept of pattern are action, 
activity, behaviour, and interaction (Becker, 2004). Action and activity are used as 
synonyms in the economics and the business literature. Behaviour is distinguished from 
actions because it is observable (Becker, 2004). The definition of routine as a pattern of 
behaviour is thus different from the definition of routine as a pattern of actions or 
activities. Burns and Scapens (2000) suggest differentiating between routines being the 
way things are done, and rules being the way things should be done. As noted by Becker 
(2004), this ambiguity entails distinguishing between routine as behavioural patterns 
(recurrent interaction) and routine as cognitive regularities (rules). Nelson and Winter 
(1982) originally proposed that the concept of routine incorporates both a repeated 
behaviour and dispositions. Their position was later revised putting greater emphasis on 
routines as capacity for potential, rather than actual behaviour under certain 
circumstances (Nelson and Winter, 2002). Feldman and Pentland (2003) suggest 
including both dimensions as they see routine from an ostensive perspective (an idea or 
a plan) and a performative perspective (actually performing the plan). Hodgson (2003) 
proposes a separation between the actuality dimension and the potentiality dimension. 
Routines can be recurrent behavioural patterns or rules and dispositions.  
 
The ontological distinction in the definitions of routine is not at the centre of this 
research, but emphasis is placed on examining the relationship between the concept of 
routine and the subject of the research. There is a consensus that the concept of routine 
includes elements such as actions, recurrent patterns, and multiple actors (Parmigiani 
and Howard-Grenville, 2011). Routines are generative and dynamic systems, not static 
objects (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Hodgson, 2003). Feldman and Pentland (2005) 
suggest a causal relationship between the ostensive aspect of routine (idea, plan, rule), 
and the performative aspect (actual implementation). Both aspects are codified 
following various artefacts that can take many different forms, from written rules to 
general physical settings (Feldman and Pentland, 2005) as illustrated in Figure 2.9.   
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The model of Feldman and Pentland (2005) shows that routine can be explored as a 
dynamic system where there is a causal loop between how things are done 
(performative) and how they should be done (ostensive).  The literature shows that 
routine can be analysed either from an ostensive or a performative perspective, or both. 
As the subject of the research is of a dynamic nature, the latter perspective is more 
convenient to understand how routine influences the relationship between suppliers and 
agents. 
 
2.6.2 Routine and dynamic capabilities 
Organisational routines are proposed to analyse how work is carried out in an 
organisation and how organisations change to adapt to variations in the economic 
context (Zollo and Winter, 2002). The concept of routine bridges the evolutionary 
theory of the firm with the dynamic capability theory. Nelson and Winter (1982) view 
routine as the skills of an organisation. In the context of a supplier agent relationship, 
understanding the relationship between activity patterns and behavioural patterns is 
important in differentiating between patterns that work for the relationship from those 
working against it.  
 
Routines can drive organisations to do things in an innovative way (Cyert and March, 
1963). By reviewing their performance on current activities, organisations can challenge 
the capabilities deployed to execute these activities. In a normal situation, external and 
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internal environment factors can lead to breaking certain routines. Different factors may 
trigger change in actual routines (Bresman, 2013): 
 Performance feedback. 
 Events that lead to expectations of change in future performance.  
 New demands from management.  
 Organisational restructuring.  
 
According to evolutionary scholars, what triggers the challenge of current routines is the 
embedded knowledge and experience inside the organisation. Routines can hence be 
considered to be containers of knowledge (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Becker, 2004).  
 
The learning process involved in routine change is transformative by nature as it entails 
understanding how things are done (performative attribute) and how they should be 
done (ostensive attribute). Organisations that succeed in challenging the routine in 
response to external or internal changes may be more competitive than others. Routines 
can be considered as capabilities held within the firm that can either contribute to its 
evolution (dynamic), or to its regression (strategic).  
 
Routines can be considered at the core of the dynamic capabilities perspective 
developed by Teece et al. (1997). Dynamic capabilities are defined as an organisation’s 
ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address 
a rapidly changing environment (Teece et al., 1997). Routines are referred to by Teece 
et al. (1997) as internal competence and distinctive activities performed by integrated 
clusters (individuals and groups) using the firm’s specific assets (Teece et al., 1997). 
Zollo and Winter (2002) explicitly used the concept of routine in their definition of 
dynamic capabilities. A dynamic capability is a learned and stable pattern of collective 
activity through which the organisation systematically generates and modifies its 
operating routines in pursuit of improved effectiveness (Zollo and Winter, 2002). 
 
Following these two definitions, the change of current routines is positioned as a 
transformation process that drives organisations to enhance their capabilities or to 
introduce new capabilities in order to adapt to changing economic environments.  
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2.6.3 Evolutionary and transactional approaches 
A major contribution by the evolutionary theory to the understanding of the supplier 
agent relationship is examining the dynamic nature of the relationship or the governance 
structure. Instead of examining the relationship at a given point in time, the research 
proposes to use the dynamic capability perspective to explore the evolution of the 
relationship. Positive routines can be positioned as learning patterns that drive the 
relationship forward by igniting transformation processes. On the other hand, negative 
routines can lead to relationship deterioration. The supplier agent problem that 
engenders self-interested behaviour is one such example.  
Following the dynamic perspective, suppliers and agents who succeed in mitigating 
dyadic risks are able to transform their current routines/competence and adapt them to 
the changing economic conditions (the move from traditional trade to a modern trade 
context in the research). Referring to the dynamic capability perspective illustrated in 
Figure 2.10, the change in current routines entails a collective interaction between 
individuals involved in the transaction, the organisations concerned (suppliers and 
agents), and the external environment (retail evolution). The transformation strategy is 
based on identifying and exploiting new opportunities that are effectively and efficiently 
embraced; it is about choosing and committing to long term paths of capability 
development (Teece et al., 1997). 
 
 
 
If suppliers are convinced that agents are hiding costs, sustaining this negative routine 
from the agent side in a modern trade context might lead to vertical integration, 
81 
 
following the TCE philosophy. If, on the other hand, agents react to this routine by 
exploiting their capabilities and by introducing new capabilities, they will not block the 
evolution of their suppliers.  Using the dynamic capability philosophy, routines may 
extend outside the firm to embrace alliance partners (Teece et al., 1997). Agents can 
break the opportunism routine by putting the actual cost at parity with the committed 
cost. The behaviour of the agent cannot be assumed to be static in nature. Agents may 
accumulate negative routines such as opportunism, as well positive routines such as 
trust. The governance structure adopted by suppliers might change as a result of the 
changes in the environment or as a result of changes in the agents’ behaviour (from 
opportunism to trust or from trust to opportunism). The reaction to environmental and 
inter-organisational risk factors may be explained by an evolution of the governance 
structure or the model adopted by suppliers and their agents. The agency and TCE 
theories explain the reaction of suppliers either through an alteration in the contract 
(AT) or in the governance structures (TCE). Neither of the two theories explains how 
the model of the agent evolves in response to the behaviour of the suppliers. Answers 
related to the expected behaviour of the agent are found in the evolutionary perspective.   
 
 
2.6.4 Expected behaviour of the agent 
The two strategies presented by the dynamic capability perspective that can explain the 
expected behaviour of agents are specialisation and diversification strategies. 
The concept of specialisation was associated with the evolution of the firm with the 
paper of George Stigler. Stigler (1951) suggested that firms start as vertically integrated 
units when markets are small. With the growth in demand, firms disintegrate and 
specialise in order to benefit from economies of scale. Despite being criticised by the 
TCE perspective, Stigler was able to explain the evolution of firms from integrated to 
disintegrated models in several industries (Agarwal, 1997).  Specialisation or 
disintegration strategies have been attributed to various evolutionary mechanisms. 
Lamoreaux et al. (2003) associate specialisation with the reduction in transportation 
cost, allowing firms to coordinate activities through long term relationships. Some 
authors attribute vertical disintegration to the modularisation of products and processes 
(Langlois, 2003; Schilling, 2000). The evolution of the channel environment, such as 
the expansion of trade, leads to specialisation (Teece, 2011).  Specialisation entails 
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focus on the core capabilities that can be leveraged by the firm to sustain its competitive 
advantage. 
 
According to Teece et al. (1997), focus and specialisation are defined in terms of 
distinctive competences or capabilities, not products. By being specialised, firms can 
benefit from an increasing return to scale with the growth in demand (Klepper, 1997). 
Competitive advantage is not just a function of how one plays the game; it is also a 
function of the assets one has to deploy and redeploy in a changing market (Teece et al., 
1997).  
 
According to Malone et al. (2011) hyper-specialisation often leads to improvements in 
quality, speed, and cost. Specialisation and hyper-specialisation are both associated with 
becoming experts in things that are already done by the firm. Agents may decide to let 
go of certain activities in order to focus on upgrading the activities that make them 
different and more specialised in terms of quality and cost.  
 
Diversification strategies are mostly adopted when the firm’s capabilities are 
significantly dependent on non-safeguarded income sources, or when the firm is 
operating in declining market conditions. Diversification is a means by which a firm 
expands from its core business into other businesses or markets (Shin, 2001). According 
to the dynamic capability perspective, diversification builds upon or extends existing 
capabilities, enabling companies to overcome unfavourable market environments 
(Teece et al., 1997). Diversification is also adopted to capture existing or future market 
opportunities, or to adapt to new technologies (Chandler, 1977). The costs of 
diversification strategies are not to be neglected. Porter (1985) notes that diversification 
can be very expensive, yet there exists a debate in the literature about the benefits of 
diversification. The key issue for Grant (1988) is not whether diversified firms are more 
profitable than specialised firms, but whether diversification improves the firm’s 
profitability. Firms need to have the financial capability to seek new capabilities or to 
extend existing capabilities. Several uncertainties exist with regards to the expected 
outcomes of diversification, which may drive firms to uncalculated adventures. This 
explains why high profits from existing activities can be used to finance diversification, 
as noted by Grant (1988). Burgelman (1983) had an opposing view and believed that 
high performing firms should continue driving their mainstream activities. 
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The debate pertaining to the impact of diversification on performance is beyond the 
scope of this research. The option of diversification can be considered by agents facing 
non-encouraging market conditions. Agents, who are heavily dependent on suppliers, 
may focus on building existing capabilities. Specialisation decreases agency costs and 
increases the likelihood of retaining relationships with suppliers.  
 
 
2.7 Gaps in the Literature  
The research examines an operational management issue that is related to the 
outsourcing of the sales and distribution activities from one member of the supply chain 
to another. The research relies on the transactional and relational theories within an 
evolutionary perspective to explain supply chain risks in the Middle East. Emphasis is 
given to network type risks, which are referred to as dyadic risks, because the concerned 
network is composed of two members. The distributor in the Middle East (agent) has a 
crucial role in the supply chain and is considered to be the main actor in the execution 
of the sales and distribution activities.  The main dyadic risks examined are those 
arising from issues that are internal and external to the supply chain, as illustrated in 
Figure 2.11.  
 
 
 
As earlier presented in Table 2.2, there is a scarcity of studies exploring supply chain 
issues, and more specifically dyadic risks in the Middle East, only a few of which take 
account of an evolutionary environment.   
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2.7.1 Context of the research  
Identifying and mitigating risks affecting supply chain members has come to be at the 
core of the supply chain discipline, mainly in the period after the year 2000, when the 
world witnessed many environmental and economic crises with significant implications 
for supply chain matters. This drove academic and corporate institutions to seek 
different solutions to optimise their supply chain and mitigate the associated risks. 
Topics related to the resilience and vulnerability of the supply chain have become 
prominent (Christopher and Peck, 2004; Peck, 2005; Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009). 
The supply chain literature has become involved in the understanding and the 
identification of all sorts of risks affecting the different supply chain members (Kern et 
al., 2012; Finch, 2004; Ritchie and Brindley, 2007; Ellegaard, 2008; Faisal et al., 2006; 
Norrman and Jansson, 2004; Decker, 2013; Wever et al., 2012; Laeequddin et al., 2012; 
Ding et al., 2013; Harland et al., 2005). There is a scarcity of research exploring 
outsourcing risks in a controversial and diversified business context like the Middle 
East, controversial for hosting significantly insecure (Syria, Iraq) but at the same time 
the richest (KSA) and expeditiously developing (UAE) countries in the world, and 
diverse since it comprises traditional and fragmented retail channel markets (Iraq, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen), modern trade markets (UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain) and 
mixed channel markets (KSA). An extensive review of the literature that has examined 
supply chain issues was presented in Table 2.2.  The table has shown bias towards 
research in Europe and the U.S, very few studies (only three) have been found 
addressing supply chain issues in the Middle East. Jraisat et al. (2013) examined 
information sharing in the export supply chain. The authors analysed multiple cases of 
producers and exporters in Jordan; specific transaction, relationship and network drivers 
of information sharing in the export supply chain have been highlighted. Trust is 
perceived to be part of the commitment relationship driver, and the absence of formal 
contracts also appears to create possible opportunistic behaviour (Jraisat et al., 2013). 
Jacobs and Hall (2007) explored the integration of port actors in the global supply 
chain. The authors analyse the case of the port of Dubai and identify the various factors 
(place specific, path dependent, institutional and political) that underlie the territorial 
embeddedness which either enable or restrict the supply chain related strategies adopted 
by the port actors. Ahmad and Daghfous (2010) used in-depth interview techniques to 
examine the concept of knowledge management in service and family business groups 
in UAE. The author found that the interviewed companies do not show significant 
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interest in, or focus on, implementing new techniques or methods to create and generate 
new knowledge. The above three articles do not examine the issues raised by the 
research, hence justifying the purpose of the study, which explores dyadic risks 
affecting FMCG supply chain members in the Middle East.  
 
2.7.2  Evolutionary perspective 
Only one article (Leavy, 2004, Table 2.2) has been found in the literature addressing the 
risks and opportunities of outsourcing within a dynamic environment. Leavy (2004) 
examines different cases of outsourcing strategies (Table 2.6).  
 
 
 
 
The author shows that outsourcing helps companies focus on their core capabilities, take 
inefficiencies out of their system, and expand their business models. Such strategies 
resulted in Nike’s turnover increasing to US$7.8 billion, with a 39% gross margin 
(Leavy, 2004). The two main risks associated with outsourcing are the risk of losing 
skills essential to compete for the future, as well as taking the outsourcing decision at a 
suitable time in line with the industry’s evolution (Leavy, 2004): 
 Losing skills and capabilities: outsourcing may meet short term opportunities, 
but organisations need to consider long term implications by retaining skills and 
know-how required to exploit future opportunities.  
 Outsourcing and industry evolution: companies need to assess the benefits of 
outsourcing to ensure alignment with the industry’s evolution in terms of timing 
and positioning in the value chain, taking into account that such decisions may 
change over time. 
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Given the dynamic nature of the institutional environment, a model that seemed 
justifiable in the past may no longer be viable in the future. Suppliers may find it 
optimal to outsource the sales and distribution activities in one country, but taking such 
a decision in another country might not conform to the evolution in the industry, and 
might put suppliers in a disadvantaged position in terms of capabilities and scale, as 
noted by Leavy (2004). Integrating the evolutionary approach helps in understanding 
how the model of suppliers and distributors is evolving, or will evolve, to mitigate 
dyadic risks, which is of academic and practical importance to understand supplier 
distributor relationships in the Middle East. The only article that has examined the 
notion of agents and distributors in the Middle East dates from 1979.  
 
Through interviews conducted with 30 industrial companies, Dunn (1979) provided 
guidelines for managing distributors in the Middle East at a time when Middle Eastern 
markets were dominated by traditional trade channels and positioned as export markets 
by suppliers. The division of responsibilities between suppliers and distributors back in 
1979 is presented in Table 2.7. 
 
 
 
Since 1979, several changes have taken place, including the following: 
 Channel dynamics: some of the key markets that were traditional in 1979 have 
since been transformed to modern trade markets. Examples include Kuwait, 
UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, KSA, Lebanon, Jordan.  
 Proximity to market:  at the time of the study, suppliers were managing their 
operations from their home countries; Unilever from the UK, P&G  from the 
USA, Danone from France, Mars from the USA, Kraft from the USA, and 
Nestle from Switzerland. Since then, all these suppliers have become physically 
present in the Middle Eastern markets. 
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 Distributor model: at the time of the study, distributors were big wholesalers 
with the required financial capabilities and market networks. Suppliers used to 
export their products to these distributors without worrying about financial risks. 
These distributors have evolved their models today and have become part of big 
conglomerates.  
 Size of the Middle East: at the time of the study, Europe and U.S markets 
contributed the biggest share of the suppliers’ overall business.  Today, with the 
rise in emergent economies, regions like the Middle East and Africa have 
become important growth contributors for many FMCG suppliers. 
 Political and economic environment: In 1979, the only insecure regions in the 
Middle East were Palestine and Lebanon; today other countries like Iraq and 
Syria have been added. UAE today is among the fastest developing economies 
in the world.   
 
The research of Dunn (1979) was not based on theoretical grounds, but rather on in-
depth interviews. This research bridges this gap by addressing the models of suppliers 
and distributors in 2014 in association with the dyadic risks affecting them. By 
integrating the evolutionary perspective, the research explores the issue while taking 
into account the dynamic nature of the external environment, as suggested by Leavy 
(2004).  
 
2.7.3 Agency law in the Middle East  
Any foreign company wishing to operate or open a subsidiary in any country in the 
Middle East has to follow the rules and regulations set by the particular country 
(Homsy, 1983).  In general, a local agent is chosen by the foreign company to handle its 
businesses in the corresponding country. An agent is someone who lobbies to obtain a 
particular contract on behalf of the principal in return for a commission or fee. Choosing 
the right agent is essential due to his role in achieving success in that region. The role of 
agents is not solely limited to promoting the sales of their principal’s products, but also 
includes other functions like procurement of visas and customs clearances, assistance in 
contract negotiations, and local government relations (Homsy, 1983). 
 
Most Arab countries have proclaimed special legislation for commercial agencies and 
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described qualification requirements, like the need to register the commercial agency 
agreement with a special registrar at the Ministry of Commerce within a short period 
after its execution. By law, any commercial agent involved in a business with an 
unregistered commercial agency agreement (or any other violation of requirements) is 
breaking the local commercial agency law (Homsy, 1983). In such a situation, the agent 
or the foreign company is subject to a fine or even the closing of the business. However, 
this is not applicable in all Arab countries, since not all governmental ministries track 
and penalise, and also due to the fact that the agent might have fulfilled other 
requirements (like being a local agent) besides the registration.  Moreover, the law does 
not punish a foreign principal who works through a local commercial agent under an 
unregistered agreement; rather it punishes the agent himself. For governments in the 
Middle East, the necessity to appoint or to partner with a local agent is given priority 
over the need to register the agency agreement. 
 
Local customers (local government ministries and public sector departments) will not 
perform any transactions with commercial agents who are not registered under the local 
commercial law.  An example of where this applies is KSA. However, these procedures 
are not strictly enforced and the foreign company is not likely to be affected.  Another 
disadvantage of unregistered agreements is that no claims of any nature will be heard 
from the agent according to Article 3 in the UAE commercial agency law (Homsy, 
1983), meaning any problem that may arise between the agent and the principal will be 
dismissed.  
 
The agency laws in countries in the Middle East such as Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE share some characteristics; private enterprise is encouraged and 
foreign suppliers must use agents in practically all cases (Homsy, 1983). In general, 
these countries restrict agency activities to their own nationals in order to protect oil 
generated capital and encourage local employment. Agents are regulated by mandatory 
registration procedures, and they are protected against sudden or random termination of 
the agreement by their foreign principals.  
 
Legal experts confirm that successful relationships between foreign principals or 
suppliers and their respective agents or suppliers in the Arab world must be based not 
only on familiarity with the laws of the particular country, but also on knowledge of the 
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business backgrounds in that region and, moreover, the principal must continuously 
cultivate good personal relations with his local agent (Homsy, 1983). Even if the formal 
contract clarifies the responsibilities of both parties to the agency relationships 
(performance based objectives), the behaviour of the parties and the interest they show 
to drive the relationship may be more important. 
 
With most of the Middle Eastern countries joining the World Trade Organisation, the 
governments of these countries are obliged to become less vigilant when it comes to the 
appointment of local agents (Samba, 2006). 
 
This transformation, driven by the interest of Middle Eastern governments in becoming 
more integrated in the international trading community by giving greater access to 
foreign companies to their markets, is putting local operators such as distributors at risk. 
The possibility of exempting suppliers from legal obligations to partner with local 
agents or partners is bound to encourage suppliers to seek further independence. 
Relational contracting may be positioned as the only option available for distributors to 
sustain historically formed agency relationships and reduce dependency risks. If the 
current research does not consider the relational perspective, it will not only be 
criticised by the authors who proposed integrating the role of trust in TCE and the 
agency theories, but also by practitioners who may also comment on the embeddedness 
of relational dimensions in transactional relationships in the Middle East.  
 
 
2.7.4  Relational perspective 
This research also addresses a third gap associated with the integration of the relational 
perspective in the transactional one. Although this gap is essential to authors who have 
criticised the TCE, this research considers that supply chain risk issues cannot be 
explored without taking into account the relational perspective. This assumption is not 
only supported by the growing importance of partnership relationships in the supply 
chain (Gottfredson et al., 2005), but also by the latest research trends in TCE and supply 
chain management (Bourlakis and Melewar, 2011). Table 2.8 provides a summary of 
the key studies that have used the TCE to understand supply chain issues. The table 
shows that many authors have accounted for the role of collaboration and trust when 
examining supply chain risks. Had this research not integrated the relational 
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perspective, it would have been condemned as incomplete by supply chain theorists. As 
explored by the agency theory, opportunism is curbed through formal contracting. 
However, formal contracting is not sufficient to mitigate opportunism as viewed by 
relationship marketing theorists (Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2003; Sivadas and Dwyer, 
2000). The research examines the mitigation of risks through formal and informal 
contracting, noting that the latter mechanism is becoming more dominant in today’s 
hypercompetitive context and the shift to relationship economies (Langlois, 2003; 
Lamoreaux et al., 2003). Table 2.8 presents an overview of the literature that explores 
supply chain issues from a TCE angle, and shows that the transactional approach 
provides limited understanding of supply chain risks as it does not take into account the 
notions of collaboration and trust. Because the research takes into account the dynamic 
nature of the transaction and the evolution of suppliers’ and distributor’s models, it has 
become more critical to integrate the relational perspective, since relationships evolve 
over time, and trust is built up over time. Building on the arguments proposed in Section 
2.7.2, suppliers may have gained experience and know-how in gaining their distributors’ 
trust (and vice versa for distributors) between 1979 and 2014.  Some relationships in 
2014 may be the outcome of the economic and non-economic rewards sacrificed during 
the period 1979-2014. This research positions the relational and evolutionary 
perspective as one entity that can only be explored together when understanding dyadic 
risks. There is a scarcity of research that explores supply chain risks from a wider 
theoretical angle: relational, evolutionary and transactional perspectives.   
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2.8 Research Propositions  
The literature review shows that the agency and TCE theories are relevant theoretical 
avenues to understand the sources and consequences of inter-organisational risks 
affecting suppliers and agents. Both theories provide clear, but not complete, 
explanations of risk mitigation strategies. Formal contracting, and vertical integration in 
case of contract failure, may provide an understanding of the behaviour of the supplier 
assuming opportunism, uncertainty, information asymmetry, and bounded rationality. 
However, these assumptions cannot be treated as universally accepted facts of human 
behaviour. Organisations may consider building relationships and developing trust to 
resolve dyadic risk issues, especially in socially driven contexts like the Middle East.  
Agency theory scholars are becoming more open towards the need to consider the role 
of trust in agency theory research   (Fayezi et al., 2012). TCE does not reject the 
antagonistic relationship between trust and opportunism. Organisations operate in 
dynamic environments. Suppliers may consider altering their governance structure, not 
only to mitigate inter-organisational risks, but also as a response to changes in the 
environment. The same applies to agents, who might adapt their behaviour to the 
expected behaviour of suppliers. By considering the evolutionary approach, the research 
explores ex ante and ex post phenomena. The transactional approach has been criticised 
by evolutionary theorists for focusing on static cases. The dynamic capability theory is 
explored in the literature review as it broadens the notion of asset specificity (Winter, 
1988; Klein, 1988).  
 
Failure to address supply chain risks may lead to further vulnerability across the supply 
chain (Svensson, 2000). As this research strictly focuses on two members of the supply 
chain (supplier and distributor), the inter-organisational risks are referred to as dyadic 
risks. The term supplier refers to multinational FMCG manufacturers and includes 
companies like P&G, Nestle, Mars, and Kraft. Distributors are local companies 
exclusively responsible for the sales and distribution of the suppliers’ brands in local 
markets. For the purpose of this research, dyadic risks caused by outsourcing the sales 
and distribution activities are defined for suppliers as the impact of behavioural factors 
such as opportunism, and informational asymmetry on their outcome and behaviour 
based performance. In other words, an inability to control performance may block 
suppliers from driving their performance (growth acceleration, cost optimisation), 
which may put them at a disadvantage relative to other suppliers who better control their 
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performance (outcome and behaviour based). For distributors, dyadic risks are defined 
as the uncertainties (probability of unexpected events occurring) caused by their 
dependency on suppliers. Since the opportunistic behaviour is embedded in human 
agents, the research assumes that suppliers might also act opportunistically by not 
taking into account the interests of distributors. Table 2.9 presents the various 
terminologies used for each dyadic member. Supplier agent relationships are referred to 
in this research as supplier-distributor relationships, and a supplier agent problem (AT) 
as a supplier distributor problem. Table 2.9 presents the dyadic members explored by 
the research.  
 
 
 
To further understand the sources of dyadic risks and the various mitigation strategies 
adopted, several propositions are developed based on TCE and agency theories. Trust 
between dyadic members is also examined given its role in bridging the gap between the 
transactional and the relationship approaches and for its contribution to building 
collaborative supply chain relationships (Whipple at al., 2010). To address the gaps 
highlighted earlier, the propositions are explored in relationship with the evolution of 
the institutional environment (retail evolution) across three contexts in the Middle East: 
Iraq (traditional trade dominated market), KSA (mixed channel market), and UAE 
(modern trade dominated market). This will help in understanding whether the 
mitigation strategies vary with the evolution in the context.  
 
The propositions raised by the research do not reject the transactional perspective, but 
aim at enriching it with the relational and the evolutionary perspectives. Although the 
transactional approach has been subject to various critiques, it has nevertheless been 
widely recognised by several advocates mainly in the supply chain discipline, as 
presented earlier in Tables 2.2 and 2.8.  
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By exploring these propositions, the research aims to address the questions below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.10 illustrates the association between the propositions that will be explored, and 
the relevant theories discussed in the literature review. It is important to highlight that 
many authors in operation management are now focusing on theory testing, rather than 
theory building, to examine supply chain issues (Ettlie and Sethuraman, 2002; Ketchen 
and Hult, 2007; McNally and Griffin, 2004; Squire et al., 2006; Zsidisin and Ellram, 
2003; Holcomb and Hitt, 2007). 
 
P1: FMCG suppliers in the Middle East who outsource sales and distribution 
activities to distributors are negatively affected by dyadic risks. 
P2: FMCG distributors in the Middle East are negatively affected by dyadic risks. 
P3: FMCG suppliers in the Middle East mitigate dyadic risks by deploying a formal 
control system with distributors. 
P4: FMCG suppliers in the Middle East mitigate dyadic risks by partially integrating 
their sales and distribution activities with their distributors. 
P5: FMCG suppliers in the Middle East mitigate dyadic risks by vertically 
integrating their sales and distribution activities without considering the role of their 
distributors. 
P6: The development of trust between suppliers and distributors contributes to 
mitigating dyadic risks. 
P7: FMCG distributors in the Middle East mitigate dyadic risks through A-
specialisation and B- diversification strategies. 
1- How do FMCG suppliers and distributors in the Middle East perceive dyadic 
risks affecting their relationships? P1, P2 
2- How are FMCG suppliers in the Middle East mitigating dyadic risks? P3, P4, 
P5 
 
3- What role does trust play in dyadic relationships in the Middle East? P6 
 
4- How are FMCG distributors in the Middle East mitigating dyadic risks? P7 
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Table 2.11 summarises the gaps presented earlier in association with the propositions 
that this research intends to explore.  
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Chapter 3. Research Methodology 
 
This chapter aims to discuss the methodologies adopted by the research and explain the 
methods used to gather and analyse data. The chapter starts with an overview of the 
research philosophy (Section 3.1.), and then focuses on the epistemological stance of 
the researcher (Section 3.2), which will justify the methodology chosen for the research 
(Section 3.3). The methods to gather and analyse the data are then discussed (Section 
3.4) followed by the foreseen practical issues resulting from the chosen methodology 
(Section 3.5).  The chapter concludes with the ethical considerations adopted by the 
researcher (Section 3.6).  
 
3.1 Research Philosophy  
The process of producing and verifying knowledge is influenced by the epistemological 
position of the researcher, which is affected by the nature of the study under 
investigation. Following this position, the appropriate methodology is chosen and the 
methods of collecting and analysing the data are followed.  Knowledge is produced and 
verified through a sequential process universally followed by natural and social science 
researchers. The key elements of a research process, adapted from Saunders et al. 
(2000), are illustrated in Figure 3.1 below.  
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Crotty (1998) defines the meaning of each element of the research process as follows: 
 Epistemology: the theory of knowledge that defines what kind of knowledge is 
possible and legitimate. 
 Theoretical perspective: the philosophical stance detailing the methodology, and 
thus providing a context for the process and grounding its logic and criteria. 
 Methodology: the strategy, plan of action, process, or design lying behind the 
choice and use of particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods 
to the desired outcomes. 
 Methods: the techniques used to gather and analyse data related to a research 
question or hypothesis. 
 
The philosophical stance adopted by the research is the starting point of the research 
process. The nature of the research and the outcomes that it intends to achieve 
determine the epistemological position adopted. Such a position is fundamental, as it 
helps in clarifying the research design and, in some cases, it might also help the 
researcher identify new designs outside his own experience (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002). 
Epistemology is related to the nature, development, and limitations of knowledge 
(Saunders et al., 2000). Epistemology concentrates on the process by which knowledge 
is acquired and validated (Gall et al., 1996). It is directly concerned with questions such 
as what it means to know, and how reality can be known. The common epistemological 
positions are objectivism, constructionism, and subjectivism (Crotty, 1998). The 
differences between objectivism and constructionism are presented in the sections 
below:  
 
 
3.1.1 Objectivism 
Objectivism describes the existence of social entities in realities that are external to the 
concerned social actors (Saunders et al., 2000). Objectivists hold that entities carry 
intrinsic meaning within them as objects, and that the objective truth is measurable 
when approached the right way (Crotty, 1998). The main perspectives that stem from 
objectivism are positivism and post positivism. 
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The positivist perspective is at the extreme end of the objectivist epistemology. 
Positivists believe that reality is not created or constructed, but can be directly measured 
through observations and scientific experimentations, and can be represented through 
objects and symbols.  
 
Human behaviour can be explained and predicted in terms of cause and effect (May, 
1997). Positivists clearly distinguish between facts and values; it is possible to measure 
social behaviour independently of the context, and social phenomena are ‘things’ that 
can be viewed objectively (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). Positivist research is grounded 
in the assumption that features of the social environment constitute an independent 
reality and are relatively constant across time and settings (Gall et al., 1996). Positivists 
defend the existence of a single reality that can be tested (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). 
Their aim is to generate a universal law that explains this reality and that reveals the 
objective truth (Girod-Seville and Perret, 2001). These laws of cause and effect become 
universal when they are generalised on a wider population base, which is a major 
objective of positivist researchers. Knowledge is developed by collecting numerical data 
on observable behaviour of samples and then subjecting this data to numerical analysis 
(Gall et al., 1996). For this reason, positivists use quantitative methods such as 
observations, experiments, and surveys to gather and collect data. Hypotheses are 
empirically tested through complicated statistical analysis techniques. They 
consequently follow a deductive reasoning approach that starts from a universal view, 
and then focuses on a few hypotheses generated for testing (Babbie, 2005), which at a 
later stage are either confirmed, refuted, or modified. The most important principle that 
governs the positivist approach is the operationalisation of a concept in order to make it 
visible for experimentation. A positivist researcher is not concerned with the context of 
the research; social reality is seen as relatively constant across time and settings (Gall et 
al., 1996). The researcher is independent, detached, and maintains a distance from the 
object of the research (Carson et al., 2001).  
 
Post positivism was introduced to address the main critiques of positivism (Kuhn, 
1970). The key points addressed by post positivists are related to the nature of reality, 
the universality of laws, and the role of the researcher. The arguments presented against 
those points are the founding tenets of the post-positivist school of thought.  
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Positivists believe in what is observable and what is available to the senses. With the 
evolution of unobservable science, especially molecules, atoms, and electrons, the 
founding positivist assumption of the observable no longer applied (Kuhn, 1970). 
Although positivist researchers have revisited their ultimate rejection of the 
unobservable since then, and consequently introduced instrumentalism as an alternative, 
they have persistently denied the existence of the unobservable (Hanson, 1958).   Post-
positivists argue that the researcher can go beyond the observed reality and reveal more 
fundamental layers, of which what we ‘see’ is a kind of projection or reflection 
(Alvesson et al., 2009). Positivists believe that reality is what constructs the person 
(Evans, 2000), and their strict focus on a reality that is observable has left substantial 
gaps in research. Some hidden patterns underlying rule formations might exist, which 
govern the observed parts of reality, and which can contribute to explaining these 
observed parts if explored (Alvesson et al., 2009).  Consequently, the post positivist 
approach has limited explanatory power for its inability to explain phenomena that are 
not visible to the eye.  
 
As noted earlier, the single aim of positivists is to generate a universal law that explains 
reality and reveals the objective truth (Girod-Seville and Perret, 2001). Previous 
experience, historical events, and contextual conditions find no place within the 
positivist rationale. The positivist researcher is entirely detached from the environment 
and is distant from the object of the research (Carson et al., 2001). This assumption has 
been challenged by post-positivist researchers, who refute the generalisation of facts 
without considering their contextual environment. The universality of findings cannot 
be proven; history warns against making such a claim (Kuhn, 1970).   
 
Another critical argument about positivist beliefs is related to the role of the researcher. 
Positivists stress the objectivity of the researcher, who has to be disconnected from his 
past and current experience, locking his knowledge in a box and acting in complete 
neutrality vis-à-vis the object.  If the separation of biases of the mind from the world 
during the entire research process does not exist, the researcher will be involuntarily 
obliged to use previous and current experience, thus contaminating the research with 
biased thoughts. While positivists claim absolute objectivity, post positivists claim a 
certain level of objectivity (Crotty, 1998).  
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Following these critical arguments, post-positivism is considered to be a refinement or a 
modified version of positivism. While positivism is on the extreme objectivist 
quantitative epistemological side that only believes in the absolute truth, post positivism 
is less extreme in rejecting the unobservable reality and rather believes in coming closer 
to the truth (Ernest, 1994). This explains why most of the researchers classify post-
positivism as an objectivist epistemology that is less rigid than positivism, yet does not 
go to the other constructionist and subjectivist extreme (Crotty, 1998).  
 
3.1.2 Constructionism 
The constructionist epistemology is on the other extreme of the epistemological debate 
between objectivism and subjectivism. The dichotomy between the positivist and the 
constructionist philosophical schools is clearly shown in Crotty’s (1998) definition of 
constructionism:  
 
“Constructionism is the view that all knowledge and therefore all meaningful reality as 
such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction 
between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an 
essentially social context.” (Crotty, 1998: 42).  
 
The above definition shows that the constructionist ideas ultimately reject the ideas held 
by objectivists. Constructionists do not believe in objective truth, but relate truth to the 
level of interaction between humans and objects. As such, the object is not external, but 
is embedded in human experience.  
 
“Constructionism claims that meanings are constructed by human beings as they 
engage in the world they are interpreting.” (Crotty, 1998: 43).  
 
Constructionists emphasise the role of meaning, which they see as constructed rather 
than created. A constructionist is an engineer whose role is to assemble existing objects 
in the world to give them meaning. The assembly of processes depends on the 
experience of the researcher and the value of the concerned objects. Constructionists 
refute the value free assumption held by positivists.  The interaction between the 
researcher and the world is at the heart of the constructionist epistemology.  With 
accumulated experience, individuals become conscious of what is happening in their 
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world. When the mind becomes conscious of something, it reaches out to, and into, that 
object (Crotty, 1998). As defined by the Oxford dictionary, experience is nothing but a 
historical accumulation of knowledge. It is the practical contact with and observation of 
facts or events. Experience represents the knowledge or skill acquired by humans over a 
period of time.  Experience is explored by constructionists with the objective of coming 
closer to reality by interpreting the meanings that emerge from the individual. These 
meanings are not value free, as believed by positivists, but are influenced by the 
external world and by the personal experience of the individual. A major theoretical 
perspective that stems from constructionism is interpretivism. 
 
The term interpretivism is derived from the Greek word hermeneuein, which means to 
interpret something (Carson et al., 2001).  
 
“Interpretivism believes in culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of 
the social life world.” (Crotty, 1998: 67).  
 
Interpretivists assume that meanings are constructed by humans as they engage with the 
world they are interpreting. According to Blumer (1969), human beings act towards 
things on the basis of their meanings for them. These meanings are extracted from the 
social interaction of human beings and are handled through an interpretive process 
(Blumer, 1969). Positivism focuses on the explanation of observable objects whereas 
interpretivism highlights the importance of understanding the meaning derived from a 
phenomenon.  
 
“The understanding of causation comes through an interpretive understanding of social 
action and involves an explanation of relevant antecedent phenomena as meaning 
complexes.” (Crotty, 1998: 69).  
 
The interpretivist researcher has an eminent role in understanding the world as it is at 
the level of subjective experience (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The researcher strives to 
understand the phenomenon from different perspectives without neglecting his current 
and past experience along with the context of the research, the insight of the actors’ 
perceptions, as well as the historical specificities that can explain why representations 
are the way they are (Eisenhardt and Grebner, 2007). The interpretivist does not accept 
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reality as it is, but seeks to understand the hidden phenomenon behind the reality by 
asking why and how questions. Thus, interpretivist researchers tend to use qualitative 
techniques to explore the phenomenon. For them, the process of generating new 
knowledge involves understanding the meaning actors give to reality (Girod-Seville and 
Perret, 2001). Such a process rigidly contradicts the positivist approach, which only 
believes in an objective truth that is generalisable regardless of the surrounding context.  
 
 
3.2 Epistemological Stance of the Researcher 
The epistemological position of the researcher influences the entire research process. An 
epistemological position, such as religious beliefs, is significantly subjective and 
personal (Brown and Dowling, 1998).  Such a position depends on the personal beliefs 
of the researcher, how he sees the world, and the nature of the topic. A particular 
epistemological approach, such as what we see and think in the research, is influenced 
by human nature (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
 
The epistemological position of the researcher is influenced by four factors. The first is 
the “where” factor and is related to where the research is taking place. The second is the 
“when” factor and relates to when the research is taking place.  The third is the “what” 
factor, covering the objectives of the research and the final one is the “who” factor, 
which discusses the role of the researcher. These factors, which are explored further in 
the following section, are far from objectivism and closer to constructionism, thus 
justifying the adoption of a constructionist epistemological stance that is supported by 
an interpretivist theoretical approach. The factors influencing the epistemological 
position of the researcher are illustrated in Figure 3.2.  
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3.2.1 The ‘where’ factor: the context of the research 
The research takes place in three different countries (Iraq, KSA, and UAE), which have 
been selected based on the maturity of the modern trade retail channel (Figure 3.3). 
Understanding how changes in the channel environment influence the dyadic risk 
mitigation strategies is central to this research.  
 
 
 
 
Iraq is a predominantly traditional trade market where small grocers with an average 
surface area of 30 square meters represent 95% of the total grocery industry business 
according to AC Nielsen.  KSA is a mixed channel market, where modern and 
traditional trade retailers have equal power.  UAE is a predominantly modern trade 
market where regional and international hypermarket stores with an average area of 
2,000 square meters represent 70% of the total grocery retail industry. The UAE grocery 
market is comparable to the trade structure in Europe and the Americas, though not yet 
as consolidated.  
 
A positivist researcher would have assumed the universality of the agency and TCE 
theories. An interpretivist researcher, however, would have looked at the contextual 
factors and how variations in the context would influence the subject being studied. 
Trade structure is an important contextual factor that influences the epistemological 
stance of the researcher.  
 
This research assumes that trade structure has an important impact on the relationship 
between suppliers and distributors. Each of the three countries selected is characterised 
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by a different trade structure, as shown in Figure 3.3. Iraq is on the extreme traditional 
trade side, UAE is on the extreme modern trade side, and KSA is positioned rather in 
the middle. Following the variation in the trade structure, suppliers may adopt different 
governance structures that might have different implications for distributors. Variations 
in the perception of risk and in the adaptation to environmental changes give rise to 
multiple realities, which affect the epistemological stance of the researcher.   
The single reality assumed by the positivist school (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002) could 
have been relevant had the research been dealing with a general context where the 
observable outweighs the unobservable. However, because the research is dealing with 
multiple realities following different contextual conditions, an interpretivist stance is 
considered more flexible in understanding what is happening in the context of the 
phenomenon under examination and why it is happening (Carson et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, the belief that the concepts of truth and reality are dependent on external 
conditions and varying contexts, as defended by interpretivists, is the founding basis of 
this research. The dynamic framework between the various contextual situations is not 
only restricted to the place (countries with different trade structure positions), but also to 
time (when the phenomenon happened or is expected to happen). This leads to the 
second factor affecting the epistemological position of the researcher, which is the 
‘when’ factor.  
 
3.2.2 The ‘when’ factor: the element of time 
Yesterday’s reality might differ from the reality of today or even that of tomorrow. This 
research explores the relationship between suppliers and distributors in three countries 
of the Middle East. The current trade structure in KSA is similar to that of UAE 10 
years ago, and the trade structure of Iraq presently is comparable to that of KSA 20 
years ago. Similarly, the expected trade structure of UAE 10 years from now may 
resemble the trade structure in Europe and USA today (see Figure 3.4). 
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The research is not exploring a static topic, but a dynamic one that is constructed 
following human beings' past experiences, the historical patterns of events, and 
predictions of what will happen in the future. In Figure 3.4, the past shows how the 
trade was structured in the three markets, the present how it is structured today, and the 
future how it is projected to be by 2020 based on growth trend simulations. The research 
explores the past, present, and the future and examines how the relationship between a 
supplier and distributor evolves over time. Such a belief is reasonably supported by the 
interpretivist epistemology, which provides the researcher with a unique flexibility to 
explore evolutionary processes. A positivist stance does not offer such flexibility.  
 
The where and when factors demonstrate that the research explores a dynamic 
transformation process of a specific phenomenon in various contexts and time frames. 
The two factors confirm the existence of a multiple reality constructed by extracting 
meanings from the present and the past, and predicting the meanings that will be closer 
to the truth in the future. The following section sheds light on ‘what’ will be explored in 
the research, by revealing how the nature of the topic explored further supports the 
adoption of an interpretivist stance.  
 
3.2.3 The ‘what’ factor: the objective of the research 
Knowing what you want to find, as noted by Miles and Huberman (1994), leads to the 
question of how to obtain the information.  
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The research seeks to uncover the following realities: 
 What are the risks affecting suppliers and distributors in KSA, UAE, and Iraq?  
 How are suppliers and distributors mitigating these risks? 
 What is the most effective contracting mechanism between suppliers and 
distributors? 
 What is the role of trust and what contributes to the development of trust? 
 What causes suppliers and distributors to integrate specific capabilities and 
outsource others? 
 How are integration and outsourcing decisions made? 
 
The researcher seeks answers that are specific to the role and context of the subject. By 
focusing on these two dimensions, he acknowledges the existence of a multiple truth. In 
a supplier distributor relationship, the two parties are bound to have different, if not 
opposing, perceptions, which mostly reside in exploring the notion and consequences of 
risks. When examining risk mitigation strategies, some members might acknowledge 
the strategic need to adapt their model to the competitive requirements, while others 
might resist change. These meanings are hidden and can only be brought to light 
through an active participation with each member of the dyad in each of the three 
markets. The research explores a relationship that was built with time and that involves 
outsourcing the sales and distribution activities. The scope of the outsourcing 
responsibility and the strategic importance of the outsourcing function might transform 
the distributor into a strategic member in the supply chain. What contributed to the 
development of trust in the past might not be sufficient to enhance the level of trust in 
the future. Moreover, the concept of trust may have diverse interpretations in the West 
and in the East. An interpretative approach will help in extracting those meanings.   
The main topics explored by this research support the adoption of an interpretative 
epistemological stance. The relationship between the topics and the researcher’s 
epistemological position are presented below. 
 
The first topic regards the notion of risk. Risk can be assessed from both an objectivist 
and a subjectivist perspective. The research focuses on the dyadic risks that result from 
outsourcing the sales and distribution activities. As examined in the literature review, 
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such risks mainly result from the inability of suppliers to control outcome and behaviour 
based performance. The researcher’s epistemological position is supported by the belief 
in the existence of multiple meanings and realities to explore the notion of risk from the 
sides of the supplier and the distributor.  
 
The agency theory assumes that the lack of control is mainly due to information 
asymmetry existing between suppliers and distributors (Eisenhardt, 1988). The 
consequences of such risks might be different following the contextual situations. To 
mitigate dyadic risks, TCE proposes increasing the level of control by altering the 
governance structure (Williamson, 1985). Although the TCE and agency theories 
assume that suppliers are risk neutral, some suppliers might be willing to face such 
risks, unlike others.  Suppliers might adopt different mitigation strategies that depend on 
several factors, such as how suppliers perceive the control loss risk, the relationship 
between risk and the context, the supplier’s past and current experience in mitigating  
risks, and the willingness of the supplier to mitigate risks in the future. An interpretivist 
paradigm explores meanings that are specific to the context under investigation and 
subject to the individual’s perceptions. These features are essential in understanding the 
risks affecting suppliers as well as the mitigation strategies adopted across the different 
contexts.  
 
The second topic relates to the notion of trust. The agency and TCE theories have been 
mostly explored and tested in a Western culture. However, a cultural reality in the West 
might not be the same reality in the East, especially when exploring behavioural 
concepts such as trust and opportunism. Following Hofstede’s dimensions of national 
culture, the six dimensions that distinguish countries are: power distance, gender, 
individualism-collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, long term orientation, and 
indulgence versus restraint (Hofstede, 1993). Such dimensions have important 
implications for individual/organisational behaviour and may affect how reality is 
interpreted. Eastern cultures, for instance, are recognised for being collectivists, which 
is different from the Western culture (Bohnet et al., 2010).  
 
The way a supplier trusts a distributor might differ from the way a distributor trusts a 
supplier. Hardin (2002) defines trust as encapsulated interest. The cultural differences 
between the West and the Middle East gave birth to seminal cultural differences 
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between suppliers and distributors. It is important to note that suppliers sampled by the 
research are multinational companies, which are the mostly likely to adopt a Western 
culture.  
 
Distributors sampled by the research are local family businesses driven by local cultural 
values and norms.  People in the West seek self-actualisation and personal achievements 
(Kim, 1994). In Eastern cultures, however, family harmony and collective welfare are 
the most important values (Park and Kim, 2003). Hardin’s (2002) definition is outcome 
based: a person’s best interest can be defined in terms of the outcome it provides. 
Trusting a person requires a demonstration of trustworthiness (Hardin, 2002). 
Trustworthiness is built over time and involves concrete acts that permanently, not 
occasionally, exhibit a belief in the continuity of the relationship. The research focuses 
on the permanent trust development dimensions by exploring how interpersonal and 
intra organisation trust come together and how they evolve between suppliers and 
distributors in different contexts in the Middle East.  
  
The relational dimension also involves the trustworthiness of the person managing the 
relationship. The creation of interpersonal trust is influenced by the capability of the 
person to establish a trustworthy relationship that balances between organisational 
interests and relational interests. In the Middle East, it is unclear whether the 
interpersonal trust dimension is more important than the inter-organisational one.  
 
The research aims at understanding the supplier distributor relationship from the 
transactional as well as the relational angles within an evolutionary perspective.  The 
relational angle is explored to respond to the literature criticizing the TCE theory. The 
assumptions raised by the relational approach might be applicable to the context of the 
research.  
 
Although some researchers have adopted a positivist stance in exploring trust (Soroka 
and Johnston, 2007), the cultural differentiation between the Western and Eastern 
meanings of trust is key to the research. There is universal agreement on the definition 
of trust; however, the application of trust and its boundaries might differ amongst 
diverse cultures. 
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Any viable account of trust, according to Hardin (2002), must be both cognitive, i.e. 
involving some knowledge of the others in terms of their trustworthiness, and relational, 
i.e. referring to trust in some specific person. Organisational values and principles and 
their corresponding application are important dimensions that can be explored following 
an interpretivist approach. Positivists do not accentuate subjective values, but rather 
treat all subjects objectively.  
 
A positivist approach focuses on the universal laws of trust and fails to adapt to specific 
cultural and relational dimensions (Choi and Kim, 2004). An interpretivist approach, 
however, explores how trust is interpreted from both sides of the dyad. It should be 
noted that trust has been given different meanings in the literature. Some have seen it in 
terms of a calculative institutional approach (Williamson, 1993), whilst others have 
used a cognitive approach (Tyler, 2002). This variation in the conceptualisation of trust 
is well accepted in the literature (Hardin, 2002).  
 
The third topic involves the notion of asset specificity. Williamson (1993) 
acknowledges that asset specificity is not a universal variable, and has to be adapted to 
the nature and context of the industry. The adoption of a positivist stance to test TCE is 
possible if the test is occurring in a controlled environment. A laboratory setting and a 
uniform channel environment are examples of a controllable research environment. In 
such a case, the asset specificity attributes are observable and a deductive research 
approach is possible.   
 
Suppliers and distributors may perceive the specificity level of assets involved in the 
transaction differently. An asset of high specificity for a supplier may not be the same 
for the distributor, and vice versa. To overcome this perceptual difference, researchers 
have focused their examination on one member of the dyad: supplier or distributor, 
seller or buyer, manufacturer or customer. By adopting an interpretivist approach, the 
researcher is able to provide a deeper understanding on the following three elements: 
 The relationship between asset specificity and the context: As presented earlier, 
interpretivists emphasise the relationship between the subject and the context; 
reality for them is not external to the research, as claimed by positivists. The 
researcher believes that both the supplier and distributor’s assets are influenced 
by the structure of the trade. The specificity of the assets might differ between 
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traditional trade countries and modern trade countries. An inductive approach 
sheds light on such differences. 
 Asset specificity: static versus dynamic: By default, and as explained by the 
TCE theory, suppliers should outsource assets of low specificity to their 
transactions, and integrate assets of high specificity. The relationship between 
suppliers and distributors is dynamic and may evolve with the evolution in the 
market. As examined in the ‘when’ factors earlier, an interpretivist stance is 
flexible in constructing reality based on past and present experiences and on 
future expectations. Questions such as what types of assets should be integrated 
in the future and why, are relevant. 
 Asset specificity profiling: The TCE theory focuses on brand, human, dedicated 
assets, physical, and information assets. Outsourcing decisions give rise to new 
types of assets that might be of high specificity to the transaction. The person 
hired by the supplier to manage the outsourcing relationship can have an 
essential role in the development of interpersonal trust.  Although it could be 
argued that this person might fall under the human or dedicated asset specificity 
classification, an inductive approach permits the exploration of new meanings 
that can contribute to enriching the theory. 
 
 
3.2.4  The ‘who’ factor: the role of the researcher 
The ‘who’ factors are critical factors that guide the epistemological position of the 
researcher as they cover his role and experience, the purpose of his exploration, and his 
target audience.  
 
In this research, it is unavoidable to separate the researcher from the world of the 
research. The researcher is a Senior Director in a supplier type organisation. His main 
responsibilities are to develop the capabilities of the organisation’s 14 distributors 
located across the Middle East, and the management of strategic transformation 
programmes that encompass presenting the rationale of the program i.e. the need for 
transformation and the transformation strategies used. 
 
The researcher is aware that his current profession and experience within a supplier type 
of organisation might cause bias, leading to an opportunistic approach, as noted by 
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Gummesson (2000). To avoid preconceived notions, the researcher decided to rely on 
his experience outside the context of the workplace and preferred not to exploit his 
current managerial position, which gives him direct access to key senior management as 
well as critical secondary data. Instead, he chose to conduct the research outside the 
scope of his work, and thus none of the 14 distributors were asked to participate to the 
fieldwork.   
 
Interpretative researchers are concerned with describing, decoding, and translating 
rather than measuring the frequency of phenomena in the social world (Schwandt, 
2001). It will be difficult for the researcher to separate himself from the phenomenon 
under exploration and thus from the external world, as proposed by the positivist 
paradigm. His role will be to extract meanings from experienced respondents through an 
active interaction that is not restricted by a structured research protocol.  
 
The researcher seeks knowledge gained through social constructions such as language, 
consciousness, and shared meanings (Klein and Myers, 1999). By adopting an 
interpretative paradigm, the researcher will be able to explore different realities within a 
given context, and connect the realities that exist in a specific context to other realties 
that exist in another. Following this approach, and as noted by Orlikowski and Baroudi 
(1991), the role of the researcher is to bring to consciousness the restrictive conditions 
of the status quo.  
 
The ‘who’ factor shows how the researcher sees the world from the eyes of those who 
are living it. This epistemological stance is also based on the principles and values that 
the researcher acquired over a period of 10 years of voluntary work in the Red Cross 
organisation, where he saw the world through the eyes of his team, which helped him 
understand how to motivate volunteers who give without expecting anything in return. 
The researcher had to adapt his leadership style accordingly, seeking abstract and 
intangible incentives that intrinsically drive the conviction of the team, not only in what 
they are doing but in why they are doing it. Since the individuals' behaviour is 
stimulated by their core beliefs, the personal and professional experience of the 
researcher plays an important role in selecting the appropriate epistemological stance. 
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3.2.5 Researcher’s epistemology 
Following the ‘where’, ‘when’, ‘what’, and ‘who’ factors presented above, the 
researcher opted to follow the interpretivist theoretical approach, which is based on a 
constructionist epistemological stance. The researcher is aware of the criticism arising 
from such a stance, especially from objectivist researchers. Epistemological stances are 
personal decisions that consist of an individual’s beliefs about the certainty of 
knowledge, the organisation of knowledge, and the controls an individual has over 
knowledge (Schommer-Aikins and Hutter, 2002). 
 
The researcher constructed his epistemological position following a process that shed 
light on the main factors influencing his epistemological beliefs, taking into account the 
subject of the research. 
 
The ‘where’ and ‘when’ factors led the researcher to determine his concern with 
multiple realities since the research is taking place in three countries, each characterised 
by a specific trade structure, and in three time zones, the past, present, and the future. 
An interpretative perspective assumes that realties cannot be understood in isolation 
from the context; inquiry into those multiple constructed realities will inevitably diverge 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1985). 
 
The ‘what’ factor confirms that the researcher is prioritizing the phenomenon under 
study over the specific measurable observations. The phenomenon is characterised by 
contextual boundaries (modern trade versus traditional trade), cultural boundaries (West 
versus Middle East), and perceptual boundaries (supplier versus distributor).  
 
The ‘who’ factor delineates the role of the researcher as an active participant in the 
research process. The researcher is not external to the social world but is at the centre of 
it. Interpretivists assume that the researcher is the primary data collection instrument 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1985). As suggested by interpretivists, the role of the researcher is 
to identify contextual meanings following numerous points of views (Green, 2000).   
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3.3 Methodology 
The researcher’s epistemological stance and theoretical perspective influence his 
methodological choice. A positivist theoretical perspective supports the adoption of 
quantitative research methodologies, whereas an interpretative stance supports the use 
of qualitative research methodologies (Crotty, 1998).  Methodology is a body of 
knowledge that enables researchers to explain and analyse methods. It is the study, 
description, and justification of methods and not the mere description of the methods 
themselves (Kaplan, 1964).  
 
Following Crotty’s (1998) research process and prior to addressing the methods that 
will be used to collect the data, the researcher will examine the strategies that conform 
to his epistemological position. The chosen methodology bridges the researcher’s 
philosophical stance and the methods used to gather information.  
 
3.3.1 Quantitative versus qualitative research   
The difference between quantitative and qualitative research originated from the 
epistemological debate between positivism and interpretivism. On first examination, 
quantitative and qualitative research methodologies look similar, starting with the 
definition of a research question, going on to the design of survey mechanisms 
(questionnaires, observation guidelines, etc.), followed by the collection and analysis of 
information, and finally concluding with a written report (Punch, 2005). Quantitative 
research tends to be linear and uses statistical methods to test hypotheses. In this sense, 
quantitative research uses a two dimensional approach, whereas qualitative research is 
non-linear and uses a multidimensional approach to develop a hypothesis or theory. 
 
Both research approaches require identifying a sample representative of a larger 
population of people or objects. Quantitative research requires a random selection of the 
sample from the study population (Duffy, 1987), implying that the findings have an 
increased likelihood of being generalisable. Qualitative research requires the selection 
of a smaller sample because of the in-depth nature of the studies and the analysis of the 
data required (Cormack, 1991). A recognised weakness of this approach is concern that 
the researcher might have been influenced by a particular predisposition, affecting the 
generalisability of the small scale study (Bryman, 1988).  
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Quantitative research is considered more reliable than qualitative investigation as it is 
able to exclude bias, giving a higher degree of confidence (Snow and Thomas, 1994). 
The reliability of qualitative research is weakened by the fact that the process is under-
standardised and relies on the insights and the abilities of the observer, thus making an 
assessment of reliability difficult (Duffy, 1987). 
 
In terms of validity, qualitative methodologies have an advantage over quantitative 
methodologies. The weakness in quantitative research is that the more tightly controlled 
the study, the more difficult it becomes to confirm what the research situation is like in 
real life. The strength of qualitative research is that there are fewer threats to external 
validity, because subjects are studied in their natural settings and encounter fewer 
controlling factors compared with quantitative research conditions (Sandelowski, 1986). 
 
Regarding the relationship between the researcher and the respondent, there exist two 
views, each in favour of one of the research methodologies. Duffy (1987) argues that 
the strength of an interactive relationship is that the researcher obtains first-hand 
experience, providing valuable and meaningful data. Since the researcher spends more 
time on the subject, data is more likely to be honest and valid (Bryman, 1988). The 
relationship between the researcher and participants might result in subjectivity and 
consequently distort findings (Cormack, 1991). In its most extreme form, this is referred 
to as going native, where the researcher loses awareness of being a researcher and 
becomes a participant (Bryman, 1988). 
 
In summary, and putting the researcher’s epistemological stance aside even when this is 
considered an invalid assumption in academic research (Crotty, 1998), the choice 
between qualitative and  quantitative research depends on the type of data the researcher 
is interested in gathering when testing an existing theory or exploring a certain reality. 
Is the researcher starting with an observable reality or is he seeking to uncover what is 
below the surface of what is claimed to be the truth? The researcher is not seeking 
numbers and numerical correlations but explanations, strategic insights, and behavioural 
dimensions. Due to the nature of the topic explored, the researcher prefers actively 
engaging with the respondents. Finally, the researcher relies on his professional 
experience in order to bring a greater value to the research topic without falling into the 
trap of being biased.  Such a position, defined earlier as being an interpretative 
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epistemology, adds to the conviction of the researcher to follow a qualitative 
methodology while taking into account regarding the philosophical assumptions raised 
by positivists. The researcher positions himself as a neutral agent in relation to the 
ongoing epistemological debate.   
 
3.3.2 Discussion on qualitative research 
Qualitative research emerged as a result of researchers working in social sciences 
interested in studying human behaviour and the social world surrounding them 
(Morgan, 2007).  Qualitative research is used when a researcher knows little about a 
topic or phenomenon but is interested in discovering more about it. Qualitative research 
is exploratory by definition, and is used when one does not know what to expect 
(Roberts et al., 2006), or when one wants to define the problem or develop an approach 
to the problem. As mentioned earlier, qualitative research stems from the constructionist 
paradigm and seeks out the ‘why’ of its subject through examining meanings that are 
hidden in human perception and are subject to their experience. The approach adopted 
by qualitative research methods tends to be inductive with a non-linear process, which 
often involves a move from the specific to the general. It is generally guided by certain 
ideas, perspectives, or hunches regarding the subject under investigation (Cormack, 
1991). This does not mean that qualitative research is a purely inductive approach. The 
researcher can start with a general theory and use a qualitative approach to refine the 
theory or even to come up with a new one. By doing so, the researcher will frame the 
research within the context of the theory and then show how inductive theory building is 
necessary (Eisenhardt, 2007).  
 
There is no truth or falsehood, as suggested by the positivist paradigm. Knowledge is of 
a softer, more subjective, spiritual, or even transcendental kind, and is based on the 
experience and insights of a unique and essentially personal nature (Burell and Morgan, 
1979). An important advantage of qualitative research is its ability to overcome 
complex social processes that cannot be revealed by quantitative research (Eisenhardt, 
2007). According to Miles and Huberman (1994), the strength of qualitative research is 
in locating the meaning of experience within the social world, placing the phenomena 
within their contexts. In most cases, interpretivism is associated with qualitative 
research methodologies.  
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The current research adopts a case study methodology, which is coherent with the 
researcher’s epistemological stance (Crotty, 1998). Case study research is 
predominantly useful for responding to how and why questions about a particular 
phenomenon (Yin, 2003).  
 
3.3.3 Choice of relevant methodology 
The epistemological stance adopted and the topic of the research guides the research 
strategy. The common strategies used by qualitative researchers are ethnography, 
grounded theory, case studies, phenomenological research, and narrative research 
(Creswell, 2007). The relevant strategy has to be identified based on the nature of the 
topic being explored, the objectives of the research, and its duration.   
 
Ethnography is a strategy of inquiry in which the researcher studies an intact cultural 
group in a natural setting over a prolonged period of time by collecting primarily 
observational and interview data (Creswell, 2007). Ethnographic research necessitates a 
daily interaction between the researcher and the research environment. It mainly aims at 
exploring how people live, and their past and present experiences. This led to it being 
commonly used by cultural anthropologists, who are interested in observing the day to 
day activities of individuals within groups, organisations, and communities. 
Ethnography provides rich holistic insights into people’s views and actions, as well as 
the nature of the location they inhabit. It is able to depict the culture, perspectives, and 
practices of people in specific settings (Reeves et al., 2008). Ethnographic research is  
relevant if the research aims at exploring the day to day interaction between supplier 
and distributor teams over a period of time.  It could also be relevant if the sole focus of 
the research is to examine the impact of culture on supplier distributor relationship. 
Ethnographic research is not a relevant strategy for this research for the reasons below: 
 Although the research accounts for cultural difference, culture has not been 
positioned as a major theme. 
 The relationship between suppliers and distributors is not examined over a 
period of time. 
 The author is not as interested in observing the interaction between different 
teams as much as in the dyadic risks that affect the relationship given the 
experience of the people managing the relationship.  
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Narrative research focuses on the stories that are told by individuals describing events in 
their lives. This strategy centres on individuals (one or two) by gathering data through 
collecting stories. It has been commonly used in disciplines such as history, sociology, 
education, psychology, and anthropology but rarely in strategy and management. This 
strategy was immediately excluded from the choices available for the researcher 
because of its inability to explore the issues addressed by the research.  
 
Phenomenological research, on the other hand, is used in strategy and management 
research when the researcher aims at understanding certain phenomena through the 
individuals who experience it (Moustakas, 1994). Similar to ethnographic strategies, 
phenomenological research is conducted over a period of time. The researcher must 
spend time with individuals to be able to provide a thorough description of what 
individuals are experiencing and how they have experienced it (Moustakas, 1994). The 
reasons that prevent the researcher from adopting a phenomenological approach are 
presented below: 
 Phenomenology follows an inductive process and does not need to be based on 
existing theory, which is not the case in this research.  
 The research questions of the present study do not involve conducting 
longitudinal research. 
 The effective use of phenomenology entails exploring the experience of 
individuals relative to a similar phenomenon. The research is involved in 
exploring phenomena that may be different between organisations and 
countries.  
 The researcher needs to set aside his personal experience, which is difficult for 
this research given the experience of the researcher and his involvement in the 
practical issues involved.  
 
Another common strategy adopted by qualitative researchers is grounded theory. 
Grounded theory strategies go beyond describing a phenomenon, as is the case with 
phenomenology, to the discovery of a theory and abstracting it through an analytical 
schema (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This strategy follows a fully inductive process where 
the researchers can start from nowhere to extract a reality that is grounded in the views 
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of participants. According to Charmaz (2006), the common features of grounded theory 
are: the collection and analysis of data in congruence, the creation of themes from the 
data not from existing literature, the inductive construction of abstract categories and 
the integration of categories into a theoretical framework. To effectively conduct a 
grounded theory strategy, the researcher must put aside prior knowledge and be able to 
step out of the existing theory. Since this research aims at exploring several propositions 
derived from TCE and the agency theories, the grounded theory is not perceived as an 
appropriate research strategy. A grounded theory approach would have been a relevant 
strategy if the researcher had not relied on existing literature, and the choice was to 
explore the risks affecting suppliers and distributors in full abstraction.  
 
A case study research strategy is based on an in-depth exploration of a programme, an 
event, an activity, an organisation, or a relationship. While ethnographic research 
focuses on how culture works, case study research depicts cultural effects by deeply 
examining the case. The cases explored are bounded by time and activity and the 
researcher collects detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures 
over a sustained period of time (Stake, 1995). Case study proved to be highly relevant 
for developing the field of strategy and management. Some case studies have 
contributed to knowledge by generating new theories (Amit and Zott, 2001) and others 
by extending or refining existing ones (Collinson & Wilson, 2006). Case study research 
has also gained importance in contemporary supply chain literature and has been used 
as a mainstream strategy to explore supply chain issues (Bourlakis and Bourlakis, 2006; 
Ellram et al., 2008; Kamann and van Nieulande, 2010; Blome and Schoenherr, 2011; 
Raised et al., 2013; Khalaf et al., 2014). In addition to its proved contribution to 
strategy, management, and supply chain research, the arguments below justify the 
decision to adopt a case study strategy for this research: 
 The multiplicity of perspectives that are rooted in a specific context is 
considered to be a distinguishing feature of case study research (Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2003).  The case study strategy account for contextual variation, which is 
seminal to this research in that it explores three different contexts.  
 A case study methodology helps in exploring complex issues, a good or bad 
practice, adding strength to what is already known from previous research, or the 
generation of new theories (Dooley, 2002). The case study methodology is 
accordingly applied for theory generation (Eisenhardt, 1989) and theory 
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refinement when little is known about an existing theory (Stake, 1995). 
According to Cavaye (1996), case study research can be structured and 
deductive following a positivist approach, or unstructured and inductive 
following an interpretative approach, or both at the same time.  This research 
explores a set of propositions that are derived from the theory and does not 
follow a completely inductive approach. The flexibility of case study strategies 
is a critical factor for this research.  
 Similar to experimental strategies, case study research addresses how and why 
questions, without the need to control behavioural events (Yin, 2003). As 
illustrated in Section 2.8, this research aims at answering why risks occur (P1 
and P2) in a natural setting, and how they are mitigated (P3, P4, P5, and P6), 
supporting the use of a case study strategy.  
 Case study strategies are able to deconstruct and reconstruct a phenomenon by 
analysing it in a natural context. They are able to investigate a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth especially in situations when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and the contact are not evident (Yin, 2003), as is the case in this 
research.  
 
The researcher will be looking at similar or different cases of supplier distributor 
relationships across Iraq, KSA, and UAE. The researcher is seeking answers from three 
different contexts.  As observed earlier, case study research is suitable to examine 
complex situations. This is not a unique feature of case study methodology, but is a 
general feature of qualitative methodologies, which specialise in exploring the 
complexities and the differences of the world under study (Philip, 1998). The case study 
methodology aids in understanding the numerous cases available in a given context 
while explaining how a difference in context influences the phenomenon under 
investigation, especially in situations when the boundaries between the phenomenon 
and the context are not clear, as noted by Yin (2003). In natural sciences, the 
phenomenon is isolated from its context, which does not assist in explaining contextual 
differences.  
 
Considering such differences is important for the topic of this research, especially since 
the research covers contexts that have structural differences. Some of the knowledge 
that proves to be true for a given context might not be true for another. Through case 
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study methodologies, the researcher is able to explain the phenomenon in its real life 
situation. As the methodology stems from an interpretative theoretical approach, 
interpretivists are assumed to understand the phenomena by assessing the meanings that 
participants assign to them (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). This entails entering into 
the minds of people and seeing how they perceive all the factors that affect a given 
phenomenon. This research adopts a deductive approach that starts with a theoretical 
exploration, while maintaining flexibility in refining the existing theory, and evolving it 
through an inductive process. Such a process fully conforms to case study research 
(Stake, 1995). 
 
The exploration of alternative research strategies, together with the reasons highlighted 
above, justify the choice of adopting a case study research strategy for this research.  
 
The strength of case study research lies in its ability to deeply understand the 
complexity of a specific case within a given context and its ability to generate, extend or 
refine new or existing theories. The research used TCE and AT as a theoretical base. 
The gaps identified led to seven propositions (defined in Section 2.8) that contribute to 
the extension of TCE and AT by integrating the relational and evolutionary approaches.  
 
 
3.3.4 Focus on case study methodology 
The case study, following Miles and Huberman (1994), is a phenomenon occurring in a 
bounded context.  As seen above, the case study is unparalleled for its ability to 
consider a single or complex research question within an environment rich with critical 
contextual variables. Below are some common categories of case study methodologies 
(Yin, 2003): 
 Explanatory: aims at explaining the causal links in real life situations that are too 
complex for quantitative types of methodologies. 
 Exploratory: aims at exploring any phenomenon by defining questions. Prior 
fieldwork, such as a small scale sampling is required before the formulation of 
research questions and the hypothesis. 
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 Descriptive:  aims at describing the natural phenomena that occur in real life 
situations. The researcher must begin with a descriptive theory to support the 
description of the phenomenon or story. 
 Illustrative: aims at illustrating certain topics within an evaluation in a 
descriptive mode. 
 Enlightening: aims at enlightening specific situations in which the intervention 
being evaluated lacks clarity in terms of outcome.  
 
Yin (2003) illustrates the different types of case study designs in a 2x2 matrix in Figure 
3.5 below.  
 
Five rationales are presented by Yin (2003) for single case study designs. The first 
rationale involves the critical case of testing a well formulated formula. A set of 
propositions are presented that either accept or reject the theory based on contextual 
conditions specified by the researcher. This rationale has several implications for theory 
building. The second rationale is mostly adopted in clinical psychology when an 
extreme or unique case is presented. According to Yin (2003), a single case study 
determines the precise nature of the disorder and whether other related disorders might 
exist. The third rationale involves a representative or typical case. The objective of a 
single case study is to capture the circumstances and conditions of a contemporary 
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event. This type of single case study is considered to be informative about the 
experiences of an average individual or organisation. The fourth rationale for single 
case studies considers revelatory cases that may arise when the researcher has the 
opportunity to observe a certain phenomenon that was inaccessible to social science 
inquiries (Yin, 2003). The fifth rationale for single cases covers longitudinal cases that 
explore the same case at different points in time. As noted by Yin (2003), it is important 
to differentiate between holistic and embedded case studies. This applies to situations 
when the same single case study involves more than one unit of analysis, such as 
different departments in the same organisation.  
 
Multiple case studies are preferred over single case studies for generalisation purposes. 
If the researcher is interested in profoundly understanding a specific phenomenon 
within a defined context, a single case study is deemed to be a relevant methodology. 
Although a case study is more concerned with understanding a specific case in all its 
complexities, case study researchers use multiple case studies to respond to the issue of 
generalisation (Yin, 2003).  
 
One must not confuse sampling logic and replication logic (Yin, 2003). Replication 
entails observing whether the outcomes of one experiment can be achieved if the same 
experiment is replicated more than once. If all the replications lead to the same 
outcome, the experiment is considered to be reliable. Replication contributes to theory 
development when the generalisation of findings occurs across a subpopulation (Easley 
et al., 2000). By examining the various terminologies used in the literature to define 
replication, four major categories of replication are identified: 
 Type 0 replication is defined as a precise duplication of a prior study. Cause and 
effect relationships in such a case are confirmed. This type of replication is most 
valid in natural sciences, where the environment can be entirely controlled.  
 Type I replication is the faithful duplication of a prior study and is assumed to be 
the purest form of replication in social sciences. 
 Type II replication is a close replication of a prior study and is considered to be 
the most common type of replication in marketing science as it involves testing 
the phenomenon in multiple contexts. If effects are shown in a variety of testing 
contexts, the case for the finding is strengthened (Easley et al., 2000).   
125 
 
 Type III replication is a deliberate modification of a prior study (Easley et al., 
2000). 
 
Multiple case studies follow the same logic of replication. According to Yin (2003), 
each case has to be carefully selected so that it either predicts similar results (a literal 
replication), or it predicts contrasting results but for anticipated reasons (a theoretical 
replication).  
 
 
3.3.5 Research design 
The research follows a multiple case study design, which, according to Yin (2003), 
should conform to the nature of the topic being explored. The rationale for multiple case 
studies derives from the understanding of literal and theoretical replications (Yin, 2003).  
 
The research covers multiple cases within each context. A major challenge of case study 
research is the identification of the unit of analysis, which is related to the way the main 
research question is initially defined (Yin, 1994). It may be an individual, a group, an 
organisation, an event, or a phenomenon. The selection of the level and scope of the unit 
of analysis involves determining where the researcher goes to seek answers, with whom 
he converses, and what he observes (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
 
If the researcher aims at exploring the phenomenon in one environment for a specific 
situation, a holistic single case study remains the most relevant approach (Yin, 2003). In 
a single case study, the researcher can examine multiple subunits, whereby data is 
collected from several departments in the same organisation. For instance, multiple 
subunits can be identified to examine the impact of effective sales and marketing 
collaboration on sales forecasting.  The consistency of case study research is associated 
with the careful identification of the cases being studied (Miles et al., 2013; Yin, 2003). 
To ensure that the identified cases are coherent with the objectives of the research, the 
researcher identified the following four steps in designing the multiple case study 
research: 
  
The design starts by defining the context of the research. Exploring the nature of reality 
in a complex setting is an important feature of case study research (Yin, 2003). The 
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research takes place in three different contexts (KSA, UAE, and Iraq) that are classified 
based on modern trade share, with Iraq and UAE being in opposing contexts: Iraq is on 
the extreme traditional trade side and UAE is on the other extreme (Figure 3.6). 
 
 
 
The second step involves defining the unit of analysis. The selection between a multiple 
case study holistic design and an embedded design depends on the phenomenon type 
(Yin, 2003). The research explores the relationship between dyadic members in the 
supply chain. The unit of analysis is represented by the dyad, composed of a supplier 
and a distributor in a given context. Fifteen multiple cases have been selected for this 
research, allocated between Iraq, UAE and KSA as shown in Figure 3.7.  
 
 
The distribution of cases considered the security issues that exist in certain countries. 
During the data collection phase, the security situation in Iraq had escalated, which 
drove the researcher to limit the cases explored in Iraq to three. Regarding the allocation 
of cases between KSA and UAE, more focus was given to KSA as it is the most 
127 
 
important country for FMCG companies in the Gulf, representing around 60% of the 
volume of their businesses. 
Suppliers and distributors belonging to each dyadic case explored are presented in Table 
3.1. The cases analysed for the research include the leading suppliers and distributors in 
Iraq, UAE, and KSA. 67% of the suppliers interviewed and 47% of the distributors 
interviewed are among the top three performing companies in their countries. Dyadic 
cases were selected to include the same suppliers in different countries, to help in 
understanding the reaction of similar suppliers to dyadic risks across different contexts. 
Since the participating suppliers and the distributors are leading FMCG players, the 
findings can be extrapolated to other players in the markets as the cases analysed can be 
positioned as benchmark cases. Leading companies are positioned as innovators, and 
their reactions to dyadic risks represent how the whole industry is most likely to react. 
 
 
 
The third step includes setting the research boundaries. Case study researchers might 
face the risk of extensive analysis by asking too many questions, targeting too many 
cases, and setting very high and sometimes unrealistic ambitions. As proposed by Miles 
and Huberman (1994) and by Yin (2003), setting boundaries for case study research 
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becomes a must. In order to be focused, efficient, and avoid falling into the trap of 
‘when to stop’, the researcher set specific boundaries for the study following practical 
advice proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994), Yin (2003), and Creswell (2007). The 
following boundaries have been set for the research: 
 Context: restrict it to three countries of the Middle East and exclude the 
remaining nine countries.  
 Industry: focus on the FMCG industry only as the researcher has access to major 
multinational FMCG companies and distributors.  
 Companies: focus on the top five companies in their categories as they should 
provide a good representation of market norms.  
 
The fourth step includes the anticipation and the mitigation of certain complexities. 
Case study research is by nature expensive in terms of time and finance (Yin, 2003), 
and the collection of data necessitates travel and accommodation expenses.  The 
researcher is a working professional, which puts constraints on the time dedicated to the 
research project.  In order to mitigate the time and financial constraints, the researcher 
was able to obtain his employer’s approval and support to conduct some of the 
necessary fieldwork during scheduled business trips to the relevant countries for a 
certain period of time.   
 
3.3.6 Issues of reliability 
The research adopts specific strategies to mitigate issues of reliability, which are general 
to all types of qualitative research and others are specific to the case study 
methodologies; the research focuses on the latter.  Yin (2003) presents four tests 
common to all types of social science research that are conducted to assess the quality 
of a research design (see Table 3.2).  
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Case study research is criticised for its inability to provide information about the 
broader class (Abercrombie et al., 1984), which jeopardises its credibility, especially in 
theory testing situations. Quantitative methodologies do not face this issue as they use 
statistical generalisations, whereas case studies rely on analytic generalisations. External 
validity refers to the degree to which the results of a study can be generalised to other 
groups. As examined earlier, multiple case studies are preferred over single case studies 
for their generalisability and replicability capabilities. According to Yin (2003), external 
validity issues are softened by adopting specific replication strategies. Replication 
strategies aim at establishing the reliability of previous findings and determining the 
generality of findings under diverse conditions (Hersen and Barlow, 1976).  
 
To meet these objectives, Yin (2003) proposes two types of replication strategies. The 
first type is literal replication, which is achieved by selecting cases that are similar and 
that are expected to attain similar results. The second type is theoretical replication, 
which is achieved if the selected cases produce contradicting results based on theoretical 
assumptions. Literal and theoretical replications bring social science closer to the 
natural sciences. According to Yin (2003), the ability to conduct six to 10 cases studies 
arranged effectively in a multiple case design is as effective as conducting six to 10 
experiments. An effective arrangement entails having two to three cases literally 
replicated and four to six cases theoretically replicated. Theoretical replication is 
possible if the research is supported by a strong theoretical review. If all cases turn out 
to be as predicted, then the six to 10 cases on aggregate provide strong support for the 
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propositions that were initially identified (Yin, 2003). This process of confirmation is 
referred to as triangulation. 
 
Triangulation originated from the concept of an unobtrusive method, which claimed that 
the uncertainty related to the interpretation of research propositions is reduced if two or 
more measurement processes have been used (Webb et al., 1966). Jakob (2001) defines 
triangulation as the combination of multiple observers, theories, methods, and empirical 
materials to overcome the intrinsic bias and the problems that come from single-method 
studies. Its purpose is to obtain confirmation of findings through convergence of 
different perspectives. Patton (2002) presents four different types of triangulation: 
 Data triangulation: involves using different sources of information in order to 
increase the validity of a study and is most popular in multiple case study 
research.  
 Investigator triangulation: refers to the use of more than one researcher or 
observer to gather and interpret the data. As a result, bias from one researcher is 
minimised if the findings from the different investigators converge.   
 Theory triangulation: researchers from different disciplines may bring different 
perspectives to examining the theory. Thus, if investigators from different 
disciplines interpret information in the same way, the findings are generally 
more robust.   
 Methodological triangulation: refers to the use of more than one method to 
gather data. Hence, the weaknesses associated with using one method are 
overcome by the strengths of another. Two types of methodological 
triangulation are presented. Between-method triangulation includes the usage of 
different methodologies, and within-method triangulation refers to the use of 
different varieties of the same method. The latter is mostly adopted by mixed 
study researchers and is considered to be time consuming and requires specific 
technical expertise.  
  
Triangulation increases the level of confidence in the findings of the research and 
provides distinct ways of understanding a phenomenon (Thurmond, 2001). Multiple 
case studies are founded on the principle of triangulation, making it a robust 
methodology (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989).   
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This research mitigates the reliability issues associated with qualitative and single case 
study research by adopting both a literal and a theoretical replication strategy through a 
multiple case study approach, as covered by the research design.  Literal replication is 
achieved by exploring different cases that belong to the same context. The researcher 
expects that by examining multiple similar cases within the same category, the findings 
will converge on the same facts in order to ensure data triangulation.  
 
It is important to note that other countries in the Middle East can be clustered within the 
three contexts defined by the research, as illustrated in Figure 3.8. The findings in Iraq, 
KSA, and UAE may be replicated to other cases that have the same channel context. 
Although qualitative analysis does not focus on generalising the findings to a wider 
population base, such a possibility adds to the sturdiness of the research design and to 
the richness of the analysis.  
 
 
 
 
3.4 Research Methods 
The following section aims at examining the research methods adopted by the research, 
and is divided into four sub sections. Methods are associated with the methodology 
selected and the research strategy followed. The first subsection discusses the data 
collection method adopted, the second examines the sampling strategy used, the third 
subsection focuses on the management process adopted to gather the data and the last 
subsection concludes with the method used to analyse the data.  
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3.4.1 Data collection methods 
Qualitative research methods are not based on pre-determined hypotheses. Instead, the 
researcher identifies a problem or topic that he wants to explore using a wide and deep 
angle lens, examining human choice and behaviour as it occurs naturally in all of its 
detail (Johnson and Christensen, 2010). 
 
Various data gathering methods are available in case study research, including 
documentation, archival records, direct observations, physical-observation, and 
interviews (Yin, 2003). The method adopted in this research takes into account the 
strengths and weaknesses of each of the data collection methods, and the limitations that 
are faced in practice.  
 
Archival records are different types of information stored in channels such as television, 
newspapers, mass media, public agencies, and syndicates. Such information can be both 
quantitative and qualitative, taking the forms of electronic records, hard files, and 
statistical data. Archival records can be subject to their own bias and influenced by the 
opinion of the data provider in several cases. To overcome this weakness, case study 
researchers are advised to choose channels that represent opposing opinions (Yin, 
2003). Archival records have not been considered in this research due to the 
unavailability of such data for the targeted firms in the Middle East, as well as the 
inability of such data to cover the perception of experts in the field and to explore a 
contemporary phenomenon.  
 
Some case study researchers gather data by using direct observation methods. The 
literature notes two forms of direct observation techniques: a conventional form and a 
formal form (Yin, 2003). Researchers using the conventional forms take field notes and 
count on their senses to draw conclusions about what they might have seen or 
experienced.  Researchers can express their personal view as long as they differentiate 
between their view and that of the participants in the narrative. Formal forms are less 
biased as the researcher gathers observational data through structured instruments. 
Direct observational methods are mostly used on longitudinal case study research and 
require many researchers to gather data especially if multiple cases are involved. They 
have not been considered as an option on the grounds of being time consuming, costly, 
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and not practical as the researcher does not intend to observe or evaluate a specific 
behaviour.  
 
In certain situations, the researcher gathers data by being an active participant and not a 
passive observer. Yin (2003) refers to this method as participant observation, where the 
researcher assumes a role in the data collection. This method was rejected due to ethical 
reasons; the researcher is an employed professional in a supplier type of firm and cannot 
play an active role in the data collection phase. Another excluded method is the 
gathering of physical artefact evidence. Such a method is not relevant for this research 
and is considered a minor data gathering technique in case study research (Yin, 2003). 
 
On the other hand, the methods that are dominant in most case study research are 
documentation and interview methods. 
  
Documentation takes many forms: letters, e-mails, memorandums, corporate 
documents, reports and internal records. (Yin, 2003). Documents are either available on 
the internet or are given by participants. In either case, documents cannot be considered 
as primary sources of evidence unless the topic of the research is to explore the 
efficiency of inter-organisational communication, for instance. In such a case, the 
internal communication information used by the firm (mails, memos, minutes of 
meetings…etc.) are analysed. In the Middle East, it is highly sensitive to share 
information and companies do not publish online information to the public. Specific 
documentation that can add value to this research was found online but the researcher 
could not afford to pay the associated costs. Such a method has not been considered due 
to retrieval issues. It should be noted that documentation can also engender some bias if 
it is not complete. The research has used the documentation method for informative 
purposes. Before gathering the data from a specific firm, the researcher went to the 
website to collect generic information about the firm. Some information on the website 
has been used as evidence. For instance, the values published on the websites of the 
targeted suppliers and distributors have been used as supporting evidence when 
exploring the notion of trust.  
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Interview data collection methods are prominent in case study research. The literature 
differentiated between three types of interviews: structured interviews, focused 
interviews, and in-depth interviews (Yin,2003).  
 
Structured interviews use survey instruments and allow for quantitative data collection. 
Such interviews produce quantitative data and are mostly conducted if the research 
targets a large sample. This research targets a refined sample of experts in the field, and 
the objective of the researcher is to capture their perception, as implied by the 
epistemological stance adopted, looking at why certain events occur and how they are 
managed. A structured approach does not conform to the objective of the researcher, the 
sample chosen, nor the data that the researcher intends to extract.  
 
A focused or a semi-structured interview method meets the objectives of this research. 
The reasons that drove the researcher to adopt this method are presented below: 
 The research explores a set of propositions that have been deduced from the 
literature review. With a semi-structured interview technique, the researcher can 
address the topic supported by an interview guide that is based on the literature 
explored and the issues tackled.  
 The researcher is targeting key informants who are top executives in the FMCG 
industry. A semi-structured interview technique takes account of the time 
constraints of these professionals and can deliver high quality data in a period of 
approximately one hour.  
 The profiles of participants give interview methods an advantage over other 
methods used in qualitative research. A semi-structured interview is insightful 
and able to capture the perception of these participants if effectively executed. 
The researcher conducted five pilot interviews to be able to collect insights that 
are specific and rich in a period of one hour.   
 Bias exists in semi-structured interviews but can be controlled better than in 
other data collection methods if the researcher is able to balance opposing 
views.. Semi-structured interviews give the flexibility to challenge certain ideas, 
provide counter arguments, and use specific practices to be able to gather solid 
evidence that significantly contributes to the topic explored.  
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The third form of interviews is the in-depth interview technique. In-depth interviews are 
highly effective but take place over an extended period of time. They have not been 
considered, not because they are irrelevant, but because of the associated complexities 
and additional costs given the scale of the research (15 dyadic cases). Moreover, the 
research is targeting senior professionals (GMs, CEOs…etc.), who cannot be easily 
retained for extensive in-depth interviews.  
 
In both semi-structured and in-depth interviews the researcher might decide to address 
additional topics and drop others which are no longer deemed relevant. Open questions 
used in in-depth interviews allow time and space for free-form responses which invite 
participants to share their understandings, experiences, opinions, interpretations, and 
reactions to social processes and situations (McGuirk and O’Neill, 2005). Silverman 
(2005) asserts that a researcher conducting semi-structured or in-depth interviews needs 
to answer the questions detailed below: 
 What status does the researcher attach to the data? Generally, interviews are 
chosen as a data collection technique for their ability to depict human experience 
about a specific issue. Individuals may attach multiple meanings to their 
experiences, which might affect the way they perceive a phenomenon. To avoid 
this issue, Silverman (2005) suggests treating interview responses as actively 
constructed narratives involving activities which require analysis rather than 
simply relying on direct experience. A constructionist approach helps on that 
front, as the researcher will not be bound by the current observable experience of 
the participant, but will be able to look into his past experience as well. Some 
interviewees from the supplier side might have previous experience from the 
distributor side, and vice versa. Moreover, the interview data collection 
procedure allows the researcher to eliminate some bias associated with the 
identity of the respondent. Interviewees from the supplier side will be asked how 
they would have acted had they been on the distributor’s side, and vice versa. 
The researcher addresses the first question raised by Silverman (2005) by 
treating the interview responses as a construction of a past, current and an 
assumed experience without any restrictions on his current experience. The 
questions of the interview should reflect this direction.  
 Does interview data really help the researcher in addressing the topic? The prime 
concern of the researcher is to explore how suppliers and distributors react to 
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dyadic risks. The researcher is not interested in collecting numerical information 
that is statistically explained, but in gathering specific insights pertaining to 
current and expected risk mitigation strategies from both members of the dyad. 
Moreover, the researcher is concerned with examining how respondents react to 
topics like trust and collaboration.  
 Is the researcher making large claims about the research? The interview is 
guided by a considerable literature review, which in itself has contributed to 
restricting some of the claims, keeping in mind that the researcher has practical 
experience in the topic under investigation. Both considerations are used by the 
researcher to frame the interview and confine it to the material being explored.  
 How is the evidence collected? The researcher distinguishes between data and 
evidence. Data is a form of information such as interview transcripts, whereas 
evidence is specific data that supports a certain proposition (Thomas, 2011).  By 
using interview techniques, the researcher is able to gather evidence linking the 
theory to reality. How and why questions are used to obtain clarity about the 
evidence being gathered. The interview technique helps in divulging evidence 
through an interactive approach between the interviewer and the interviewee.  
 
The above recommendations justify why the researcher opted for a semi structured data 
collection method. Such a method will help in structuring some of the issues suggested 
by the literature review while giving the freedom to explore specific insights that are 
brought up during the discussion (Thomas, 2011).  
 
3.4.2 About semi structured interviews 
The success of a semi structured interview method relies on the researcher’s level of 
preparation before conducting the interview and on his technical skills during the 
interview stage. Researchers who hold interviews when unprepared and untrained 
will fail to conduct effective interview meetings or gather insightful information. The 
interview method was used to collect data for the research. During the preparation 
phase, the researcher should focus on the main objectives that should be met during 
the interview. Data collected should aim at answering the research questions and 
provide deeper understanding of the propositions raised by the research.   
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As the author has adopted a case study methodology, it is important to keep in mind 
that some important features of case study research are to establish cause and effect 
relationships, observe effects in real contexts, and recognise that the context is a 
powerful determinant of both causes and effects (Cohen et al., 2007). The failure to 
connect the selected method (semi structured interview) with the chosen 
methodology (case study) leads to a disruption in the research process since the 
method refers to techniques and procedures used in the data gathering process and 
the methodology aim is to describe approaches to the  paradigms of the research 
(Kaplan, 1964). 
 
Semi structured interviews should also consider other objectives that are as important 
as the main ones: understanding the dyadic case from different angles (supplier and 
distributor) and being able to compare the case to other similar or different cases. 
Qualitative, less structured, word-based, and open-ended questionnaires help meet 
these objectives as they are able to capture the specificity of a particular situation 
given the experience of the interviewee (Cohen et al., 2007). They also help 
understand the why and the how factors behind the phenomenon, which guided the 
epistemological stance of the author, as covered earlier.  As a good share of the 
qualitative data collected is analysed in congruence with the data collection phase 
(during or shortly after each interview), the management of the interview must be 
well structured even if an unstructured method is being adopted. Interview guides are 
used in semi structured interviews to organise the flow of the questions (Cohen et al., 
2007) given the time granted by the interviewees.  
 
To ensure that the interview schedule covers all areas concerned with the research topic 
as suggested by qualitative researchers (Yin, 2003; Creswell, 2007), the researcher 
shared the interview schedule with professional (senior consultant) experts in the field. 
The feedback received, coupled with Silverman’s five considerations, contributed to 
refining the interview schedule while ensuring that most angles of the phenomenon 
being explored could be covered in a one hour interview. The time is considered to be 
fair taking into account the type of the sample being targeted. It is worth noting that 
some interviews lasted two hours due to the interviewees’ interest in the topic explored.  
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The interview guide must include questions that help the researcher capture valuable 
insights associated with the propositions raised by the research. The interview guide 
developed for the research is presented in Appendix I.  
 
It is very important for an interview research guide to be designed to meet the 
propositions derived from the theory. Table 3.3 links the questions asked in the 
interview guide to the relevant propositions and the themes associated with each 
proposition.  
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To organise the data gathered from interviews and keep track of key messages shared, 
the researcher designed a data summary report updated at the end of each interview. 
This report captures considerable impressions and reflections, making them available 
for further reflections and analysis (Miles et al., 2013). After covering the data 
collection methods used in this research, the section that follows focuses on the target 
sample to collect the data from.  
  
3.4.3 Sampling strategy 
Collecting data from case study participants is a time consuming and challenging 
process (Cavaye, 1996). A key feature of multiple case studies is the specifity of the 
sample selected.  Case study research usually includes two levels of sampling. The first 
level, which relates to selecting the case, was covered in the methodology section, and 
the second level, which covers the sample within the case, will be examined in the 
following section. 
 
The sample within the case should assist in understanding the phenomenon and 
proposing strategic insights pertaining to the exploration of issues and opportunities. 
Qualitative research adopts a purposeful sampling strategy. The selected sample aims at 
serving a specific and defined purpose; the statistical representation of the sample is not 
of importance (Ritchie et al., 2003). Purposeful sampling entails setting criteria that are 
related to the purpose of the research (Given, 2008). The sample is collected from 
information rich cases for in-depth study. Below are common types of purposeful 
sampling presented in the literature (Given, 2008):  
 Extreme and deviant case sampling: refers to studying bipolar samples such as 
examining management style in an organisation that did exceptionally well, and 
in another that did exceptionally poorly.  
 Typical case sampling: includes cases that are not unusual in any way. An 
example would be examining a common business issue in a specific 
organisation, such as how employees interact to resolve a communication issue.  
 Theory based sampling: refers to the theory testing approach, where the sample 
selected is based on its ability to interpret the propositions deduced from the 
theory. Theory based sampling can overlap with other purposeful sampling 
techniques. 
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 Paradigmatic case sampling: refers to benchmark or exemplar samples to 
particular cases.  An example is the study of information system implementation 
in organisations known for adopting specific and renowned technologies. 
Another example could be the study of a franchising agreement.  
 Stakeholder sampling: is mostly adaptable in evaluation research and in some 
policy analysis cases. It consists of identifying key stakeholders directly 
involved in one of the steps in the case evaluation process.  
 Maximum variation sampling: the sample is composed of individuals or cases 
covering a multi-dimensional perspective of the phenomenon under study and 
generally includes typical and extreme sampling.  
 Criteria sampling: refers to cases or individuals that meet specific criteria. 
 Expert sampling: includes individuals that are expert in the related field who can 
add value in advancing the researcher’s interest, paving the way for potentially 
new research possibilities.  
 Disconfirming or negative case sampling: includes searching for cases that do 
not conform with the known reality, whether inductive or deductive.  
 
The procedure used to determine the purposeful sampling strategy most adaptable to the 
research question depends on the study under exploration and the ability to access the 
sample. As noted by Given (2008), the researcher has to think of the person, place, or 
situation that has the largest potential for advancing the understanding of the research.  
The researcher aims at understanding the experience of individuals directly concerned 
with the supplier distributor relationship. The richer the experience, the more valuable 
the insights collected for the research. Expert sampling is the most relevant purposeful 
type of sampling for this study.  
 
Expert sampling entails seeking key informants within the cases targeted by the 
research. This sampling strategy is considered to be reliable when examining the 
perception of decision makers (Robson and Foster, 1989). Jennings (1964) presents 
three categories of key informants. The first one is the economically dominant category, 
consisting of business leaders occupying major economic positions in the community. 
The second is the prescribed influential category and includes civic leaders for example, 
who hold formal positions designed to sanction and facilitate influence in the 
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community. The attributed influential comprises the last category and consists of 
community members perceived to be influential in the community.  The economically 
dominant are considered to be reliable in providing organisational data (Seidler, 1974). 
They are capable of understanding the strategic implications of the organisational 
context and are aware of current and future challenges that an organisation might face. 
Parcel et al. (1991) consider CEOs and General Managers as the most reliable 
informants.  However, due to the difficulty of achieving a high response rate from CEOs 
in large organisations, other senior executives that hold strategic decision making 
positions can be considered as key informants (Gupta et al., 2000).    
 
The investigation will thus be limited to key senior managers who have influence on the 
supplier distributor relationship and have an in depth awareness of the strategic issues 
affecting the organisation and the risks involved. This includes CEOs, general 
managers, regional sales directors, and country managers. As noted earlier, the sample 
will include key informants from suppliers and distributor organisations, which would 
help cover the topic from different perspectives, a key advantage of multiple case study 
research (Dooley, 2002). This is deemed necessary as the research is exploring a dyadic 
relationship. 
  
The research targets a total of 30 key informants allocated by dyadic case and by 
country. For each dyadic case, two key informants were targeted and a semi structured 
interview was held with the supplier and another with the distributor. Although more 
managers could have been targeted, the researcher decided to limit the sample size in 
order to avoid deviation from the phenomenon being explored and respect the 
boundaries set for the research (Yin, 2003). It should be noted that the selected sample 
takes into account the expectation that case study research requires an average of six 
participants (Yin, 2003) and grounded theory between 30 and 50 participants (Morse, 
1994).  
 
Managers were sorted following their current and previous experiences using the 
LinkedIn web portal. It should be noted that five test interviews have been conducted 
with senior FMCG experts to refine and validate the research guideline, as noted earlier. 
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Table 3.4 displays the job positions held by the key informants targeted by the research 
and their split across the three contexts and by dyadic case. 
 
 
 
The table shows that most of the key informants who participated in this research have 
more than 15 years of experience in the FMCG industry. The research deliberately 
covered interviews with senior experts (CEOs and vice presidents) in UAE and KSA, as 
both countries are witnessing an evolutionary channel environment, which could reveal 
how FMCG leaders (suppliers and distributors) are adapting their dyadic relationships 
to these changes. Figure 3.9 shows that 23% of the interviewed participants are CEOs 
with more than 25 years of experience in the FMCG industry, and 40% are general 
managers with 15 to 20 years of experience in the FMCG industry. The other 
participants are managing directors, vice presidents, regional sales directors, business 
development directors, country managers and franchise directors.  
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3.4.4 Management process to gather the data 
This type of research requires a specific management process due to the following 
constraints: 
 Accessibility to senior managers: especially since the researcher has excluded 
managers within his professional scope.  
 Financial budget: the field research requires several trips to the targeted 
countries, thus substantial financial costs were incurred including travel, 
accommodation, and transportation costs.  
 Time: because the project was not on a full time basis, managing thirty 
appointments with senior professionals required dedicated administrative time 
management. 
 
Such complexities are acknowledged by qualitative researchers (Yin, 2003; Creswell, 
2007). To overcome these constraints the researcher adopted the following road map 
(see Figure 3.10). 
 
 
 
The preparatory phase is the most crucial phase in this type of research as it leads to 
effective fieldwork management. The most feasible option for the researcher was to 
request that his fieldwork be financed by his employer (supplier type organisation). This 
entailed formulating a project proposal showing the benefits for the employer and the 
funds required to support the field research. One of the researcher’s responsibilities 
includes driving the evolution of the various distributors across the Middle East.  
Therefore, this research was positioned as a step in building an appropriate risk culture 
with distributors, thus enhancing awareness of the upcoming risks affecting distributors 
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in the Middle East. By building this awareness, distributors may gain valuable 
knowledge pertaining to the most common risk mitigation strategies. This will allow 
them to transform their model with lower levels of uncertainty. This positioning was 
positively welcomed by the Vice President of the organisation, and a budget was 
allocated to conduct the field research and share the generic findings in a dedicated 
seminar. The sharing of the generic findings is essential to protect the interests of the 
companies interviewed. Ethics in this type of work is of primary importance (Yin, 
2003).  
 
While developing the database for the experts targeted by the sample, the researcher 
took into account the possibility of low response rates as the targeted participants do not 
fall within the professional scope of the researcher. He thus cannot rely on distributors 
within his workplace. Some participants might not be open to sharing such information 
and/or might resist recording the interview. Such factors are common to in-depth 
interview techniques. The researcher needs to ensure that his sampling plan is feasible 
in terms of cost, time, and compatibility with the research objectives (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  To secure 35 confirmed interviews (including the five pilot 
interviews to refine the interview guide), a database of 60 participants was built, all of 
which fit with the sample criteria set for the study. The participants were sourced 
through personal friends, who helped facilitate access to certain contacts. The researcher 
used the LinkedIn online network to search for contacts within the sample criteria. The 
researcher also registered with special FMCG community groups on LinkedIn, which 
helped him interact and identify relevant participants and influencers.  
 
Thirty five out of the 60 contacted participants confirmed their participation in this 
research following the interview schedule proposed. A 55% response rate is considered 
acceptable as long as the minimum target set for the research is achieved, noting that 
qualitative research does not emphasise the size of the sample as much as it stresses the 
depth of the insights gathered.  Other contacted participants, who showed interest but 
were not available for interviews due to travel constraints, were kept as replacements in 
case any of the 35 participants cancelled the interview at the last minute for unforeseen 
reasons. This strategy proved effective, especially since the researcher was faced with 
three cancellations during the interview process.  
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After inviting all the participants, the researcher was ready to proceed with the interview 
following the timetable presented in Table 3.5. 
 
 
It is very important to note that the data analysis phase in semi-structured interviews is 
congruent with the data collection phase (Mile et al., 2013). The researcher ensured that 
all key findings were synthesised by the end of each interview. A brief case study report 
was kept as a reference to be used in the formal analysis phase (Phases 3 and 4, Figure 
3.10).  
 
3.4.5 Data analysis  
It is strongly advised that qualitative data be analysed in harmony with the data 
collection process (Miles et al., 2013). The previous section showed how data collection 
and data analysis processes are interrelated in Phases 2, 3, and 4. Data collection took 
eight weeks approximately; however, the analysis took a total of 25 weeks. Data 
processing and management generally require three to five times the time needed to 
collect the data (Miles at al., 2013). While conducting the analysis, the researcher 
should differentiate qualitative from quantitative data analysis. As noted by Patton 
(2002), qualitative data analysis has to consider the following: 
 A focus on hidden meanings rather than on quantifiable observable phenomena.  
 In-depth analysis without relying on specific categories and pre-determined 
variables.  
 The sensitivity to the context rather than seeking a universal generalisation.  
 The role of the researcher while conducting the analysis rather than assuming a 
value-free inquiry.  
 The collection of substantial data for a limited number of cases instead of 
limited data for numerous cases.  
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 The aim of describing what is happening in the world and the reasons behind it 
rather than measuring specific variables based on what is already known.  
 
The researcher followed the four steps proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994) to 
analyse the data collected, illustrated in the framework below. 
 
  
 
This framework shows that qualitative data analysis follows a dynamic process, where 
the analysis of data occurs concurrently with the collection of data, as highlighted 
earlier. Conclusions are drawn and verified by going back to the data collection phase. 
The researcher adopted the same approach, where data is collected and concurrently 
analysed in Phases 2 and 3, and later verified in Phase 4.  
Even if the number of cases is limited, the amount of data collected from in-depth 
interviews is substantial. For this research, the transcription of a one hour interview 
resulted in a word document of 25 to 30 single spaced pages. A total of 50 hours of 
interview time were transcribed (see: http://www.transcriptionstar.com/services.html) 
leading to a document comprising 1,350 pages organised by case. Some comments have 
been given in Arabic, which required translation and cleaning. To manage this load of 
analytical material, Miles et al. (2013) propose condensing the data collected. This 
phase has also been referred to as the data reduction phase. However, the researcher 
decided not to use this expression as it might potentially imply that some data might 
have been lost in the process (Miles et al., 2013).  
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Data condensation is defined as the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, 
abstracting, and transforming data that appear in interview transcripts (Miles et al., 
2013). In this research, and similar to other studies that followed the same approach, 
data condensation started long before the data collection phase.  
 
Data condensation takes the form of writing summaries, coding, developing themes, 
generating categories and writing analytical memos (Miles et al., 2013). As illustrated 
earlier in Figure 3.11, the two sided arrow between data condensation and conclusion 
drawing implies that data condensation is an on-going process that only ends when the 
findings have been reached. Data condensation is an integrated part of the analytical 
process, where the researcher sharpens, focuses, and organises the data in a way that 
allows for final conclusions to be drawn and verified (Miles et al., 2013). 
 
Coding is considered to be at the core of the data condensation stage. It is the critical 
link between data collection and the meanings assigned to this data (Miles et al., 2013). 
Since the prime qualitative data to be analysed is textual (after being transcribed), the 
words have been refined from their original version for a more comprehensive analysis. 
Codes are used not only to simplify the qualitative analytical process, but to guide the 
researcher towards the propositions that he intends to explore and the hidden meanings 
that he aims to uncover. From a constructionist perspective, codes help uncover 
meanings that are hidden in the text. These meanings are associated with the perception 
of individuals and might be influenced by the subjective belief of the researcher.  
 
In most cases, codes are words or short phrases that symbolically assign a summative, 
relevant, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute to a portion of language-based or 
visual data (Saldana, 2013). The major types of codes used for this research are 
presented below, following the recommendation of Miles et al. (2013): 
 Descriptive coding: is a code generated by the researcher. It can be a word or a 
short sentence that aims at summarizing the basic topic of a short paragraph. The 
current research uses descriptive coding mainly to organise and sort data into 
specific topics. Descriptive codes assist in consolidating the mass of data into an 
inventory of topics. It also helps exclude data not deemed relevant to the 
objective of the research and hence will not be used in the conclusion phase. The 
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descriptive codes are self-generated by the researcher and can be predetermined 
following the propositions that were previously identified. 
 In-vivo coding: is a common code adopted by qualitative researchers as it uses 
the interviewee’s own language and records it as a code. In-vivo coding helps 
uncover the meanings that participants assign to certain topics and helps in 
understanding how individuals perceive and react to specific matters. In-vivo 
coding was the prime coding mechanism used as a result of the researcher’s 
interest in using the participants' own words in interpreting a specific topic. 
Reference to the participants' own words is very important as the research 
assumes that suppliers and agents might have a different interpretation of the 
same phenomenon. Suppliers and distributors may use different words and 
terminology in interpreting the notion of risk and trust, which might influence 
the whole meaning during the analysis phase. In-vivo coding also assists in the 
detection of specific patterns in the text; the frequent use of the same word for 
instance might lead to substantial pointers. In-vivo codings are placed in 
quotation marks to be differentiated from the researcher’s generated codes in the 
analysis section.   
 Proposition coding: This research explores seven propositions that have been 
derived from the theory. Specific themes associated with the proposition have 
been identified to explore each proposition. To have a focused analysis the 
researcher has integrated these themes in the research guideline. This will help 
in analysing the reaction of the interviewee to the themes and will assist in 
exploring the applicability of the theme to the case. Saldana (2013) differentiates 
between first cycle and second cycle coding. While performing the analysis, the 
researcher might realise that a set of codes (first cycle codes) can be regrouped 
under one code (2
nd
 cycle codes). Some codes associated with the proposition 
may also emerge from the interviews, a major feature of inductive research. 
Hypothesis coding is thus supported by secondary thematic coding, which helps 
in uncovering specific themes that emerge from interviews.  
 
NVivo 10 (see: http://www.qsrinternational.com/products_nvivo.aspx) was used to 
analyse the condensed data based on the above mentioned coding assigned following 
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the literature review and thematic codes that emerged from interviews (Miles et al., 
2013). Screenshots of NVivo are presented in Appendix II.  
The data condensed is then displayed. A display is an organised and compressed 
assembly of information that allows for conclusion drawings and resulting actions 
(Miles et al., 2013).  Extended texts were previously used as data display mechanisms. 
A 1,000 page document is complicated in itself, especially since the information is 
dispersed and non-structured. Moreover, extended testing overloads the information 
processing capability of the researcher, especially because humans are limited in 
processing large amounts of information (Miles et al., 2013).  Some information might 
be missed for simplification purposes. Following the recommendation of Miles et al. 
(2013), the researcher used different types of tables to analyse the data. It is up to the 
researcher to decide the design of the display following the conclusions expected to be 
drawn. Displays can also be considered to be a form of data condensation (Miles et al., 
2013).  The display tables used by the researcher aimed at gathering relevant evidence 
for each proposition. They were filled in at the end of each interview as part of the 
interview summary report conducted to analyse each case. 
 
A multiple case analysis entails analysing each individual case individually, then 
examining the similarities and differences between the cases (Yin, 2003). After 
examining the relevance of the themes for each case, a cross analysis was conducted 
between the cases that are similar and those that are different.   
 
Table 3.6 shows, for instance, the data display table used to explore P4. The researcher 
used this table to reconfirm the main themes discussed during the interview and to 
validate the emergence of the new themes. These tables were helpful in summarizing 
insights from the interviewees and were efficient, specifically in interviews that faced 
some timing restrictions.  
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The condensation and the display of qualitative data as recommended by the framework 
of Miles and Huberman (1994) are integral parts of the analytical process. The 
conclusions are vague at first, but become clearer and more focused as the process 
develops (Miles et al., 2013). The final conclusion only appears at the end of the data 
collection, condensation, and display phases. Interpretivists are interested in thoroughly 
exploring a few cases, instead of skimming through several cases.  
 
As explored in the research design section, data has to be verified. Verification may be 
brief, or thorough, or it may aim at replicating the findings to another data set (Miles et 
al., 2013).  The analysis of the similarities and differences, and the use of literal and 
theoretical replication, have served in verifying the conclusions.  In addition, the 
researcher verified the findings in Phase 4 by exploring the key conclusions with a 
confined sample composed of experts who are either CEOs or General Managers.  
 
This final verification aims at confirming the sturdiness, plausibility, conformability, 
and validity of the conclusions drawn (Miles et al., 2013). It will also confirm whether it 
is necessary or not to go back to the theory in order to review some of the suggested 
propositions (Yin, 2003). 
 
 
3.5 Foreseen Practical Problems from Chosen Methodology   
To present stronger evidence and reduce bias, it is preferable to use more than one 
method in case study research (Yin, 2003). In a single case study, the use of multiple 
methods might be feasible as the researcher will select the cases that give him 
accessibility to multiple sources of data. The firms that resist information sharing will 
not be considered in the scope of the single case study research. The selected firm that 
provides such information is aware that no other firms are involved in the research so 
there is no risk of information leakage. The choice of exploring multiple cases was 
based on the difficulty of combining multiple methods to focus on a single case in the 
Middle East. As shown in Section 1.2.2, the researcher is bound to face cultural 
obstacles associated with information sharing. This was confirmed after several 
unsuccessful trials that drove the researcher to rely mainly on gathering data from the 
interviews conducted with senior executives. The strategy of gathering interview data 
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from 15 cases of 30 FMCG companies (suppliers and distributors) in the Middle East 
provides as solid evidence as had multiple methods been used. Interviews were 
conducted with people from different firms, hence the data gathered is a result of 
multiple sources that need not share the same opinion. The researcher did not get rival 
opinions haphazardly, but had planned for them prior to and during each conducted 
interview. The theoretical background discussed in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.1 helped the 
researcher orient the discussion during the interview to be able to understand the 
similarities and differences between various views.  
 
The objective of using more than one method of data collection is to reduce bias and 
reinforce the findings. The same objective was reached by conducting multiple cases 
and checking for rival opinions due to the complexity of adopting more than one 
method. This does not mean that the researcher did not refer to secondary data 
collection strategies at all. For some propositions (P6 and P7), the websites of the firms 
being explored were used to demonstrate how suppliers and distributors emphasise the 
notion of trust in their values. The websites of distributors who participated in the 
multiple cases analysed have been used to gather evidence associated with the 
specialized roles of distributors.  
 
Another limitation is associated with the number of interviews conducted with each 
firm. In a normal context, it is advisable to interview more than one person in the same 
firm to be able to highlight different views, thus enriching the data gathered. Given the 
profile of the participants targeted by the research and to minimise associated 
complexities, the researcher conducted one interview in each firm.  
 
As noted in Section 3.4.3, the sample targeted by the research is composed of senior 
staff.  The topic deals with senior strategic issues associated with outsourcing and 
integration of essential activities across the supply chain. In the Middle East, these 
decisions are not managed by supply chain managers, relationship managers, or other 
operational managers but are centralized with top management in most cases. In certain 
cases, the relationship between suppliers and distributors is managed on two hierarchal 
levels: top management and operational management. This research does not explore 
the day to day friction that exists between the management team from either side of the 
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relationship, but is concerned with the risks that affect the relationship as a whole. 
Gathering data from executives who set the dyadic risks mitigation strategies brings 
more valuable insights than having more than one interview in each firm.  
 
The attempt to conduct more than one interview in each firm may lead to further 
complexities; a senior executive interviewed might feel undermined or offended if the 
researcher asks to have other interviews with middle management.   Moreover, the 
researcher would need to justify to top management why more than one interview is 
needed, manage resistance as well as the risk of obstructing the whole interview 
process. Such complexities could have been managed if the research only focused on 
one case, which is not the case in this research.  
 
 
3.6 Ethical Considerations 
Strict ethical attention has been considered during the course of the research. The prime 
concern of the researcher is to assure the firms interviewed that the data shared will not 
be used outside the scope of the research.  
 
Potential ethical issues must be avoided in the process of collecting, analysing, and 
communicating the data. An important concept when considering the ethics of research 
is that of consent (Thomas, 2011). To tackle this concept, the researcher must consider 
the following questions (Thomas, 2011): 
 Who is the research benefiting? 
 Do you have the right to take up people’s time and energy? 
 Is there any possible discomfort that participants will have to experience? 
 Are you invading participants’ privacy? 
 Are you compromising your participants’ standing of whatever kind in their 
communities? 
 
Thomas (2011) distinguishes between “opted in” and “implied” consent. Opting in 
consent is when participants actively indicate their willingness to take part in the 
research. Implied consent is when the researcher assumes that the participants will give 
their consent as soon as they are informed about the research.  
 154 
 
A decision was made to address these questions from the very beginning of the research 
process. An access strategy was adopted by the researcher that focused on the ethical 
matters that must be considered to avoid any issue that may put the quality of the 
research into jeopardy. 
 
The researcher clearly informed interviewees about the purpose and nature of the 
research, and assured them about the confidentiality of the information shared. A signed 
invitation letter was sent to all participants highlighting the objectives of the research, 
its scope, and benefits (See Appendix III).  The letter also indicated that this research is 
for academic purposes and the interview would be recorded and that information shared 
would not be used beyond the scope of the research.  
 
To ensure ‘opted-in’ consent the researcher scheduled a telephone call with each target 
participant. Although such action was time consuming and caused some delays in 
starting the fieldwork, it proved very effective and a prime contributor to building 
assurance. The researcher was able to clarify in the call the content of the research and 
reiterate his purpose.   
 
To safeguard participants, a hard copy of the same letter was given to each participant 
prior to the start of the interview and an appreciation note was sent following each 
interview. A summary of the main topics to be discussed during the interview was also 
sent to interviewees two days prior to the scheduled interview date. A copy of this letter 
is presented in Appendix IV. 
 
As presented in Section 3.4.1, the researcher conducted five pilot interviews in order to 
amend the interview guidelines if necessary, and gain experience in conducting 
interviews in terms of communication and time management. This step helped the 
researcher simplify certain terminology (such as the notion of asset specificity) that the 
participants may not be familiar with.  
 
It is also important to note that communication with participants emphasised that this 
research is being conducted for academic purposes and aims at adding to existing 
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knowledge (practical and theoretical). Such transparency has been adopted during all 
the course of the research.  
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Chapter 4. Discussion of Results 
 
This chapter discusses the results of the 15 multiple cases analysed, and is divided into 
seven subsections, presenting the findings relative to each proposition.  
 
 
4.1 Dyadic Risks Affecting Suppliers 
 
P1: FMCG suppliers in the Middle East who outsource sales and distribution 
activities to distributors are negatively affected by dyadic risks. 
 
Interviewees from the supplier side confirm that dyadic risks have substantial 
implications for their ability to optimise their performance. The diverse implications of 
dyadic risks are a consequence of variations in the complexity (control actual price to 
trade and cost to serve), programmability (capability of the sales teams, quality of 
execution), information asymmetry (control actual distributor margin, information 
sharing, alignment on objectives and strategies), and investment intensity (control actual 
trade funds) of sales and distribution activities.  
 
 
4.1.1 Issues of control  
Friction emerged between the supplier in Case 14 and his distributor when the former 
took the decision to place himself closer to the market by establishing an office in KSA. 
The supplier became aware of the prices invoiced to trade and the actual costs incurred 
in the market, thus recognizing that the distributor is making an actual margin that is 
much higher than the margin initially agreed on.   
 
“When we [the supplier] were managing the business from a distance, we did not know 
what was happening…but when we deployed a Country Manager in KSA, he was able 
to see what was going wrong in the business.  The friction with the distributor increased 
when we discovered that he was making higher margins by selling at prices higher than 
the recommended ones.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
 157 
 
Suppliers outsourcing their sales and distribution activities do not directly invoice to 
trade. Their role ends by recommending an invoiced price, beyond which they have no 
(or limited) means to control the actual price invoiced to trade by distributors. As 
predicted by the agency theory, a distributor can benefit from this situation to act 
opportunistically, thus increasing the probability of dyadic risks occurring. The 
opportunistic behaviour is operationalised by invoicing to trade at higher prices, thus 
achieving higher margins than anticipated. This situation is widespread in the Middle 
East, and was observed in 11 out of the 15 cases examined. Dyadic risks also arise due 
to the supplier’s inability to control the actual costs incurred by the distributor. Several 
cases explored exhibited distributors committing to deploying certain capabilities on 
paper that were not actually sustained in reality.  
 
“We always thought that he had this number of vans, but when we started going into the 
details of the information we discovered that the number of vans was much lower than 
our expectations.”(Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
“A distributor can say that he has a dedicated team but how can you make sure that this 
team is actually dedicated, how can you control it?”(Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
A distributor lowering costs at the expense of capabilities expected to be deployed to 
meet the channel needs is considered to be acting opportunistically. However, if the 
distributor is optimizing costs without affecting capabilities required to drive the 
business, then this behaviour is interpreted differently. Issues associated with the 
inability to control the actual costs of distributors have been observed in many cases 
(Cases 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 15). Suppliers were more concerned with capabilities 
deployed rather than costs incurred. These dyadic cases provide tangible evidence of 
how distributors can turn information asymmetry to their own benefit. Distributors hide 
information related to actual costs incurred in the market as well as prices invoiced to 
trade in order to conceal the fact that they are making higher margins. The inability to 
control the capabilities deployed in each channel and the associated actual costs 
incurred hindered suppliers from accelerating their growth, leading to severe loss in 
market share (Cases 13, 14).  
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“We were growing lower than market growth; our market share for the past two years 
is on downward trends.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
4.1.2 Alignment on objectives  
Dyadic risks also arise from misalignment on objectives and strategies. This theme 
emerged from interviews conducted with suppliers in Cases 6, 8, 11 and 14. 
“They [the distributor] were not focusing on the right channels. They were doing things 
without aligning with us, we had different agendas” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
When digging more with the interviewee into these different agendas the consequences 
of dyadic risks were emphasised. 
  
“Our [the supplier] agenda was to grow the business, his [the distributor] agenda was 
to sell as much as possible and with the least amount of costs incurred, to take as much 
marketing money as possible and improve his profit margin” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
The situation becomes more severe when the opportunistic behaviour of the distributor 
starts to affect the supplier’s competitive positioning in the market.  
 
“Competition is increasing, everyone is becoming more active in the market … I [The 
Supplier] know that to improve my performance, I need to increase my coverage but the 
distributor is resisting investing in additional vans.”(Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
A misalignment on objectives and strategies may put the entire relationship at risk. The 
fact that a supplier feels trapped in a dyadic relationship by obligation rather than by 
conviction has negative implications for the relationship. 
 
“You [the supplier] cannot divorce them [the distributor], even if you no longer love 
them. You still need them because the foreign investment law does not allow you to 
operate on your own.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).  
 
This suggests that as soon as laws and regulations become more flexible, a supplier 
might terminate the relationship instantaneously, as witnessed in Cases 11, 13, and 14. 
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4.1.3 Information sharing 
Case 13 is a typical example of information asymmetry between suppliers and 
distributors.  
 
“Our previous distributor was simply refusing to give us [the supplier] detailed 
information … We had visibility over the macro sales figures only … but when we asked 
for more details, we were facing an unjustified resistance” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
According to insights gathered, the reasons that drive a distributor to hide information 
do not only relate to the self-interest behaviour of the distributor, but also to the 
mentality of the distributor and the way information is perceived.  
 
“If I am a distributor, for me information is power, and giving out this information is 
like giving out part of my power” (Interview, Distributor KSA). 
 
According to a general manager interviewed, this is the mentality of an old school 
distributor who believes that controlling information ensures the supplier’s dependency 
on him. Such a distributor does not mind sharing sales information at the total country 
level, but refuses to give sales information by channel or at the customer level as this 
might highlight some weaknesses in his operations.  
 
“If we [the supplier] know such information, there is a possibility that we use it against 
them, by challenging the way they do things.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
Five cases explored (Cases 6, 7, 8, 10, and 11) show how distributors use information 
asymmetry to preserve a powerful role, which can be a self-destructive act, and the 
supplier’s performance in the market is affected.  
 
“We [the supplier] were giving the distributor a budget that has to be invested in the 
trade, but we did not have any visibility over how the money was being spent.  The 
distributor refused to give us a copy of contracts with retailers; with the rise of modern 
trade and the continuous inflation of costs, we could no longer tolerate such 
behaviour.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
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“The inability to control information means a difficulty in achieving an accurate 
forecast, which puts all the supply planning at risk... we sell food products with expiry 
dates in a vast market and in unconventional climatic conditions.  How can we grow 
further if we are not able to forecast precisely?” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
It is not accurate to assume that distributors are open to unconditionally sharing all sorts 
of information, as has been concluded from most interviews conducted. However, some 
distributors did not object to being open with their suppliers as long as openness is 
mutual.  
 
“If my supplier asks me to share information about costs, such as working on a certain 
project to improve efficiency, I do not mind sharing it if the benefits are mutual.” 
(Interview, Distributor UAE). 
 
“I mean we expect our customers to be open to us and give us information, we must 
therefore understand when our suppliers ask information from us; we are their 
customers.” (Interview, Distributor UAE). 
 
 
4.1.4 Level of focus and dedicated capabilities 
Some suppliers were dealing with big well established distributors in the regions, who 
lacked the required focus.   
 
“We [the supplier] felt diluted in his [the distributor] portfolio. His main interest was to 
drive the beverage business while our interest was to grow our own business.” 
(Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
This dyadic case shows that it is not enough to choose a leading distributor, if the 
supplier is not receiving the right attention and focus. The lack of dedicated capabilities 
and the lack of existence of synergy with its distributor’s portfolio blocked the supplier 
in Case 11 from meeting his growth ambitions.  
 
“We [the supplier] were growing by 15% in a market where we have the potential to 
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grow by 40%.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
 “We feel like a small fish in a big ocean. The only thing that was dedicated to us was a 
channel we called Van Sales Operation, which was the only channel where we had 
certain control, vision, transparency … In modern trade we do not have any focus and 
we were drowning in the distributor’s vast portfolio.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
The supplier from Case 11 reconsidered the relationship with its distributor due to a lack 
of focus. This theme, which emerged from interviews, has also been observed in other 
dyadic cases (Cases 3, 6, 7,8,10, and 11). 
 
The supplier in Case 6 was dealing with six distributors in UAE, and is currently 
reassessing its entire structure to have better control and achieve additional category 
synergies.  
 
“I [the supplier] do not know very much about the coverage capability, the type of 
equipment that they use, the information systems they have, and how relevant their 
portfolio is.  In our opinion, we would ideally look at having two distributors in a 
market like UAE, but with different focus portfolios; one would be very much impulse 
portfolios, and one would be the destination portfolio. That is very much what we are 
doing at the moment.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
These findings reveal that suppliers who outsource their sales and distribution 
operations are suffering from dyadic risks. Four dyadic cases have decided to 
discontinue the existing relationships, while the remaining four have given distributors a 
notice period during which they are required to upgrade their capabilities. This research 
shows that there are some exceptional dyadic cases where suppliers have accepted 
living with dyadic risks.  
 
On the other hand, some distributors are highly aware of the importance of giving their 
suppliers dedicated capabilities. This has been observed in dyadic cases 9, 12 and 15.  
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“We are aware that our suppliers need focus and dedication, we need to build our 
capability while making sure to have the right business model that makes each supplier 
feel important in our portfolio” (Interview, Distributor KSA). 
 
4.1.5 Capability of sales teams and quality of execution 
According to the sales director of a supplier interviewed (Case 4), suppliers in UAE pay 
the highest bill of trade evolution.  
 
“Retailers in UAE realised that it’s not about opening new stores, but rather about 
attracting more shoppers.  In order to do so, they needed to achieve better profits to 
fund their growth.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
It is not only about achieving more margins from suppliers, but about gaining better 
know-how to attract more shoppers and improve the quality of execution.   
 
“There is a strategic need for collaboration between suppliers and retailers to 
exchange category and shopper expertise … retailers rely on suppliers profoundly as 
they are the brand experts.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
To be able to fully play their role and enhance their collaboration with retailers, 
suppliers should possess the right capabilities.  
 
“Distributors who cannot cater to the needs of modern trade retailers in terms of 
capabilities and information systems will find no place in UAE in the future.” 
(Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
Distributors realise that controlling the relationship with modern retailers is a source of 
power. 
“They [the distributors] feel privileged knowing everything about the customer… if we 
go and negotiate and try to build relationships with retailers, then why should we need 
them anymore?” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
“Because a distributor is fully representing your brand, you will not be taken seriously 
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within the local retail environment.  At times, distributors do not want you to speak to 
retailers because they are very protective and they want to hold on to this relationship 
as long as possible.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).  
 
This is not only affecting suppliers’ abilities to control their performance, but also 
preventing them from gaining category knowledge that can be used to accelerate growth 
and drive relationships with modern trade retailers.  
 
“The name of the game is: if we are not able to make that change ourselves and evolve 
with the retailers and deliver on their expectations, then there is a risk of being made 
obsolete.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
Managing relationships with international retailers like Carrefour requires a specific 
level of skills and expertise. As highlighted earlier, suppliers have the advantage of 
attracting potential talent. To attract the same level of skills, a distributor has to pay 
higher remuneration, thus achieving lower margins. Distributors who refuse to attract 
competent capabilities to professionally manage the relationship with key accounts and 
refuse to share customer-based information are exhibiting opportunistic signals to 
suppliers.  
 
The suppliers interviewed who do not attain such capabilities are at a disadvantage 
compared to those who have the best capabilities to deal with international retail 
customers. Deploying the right capabilities is not only restricted to modern trade 
channels. Suppliers emphasised the need to have multiple channel expertise, as 
confirmed by eight cases explored. Four other dyadic cases of suppliers who have not 
yet reached a detrimental phase with distributors, but are currently exercising pressure 
to drive them to change, were encountered. A CEO interviewed notes:  
 
“Distributor development is an important risk blocking us [the supplier] from acquiring 
the necessary capabilities to grow in UAE.  We know that we have to either move to a 
more capable distributor whose cost is going to be higher, or invest in driving the 
capabilities of our current distributor, who we believe has an inefficient cost structure.  
We are now verifying our options.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
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“If I'm getting the right quality of execution at the right cost, I will be meeting with the 
needs of my suppliers, otherwise I will be causing them issues in the market versus their 
competitors.” (Interview, Distributor KSA). 
 
Suppliers dealing with non-competent distributors realise that their competitors are 
achieving better results in terms of relationship with retail and quality of execution. On 
the other hand, distributors who are equipped with the right capabilities are positioned 
as strategic supply chain partners.  
 
“Our suppliers do the marketing and we are their operational arm in the market.  We 
have a responsibility to drive the competitiveness of our supplier’s brands, they count 
on us in building physical availability as much as we count on them in building mental 
availability.” (Interview, Distributor UAE). 
 
4.1.6 Cases tolerating dyadic risks 
Suppliers, mainly in Iraq, acknowledge the existence of dyadic risks but are not seeking 
any structural changes, primarily due to the nature of the business in such traditional 
trade countries.  
 
“In traditional trade countries, you need a minimum amount of systems and 
infrastructure, because your operation is simplified. You are doing the basics. You are 
taking this package, putting it on the checkout counter or in the fridge, making sure the 
stock is available.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
 
In a modern trade country, the above tasks are considered to be basic and suppliers have 
higher expectations.   
 
“We look at freshness, competition, the quality of the display, the range, are we 
overselling, or are we underselling? The whole operation is more complicated because 
you have done the fundamentals and you are moving beyond the sales operation.” 
(Interview, Supplier UAE). 
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The level of expectations between a traditional trade and modern trade countries are 
different as expressed by a regional sales director interviewed:  
 
“In a traditional trade country, the salesperson is an order taker.  But in a modern 
trade country like UAE, the salesperson is an order maker” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
To make the order, the salesperson should be able to build unique relationships with key 
customers, have the right category understanding, and be strong in negotiation, 
highlights the interviewee. In Iraq, these tasks are not requested from the salesperson, 
where the role of the distributor is to ensure that products are available in a fragmented 
retail environment.  
 
A country manager interviewed for Iraq notes: 
 
“Our distributor has to ensure proper distribution routes, reaching the 30,000 grocery 
stores in Iraq either directly or through wholesalers.  He needs to invest in vans and 
manage the transactions from A to Z, and we are not anxious about how this is being 
done.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
 
This indicates that suppliers in Iraq are not concerned with knowing the ‘how’ part. 
Suppliers are satisfied as long as distributors are bearing all the risks associated with 
investments in physical distribution assets and are covering as many stores as possible. 
Suppliers incur minimal levels of commercial investments in traditional trade markets, 
thus limiting the possibility for opportunistic behaviour by distributors.  
 
“We spend in trade offers, but our investments are negligible compared to investments 
in modern trade markets.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
 
Distributors in Iraq may act opportunistically, but the consequences of their behaviour 
are contained to a certain extent.  On the other hand, suppliers appear to be acting 
opportunistically in a country like Iraq, where distributors absorb all related risks. In 
such a context, suppliers are risk averse and are solely interested in driving volume, and 
gaining opportunistic sales opportunities while incurring minimal investments, as 
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highlighted by a general manager interviewed. The General Manager of a large 
multinational supplier in the Middle East adds: 
 
“If you ask me today whether we would go and invest US$ 100 million in Iraq, my 
answer would be ‘maybe not’. Why, because of the environmental risk factors in the 
country. I think that over the coming 10 years, the future prospect of distributors is very 
bright in Iraq because international suppliers will be very careful regarding the 
security of lives, their personnel, security of assets, and the security of cash.” 
(Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
 
The insight shared shows that suppliers may tolerate dyadic risks and accept 
outsourcing their sales and distribution activities to avoid absorbing environmental risks 
that may have greater negative implications. A distributor can thus present himself as 
the right candidate for absorbing these risks and acting on behalf of the suppliers in the 
local market. 
 
 “Our distributor acts as if he is the supplier in the country.  When you go to the grocery 
and you ask about our products, they will tell you the name of the distributor, we do not 
mind that because they are representing us in the field” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
 
The dyadic cases analysed show that suppliers in KSA and UAE are vulnerable to 
dyadic risks, unlike suppliers in Iraq, who seemed to be more tolerant. Some suppliers 
in UAE and KSA have given distributors a notice period to enhance their capabilities, 
and others are considering doing so in the near future. As predicted by the agency and 
TCE theories, the multiple dyadic cases explored show that suppliers who outsource 
their sales and distribution operations to distributors are negatively affected by 
relational risks. These suppliers are less confident about their ability to accelerate 
growth and optimise costs, thus highlighting the negative consequences of dyadic risks 
performance. A general manager outsourcing the sales and distribution activities notes: 
 
“Priority number one for us is growth, we [the supplier] have brands that we think have 
the potential to grow by 15% to 17%, which is much higher than our current growth 
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rates, and we will not allow our distributor to block us from meeting our growth 
ambition.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
In traditional trade markets like Iraq, where environmental risks are high and where the 
role of the distributor is restricted to basic sales tasks, suppliers seem to accept the 
consequential risks. The findings in Iraq show that by outsourcing certain tasks, 
suppliers transfer the risks associated with these tasks, as predicted by the agency 
theory. A General Manager interviewed notes: 
 
“We absorb all the risks that they are not willing to absorb; it is a winning situation for 
them.” (Interview, Distributor Iraq). 
 
Exploring multiple cases in three different contexts shows that dyadic risks are affecting 
FMCG suppliers in reality, but the consequences of such risks vary with the variation in 
the context. Dyadic risks mainly take the form of opportunism, information asymmetry, 
non-competent capabilities, and the lack of focus. In channel contexts like UAE and 
KSA, the consequences drive suppliers to transform their entire sales and distribution 
models.  The findings thus confirm the first proposition raised by the research.  
However, this proposition is more valid for FMCG suppliers in UAE and KSA than for 
FMCG suppliers in Iraq.  
 
 
 
4.2 Dyadic Risks Affecting Distributors 
 
P2: FMCG distributors in the Middle East are negatively affected by dyadic risks. 
 
The research defines dyadic risks for distributors such as the uncertainties (probability 
of unexpected events occurring) that are caused by their dependency on suppliers. Cases 
of suppliers who terminated their relationships with distributors have been observed 
(Cases 11, 13, 14), reinforcing the significance of dyadic risks for distributors. 
Distributors who were given a notice period to upgrade their capabilities may also be 
facing the risk of relationship termination in the near future, as confirmed by dyadic 
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Cases 6, 8, 10, and 15. Evidence that confirms the significance of dyadic risks for 
distributors are organised in two categories (see Table 4.1):  
 Relationship termination: includes distributors who experienced the termination of 
their relationships with suppliers. These represent a concrete example of the actual 
consequences of dyadic risks, showing that relationships with suppliers should 
never be taken for granted.  
 Notice period: includes distributors who were given a notice or a probation period 
to restore the relationship; or else face potential relationship termination.  
 
 
 
The table shows that in Iraq, distributors are less exposed to dyadic risks as suppliers are 
not anticipating any key transformations to their existing relationships at present. 
Suppliers have accepted their dependency on distributors, who can absorb all risks, as 
predicted by the agency theory. A vice president of a supplier type of organisation 
notes:  
 
“I think that Iraq, from a distributor point of view, will flourish for many, many years.” 
(Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
In UAE on the other hand, most suppliers interviewed have given their distributors a 
notice period to shape up their capabilities (Cases 6, 8, 10), and in KSA some have 
terminated existing relationships (Cases 11, 13, and 14). These two sets of cases were 
primarily used to explain the sources of dyadic risks affecting distributors in the Middle 
East. The findings presented below are not only restricted to information gathered from 
distributors, but also includes information gathered from their suppliers in the region. 
Distributors should be concerned about their dependency on suppliers due to specific 
sources, some of which were anticipated by the research while others emerged from the 
interviews.  
 169 
 
4.2.1 Legal protection 
The local laws in the Middle East obliging foreign fast moving consumer goods 
(FMCG) suppliers to appoint or partner with local distributors were originally formed to 
protect local companies from globalisation and to control the wealth generated by oil 
rich countries. This law is not restricted to a specific industry, and thus forces 
multinational FMCG suppliers, such as the cases targeted by the research (Cases 1 
to15), to appoint distributors in the local market. A CEO for a key FMCG company 
notes: 
 
“In the Gulf region, suppliers are legally obligated to work with distributors. If I want 
to set up my own sales force, I might not always be able to do so as I have to be tied up 
with a local distribution company.” (Interview, Supplier, Middle East). 
 
Such laws made it difficult for suppliers to establish their own sales and distribution 
operations in the Gulf and operate independently from their current distributors.  
 
 “It is like a Catholic marriage which makes it almost impossible to end by divorce, and 
too costly if divorce is being considered.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).  
 
Such laws safeguarded distributors, as shared by a CEO of a distribution company in 
UAE:   
 
“Any multinational company must be in partnership with a local company that has a 
majority share of 51%, this protected us as distributors.” (Interview, Distributor UAE). 
 
To maintain their independence and avoid being firmly linked to a local partner, FMCG 
suppliers opted for a transactional distribution model where the supplier’s role is solely 
to export the product to the local market, leaving the management of the sales and 
distribution operation to another party. Suppliers do not have the right to issue invoices 
to retail customers unless they have set up a legal entity in partnership with a local 
company.  
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The turning point occurred two years ago when the government of KSA introduced 
some flexibility, allowing foreign companies to establish physical operations on the 
ground without relying on local companies.  Governments, as noted by one of the 
interviewees, are obliged to relax some laws in order to be able to join the World Trade 
Organisation. This drove suppliers to question their models of outsourcing the sales and 
distribution activities, and seek different strategies to mitigate dyadic risks. A 
transformation process of the sales and distribution models erupted when one of the 
suppliers interviewed (Case 13) decided to terminate its relationship with its current 
distributor.  The business development director of Case 14 notes: 
 
“In KSA, we [the supplier] followed exactly what Case 13 experienced, and we even 
used the latter as an example to encourage our shareholders to exit the relationship 
with our existing distributor. We could not tolerate his behaviour anymore, and we 
needed to find a solution. I think that many other FMCG companies will follow, it is like 
a domino effect and distributors should truly consider these trends.” (Interview, 
Supplier KSA). 
 
In UAE, on the other hand, suppliers are still obliged to have a local partner by law, 
though there are some ways to bypass the law.  
 
“Our [the supplier] local partner is a silent partner; we manage the operations as if we 
were operating alone.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
Distributors in UAE agree that governments are becoming less strict nowadays as a 
means to attract foreign direct investments, which can only be done by encouraging 
multinational companies to establish their own operations in the local market, as 
highlighted by the CEO of a distribution company in UAE. This is why the government 
of Dubai developed a free zone in Jebel Ali which offers such benefits as import and re-
export tax free protection, 100% foreign ownership, corporate tax free operations, 
minimum operating costs, and other benefits, according to a regional sales director 
interviewed. With these new regulations allowing suppliers to operate independently in 
the market, distributors can no longer rely on the law to protect their roles. In addition, 
the new regulations have also relaxed the compensation fees paid to distributors should 
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a supplier decide to terminate his services, making the exit costs much more affordable 
than they used to be in the past.  
 
“As long as we [the supplier] give an acceptable notice period to our distributor, there 
is no legal obligation to pay him a compensation fee. It all depends on the exit 
arrangement reached as well as our business ethics to ensure that we were fair till the 
very end.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
4.2.2 Market know-how and threat of substitute 
In the past, distributors possessed the market knowledge advantage, being local 
companies that are physically present in the market, retaining the required connections. 
They knew the laws, the system, the trade, the consumers, and were able to build on this 
advantage at a time when multinational companies used to manage their businesses in 
the Middle East remotely from England, France, Luxembourg, and the United States.  
 
“We needed someone who knows the market and is familiar with the local culture” 
(Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
The research of Dunn (1979) confirms this insight but dates back 35 years, which is 
why the above interviewee used the past tense when describing the situation.  
 
With the growing importance of Middle Eastern markets today, all suppliers 
interviewed are physically present in KSA and UAE through representative offices, but 
not yet in Iraq, mainly for security reasons.  
 
“The Middle East represents a good share of our international business; there is a need 
to be physically present in the market.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
By hiring local experts over time, suppliers were able to acquire the knowledge they 
once lacked and have succeeded in embedding the local cultures within their own 
organisations by being more integrated in the Middle Eastern societies.  Table 4.2 
illustrates how, for three of the 15 cases explored, the experts interviewed were foreign 
(British, South African, and French). In 10 out of the 15 cases examined, the experts 
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interviewed from multinational firms had previous experience in local distribution 
companies.  
 
 
 
 
Suppliers no longer need to rely on distributors for information. Over time, and by 
hiring local experts with previous experience in distribution companies, suppliers were 
able to acquire the right know-how. This transfer of learning is the second turning point 
in supplier distributor relationships in the Middle East. Suppliers are now aware of what 
is happening, familiar with the business dynamics, and experienced in managing 
distribution type organisations in the Middle East. A vice president interviewed notes: 
 
“It is not difficult for me [the supplier] to know what it would cost me to operate in 
UAE in KSA or any other country in the Middle East. I have teams comprised of 
individuals who used to manage the day to day operations in leading distribution 
companies in the Middle East. Now we know better than before.” (Interview, Supplier 
Middle East). 
 
This theme emerged from interviews and has substantial implications for distributors. 
Suppliers can use their acquired knowledge of the actual market situation to renegotiate 
their contracts with distributors. A contract renegotiation may be translated into a 
decrease in margins.   
 
“With the increasing pressure on costs and the change in the retail scene, we [the 
supplier] had to adapt our distributor margin to the actual situation in the market.” 
(Interview, Supplier UAE). 
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In KSA and UAE, distributors used to build on the power of knowledge and information 
asymmetry in the past, but can no longer do so nowadays. Suppliers are no longer kept 
in the dark; in fact some might have as much knowledge as distributors. With the 
increase in market knowledge, suppliers started to see the gaps, assessing more 
thoroughly the capabilities of their distributors, thereby leading to higher expectations 
going forward.  
 
“Our distributors know how to sell, but with the evolution taking place, our 
expectations from our distributors have changed. They really need to know what kind of 
value they can add to our business.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
Suppliers might achieve better results than distributors in certain functions. Moreover, 
some distributors are aggressively building their capabilities to be able to attract 
suppliers from other distribution companies. Distributors thus face the threat of 
substitution either by their suppliers who are acquiring local skills, or by other more 
competitive distributors in the market. Suppliers who are working with distributors who 
have also acquired resources who had a previous experience with multinational 
suppliers face lower levels of dyadic risks. 
 
“I used to work with ABC (supplier type of organisation); this has helped me introduce 
new ways of thinking. I even coached my people in how suppliers operate and what the 
priorities are that matter for them.” (Interview, Distributor KSA). 
 
4.2.3 Scale and risk absorption 
The scale of the distributor in relation to that of the supplier has been a key advantage 
for the former. Distributors built their scale by succeeding in representing several 
international suppliers at the same time. Distributors have quadrupled their size due to 
the dynamic growth of all their suppliers put together, as shared by one of the 
interviewees.  
 
A supplier used to benefit from the distributor’s scale for two main reasons, noted a 
regional sales director interviewed.  
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“First, distributors with large scale have a cost advantage as they can spread their 
fixed costs over a bigger business, and second they have the negotiation advantage as 
they can go to the trade with a bigger portfolio.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
Scale is positioned as a source of power for distributors, the importance of which cannot 
be underestimated. In modern trade markets, however, distributors cannot merely rely 
on scale. Cases 11 and 15 are typical examples of suppliers operating with sizeable 
distributors in KSA. Scale was not working for both companies as they felt diluted in 
the portfolio of their distributors. Although scale provided them with competitive costs 
to serve, this, however, came at the cost of focus. As demonstrated earlier, both 
suppliers suffered from dyadic risks due to the lack of focus. The supplier of Case 11 
terminated his relationship with the distributor due to a lack of focus and the supplier of 
Case 15 has given its distributor a notice period.  
 
“We [the supplier] want to work with someone who makes us feel important to his 
portfolio … This is how we can draw his attention and dedication.” (Interview, Supplier 
KSA). 
 
Distributors used to benefit from the scale advantage in the past but many suppliers 
have now achieved a critical scale, allowing them to consider different alternatives. A 
general manager who is not convinced of the notion of scale notes:  
 
“If you had asked me [the supplier] this question 15 or 20 years ago, I would have told 
you that I was obliged to outsource because it makes financial sense for me; it is not the 
case today as I have the scale to be on my own.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
Some suppliers do not agree with this view, and still consider the notion of scale a 
strategic advantage of distributors. The only risk that exists is distributors losing their 
scale due to their inability to sustain their relationships with suppliers. They will thus 
lose an important source of power that used to justify their existence in the past. 
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Whilst the scale dimension might still be an advantage for distributors in Iraq, it is no 
longer the case in UAE and KSA, where suppliers perceive that outsourcing to 
distributors for their mere ability to absorb certain risks is not sufficient.   
 
“If we [the distributor] have the scale to absorb financial risks, it will be more risky if 
we keep outsourcing all the sales and distribution activities to a distributor. If our 
distributors have the scale, they cannot treat us with mediocrity anymore, regardless of 
our size”. (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
The main influence of distributors is their ability to absorb financial risks. Several 
distributors interviewed make up part of gigantic conglomerates operating in various 
business sectors such as banking, real estate, automotive, heavy industries, and 
distribution. Their access to capital presented a central benefit in the past and will 
continue to do so in the future if they demonstrate to all suppliers their significance to 
their portfolio, regardless of scale. Some distributors are aware of these changes, as 
noted by a CEO interviewed:  
 
“We [the distributor] have access to capital; we offer our suppliers a risk free model in 
which we are absorbing the biggest share of the risk. But our suppliers have their 
growth ambitions, and to grow we need to give them enough focus and make them feel 
important in the way we allocate our resources and set our plans.” (Interview, 
Distributor UAE). 
 
4.2.4 Unpredictability of suppliers 
A distributor, who is instigating considerable dyadic risks for the supplier, should not 
feel surprised if one day their supplier decides to terminate the relationship. Some 
distributors interviewed, who should feel confident about their relationships with 
suppliers (as confirmed by the interviews conducted with their suppliers), were 
exhibiting signs of concern about the sustainability of the relationship.  This was 
observed in Cases 4, 5, 9, 12, and 15. The vice president of a key distribution company 
in KSA (Case 12) notes: 
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“My supplier can decide at any point in time to put an end to the relationship, even if 
we are the best in town.  They did it in other countries, and the possibility that they do it 
in KSA will always remain in our calculations, although we are on very good terms with 
them.” (Interview, Distributor KSA). 
 
The general manager of a key distribution company in UAE (Case 4) adds: 
 
“The second our supplier feels that we are not evolving with the market and we are not 
maintaining a level of capabilities that is up to the standards in the various trade 
channels, he might reconsider the relationship even if we are among the best in the 
market today.” (Interview, Distributor UAE). 
 
A decision to review the relationship regardless of historical experience has also been 
witnessed. Distributors of Cases 4, 9, 12, and 15 fear the unpredictability of suppliers 
but Case 5 provides an example of the validity of this type of uncertainty. The supplier 
of Case 5 discontinued the relationship with his distributor, not because of dyadic risks, 
but because it was a strategic recommendation that came from top management.  
 
“It has been decided that we [the supplier] need to directly control the downstream 
supply chain activities; we do not find the need for distributors anymore.” (Interview, 
Supplier UAE). 
 
Distributors in KSA and UAE are significantly affected by dyadic risks and should be 
concerned about their level of dependency on suppliers, as predicted by the agency 
theory. Dyadic risks put distributors in a continuous uncertain mode about their role in 
the future. Insights shared from suppliers and distributors confirm that the sources of 
power that distributors used to have in the past are currently being eroded: legal 
protection, market know-how, scale, and risk absorption. Moreover, the agency theory 
assumes that distributors tend to behave opportunistically, but this research shows that 
the opportunistic behaviour is not exclusive to agents but can also be exercised by 
suppliers. The unpredictability of suppliers is a main theme that emerged from five 
cases explored. This theme should keep distributors prepared and mindful not to abuse 
their relationships with suppliers.   
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P1 and P2 confirm that dyadic risks are affecting FMCG suppliers and distributors in 
the Middle East. 
 
The findings confirm that an agency type of relationship can be applied to supplier-
distributor relationships in the Middle East. An agency relationship arises whenever one 
party, called the principal (FMCG supplier in Middle East), decides to delegate certain 
activities to an agent (FMCG distributor in Middle East) in a particular domain of 
problems (Ross, 1973).  In such a relationship, the agent’s behaviour to maximise his 
individual interests at the expense of the principal’s interests is deemed as natural 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The confirmation of the first proposition shows that the 
agency problem is indeed universal (Ross, 1973; Demski and Feltham, 1978) and that 
its applicability is neither industry nor context specific. The current research 
demonstrates that agency problems are applicable to the FMCG industry in business 
contexts like the Middle East.  P1 confirms the existence of agency problems, and P2 
demonstrates that the opportunistic behaviour is not restricted to the distributor but can 
also apply to suppliers, who might also act opportunistically. Moreover, suppliers in the 
Middle East maximise the utility of their distributors by gaining know-how and skill 
transfer. When the situation becomes less complex and the risks of integration become 
less intense (in modern trade countries), suppliers in the Middle East appear to favour 
their private interests over the relational interests.  The agency theory assumes that 
suppliers are risk neutral (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Wiseman and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998); the current research confirms that suppliers are risk neutral when 
such behaviour serves their best interests. In UAE and KSA, some suppliers took the 
decision to terminate their relationships with their distributors despite the associated 
risks. In Iraq and other similar traditional trade countries, suppliers are risk averse as 
they prefer delegating the sales and distribution activities to distributors who are willing 
to absorb the complexity of the transaction (fragmented traditional trade universe).  The 
dyadic cases explored show that distributors in the Middle East should be comfortable 
working with risk averse suppliers rather than with risk neutral ones. A risk neutral 
supplier, on the other hand, is unpredictable and puts the distributor in a situation of 
greater uncertainty. Agency relationships that involve risk averse suppliers are deemed 
to last longer in a context like the Middle East.   
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The research also confirms that dyadic risks are context specific. This finding would not 
have been achieved had the research taken place in bounded contexts like many of the 
studies exploring supply chain risks. Dekker (2013) examined transaction specific risks 
in Japanese manufacturing firms, Handfield and Bechtel (2002) in North American 
firms, Harland et al. (2005) in UK private and public industries, Ettlie  and Sethuraman 
(2002) in UK durable manufacturers. The choice to conduct the research in three 
different contexts and to explore dyadic risks from the perspective of both dyadic 
members helped support the environmental identity of dyadic risks.  One of the factors 
supporting the epistemological stance of the author is the context of the research: three 
countries with different channel environments. The interpretative epistemological 
position helped reveal a truth hidden in the context. The choice to adopt a multiple case 
study methodology for its ability to account for contextual variations (Yin, 2003) is also 
confirmed as relevant. The research confirms the existence of dyadic risks in dyadic 
relationships in the FMCG industry in the Middle East, but the implications of these 
risks differ with the variation in the context. In traditional trade countries like Iraq 
dyadic risks do exist but their implications are low.  In KSA and UAE, where the 
modern trade channel is on the rise, dyadic risks have moderate implications for some 
cases and high implications for others. Dyadic risks do not appear to be solely context 
specific, but also task specific. As predicted by Eisenhardt (1998), the research confirms 
that dyadic risks are more serious when tasks are un-programmable, specifically in 
modern trade countries like UAE and KSA. In such countries, the sales task 
significantly depends on behavioural and interpersonal skills, such as the negotiation 
with key accounts and the control of the quality of execution. In this case, suppliers are 
extremely affected by their inability to control outcome and behaviour based 
performances. In Iraq, on the other hand, the sales task is highly programmable: sales 
and delivery to a fragmented retail channel. The sales operation in a traditional trade 
market like Iraq depends on the logistical capabilities (geographical distribution) of the 
distributor.  The sales person is not expected to build strategic relationships with 50,000 
small grocery retail outlets, but is expected to ensure the availability of products in these 
stores. Programmable tasks may be more complex, but are observable and result in a 
lower information asymmetry level (Eisenhardt, 1998). FMCG suppliers in the Middle 
therefore outsource programmable tasks as they engender low levels of dyadic risks. 
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Non programmable tasks, on the other hand, result in higher levels of dyadic risks, 
which puts the outsourcing decision in question.   
 
Authors exploring network risks assume that dyadic or triadic networks are affected by 
lower levels of risks than multiple member networks (Choi and Krause, 2006). The 
current research does not refute this assumption, but shows that the risks affecting 
dyadic networks must not be underestimated. Evidence gathered in the research 
confirms that network risks are to be substantially addressed in dyadic, triadic, and other 
forms of networks. The network explored in the Middle East is composed of a supplier 
base and a buyer base. Suppliers are more concerned with dyadic risks associated with 
their buyer or distributors’ base. Distributors, on the other hand, are more concerned 
with the networks associated with their supplier’s base. One supplier operates with one 
or two distributors at most, which makes its network less complex than a distributor 
who operates with five or even ten different suppliers, according to Choi and Krause 
(2006). The intensity of dyadic risks affecting distributors is thus amplified to the size 
of its network. The behaviour of suppliers dealing with one or two distributors who are 
exercising opportunistic behaviour according to the agency theory can be controlled, as 
the size of the network is less complex. The research confirms that the amount of 
complexity is proportional to the size of the network size (Choi and Krause, 2006; Choi 
et al., 2001) but the implications of these complexities are the same despite the network 
size: the dependency of a supplier on a single distributor in UAE and KSA does not 
limit his exposure to dyadic risks. In a context where the implications of dyadic risks are 
low (like in Iraq) suppliers are more likely to accept networks with larger sizes. This 
explains why it is common to see one supplier operating with several distributors in 
traditional trade markets in the Middle East. A smaller network is preferable, but in 
some traditional trade markets with vast areas larger buyer/distributor networks can 
achieve better results. This is why in Egypt, for example, many suppliers deal with three 
to five distributors. As long as dyadic risks have lower implication levels 
(programmable tasks in traditional trade markets), suppliers can accept higher 
complexity levels through larger networks to be able to cover larger areas.  
 
Following the examination of the dyadic risks affecting the supplier and distributors and 
their implications for both dyadic members, the research explores how suppliers and 
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distributors might react to such risks using the propositions raised by the agency and 
TCE theories. The findings are presented in the following three sections: Section 4.3 
presents the risk mitigation strategies that do not consider a transformation of the 
supplier distributor model, relying on the agency theory propositions. Sections 4.4 and 
4.5 examine the strategies that consider a partial and a full integration of sales and 
distribution activities respectively, following the propositions of the TCE Theory.  
 
 
 
4.3 Dyadic Risks Mitigation (Supplier): Agency Theory Proposition 
 
P3: FMCG suppliers in the Middle East mitigate dyadic risks by deploying a 
formal control system with distributors. 
 
The notion of dyadic risk is mainly associated with distributors that tend to behave 
opportunistically with suppliers by benefiting from the presence of information 
asymmetry and the inability to control their behaviour. The section discusses the cases 
that have used the approach recommended by the agency theory to mitigate dyadic 
risks. Thus, this section focuses on the control system deployed by FMCG suppliers in 
the Middle East to reduce the probability of dyadic risks occurring. The cases explored 
show that some suppliers have adopted basic control systems whilst others went for 
more advanced systems. 
 
4.3.1 Basic control systems 
The basic type of control system appears to be most commonly adopted by suppliers in 
Iraq. The section presents what is meant by basic control systems and why such systems 
would be more relevant for Iraq, but not for KSA and UAE.  
The findings of P1 show that suppliers in Iraq acknowledge the existence of dyadic risks 
but do not see the same implications of these risks on their businesses as do suppliers in 
KSA and UAE. It is therefore normal that the mitigation strategies adopted by suppliers 
in Iraq differ from those in UAE and KSA. The mitigation of dyadic risks in Iraq starts 
by controlling the borders and avoiding counterfeits. A general manager of a 
multinational company in Iraq notes:  
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“We used to deal with parallel import products from Syria and Jordan; some of our 
distributors in Iraq are also selling to other markets.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
 
Many suppliers used to operate with more than one distributor in Iraq, and also in KSA 
and UAE (Case 1 in Iraq, Cases 6 and 7 in UAE).  
 
“Having more than one distributor adds a lot of complexities to the business. This might 
be the right solution in big countries like Egypt and Iran, but I do not see it in Iraq and 
definitely not in UAE.” (Interview, Supplier Middle East). 
 
A supplier can control this situation by consolidating his business with one distributor 
deemed the most appropriate to perform the required actions.  
 
“We [the supplier] had two distributors; one was covering Baghdad and Erbil and the 
other was covering the remaining regions in Iraq. It was not the right go-to-market 
because some distributors were dropping their prices to sell more volumes outside their 
territories, so we decided to consolidate with one main distributor.” (Interview, 
Supplier Iraq). 
 
The mitigation of dyadic risks starts by reducing the probability of their occurrence. It is 
generally acknowledged that having more than one distributor in a country increases the 
probability of dyadic risks occurring.  
 
After organising the go to market, suppliers seek to formalize the relationship.  
“We signed a contract which specifies the margins that should be made, but whether the 
distributor is respecting the contract is another story,” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
 
Controlling prices to trade in a fragmented market like Iraq is a complex thing to do but 
this does not seem to be a problem for suppliers. 
 
“A distributor can benefit from this complexity in various ways and there is only little 
that we can do to control the distributor’s action. We know that the contract alone does 
not provide enough assurance.  However, our priority is not to control whether the 
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distributor is making more money than he is supposed to, but to make sure that he has 
the prerequisites to grow the business.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
 
What matters for suppliers is not solely the contract terms, but their application in 
reality. Their interests rose when Iraq started representing a good share of their 
business.  
 
“We cannot manage Iraq as an export market anymore, where we send products and we 
do not care how and where the products are sold.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
 
A basic control system drives a supplier closer to markets by employing a dedicated 
market manager, whose role starts by understanding the market and identifying whether 
the distributor has the right capabilities to grow the business or not.  
 
“Today we have recruited someone based in Iraq who manages the distributor on the 
ground versus us managing it remotely from Lebanon …his role is to define our key 
priorities in Iraq, our four must-win battles in Iraq, and ensure that we’re deploying all 
the actions. He also has a prime role in bringing market insights about competitors and 
customers.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
 
To mitigate dyadic risks, the role of the market manager has to be well-positioned for 
distributors. He has to establish control without making the distributor feel that he is 
being controlled.  This is not a straightforward task to do, but it appears that the 
suppliers interviewed are satisfied with the way their market managers are handling 
their distributors in Iraq.  
 
“The market manager adds value to the distributor business by agreeing on the efficient 
route to market strategy, bringing know-how and expertise to deploy the strategy, and 
demonstrating how the distributor can generate more sales by investing better in the 
business.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
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A basic control system is not as associated with controlling the distributor as it is with 
understanding the market and transferring know-how to distributors to grow the 
business.  
 
“The market manager is our ambassador in the market; he brings us market insight but 
more importantly, he gives us the ‘why’ behind our performance” (Interview, Supplier 
Iraq). 
 
“Having a market manager allowed us to obtain information and access to the 
distributor’s information systems.  In the past, we did not have the visibility that we 
have today.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
 
“The market manager had a prime role in transferring the yearly plans and building the 
capabilities of our teams.” (Interview, Distributor Iraq). 
 
For the suppliers interviewed, product availability and distribution are the main sales 
performance drivers in a traditional trade market like Iraq. A supplier’s main interest is 
to grow the business with minimal financial risks that are transferred to distributors in 
return for an adequate gross margin and the placement of a market manager who 
provides the necessary know-how. The market manager is viewed by suppliers as the 
founding pillar of a basic control system. A market manager interviewed for Iraq notes: 
 
“The message from my CEO was clear: ‘Go and implant our culture in the distributor’s 
organisation. Let them deal with the trade the way we do’. I coach their teams, conduct 
weekly meetings with them to review objectives, align on plans and identify 
opportunities… I conduct frequent market visits with them to identify the gaps and give 
them feedback” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
 
A basic control system based on employing a market manager to supervise the 
distributor proved to be very effective for the suppliers interviewed.  
 
“Last year, we were able to achieve US $50 million in sales at accelerated double digit 
growth rates; it was a record year for us in Iraq.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
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The analysis of the multiple dyadic cases shows that a basic control system to mitigate 
dyadic risks is sufficient in Iraq. The cases explored show that an effective basic system 
is based on the following: 
 Entering into a fixed margin contract, which covers a share of the environmental 
risks associated with doing business in Iraq. The contract is renewable on an 
annual basis as suppliers are not yet willing to engage in long term contracts in 
Iraq.   
 Hiring a market manager, based in Iraq, whose role is to supervise the 
performance of distributors, transfer know-how, and ensure the deployment of 
the appropriate sales fundamentals.  
 Implementing a standard reporting tool, such as stock and sales reports that 
mainly focus on controlling macro sales performance.  
 
By setting up such a system, suppliers (Cases 1, 2, and 3) have succeeded in reducing 
information asymmetry with distributors, thus confirming the proposition raised by the 
agency theory. Suppliers who have not yet deployed such a system seem less confident 
about the future of their business in Iraq.  
 
“We should grow between 7% and 8%, I’m not sure… Iraq would be a wide space 
territory for us, the growth potential is on the high double digit side but we really do not 
know much about the market” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
 
The reason why such suppliers have not established a basic control system is not 
because they do not see its benefits, but because they first need to ensure whether they 
have chosen the right distributor in that market. A CEO of a supplier interviewed notes:  
 
“Before we decide to place someone in Iraq, we need to make sure that the distributor 
with whom we are currently dealing will be our choice in the future.” (Interview, 
Supplier Iraq). 
 
Such suppliers do not consider they are dealing with distributors in Iraq, but rather with 
importers.  
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“We do not have a distributor in Iraq, only someone who imports our products. You can 
call him an importer or a wholesaler.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
 
The above cases reveal that the prerequisite for deploying a basic control system is to 
first ensure that suppliers are dealing with the right distributors. This is the main reason 
that led companies (Cases 1, 2, and 3) to adopt a basic control system in Iraq and 
prevented others from doing so.   
 
The analysis of the interviews conducted in KSA and UAE shows that a control system 
with basic features is not enough to mitigate dyadic risks. The dyadic cases examined in 
both countries confirm that a system with more advanced features is required.  
 
 
4.3.2 Advanced control systems 
An advanced control system does not replace a basic system, but rather complements it. 
According to the interviews conducted, a control system has to give suppliers the ability 
to control their sources of costs and drivers of growth. A fixed margin based contract, 
which might be sufficient in a country like Iraq, does not give suppliers the right to 
control the actual costs incurred, deemed necessary for suppliers in KSA and UAE. This 
is why such suppliers confirm the need to have a cost plus contract, which forces 
distributors to share their actual cost structures. A regional sales director of a 
multinational company interviewed notes:  
 
“In UAE, I am in favour of cost plus contracting as I believe that margin contracts 
(fixed price contract) will soon become obsolete.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
A similar insight was obtained in KSA. 
 
“In 2011, we decided to move to a cost plus contract because we had no visibility over 
the cost to serve structure of our distributor.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
Conducted interviews show that dyadic cases in KSA and UAE can be grouped into 
three categories:  
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 Group 1: groups suppliers who have entered into cost plus contracts with 
distributors to better control their costs to serve.  
 Group 2: groups suppliers who are on fixed margin contracts with distributors 
but are willing to shift to cost plus contracting in the future.  
 Group 3: groups suppliers who are not willing to shift to cost plus contracts, but 
have found alternative solutions that provide them with the same level of 
control.  
 
Table 4.3 illustrates the similarities and differences between each of the above three 
groups.  
 
 
 
Table 4.3 shows that four cases in UAE have shown high willingness to implement cost 
plus contracts in the future. These interviewees believe that cost plus contracts give 
suppliers a good level of control over their cost to serve, and allows them to seek cost 
optimisation opportunities and efficiency programmes. The latter is very important, as 
expressed by a supplier who experienced cost plus contracting in KSA (Case 14 in 
KSA). Case 14 shows that the willingness to move to cost plus contracting is not only 
associated with controlling the cost to serve, but also with identifying cost optimisation 
opportunities that allow for re-investment in the business to further drive growth.  
 
“A cost plus contract does not necessarily mean looking for savings, but it’s about a 
more effective allocation of costs to improve your service, to have better capabilities, 
and above all it drives your level of control far up. You have to be in a position of 
believing that it will drive growth.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
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The move to cost plus contracting is perceived as an entire change in the relationship, 
which can bring a positive outcome to both parties as long as the distributor understands 
the mutual benefits gained. A regional sales director interviewed notes: 
 
“A cost plus contract gives a supplier [the supplier] full visibility, but as the same time 
it leads him to absorb certain risks associated with cost inflation.” (Interview, Supplier 
UAE). 
 
In fixed margin contracts, suppliers are not affected by potential cost increases that arise 
due to market inflation, as they are entirely transferred to distributors. In a cost plus 
contract, a supplier is willing to share these risks, as long as he is allowed to intervene 
in optimizing the distributor’s cost structure. A supplier willing to shift to cost plus 
contracting highlights:  
 
“If we [the supplier] implement a cost plus contract, we will have more visibility over 
costs, and we will be more certain of what we want and what resources to deploy.  We 
are going to do this together with our distributor; we will take inefficient costs out of 
our system and invest in value driving activities.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
On the other hand, the tangible experience of some suppliers and their distributors with 
cost plus contracts (Cases 12 and 14) shows that the move to cost plus contracting may 
lead to negative impacts on the relationship.  
 
“We told our distributor that a cost plus model means two things: ‘you will disclose 
your costs, and we will reimburse you for your costs plus a certain margin’. When we 
asked them to share their cost structure, they resisted at first but then accepted to do so 
… We then discovered that the actual costs incurred were much less than the costs we 
thought they had incurred.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
A prerequisite for cost plus contracting is a mutual alignment on the structures of costs 
notes a CEO interviewed: 
 
 188 
 
“We need to agree together on the payroll and the number of employees, this is number 
one. Number two, we need to agree on the petrol cost and selling cost and track cost 
and warehousing cost and others. If we agree together on those cost components and on 
the yearly inflation, which is on increasing trends, then a cost plus contract may work 
but this is debatable”. (Interview, Distributor UAE). 
 
An alternative solution to cost plus contracts is presented by a supplier interviewed in 
KSA (Case 12) who had a negative experience with cost plus contracting because of the 
complexity that such a contract can bring to the relationship. The Vice President of the 
concerned supplier notes: 
 
“Many suppliers have people coming on assignments of two to three years, who want to 
demonstrate their innovative achievements by challenging the costs of their distributors 
on a daily basis, which is not healthy for the relationship; If they need visibility, we [the 
distributor] can give it to them without the need for a cost plus arrangement” 
(Interview, distributor KSA). 
 
This complexity was acknowledged by the supplier and the alternative to a cost plus 
contract was the integration of the information system and the frequent sharing of 
financial information. 
 
“The distributor shared with us all the financial information, and we make investment 
decisions jointly.  If there is room for optimisation, we propose our point of view, they 
present their view, and we reach an agreement together.  Our information systems are 
integrated; we have access to all types of information.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
The purpose behind cost control is to identify optimisation opportunities that drive 
suppliers to improve their investment plans.  
 
“Controlling costs has to be coupled with improving capabilities, recruiting higher 
levels of talent, investing in technology, investing in training, buying more vans, placing 
another 50 merchandisers…etc. You can make these decisions if they make more sense 
for the business” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
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A cost plus contract might sometimes restrict distributors from optimizing their costs, 
since the costs incurred are reimbursed by the supplier. For this reason, a regional sales 
director interviewed who is evaluating the move to cost plus contracting suggests 
adopting a cost plus contract with cost optimisation incentives.  
 
“We need our distributor to take responsibility for growth, profitability, and cost 
savings.  To engage distributors, a cost saving incentive has to be associated with a cost 
plus contract which will drive them to effectively seek cost optimisation opportunities.” 
(Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
The founding pillars of an advanced control system are either a cost plus contract, or the 
sharing of cost based information and the integration of information systems. By 
adopting this type of contract, suppliers do not only mitigate dyadic risks, but also play 
a role in determining the required capabilities that must be deployed to drive the 
business. A basic control system is the entry point to the advanced system. Suppliers 
cannot deploy a cost plus contract if they do not have a market manager who has a full 
visibility over their distributor’s profit and loss statement.  
 
In addition to cost plus contracts, an advanced control system to mitigate dyadic risk 
also incorporates the following features, following the multiple cases explored: 
 Joint information system to set and track sales KPIs: three suppliers interviewed 
have deployed a joint EDI interface with distributors. 
 Frequent communications: weekly business review meetings between suppliers 
and distributors. The sales directors interviewed are involved in the smallest 
details of the business.  
 Assessment of distributor capabilities: incorporates the evaluation of the sales 
teams, and auditing the distribution operation.  
 
The third proposition shows that the solutions proposed by the agency theory to mitigate 
dyadic risks are relevant to the Middle East. According to the agency theory, agency 
problems are resolved based on deploying formal control systems. The findings of the 
research show that a contract alone is not sufficient to mitigate dyadic risks. From a 
theoretical perspective, this finding is consistent with the original authors of the agency 
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theory. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), suppliers incur additional agency 
costs to control contract implementation. The cases explored confirm that fixed and cost 
plus contracts should be accompanied by other agency costs incurred by suppliers in the 
Middle East. The area manager deployed to supervise the behaviour of distributors 
appears to have a pivotal role in the relationship. When looking at the different 
components of agency costs, agency theorists pay special attention to incentive costs, 
monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). The cases adopting a control system to mitigate dyadic risks (P3) 
show that in the Middle East one resource alone, the area manager, is expected to 
incentivise, monitor, and motivate the distributor. It can be assumed that the role of the 
area manager is even more important than the formal contract deployed in the Middle 
East. A big share of the agency costs incurred by suppliers is associated with the salary 
of the area manager. According to the agency theory, the reduction in information 
asymmetry includes the deployment of special people who can act as information 
systems (Eisenhardt, 1988). The research shows that in both basic and advanced control 
systems, the main role of area managers is to report outcome based information that is 
both quantitative and can be measured. Agency theorists acknowledge that outcome 
based variables can be easily controlled as they are observable and measurable 
(Eisenhardt, 1988; Churchill et al., 1985). However, the research shows that in non-
complex transactions that are significantly outcome based (cases in Iraq) an area 
manager and a fixed margin contract are sufficient to mitigate dyadic risks. However, in 
more complex transactions (cases in UAE and KSA) suppliers are not confined to basic 
control systems but rather opt for what the research has defined as an advanced control 
system. Advanced control systems show that if the agency theory is to be used to 
understand the mitigation of dyadic risks, the controlling mechanism proposed by the 
theory should adapt to the complexity of the transaction or to the programmability of the 
tasks that are delegated to the agent (Eisenhardt, 1988). This is why advanced control 
systems have been presented as the relevant solution to mitigate dyadic risks in 
countries like UAE and KSA. By looking at the structure of advanced control systems, 
one can infer the various dimensions of the agency theory in dynamic contexts like the 
Middle East. Figure 4.1 shows how these dimensions are connected together in the form 
of a jigsaw puzzle, one piece cannot operate without the other.  
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The contracting dimension includes the optimal contract adopted by suppliers to 
mitigate dyadic risks. Cost plus contracts are positioned as significantly relevant in 
UAE and KSA, but not in Iraq. From a theoretical perspective, this finding confirms the 
work of authors who find that cost plus contracting is highly relevant in complex 
transactions (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001). Cost plus contracts can also include special 
incentives to optimize costs.  In most of the cases, such incentives are behaviour based, 
which makes them more effective than outcome based incentives (Anderson and 
Olivier, 1994). A CEO interviewed notes that cost plus contracts pave the way for 
exploring many cost optimisation opportunities and productivity enhancement 
programmes. These terms are more relevant in modern trade contexts, where 
distributors are expected to demonstrate competent and cost effective capabilities. The 
success of cost plus contracts is not in their formulation (ante contracting phase), but in 
their application (post contracting phase).  The cases explored also show that formal 
contracts alone are not sufficient to mitigate dyadic risks, thus bringing the human 
dimension into the puzzle.  
 
The human dimension (area manager) can be a reason for contract success, and its 
absence from the puzzle might cause contract failure. The research confirms that in both 
basic and advance control systems the area manager has a prime responsibility for 
supervising the contract.  However, the role differs between traditional trade and 
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modern trade contexts, not only due to the nature of the transaction but also due to the 
type of contract deployed in each context. In traditional trade contexts like Iraq the role 
of area managers is outcome based, whereas in modern trade contexts the role is rather 
behaviour based. To be able to effectively perform their roles, area managers in Iraq are 
merely expected to measure and control the dollar value,  the ‘what’, whereas in UAE 
and KSA they should be more involved in the ‘how’, which includes defining the sale 
process, motivating the sales teams, and developing their capabilities (Weitz, 1981; 
Anderson and Olivier, 1994). These tasks cannot be performed at a distance, but in 
proximity. A main difference between BSC and ACS is related to the physical presence 
of the area manager. The cases explored in Iraq showed that an area manager can 
supervise two different distributors in two different countries. This is not the case in 
UAE and KSA, where the area manager must be closer to distributors and more 
involved in the day to day operations. The human dimension may also be viewed as a 
point of convergence between the TCE and agency theories as it represents a form of 
integration of human assets. In both ACS and BCS area managers can be viewed as 
human assets of high specificity and their role is crucial to contracting success.  
 
The relational dimension is represented by the capability development theme in the 
advanced control system category. The area manager supervising or controlling the 
distributor’s behaviour has a dual responsibility, one linked to the mitigation of dyadic 
risks and the other linked to gaining the distributor’s trust by developing their 
capabilities. The findings show that the area manager needs to create a balance between 
the controlling actions and the trust development actions, as suggested by Laeequddin et 
al. (2012). The research confirms that controlling actions not supported by relationship 
development actions may be negatively perceived by the controlled party (the 
distributor). The agency theory pays little attention to the expected reaction of the 
distributor vis-a-vis the controlling actions taken by the supplier. Agency theorists 
encourage the inclusion of relational themes when exploring agency relationships. The 
latest literature on agency theory and supply chain management suggests investigation 
of how agency variables such as goal conflict, information asymmetry, and risk aversion 
can be altered to achieve positive outcomes through effective collaboration (Fayezi et 
al., 2012). This suggestion is supported by the growing importance of partnership 
relationships in the supply chain (Gottfredson et al., 2005). Suppliers and distributors 
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are members of the same dyadic network; neglecting the relational dimension is a pre-
assumption of a disruption in the network. By taking into account the relational 
dimension, an advanced control system represents an updated understanding of agency 
relationships and brings new knowledge to the study of the agency theory. These 
systems confirm that controlling actions that are not supported by collaboration actions 
may fail to achieve their desired outcome. Suppliers who develop the capabilities of 
their distributors project positive intentions of relationship continuation. Such actions 
show that suppliers care for the wellbeing of their distributors. Distributors who deploy 
competent capabilities also show commitment to their relationships with their suppliers. 
This behaviour corresponds with the definition of trust as the willingness of a party to 
be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectations that the latter 
will perform a particular action important to the former, regardless of the former’s 
ability to monitor or control his actions (Mayer et al., 1995).  
 
Agency relationships cannot neglect the latest trends in technological advancement. The 
reduction, or even the elimination, of information asymmetry was merely idealism in 
agency relationships in the past but with the advance in information exchange tools it 
has become a possibility. Information systems have been presented as a main theme of 
advanced control systems.  EDI systems may fully control outcome based indicators; 
some suppliers are even showing pronounced interest in systems that control qualitative 
indicators. Supply chains are viewed as a forward flow of products and a backward flow 
of information (Rayport and Sviokla, 1994). Information asymmetry might cause 
several disruptions in the backward flow of information (from distributor to supplier).  
In such a context, the agency theory cannot neglect the transformative role that 
technology has on agency relationships.  
 
The integration of information processes involves investing in a developed information 
infrastructure, specifically in modern trade countries where retailers have become 
sophisticated in information system technologies. International manufacturers are 
moving from basic Vendor Management Inventory (VMI) processes (Barratt and 
Oliveira, 2001) to Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) 
processes (Holmström et al., 2002). Through cloud computing technologies, CPFR has 
evolved to Processes of Collaborative Store Ordering systems (PCSO) (Pramatari et al., 
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2002). PCSO goes a step beyond the management of sales forecast and inventory levels 
and allows daily online sharing of store level information like promotions, in-store 
activities, and shelf alerts. Specialized IT organisations such as Microsoft, SAP, Sales 
Force Dot Com, SAS, and Oracle have developed specific CRM capabilities to meet the 
strategic need for information integration and collaboration across the value chain.  
 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) facilitates both upstream and downstream 
information integration (Zhou and Benton, 2007). Information systems have become 
core capabilities that drive collaboration and enhance the flow of information across the 
supply chain.  From an AT perspective, the strategic importance of technology lies in its 
capability to reduce information asymmetry between suppliers and distributors. By 
integrating the technological dimension, advanced control systems that are derived from 
the cases explored bring the agency theory to the modern age of digital technologies. 
Agency theory assumptions (namely information asymmetry) were defined in times 
when technology had a very limited impact on agency relationships (Eisenhardt, 1988). 
With the move to a connected world, the research shows that agency studies should not 
neglect the relevant technologies that can be used to mitigate dyadic risks.  
 
The four dimensions depicted in Figure 4.1 shows how the current research bridges the 
solutions that were provided by the agency theory to mitigate dyadic risks in the past 
(Basic Control Systems, Quadrants 1 and 2) and the ones that should be considered in 
current and future agency research (Advanced Control Systems, Quadrants 1,2,3,4). The 
research shows that basic control systems are relevant to understanding the mitigation of 
dyadic risks in traditional contexts. On the other hand, in contexts where dyadic 
members have access to technology (Quadrant 4) and where relationships matter 
(Quadrant 3), advanced control systems are more relevant. The third proposition thus 
confirms that the agency theory is a relevant theoretical avenue to understand the 
mitigation of dyadic risks in the Middle East. The control system proposed by the 
research is a set of four sub systems (four dimensions) that operate together to mitigate 
dyadic risks. The difference between the controlling systems adopted in traditional 
(BCS) and modern trade (ACS) contexts confirms the latest trends in agency research.  
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Given the assumptions of opportunism, uncertainty, and bounded rationality, the 
probability of system failure is considered high, as proposed by transaction cost 
economics theory (Williamson, 1975). According to TCE, control choices are expected 
to be aligned with the underlying exchange hazards so that transaction costs are 
minimized (Williamson, 1975). TCE theory proposes the mitigation of dyadic risks by 
integrating assets of high specificity and outsourcing those of low specificity. The most 
common forms of assets presented by TCE theory are site asset specificity, physical 
asset specificity, human asset specificity, brand asset specificity, and dedicated asset 
specificity (Williamson, 1975). The 4
th
 and 5
th
 propositions suggested by the research 
mainly focus on the strategies proposed by the TCE to mitigate dyadic risks between 
FMCG suppliers and distributors in the Middle East.  
 
 
 
4.4 Dyadic Risks Mitigation (Supplier): Transaction Cost Economics Theory 
Propositions-Partial Integrated Models 
 
P4: FMCG suppliers in the Middle East mitigate dyadic risks by partially 
integrating their sales and distribution activities with their distributors. 
 
The partial integration of sales and distribution activities is a strategy adopted by several 
suppliers to mitigate dyadic risks. Interviews revealed some minor similarities between 
a partially integrated model and a fully outsourced model; however, the differences 
outweigh the noted similarities. Analysing the similarities and differences explained 
how dyadic risks can be mitigated by integrating capabilities associated with these risks. 
A significant finding reveals how a partially integrated model is a continuation of the 
advanced control system.  
 
 
4.4.1 Partially integrated model: similarities with a full outsource model   
Following the cases analysed three main similarities between a partially integrated 
model and a fully outsourced model emerged. The ability of suppliers to control the 
price to trade has been identified as the first similarity. 
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 “To control the selling price to trade, I have to either invoice directly to trade, or gain 
full access to the distributor’s invoicing system” (Interview, Supplier KSA).  
 
Suppliers adopting an FOM and those adopting a PIM do not consider invoicing directly 
to trade, as they accept dyadic risks associated with controlling the price to trade. These 
risks hinder them from obtaining full visibility over the actual margins made by 
distributors. If distributors are selling at prices higher than the recommended ones, they 
will be making more than what they are expected to make. 
 
The reason a supplier in a PIM and FOM is willing to accept potential opportunistic 
behaviour instead of displaying readiness to control prices to trade is explained in the 
following: 
 
“Direct invoicing to trade means managing and absorbing credit risks, something not 
all suppliers are willing to do.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
“Some customers have a 45 days credit limit, while others operate on a 75 days credit 
limit. We do not want to bear those charges.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
Suppliers thus recognise that the financial risks associated with directly controlling the 
prices to trade are higher than the dyadic risks involved. Even if this might lead 
distributors to achieve higher profits than committed, they are absorbing all financial 
risks involved at the same time.  
 
The trade-off between financial and dyadic risks drives suppliers adopting an FOM and 
PIM to bear the opportunistic behaviour associated with the inability to control price to 
trade. Both models thus outsource invoicing to trade to their distributors. 
 
Another similarity between a partially integrated model and a fully outsourced model is 
related to the ability of suppliers to control execution at retail. The full control of the 
sales execution functions entails integrating the sales supervisors, the sales 
representatives, and the merchandisers. Many suppliers interviewed agree that the 
complexity associated with this integration outweighs its benefits.     
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“I [the supplier] consider myself as having 1,500 sales employees working for my 
brand who are financed by the distributor. If I want to run this operation myself, I have 
to hire 1,500 employees, pay them indemnities, manage their bonuses, and have a full 
human resources team on board to make sure that we are complying with local 
regulations…etc. Why would I do all that when I have someone who can do it on my 
behalf?” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
“The worst nightmare we have is related to employment compliance law.  There is a big 
difference between having a team of 10 and a team of 100 in the market.  Recruiting is 
not easy, and making sure that we are abiding by the law is not easy either, especially if 
we are dealing with a big team …” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
The sales execution functions represent around 80% of the sales force population, 
highlights one of the interviewees. The integration of such functions has to make sense 
business-wise, otherwise transferring the complexities to the distributor remains a better 
option.  
The third similarity noted is related to the perception of suppliers with regards to 
controlling logistical capabilities. Suppliers with either PIM or FOM acknowledge the 
need for a very effective logistical operation, and agree that distributors are the most 
suited to manage such an operation.   
 
“They have the infrastructure, and the know-how; this is where they can add value the 
most.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
In addition to that, distributors can build on their scale to optimise logistics costs. A 
distributor allocates logistics costs across all suppliers, which gives him a cost 
leadership advantage, as highlighted by an interviewee. Suppliers do not seem 
concerned with dyadic risks associated with outsourcing logistics activities.  
 
In summary, suppliers adopting an outsourced model or a partially integrated model 
share similar perceptions regarding controlling prices to trade, execution at retail, and 
logistical capabilities. They agree that the cost of integrating these functions outweighs 
 198 
 
the benefits. The mitigation of dyadic risks through a PIM is explained by the 
differences between PIM and FOM.  
 
4.4.2 Integration of key account managers 
Suppliers adopting a partial integrated model prefer to have direct control over the 
relationship with trade (Cases 9, 12, and15). Unlike in a fully outsourced model, a 
supplier adopting a partially integrated model is significantly involved in the 
organisational structure of the distributor.  
 
“We [the supplier] handle the key accounts and we give the distributor all the rest. 
What does the rest comprise of? Grocers’ shops, wholesalers, and even supermarkets, 
though not the big ones. So in my opinion, it depends on the country and on the weight 
of the modern trade business.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
Integrating key account management functions involves direct negotiations with key 
customers, joint business planning, and category management. Such responsibilities are 
normally handled by the distributor, but in a partially integrated model suppliers agree 
that integrating these functions can add further value to the organisation and can 
mitigate the related risks.  The decision to integrate key account management functions 
is associated with the supplier’s scale; those who are category leaders and have the 
required scale may achieve better results if they integrate this function. It is important to 
note that scale is not only associated with the ability to afford the cost of integration, but 
also with market share. Suppliers who have a high market share, exceeding 20%, should 
consider the option of integration, as noted by a general manager interviewed.   
 
“Carrefour looks at me [the supplier] as this guy who sells chocolate.  I am powerful, 
because I represent that % of the chocolate market in UAE. If he sees me as the 
chocolate guy who represents a much lower % of the business, I am not that powerful 
and thus it is preferable that a distributor represents me.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
The research is primarily interested in exploring how integrating the key account 
management function mitigates dyadic risks. According to insights gathered, integration 
brings suppliers the ability to control their spending budgets by holding direct 
 199 
 
negotiations held with key accounts. However, in a fully outsourced model where 
distributors negotiate with key accounts, suppliers have limited visibility over how 
investments are spent (control trade funds), which drives distributors to act 
opportunistically. An advanced control system does not reduce this information 
asymmetry, but integrating the key account management function can attenuate it.  
 
“We [the supplier] sign the contracts with major key customers and we decide how 
much we want to spend, depending on the targets set and the market’s potential.” 
(Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
Integration is also related to directly controlling the drivers of growth. Investments at 
the retail level are performance based, comments a regional sales director interviewed in 
KSA. 
 
“Controlling funds means controlling the sources of growth in a big share of the 
market, since modern trade is now a growing trend.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
By integrating the key account management function, suppliers in UAE and KSA with a 
critical scale can mitigate the risks associated with this function. In Iraq, this integration 
is not relevant as the modern trade channel is still small and undeveloped. 
 
 
4.4.3 Integrated planning 
Another difference between a partially integrated model and a fully outsourced model is 
associated with the involvement of the supplier in the distributor’s operations. Having 
an employee from the supplier side negotiating with key accounts, and another from the 
distributor side in charge of order taking, invoicing, delivery, and in store execution, 
necessitates substantial collaboration, as noted by the general manager of a reputable 
FMCG company in KSA.  
 
In a partially integrated model, the supplier continues to outsource part of the operation, 
as seen earlier (invoicing, execution functions and logistics), to the distributor whilst 
only integrating the key account management functions. This poses a significant 
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challenge to both parties to ensure the soundness of the outsourcing relationship. The 
key account manager is based at the distributor’s premises; the interaction with the 
distributor’s team is on a daily basis and requires direct access to the distributor’s ERP 
system. Different levels of collaboration are needed as the frequency of communication 
moves from monthly levels (advanced control systems) to daily levels. The PIM cases 
explored show that objectives and strategies are not set on a total country level, as is the 
case in fully outsourced models, but on the channel if not on the customer level. The 
integration of the key account management function gives suppliers full visibility. 
Objectives and strategies are set based on the supplier’s as well as the distributor’s 
experiences in the market. In a fully outsourced model, suppliers rely on distributors 
when setting objectives and strategies.  On the other hand, in partially integrated 
models, suppliers and distributors set their long term objectives together. The vice 
president of a distribution company that is partially integrated with its supplier notes:  
 
“We [the distributor] look together at how we are going to build the business for the 
future, what our challenges are, and what we are going to do about them.” (Interview, 
Distributor KSA). 
 
The alignment is not only on the strategic front but also on the operational front.  
 
“If there is an idea with the marketing department, they are talking to each other on a 
daily basis.  For me [the supplier], it does not matter who is creating the demand, 
where the idea is coming from, whether it’s from the marketing guy or from the sales 
guy because they work together daily. So while a marketing guy might do a better job in 
Carrefour by understanding shopper profile and so on, he will pass the knowledge to 
the sales guy, who happens to be from the distributor side.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
Suppliers and distributors also align on the investment strategies that need to be put in 
place to accompany existing growth opportunities.   
 
“The sales director of our supplier came and told us that he wants us to invest in an 
additional 100 employees.  We sat with him, looked at the benefits and expected return 
on this investment. We gave our feedback and aligned on the steps to go forward. By 
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doing so, the supplier did not feel that we are over or under investing because we were 
mutually aligned on what to invest and why.” (Interview, Distributor KSA). 
 
4.4.4 Information system integration  
A supplier with a partially integrated model does not face significant challenges with 
the distributors regarding information sharing as he is able to access the latter’s 
information system to extract the required information. A distributor may resist 
collaboration if the benefits gained are not made clear to him. Cases 9 and 12 have 
concretely shown that information sharing is a two way process that brings benefits to 
both parties. By accessing the distributor’s ERP system, a supplier reduces information 
asymmetry and limits the level of opportunism. The benefits for suppliers thus lie in the 
mitigation of dyadic risks by better controlling the sources of costs and drivers of 
growth. In return for such collaboration, both suppliers succeeded in providing 
distributors with the required know-how and enhanced planning, thereby resulting in 
higher financial benefits. The concerned distributor notes:   
 
“Our supplier is able to obtain whatever is required from our sales system.  We 
deployed a joint S&OP process, which led us to discover that there is a lot of cash tied 
up in our warehouses.  We collaborated with our supplier to optimise our inventory 
levels, improve our cash flow, while providing them with fresher products in the 
market.” (Interview, Distributor KSA). 
 
Similar insights have emerged from Case 9:  
“Our supplier helped us [the distributor] in orienting our plans to achieve better 
results. A promotion on Brand A can yield better results in certain areas than a 
promotion on Brand B, and we can only obtain this kind of information from our 
supplier.”(Interview, Distributor UAE). 
 
The above conforms to the views shared by the suppliers: 
“We give them quarterly news on our brands, what is happening, we provide them with 
sales guidelines and competition news, and we share with them shoppers' data so that 
they are aligned on our sales strategies by channel and what we want to achieve with 
them on a monthly basis.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
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4.4.5 Capability development 
As seen earlier, suppliers adopting a partially integrated model are not concerned with 
integrating the sales execution functions, but prefer being involved in developing the 
capabilities of their distributors’ teams. According to a sales director interviewed, the 
role of the salesperson in modern trade countries has evolved from an order taker to an 
order maker. To control their drivers of growth, suppliers adopting a partially integrated 
model find it more effective and less risky to invest in developing, rather than 
integrating, the capabilities of their distributors’ teams. Suppliers and distributors share 
equal responsibilities for upgrading the capabilities of their teams, for exchanging 
talents and for sharing best practices. 
 Upgrading the capabilities of their distributor teams: 
“We [the supplier] have trainings that are patented for us and are shared with 
our distributors.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
“We [the supplier] have a dedicated training college. We attend all the trainings 
together with our distributors and we therefore develop and grow together.” 
(Interview, Supplier UAE).  
“We [the distributor] signed the contract with a the leading training companies 
in the Middle East, and we are now building our own training entity, which will 
provide full talent development programmes from induction to functional 
trainings.” (Interview, Distributor KSA).  
 Sharing best practices and know-how: 
“We [the supplier] tell them what their supply chain should look like, how their 
sales organisation can be designed, how they can optimise their route to market.  
This is all done based on sharing best practices with them, and in return we 
develop an efficient operation” (Interview, Distributor UAE).  
 Talent exchange: 
 “We have talent exchange programmes; for instance I worked at the 
distributor’s offices on a special assignment in the past. We also receive people 
from the distributor working with us on special projects. By doing so, we 
enhance the integration of our organisations.”  (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
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4.4.6 Dedicated capabilities and focus 
Another difference between a partially integrated model and a fully outsourced model is 
the level of focus on the supplier’s brands. Focus comes at a cost, as noted by a general 
manager interviewed. In a fully outsourced model, the supplier does not receive enough 
focus; he might not have the critical scale to demand focus (Case 11), or he might have 
the scale but the distributor might be acting opportunistically (Cases 13, 14). Suppliers 
adopting a partially integrated model mitigate dyadic risks by having dedicated 
capabilities. Category, channel, and regional focus are positioned as the main 
requirements for suppliers in KSA and UAE.  
 Category focus: 
 “You cannot have a distributor who is actually good at everything. Suppliers 
may prefer giving different components of the business to different distributors; 
milk business to Distributor A, confectionery business to Distributor B. The 
decision is driven by the core competencies of the distributor, and his 
willingness to show the supplier that he is giving the brands the necessary 
attention.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 Channel focus: 
 “The merchandisers of our distributors are dedicated for us, we are sure that 
they are spending 100% of their time on our products in the store, not on other 
products.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 Regional focus: 
 “We [the distributor] might not have strong presence in a specific region in 
KSA, so we must have to go and liaise with sub distributors to ensure that the 
supplier’s products are available in all the regions; we invest in regional 
branches to cater for these sub distributors” (Interview, Distributor KSA). 
 
4.4.7 Governance structure of partially integrated models 
The governance structure of a partially integrated model is a hybrid structure that 
combines integration and outsourcing. Assets with low specificity for suppliers and high 
specificity for distributors are outsourced. On the other hand, the assets that are of high 
specificity for suppliers are integrated. As proposed by TCE theory, integration 
decisions are made based on asset specificity. It cannot be presumed that dyadic risks 
are fully mitigated through partially integrated models. Suppliers agree to absorb dyadic 
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risks associated with outsourcing assets with low specificity because the costs of 
integration are higher than the costs of outsourcing such assets (as seen with the 
similarities between FOM and PIM). Cases 9 and 12 show that suppliers are not willing 
to assume credit risks and the complexities of managing the execution function. They 
prefer to adopt an advanced control system to mitigate these risks, as depicted by the 
agency theory.  
 
On the other hand, dyadic risks resulting from the inability to control the sources of 
costs and the drivers of growth in modern trade are mitigated by integrating assets with 
high specificity, as advocated by the TCE theory: 
 Human assets: key account manager and capability development 
 Information assets: integrated information systems.  
 Dedicated assets: focus by category, channel, and region. 
 
A partially integrated model combines the agency theory with the TCE theory and 
shows how suppliers and distributors can collaborate with minimal dyadic risks being 
encountered. This finding illustrates the operationalisation of the transactional approach, 
mixing between optimal contracting and integration.   
 
The evolution of retail is positioned as an asset segmentation force since the assets of 
high specificity are those related to the management of modern trade.  Following the 
cases analysed a difference between the specificity of assets in modern trade countries 
and in traditional trade countries has been noted.   
 
For instance, sales execution assets and logistics assets are of high specificity for 
distributors mainly in Iraq but not for suppliers. This finding is confirmed with the PIM 
cases explored. In Iraq, most of the sales and distribution assets are of low specificity 
for suppliers, which explains why the optimal governance structure is a fully outsourced 
model, where dyadic risks are mitigated through a basic control system. In KSA and 
UAE, key account management assets are of high specificity, therefore integrating these 
assets mitigates the associated dyadic risks. Assets with low specificity, such as the 
human sales assets in traditional trade, human sales execution assets in modern trade, as 
well as logistical assets, are hence outsourced to distributors. 
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For partially integrated models to work, assets considered to be of low specificity for 
suppliers should be treated as highly specific for distributors, as noted by Cases 9, 12, 
and 15. In that way, suppliers and distributors have equal responsibilities in the 
mitigation of dyadic risks. The three cases analysed (Cases 9, 12, and 15) show that a 
partially integrated model is best practice for successful supplier distributor 
relationships in the Middle East. Partially integrated models allow suppliers to focus on 
value adding functions, while involving themselves in the development of their 
distributor capabilities. These models also allow distributors to focus on the core 
functions of suppliers, thus justifying their role as effective outsourcing partners.  
 
A similarity is found between partially integrated cases (P4) and advanced control 
system cases (P3) when it comes to the technological (information system integration) 
and relational (capability development) dimensions. The human dimension in partially 
integrated models, on the other hand, is treated following the assumptions raised by the 
TCE. The partially integrated cases analysed show that suppliers integrate assets of high 
specificity. A similarity is identified between the specificity level of assets and the 
intensity level of dyadic risks. The integration of key account management functions, 
for instance, allows suppliers to mitigate dyadic risks associated with the inability to 
control trade funds. It can be assumed that in cases where suppliers are not interested in 
controlling trade funds (Iraq) the key account management function is of low 
specificity. This is why partially integrated models have been strictly observed in UAE 
and KSA, but not in Iraq. Advanced control systems proposed in P3 help suppliers 
reduce dyadic risks, but partially integrated models may lead to the elimination of 
certain dyadic risks. From a theoretical perspective, the governance structure that results 
from partially integrated models shows how human asset specificity can have a strategic 
role in the mitigation of dyadic risks in the Middle East. As discussed in the literature 
review chapter, Leavy (2004) suggests that outsourcing might lead to the erosion in 
skills and capabilities of suppliers, and might also be disruptive in evolutionary 
contexts. The integration of key account managers within partially integrated 
governance structures demonstrates that suppliers are not willing to compromise on the 
skills associated with the management of key accounts. The fact that this integration has 
only been observed in dynamic contexts (UAE and KSA) illustrates how, with the 
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evolution in the industry, suppliers are willing to reconsider certain outsourcing 
decisions. 
 
As explored in the cases analysed, partially integrated models do not undermine the role 
of the distributor, but rather place it more in value. In most cases explored, key account 
managers are located at the premises of the distributors. The daily interaction between 
suppliers and distributors through this human interface may either impede or enhance 
effective collaboration. A similarity is found between all the PIM cases explored, 
showing that the integration of highly specific assets adds value to the relationship. 
Although the implicit intention of the supplier is to exercise higher control levels 
through this integration, the explicit behaviour of the human assets managing the 
relationship is the main contributor to relationship management. Partially integrated 
models can be considered as examples of effective supplier distributor collaboration if 
dyadic members orient their efforts and resources to the mutual development of trust. 
As defined in the literature, interpersonal trust is developed by the individual boundary 
spanner (supplier or distributor) in his individual opposite member (supplier or 
distributor) (Zaheer et al., 1998). The failure to develop trust might encourage either of 
the dyadic members to act opportunistically, making the 4
th
 proposition unable to 
provide solid theoretical grounds for understanding the mitigation of dyadic risks. The 
research also confirms that a prerequisite for the successful adoption of a partial 
integrated model is the high levels of inter-organisational trust, which is defined as the 
extent of trust that is placed in the partner’s organisation by the member of the focal 
organisation (Zaheer et al., 1998).   
 
Since the findings confirm that partial integrated models represent examples of effective 
collaboration between suppliers and distributors, one might ask why these models have 
not been given more importance in the literature (Hennart, 1993). From a supply chain 
perspective, evidence gathered from partially integrated cases confirms the need to 
extend the TCE beyond the transactional boundaries (Wever et al., 2012). To 
understand how the transactional and relational perspectives coincide, the research 
explores the cases that adopted vertical integrated models (extreme transactional 
approach) in P5 and the cases that relied on the development of trust to mitigate dyadic 
risks (extreme relational approach) in P6.  
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4.5 Dyadic Risks Mitigation (Supplier): Transaction Cost Economics Theory 
Proposition-Vertical Integrated Models 
 
P5: FMCG suppliers in the Middle East mitigate dyadic risks by vertically 
integrating their sales and distribution activities without considering the role of 
their distributors. 
 
The following section focuses on suppliers who considered mitigating dyadic risks by 
vertically integrating their sales and distribution activities. The same analytical 
framework was used to compare the similarities and differences between a partially 
integrated model and a vertically integrated model. Six cases are adopted in this 
analysis, split between three in KSA and three in UAE. In each country, the three cases 
comprised two vertically integrated models and one partially integrated model (See 
Table 4.4). The analysis does not take into account cases in Iraq, as integration is not 
perceived as a viable option to mitigate dyadic risks, as discussed earlier in the research.  
 
 
 
 
4.5.1 Vertical integrated models: similarities with partially integrated models 
The analysis performed revealed more differences than similarities between partially 
integrated and vertically integrated models. Two main similarities have been identified: 
the integration of the key account management function and the outsourcing of the 
logistical function.  
 
If suppliers adopting a partially integrated model see that integrating the key account 
management function reduces the probability of dyadic risks occurring, then there is no 
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reason for suppliers to adopt a vertically integrated model to not integrate this function. 
The analysis of Cases 9 and 12 showed how the integration of modern trade 
management assets contributed to mitigating dyadic risks. This finding has also been 
confirmed by the VIM cases analysed in UAE (Cases 4 and 5). 
 
“The integration of the key account manager is not just about having direct negotiation 
with the trade; it’s about business development, joint business planning, category 
management, and so on.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
When a supplier decides to integrate the key account management function, he does not 
need to worry about whether the distributor is deploying the right capabilities or not. If 
suppliers believe that they can achieve better results in managing key accounts than 
their distributors, then why take the risk of outsourcing this function? 
 
“It is very unlikely that our distributor will do a better job than we do in key account 
management today.  With the level of expertise that we have or can attract, there is no 
way he can do better unless we, as a company, admit that we cannot have such expertise 
in-house.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
Suppliers can build on their ability to attract better calibre resources. As noted by a 
regional sales director interviewed, distributors are local companies that do not offer a 
long term career path for people who want to grow and evolve.   
 
“Distributors have limited capabilities to attract good people. That was acceptable in 
the past but it is not the case today as I [the supplier] need to have a competent person 
who knows how to negotiate with Carrefour or Spinneys, for example. This is how I can 
optimise my spending and ensure that I am receiving the right return.” (Interview, 
Supplier UAE). 
 
The insights shared between partially and vertically integrated cases regarding the 
mitigation of dyadic risks via integrating the key account management function are very 
similar.  
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The second similarity involves outsourcing the logistical capabilities. Suppliers 
adopting a vertically integrated model do not see an association between dyadic risks 
and the integration of logistical capabilities. Distributors are not perceived as adept at 
concealing information about the different components of their logistical costs. The 
cases explored confirm that it is not necessary to integrate logistical assets since a 
supplier can find this service at a cheaper cost, either from his current distributor or 
from a specialised service provider as in Cases 4 and 5.  
 
“You [the supplier] have to make sure that you have a good grasp of the value added 
responsibilities like key account management, and be able to let go of others like 
warehousing and delivery, when there is a cheaper way of doing it” (Interview, 
Supplier UAE).   
 
Integrating logistical assets entails investing in a delivery fleet and renting several 
warehouses. Such capital expenditure decisions are more complex to manage in 
multinational companies than in local companies.  
 
“I [the supplier] will give you an example; today if I want to add one delivery van in 
Abou Dhabi and we are now in February, I have to wait till May to request additional 
CAPEX.  The process will take time and approval would not be obtained before October 
or November.  I can then buy the van, but it will take me another few months before the 
process is complete and the van is delivered to us.  On the other hand, I can ask my 
distributor to purchase the van over the phone by showing him the added value this will 
bring to his business and the return it will generate.  The van will be bought in a 
month’s time at the latest.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).  
 
Partially and vertically integrated cases have both found ways to control their 
distribution operations without the need to integrate the physical assets involved.  
Although neither model is concerned with managing the logistical function, it has been 
noticed that suppliers operating a vertically integrated model are more focused on 
controlling the performance of the logistical operations. They do not want to absorb the 
financial risks associated with investments in physical assets, but rather invest in people 
to monitor the management of such assets.  
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Following the six cases analysed, it can be presumed that the similarity between Partial 
and Vertical Integrated models shows that TCE is an adequate theoretical avenue to 
understand DRM strategies: 
 Assets of low specificity for FMCG suppliers in the Middle East (physical assets 
such as logistics) are outsourced. 
 Assets of high specificity for FMCG suppliers in the Middle East (human assets 
such as key account management) are integrated. 
 
These two conclusions do not reveal the elements of uniqueness of VIMs. Following the 
analysis of Cases 4, 5, 13, and 14 a vertically integrated model is distinguished by the 
following three themes: Integration of invoicing, integration of execution functions, 
information integration.   
 
The analysis of the PIM cases previously showed that suppliers adopting a partially 
integrated model share the same perception of financial risks as those fully outsourcing 
their sales and distribution activities. This is not the case for a supplier who decides to 
vertically integrate the sales and distribution activities. Evidence gathered from Cases 4, 
5, 13, and 14 shows that suppliers are willing to absorb the financial risks associated 
with the integration of invoicing.  Even if they believe that direct invoicing to trade will 
expose them to credit risks, the benefits achieved are deemed much higher. 
 
“I [the supplier] do not have to worry any more about whether the distributor is 
invoicing at higher prices and consequently achieving higher margins. I invoice directly 
to trade and I control the entire margin structure.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
By directly invoicing to trade, dyadic risks associated with the gap between the actual 
margin that the distributor is making and the committed one is eliminated. In return, 
suppliers absorb the resulting credit risks, which can reach up to 75 days for some 
customers. They are also obliged to deploy more accounting people to manage the 
transactions and control credit risks, as noted by a general manager interviewed.  The 
benefits are, however, justified:  
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“If the financial charges and the additional costs are 2% and we are able to save 2% or 
even 3% by controlling the price structure, the financial risks are thus diminished” 
(Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
Another difference between a partially integrated model and a vertically integrated 
model relates to the integration of the execution functions, including sales supervisors, 
sales representatives, and merchandisers. Suppliers adopting a partially integrated 
model exclude these functions from their integration decisions and prefer investing in 
training to develop their distributors’ capabilities. Such functions are perceived as 
labour intensive and the resulting significant complexities do not justify their 
integration. On the other hand, suppliers with vertically integrated models do not 
segregate between the management and execution functions, and consider all human 
assets (management and execution) of high specificity. As noted by a business 
development director interviewed, the integration of the execution functions enabled 
them to improve the efficiency and productivity of their merchandizing activities.  
 
“Merchandising is a core function that gives you control over the quality of your 
execution and your availability at point of sale.  Third party merchandising is more 
difficult to manage and motivate. In reality, you have a lot of employee turnover in third 
party merchandizing, which means you have to retrain and re-evaluate and track and so 
on. It’s a big headache.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
By integrating the execution functions, suppliers are able to control their entire sales 
force by monitoring the exact number of sales representatives and merchandisers 
deployed, and how they need to be trained. In addition, they no longer face the risk of 
not receiving the right focus on their categories and brands by distributors. In a partially 
integrated model, a distributor can commit to having a dedicated execution function on 
paper, but the supplier has no means of finding out whether this has taken effect or not.  
  
It can be argued that there are benefits gained by moving from a sales force of 10 as is 
the case in a partially integrated model, to a sales force of 100 as is the case in a 
vertically integrated model. VIM cases, however, show the willingness to absorb all 
resulting risks. 
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“Having a bigger sales force means having a bigger human resources team to manage 
the large number of employees.  It is worth considering the benefits achieved in terms of 
efficiency and focus.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
This point of view might be subjective, and is associated with the way a supplier 
balances between the costs and benefits of integrating sales execution teams. The cases 
explored (Cases 4, 5, 13, and 14) reaped significant benefits following the integration of 
their execution functions by improving their visibility at point of sales, and achieving 
better standardisation and more control over the efficiency and productivity of their 
execution teams. Does this imply, however, that suppliers currently outsourcing 
execution functions (Cases 9 and 12) to distributors are compromising on the quality of 
execution? One of the concerned sales directors interviewed confirms that a similar 
output can be achieved. 
 
The third difference between PIMs and VIMs is on the level of information sharing. 
Suppliers adopting a partially integrated model mitigate dyadic risks by integrating 
information processes. On the other hand, suppliers following a vertically integrated 
model use one fully integrated information system. They do not see the need to deploy 
an information interface with a distributor whose role is specific and limited.  
 
“We [the supplier] have installed the SAP system, which enables us to control all the 
information from shipment to invoicing; it is also integrated to the WMS (Warehouse 
Management System) so we know we control all the sales and supply processes.” 
(Interview, Supplier KSA).  
 
Suppliers who partially integrate the sales and distribution activities can mitigate dyadic 
risks by integrating their systems with those of their distributors. In VIM cases, 
information asymmetry does not exist as suppliers control the input and the output of 
information. Suppliers adopting VIM are able to control qualitative KPIs (behaviour 
based performance), which can be achieved in PIMs but through advanced information 
systems.  
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“As the business grows and becomes more complex, the control of the quality of the 
execution across channels becomes important.  We track quantitative KPIs, but recently 
we started setting qualitative targets.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
The importance of tracking qualitative KPIs has been noted by suppliers who are 
assessing the shift to partially integrated models. The only difference is that they have to 
deploy the right information system with distributors, which would allow them to do so 
on a regular basis, and in a timely manner.  
 
“We are coming closer and closer to the information available. It is just the immediacy 
of it. You want to know what's on the shelves in the marketplace every day, you want to 
know your shelf share, you want to know what your distribution is, and you want to 
know how to make better decisions and react better.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
Collecting transaction based information is not enough. A distributor in a partially 
integrated model might be able to provide all the numerical information, but lacks the 
capabilities to assess and report qualitative information. A supplier adopting a partially 
integrated model has the responsibility to deploy the systems and processes that are able 
to track such information.  
 
“You have to be able to capture what is beyond the numbers, whether it’s insights on 
pricing, planograms, or competitor information. We are in the FMCG business, which 
is about speed, so the information has to be quick, relevant, and insightful. Personally, I 
think this is where we have to assist our distributors.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
 
4.5.2 Governance structure of vertically integrated models 
The analysis of the differences and similarities shows that vertically integrated models 
adopt a centralised governance structure. Similar to partially integrated models, assets 
with high specificity are integrated. A major difference, however, is that these assets are 
not restricted to the management functions but also incorporate the execution functions. 
Execution functions are highly programmable and can be controlled through 
conventional control systems, as specified by the agency theory. Evidence gathered 
 214 
 
shows that vertical integration is the optimal solution for suppliers to fully mitigate 
relational risks. Accordingly, suppliers agree to absorb the financial risks associated 
with integration and perceive the cost of integration to be lower than the cost of 
outsourcing.   
 
During the discussion with the suppliers adopting VIM an important difference with the 
PIM cases associated with the role of the distributor was noticed. A distributor has a 
limited role in vertical integrated models, and his responsibilities are only restricted to 
the logistical operation since the management and the execution sales functions are 
handled by the supplier, who also invoices to trade directly. Suppliers adopting a 
partially integrated model view the distributor as an active partner they are willing to 
develop, whose opinion and role matter. This is why the model is called a partially 
integrated model, where a good part of the sales activities is still outsourced to a 
distributor and the responsibilities are shared. On the other hand, the distributor for a 
supplier adopting a vertically integrated model is specialised in logistics services. For 
this reason, suppliers adopting a vertically integrated model refer to distributors as 
service providers rather than distributors. A general manager of a multinational vertical 
integrated firm described the situation as follows:  
 
“You have the choice of being a service provider and completely divorce the concept of 
account management. You just let it go and do service providing. You’re like a logistics 
operator, and you just let us have a direct relationship with the trade, it’s a different 
business model with different margins. Your investment is just in facilities and in 
efficiencies. You will lose part of the margin cake, but you do not have to carry the same 
level of overhead that you would otherwise need.”(Interview, Supplier UAE).  
 
The role of the distributor in a vertically integrated model is diminished from managing 
a sizeable share of the sales and distribution activities to managing a few specific 
functions. The logistical assets with low specificity for suppliers are outsourced to 
distributors. This does not imply that these assets are not important, but rather the 
integration costs are much higher than the outsourcing costs involved. To be performed 
in a cost effective manner, they require distinctive levels of specialisation. Distributors 
can build on their scale to play this role. This is why the physical logistical assets are of 
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high specificity for distributors across the three models (FOM, PIM and VIM) and 
especially in VIMs.   
 
Following the interviews conducted with the concerned suppliers, it has been noticed 
that the term ‘service provider’ is not restricted to logistical operations but can also 
cover other operations, including the specialisation in a specific channel that the 
supplier wishes to explore.  
 
“We [the supplier] look at small companies who can perform a specialised service.  For 
instance, we are now seeking distributors specialised in pharmacies, schools, and the 
food service channels. These represent small channels and are better outsourced to 
distributors.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
 
4.5.3 Critical themes that emerged from interviews  
A central theme that emerged from interviews is related to the identity of the service 
provider, whether it is the existing distributor whose role has shrunk, or another 
specialised company. Three out of the four vertical integrated cases analysed (Cases 5, 
13, and 14) confirm that the specialised service provider should be a newly hired 
company instead of the existing distributor. This shows that the vertical integration of 
the sales and distribution activities might lead to the discontinuation of the existing 
relationship, and the formation of a new relationship of a transactional nature. As 
confirmed by interviews conducted with the VIM suppliers, relationships with service 
providers are purely transactional, based on a yearly contractual fee that is restricted to 
warehousing and delivery.  
 
Another element that emerged from interviews is related to the difference in the 
perception of risk between suppliers adopting a PIM and those adopting VIM.  By 
agreeing to absorb the costs of integration, Cases 4, 5, 13, and 14 confirm that suppliers 
are risk neutral, conflicting with the predictions of the agency theory.  Such risk 
neutrality is well calculated, however, as noted by a business development director 
interviewed:  
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“You [the supplier] need to be a business with US$ 150M turnover to start thinking 
about operating on your own in KSA.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).  
 
Data gathered shows that vertically integrated cases would not have considered such 
decisions had they not been able to absorb the consequential integration costs. This does 
not mean that PIM cases do not have the critical scale to integrate vertically. With 
relatively the same scale, Case 14 in KSA is vertically integrated, whereas Case 12 in 
KSA is partially integrated. This gap has been filled by exploring the role that trust can 
play in the mitigation of dyadic risks in the Middle East.  
 
The evidence gathered does not provide strong support for full vertical integration of the 
sales and distribution activities in the Middle East. From a TCE perspective, vertical 
integration is based on the elimination of dyadic risks (Williamson, 1975). Supply 
network theorists also present centralisation as a means to reduce complexities across 
supply network (Choi & Krause, 2006). The multiple cases analysed show that vertical 
integration decisions in the Middle East are significantly dependent on four factors: 
critical scale, supplier’s predisposition to risk, relationship with distributor, and site 
specificity. The understanding of these factors reveals some convergence with the 
theory, though some divergence has also been highlighted.  
 
A relationship is identified between vertically integrated cases and the supplier’s critical 
scale. Such an association has been acknowledged by the literature; a positive 
relationship is identified by Williamson and Riordan (1985) between the production 
cost function and vertical integration. A similar association is found by other authors 
between economies of scale and vertical integration decisions (Liang and Huang, 1998; 
John and Weitz, 1988). The research does not reject such a relationship, as the 
interviewed experts emphasised the importance of the association between critical scale 
and the decision to integrate the sales and distribution activities. An interviewee in KSA 
(Case 14) clearly stated that the integration decision had been delayed until the business 
achieved the minimal scale that would allow the financing of a vertically integrated 
governance structure. Meanwhile, the concerned supplier tolerates the dyadic risks 
involved, knowing that it is a matter of time before they are entirely eliminated.  
 
 217 
 
The association between critical scale and vertical integration decisions is further 
exemplified by the cases that have achieved the required critical scale, but have not 
opted for vertical integration strategies (Cases, 9 and 12). The evolutionary theory 
seems more relevant in explaining the strategies adopted by these cases. The theory 
considers that firms dilute their strength as they integrate specific activities (such as 
sales and distribution) that can be outsourced to other firms that are more specialized 
and can achieve better results. Some authors even suggest that firms start as vertically 
integrated units, but move to further disintegration and specialisation as they gain scale 
(Stigler, 1951; Agarwal, 1997). It has also been argued that such an approach results in 
transaction cost optimisation (Lamoreaux et al., 2003). In dynamic environments where 
firms are strategically driven to focus on their core capabilities specialisation is key 
(Teece, 2011).  In contrast to the TCE approach, which encourages integration, the 
evolutionary theory somehow favours disintegration (Langlois, 2003). Through 
specialisation, or even hyper specialisation (Malone et al., 2011), both suppliers and 
distributors can leverage on their core competencies, and improve the quality of their 
services, which will ultimately lead to lower transaction costs and higher returns. The 
cases that have the critical scale but have not adopted vertical integration strategies 
demonstrate the direction proposed by the evolutionary theorists. Evidence collected 
from these cases demonstrates conviction in outsourcing the sales and distribution 
activities to distributors who can achieve better results in terms of cost and quality of 
services. The concerned suppliers prefer to focus their attention on brand building and 
capability development, whilst distributors focus on the sales and distribution activities 
across the various retail channels. This direction proved successful, thus demonstrating 
that vertical disintegration may be as (if not more) relevant as vertical integration even 
for suppliers who can afford the resulting integration costs.  
 
The second factor discusses the supplier’s predisposition to risk. This factor is presented 
as an important difference between the cases adopting vertical integrated structures and 
those adopting full outsource (BSC, ACS) or partial integrated structures. Suppliers 
willing to vertically integrate their sales and distribution activities exhibit neutrality 
towards the associated risks, and do not mind absorbing financial and market 
complexity risks. One might assume that these suppliers associate higher implication 
levels to dyadic risks than to financial or other market risks. The benefits that result 
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from the full control of the various transaction cost components outweigh the costs of 
integration, thus justifying the decision to absorb the associated risks. A convergence is 
identified between this finding and the assumption raised by transactional theorists 
(Williamson, 1975; Demiski and Feltham, 1978; Eisenhardt, 1988; Alchian and 
Demstez, 1972). The divergence from the theory is noted by the cases that did not opt 
for vertical integration (BSC, ASC, VIM). Those suppliers are considered to be risk 
averse, as they are not willing to absorb the risks of integration even if they can afford 
the associated costs. The agency theory assumes risk neutrality of suppliers (Eisenhardt, 
1988; 1989), thus this finding diverges from the theory and demonstrates that suppliers 
favour dealing with dyadic risks rather than eliminating them. Strategies such as the 
deployment of a control system (BCS or ACS) as shown in P3, and those associated 
with partial integration as confirmed by P4, are tangible supporting evidence. This 
divergence is considered substantial as the number of these cases (11 out of 15) 
outweighs those that implemented vertical integration (4 out of 15 cases). This evidence 
shows that P5 is strictly restricted to suppliers who prefer to eliminate dyadic risks 
rather than seeking means to manage them, regardless of the associated risks. It is 
premature to judge which approach will prevail in the future, as the vertically integrated 
cases explored were in their early maturity levels, where the decision had been taken 
either during the data collection phase or slightly before it. If vertical integration 
decisions led to substantial implications for performance, the risks taken by suppliers 
are justified and the associated costs are absorbed. Other suppliers will follow and 
supplier distributor relationships in modern trade countries in the Middle East will be 
witnessing increasing vertical integration trends. On the other hand, if vertical 
integration decisions do not lead to the desired outcomes, the future will witness trends 
that shift away from vertical integration. The same rationale is applicable to dyadic 
cases opting for ACS or PIM. It is worth exploring the implications of vertical 
integration decisions on suppliers’ performance in future research. This limitation is 
discussed later on in the dissertation.  
 
Evidence at hand shows that a risk neutral behaviour cannot be generalised to all 
suppliers, unlike what is predicted by the theory, but a risk averse behaviour has been 
predominantly observed with most of the suppliers interviewed. Predominant strategies 
are those that favour dealing with dyadic risks and that assume that agency costs remain 
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lower than integration costs. The hidden costs associated with integration discourage the 
majority of interviewed suppliers from adopting VIM strategies.  
 
It has been noticed that the relationship with the distributor is a critical third factor in 
vertical integration strategies. An important similarity is found between cases adopting 
VIM strategies and the relationship status with their previous distributors. Vertical 
integration has been positioned as the outcome of relationship or contract failure, as 
predicted by TCE theory (Williamson, 1975). Evidence collected, however, shows that 
some of these suppliers have resorted to the vertical integration decision as a last option. 
Prior to deciding on vertical integration, these suppliers tried to restore their 
relationships with their distributors by exploring partial integrated models (Cases 4 and 
14). A day to day interaction experience (PIM) increased the level of relational friction; 
instead of mitigating dyadic risks it led to their amplification. From a theoretical 
perspective, this finding shows that the relational approach is given priority over the 
transactional approach, supporting the assumptions of relational theorists (Granovetter, 
1985; Rooks et al., 2000; Dyer & Singh, 1998). Following this perspective, it can be 
assumed that the failure to develop trust between suppliers and distributors may lead to 
a termination of the relationship, and accordingly to vertical integrated governance 
structures. Such a conclusion is partially relevant as evidence collected from this 
research shows that in the Middle East it is essential to disassociate between the failure 
to develop inter-organisational trust and the failure to develop inter-personal trust, as 
defined by Zaheer et al. (1998). Evidence gathered from Cases 4 and 14 show that the 
failure to develop inter-personal trust leads to the transformation of the distributor role 
within a vertically integrated structure due to the high level of inter-organisational trust. 
In Case 4, for example, the supplier vertically integrated the sales and distribution 
activities and kept the logistical services with the distributor. In Case 14, the supplier 
has also integrated the sales and distribution activities while seeking strategic alliance in 
manufacturing with the distributor.  
 
Evidence gathered from Case 13 shows that a lack of inter-organisational trust leads to 
the elimination of the role of the distributor within a vertical integrated set-up. This 
demonstrates that the development of relationship specific assets (Dyer & Singh, 1998) 
should focus on the development of both inter-personal and inter-organisational trust. 
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Both types of trust are important to sustain and develop the relationship, as presented in 
P6. However, a disruption to the inter-organisational trust is translated into a permanent 
break of the dyad (divorce), whereas a disruption to inter-personal trust leads to a 
transformation of the dyad in contexts of high levels of inter-organisational trust. The 
relationship with the distributor accordingly dictates whether vertical integration 
strategies should be considered or not. Moreover, it dictates what form of integration to 
take, one that transforms the role of the distributors in cases of high levels of inter-
organisational trust and low levels of inter-personal trust, or one that eliminates the 
distributor role due to the lack of inter-organisational trust.  
 
The fourth factor focuses on the supplier’s site specificity. Although the research only 
examines the downstream activities across the supply chain (sales and distribution), a 
similarity is found between the upstream integration of suppliers and their downstream 
integration strategies. The four suppliers who integrated the sales and distribution 
activities have factories established in the markets. Although the interviewees did not 
make much association between their upstream participation and the downstream 
decisions across the supply chain, having manufacturing facilities gave them an 
advantage over other suppliers who are only represented through commercial offices. 
These suppliers are familiar with the local laws, already have employees in the markets 
and have already taken the risk in terms of investing in manufacturing operations. This 
learning advantage may encourage the consideration of full integration strategies, 
upstream and downstream. Exploring the association between upstream and 
downstream strategies across the supply chain is out of the scope of this research, but 
from a TCE perspective one can note that site assets (Williamson, 1975) can be 
considered of high specificity for suppliers adopting VIM strategies. As these suppliers 
have chosen local sourcing to optimize their transaction costs, and since they are already 
established in the market, they view the integration of the sales and distribution 
activities as an incremental opportunity to seek further transaction cost optimisations. 
 
Through the above  four factors, it can be concluded that TCE theory is a relevant 
theoretical avenue to understand the mitigation of dyadic risks, but the relevance of the 
theory is only supported by four cases out of fifteen cases. The other 11 cases 
demonstrated that the dynamic capability approach (1
st
 factor) and the relational 
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approach (3
rd
 factor) favour dealing with dyadic risks over eliminating them. Moreover, 
an important divergence from the theory is noted when it comes to the efficiency of 
integration versus the benefits of disintegration (factor 1) and when it comes to the 
supplier’s predisposition to risk (factor 2). Following these four factors, it can be 
concluded that vertical integration strategies can be positioned as optimal strategies to 
mitigate dyadic risks in specific cases where: 
 Suppliers have the critical scale that allows them to absorb the costs of 
integration. 
 Suppliers are risk neutral and perceive the risks of integration to be lower than 
the risks of outsourcing.  
 Suppliers have experienced a negative relationship with their distributors (lack 
of trust) mainly on the inter-organisational front. 
 Suppliers are physically established in the market through manufacturing 
facilities. 
 
As trust has been positioned as a main determinant of relationship failure or success, the 
research has highlighted the role of trust in dyadic relationships in the Middle East. The 
sixth proposition specifically explores how trust is developed between suppliers and 
distributors in the Middle East. This helps in understanding the areas of convergence 
and divergence between the relational and the transactional approach, which is a major 
gap emphasized by the research.  
 
 
 
4.6 Dyadic Risks Mitigation (Supplier and Distributor): Relational Approach-
Trust 
 
P6: The development of trust between suppliers and distributors contributes to 
mitigating dyadic risks. 
 
The various cases explored demonstrate that the transactional approach is capable of 
explaining the strategies adopted by suppliers to mitigate dyadic risks. By exploring the 
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role that trust plays in dyadic FMCG relationships in the Middle East, a more complete 
picture of the DRM strategies can be provided. The analysis of P6 is conducted by 
examining the similarities and differences between four sets of cases:  
 Cases where trust contributed to the evolution of the relationship between 
suppliers and distributors 
 Cases where trust led to the reassessment of the relationship between suppliers 
and distributors. 
 Cases where the lack of trust led to relationship failure. 
 Cases where trust had a neutral effect on the relationship. 
 
 
4.6.1 Cases where trust contributed to the evolution of the relationship  
Trust proves to play a positive role in the mitigation of dyadic risks across Iraq, KSA 
and UAE. A similarity has been identified between FOM cases in Iraq (Cases 1 and 2) 
and PIM cases in both KSA (Cases 12 and 15) and UAE (Case 9). These similarities 
show that suppliers and distributors have a shared responsibility for the development of 
trust. Evidence gathered demonstrates that trust is positioned as a dyadic risk mitigation 
strategy that complements the transactional approach. Trust is developed between 
suppliers and distributors following the exchange of economic and non-economic 
rewards between the dyadic members. Some of the themes that explain the development 
of trust have been discussed in the literature and others have emerged from the 
interviews.  
 
Four secondary themes have been grouped under economic rewards: fair margins, 
investment in human assets, investments in physical assets, and investments in systems.  
 
A supplier who does not give a fair distributor margin should not expect the same level 
of output compared to other suppliers. A fair margin entails being clear about the 
capabilities to be deployed (bearing in mind the associated costs). This describes a fair 
supplier distributor relationship where each party is apprehensive about the financial 
interests of the second party. Such a situation has been observed in the two outsourced 
cases in Iraq, and in all the partially integrated cases in UAE and KSA.  
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“We ask our distributor to absorb all the risks in Iraq. How can we motivate him to do 
that if we are not compensating with an acceptable margin?” (Interview, Supplier 
Iraq).  
 
By outsourcing the sales and distribution activities, suppliers are transferring 
environmental and financial risks to distributors. What prevents FOM and PIM cases 
from vertically integrating sales and distribution activities is their reluctance towards 
absorbing the related integrating risks. The cases explored confirm that relationships 
based on fair economic foundation are the ones that will succeed (Cases, 1, 2, 9, 12, and 
15).  
 
“I [the supplier] am with a cost plus contract because it covers the costs incurred by my 
distributor.  Because we might not agree on how costs are calculated, we opted for a 
margin contract that is close to the market average, and in return the distributor is 
giving us the necessary capabilities to meet with the competitive environment” 
(Interview, Supplier KSA).  
 
The second theme includes the investments in human assets. Some suppliers have 
established a special training college (Case 9) for the development of their own 
employees as well as those of their distributors. 
 
“We [the supplier] do not differentiate between employees; they receive the same 
learning.  We have one content and we share the same message, so that the distributor’s 
employees become qualified like our employees and thus operate similarly, which is a 
dream come true.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).  
This same supplier has also initiated a talent exchange program that aims at retaining 
talent within the distributor’s organisation by providing them with a chance to 
participate in special assignments at the supplier’s offices.  
 
Distributors have also invested in dedicated capabilities from their end, to accelerate 
growth and optimise their cost to serve. Pre-empting the sources of dyadic risks leads to 
their mitigation long before their actual occurrence. As highlighted by a general 
manager interviewed, companies need to invest behind trust. Investment in inter-
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organisational trust from a distributor perspective means investing in assets deemed of 
high specificity for suppliers. This requires a precondition to raise the awareness about 
the specificity of those assets which fall under the joint responsibility of suppliers and 
distributors. The capabilities to manage a modern trade market and the costs involved 
are different from the ones required to manage a traditional trade market, as explained 
by the regional sales directors of a supplier in UAE. Both companies anticipated the rise 
in modern trade, and thus prepared their distributors to adapt their capabilities to the 
channel context. In turn, their distributors have met them half way by conducting their 
own training programmes. To retain and develop talent to meet the expectations of 
suppliers, distributors of partially integrated cases also invested in talent development 
programmes. They are also active in participating in academic job fairs to attract fresh 
graduates that are dedicated to suppliers.  
 
“We have an organisation that fits the need of a modern trade market.  We always 
refresh our team with fresh talent to show our suppliers that we are very active on 
people related topics; we know that this is important for them” (Interview, Distributor 
UAE). 
 
Investments in physical assets have also been classified as a category of economic 
reward that drives trust. Suppliers adopting FOMs and PIMs are not concerned with 
investing in physical distribution assets, but expect their distributors to have the most 
efficient logistical capabilities. Distributors who succeeded in gaining their suppliers’ 
trust made substantial investments to upgrade their logistical infrastructure by building 
supply chain operations, allowing them to offer the best services at lower costs. Cost 
optimisation is achieved by scaling up the operation to other suppliers.  As long as a 
distributor is offering a competitive cost, suppliers should not care how those costs are 
allocated, highlights a general manager interviewed.  
 
“Due to our fully automated best in class warehouses we were able to improve our 
service level by 30%. We want to make sure that we are offering the best storage 
conditions that will benefit our suppliers and any other company seeking logistical 
services.” (Interview, Distributor UAE).  
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“If we do not want to invest in logistics this does not mean that logistics is not 
important to us. When our distributors seek state of the art logistical infrastructure, they 
are indirectly telling us that they care about our products.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).  
 
Investment in  physical assets is not only associated with investments in vehicles and 
distribution centres, but in systems and processes as well. Distributors who create 
synergy and synchronise their systems with those of suppliers represent tangible 
examples of how far inter-organisational trust can go. Distributors are aware that in a 
competitive world where it is becoming more difficult to anticipate demand variation, 
demand management and forecast accuracy are becoming of strategic necessity. 
Distributors develop trust by building integrated information systems, which leads to 
integrated S&OP planning.  
 
“They can access our system from their offices through a web EDI interface, they 
basically see everything.” (Interview, Distributor KSA).  
 
In a context of trust, suppliers and distributors agree that the period of hiding 
information has long disappeared. Nowadays, an open book policy is practised where all 
sorts of information is shared, including financial reports. Distributors are aware that, in 
situations where suppliers are seeking different financing alternatives to accelerate their 
growth, they cannot block them from having full visibility over their cost structure. By 
giving suppliers access to such information, distributors show a transparent attitude, 
which strengthens the level of trust achieved. Most suppliers interviewed reject 
operating in the dark. Transparency is positioned as a founding pillar of trust, as agreed 
by most of the cases.  
“Transparency is important in the development of trust, specifically in a context where 
information is abundantly available everywhere and in different forms.” (Interview, 
Supplier KSA). 
 
Transparency has to be mutual. Suppliers and distributors both agree that transparency 
is not only restricted to receiving information, but also includes transparency in the way 
objectives and strategies are set.  
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“We [the distributor] are clearly aligned on the objectives of our supplier in the market 
and we are aware that we need to reinforce our capabilities to meet the needs of our 
supplier. As long as the supplier shares with us the why and how, it is enough.” 
(Interview, Distributor UAE). 
 
The investment in non-economic rewards has also been also viewed as an important 
driver of trust.   
 
Four secondary themes have been grouped under the non-economic rewards: value 
transfer and adoption, quality of the teams managing the relationship, investment in 
time, and long term orientation.  
 
Interviews held with some distributors (Case 1, 9, and 12) led to the perception that 
interviews were being conducted with the suppliers instead. They assert that adopting 
the values of suppliers is one of the most successful factors in the relationship. The 
concerned suppliers succeeded in applying their values externally with their distributors. 
A corporate value mentioned is mutuality, which according to a general manager 
interviewed, is a mutual shared benefit that can take many forms, financial and non-
financial.  
 
“Many multinational companies have values that can be found on their websites, but 
only a few are able to apply them in reality.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
 
This supplier was able to measure its strategies and actions with the distributor through 
the mutuality principle.  Experts interviewed stressed the importance of transferring 
their values to distributors and encouraging them to adopt these values. The insight 
shared by the vice president of a distribution company confirms that such value can be 
positioned as a safeguard for distributors:  
 
“It tells us [the distributor] that our supplier will support us in good times and bad 
times. We celebrate success together; in fact we are going to South Africa tomorrow to 
celebrate our achievements in 2012.  …We identify solutions together; we share certain 
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risks, we are now in a discussion to see how we can minimise the financial impacts of 
certain laws set by the government.” (Interview, Distributor KSA). 
 
If a supplier believes that in today’s competitive world, having a strong partner across 
the downstream sales and distribution chain is a key competitive advantage, then he 
should try his best to set values to protect this relationship. Trust is not only about 
setting a value like mutuality, but also about putting such values into action. Although 
separate interviews were held with suppliers and distributors, the cases that succeeded 
in transferring the values of collaboration, trust, and mutuality can explicitly be noticed 
simply by matching the language used by both suppliers and distributors.  
 
“The model we [the supplier] have in KSA is not a model that we use exclusively in 
KSA. Given that one of our values is mutuality, or win-win, if we feel that the distributor 
is making too much money, then we intervene and we say: ‘You just have to be more 
mutual and give back’. Similarly, if he is not making enough money, we intervene to 
make sure we dissect his income statement to find inefficiencies, or we decide to 
sacrifice some of our profits to compensate his margins.”(Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
The same theme is replicated in Case 9 of a supplier who is criticised by others for 
‘moulding’ its distributors. The term moulding was used by at least three non-associated 
interviewees. This did not seem to be an issue for the involved distributors, who 
demonstrated pride in embracing the culture of their supplier. Trust is found among the 
core values of this supplier; it is about having confidence in each other’s capabilities, as 
expressed by the regional sales director interviewed. 
 
“Who said that integrating certain capabilities means we can do a job better than our 
distributor?”(Interview, Supplier UAE).  
 
The suppliers that succeeded in transferring values of trust to distributors (Case 1, 9, and 
12) demonstrated that trust is not about having positive intentions, but about believing 
in each other’s capabilities. This theme, which emerged from interviews, may be one of 
the driving pillars of partially integrated models. To be able to cascade these values, the 
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right people are needed from both sides of the dyad. This led us to another emerging 
theme related to the quality of teams managing the dyadic relationship.   
 
The quality of the team managing the relationship is a second type of non-economic 
reward. The teams managing the relationship have to ensure that trust is practised on a 
daily basis. This has been clearly noted by the sales directors interviewed. The 
integration of the key account manager can bring benefits that are either mutual to both 
suppliers and distributors (win/win situation), or restricted to suppliers (win/lose 
situation). If the person adapts a coercive approach and uses the integration model to 
exert a controlling role, inter-personal trust deteriorates as a result. On the other hand, if 
the person adopts a rewarding approach and uses integration to engage and motivate the 
sales teams, inter-personal trust is strengthened.  
 
“It’s all about synergy and day to day harmony.” (Interview, Distributor KSA). 
 
People may give wrong signals and this becomes very delicate when interaction takes 
place on a daily basis. Many examples were shared by distributors who had asked 
suppliers to either change or keep the person managing the relationship. Investments in 
dedicated assets contribute to the development of inter-organisational trust. Inter-
personal trust is also important and can be both constructive and destructive. One of the 
suppliers interviewed is dealing with the same distribution company in both UAE and 
Lebanon. Inter-organisational trust is high in both countries, but the supplier had issues 
on the inter-personal front with the team in UAE, which had negative consequences on 
the overall relationship. The supplier had to reassess the role of its distributor in UAE 
due to the lack of inter-organisational trust. Examples shared during the interviews 
made this theme an important driver of successful collaboration and trust development 
between suppliers and distributors.   
 
Trust in the Middle East appears to be developed, not only through investments in kind, 
but through investments in time. Supplier and distributor teams have to dedicate special 
time to review the business across all organisational levels starting from the owners all 
the way to merchandisers. The owner of a key distribution company interviewed plans a 
yearly meeting with the president of the supplier organisation to discuss the vision and 
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key strategies in KSA. The CEO of the distributor plans quarterly meetings with the 
supplier’s CEO to discuss macro performance figures and the general managers meet on 
a monthly basis to focus on the performance of the month and the key actions required.   
 
The frequency in communication and time dedication is not only restricted to the upper 
part of the organisation, but also applies to middle and the lower management. Building 
trust, notes the vice president interviewed, cannot be done overnight, but requires 
months if not years. Suppliers have to constantly invest in time in order to draw the 
distributors to their businesses. 
  
A main challenge of a partially integrated model is the ability to make this model work 
by giving it enough time to work, highlights a general manager interviewed.   
 
As trust is driven by investments in financial and non-financial rewards, it might be 
relevant to ask how suppliers and distributors view their return on investments.  Dyadic 
members who succeeded in investing behind trust (Cases 1, 2, 9, 12, and 15) do not 
expect to realise the return on their investments in a year or two. Investment in trust 
development actions is not like investing behind a promotion, noted one of the 
interviewees. The cases explored confirm that suppliers and distributors need to 
consider long term returns behind their investments, be it investments in tangible assets 
to drive economic rewards, or investments in intangible assets to drive non-economic 
rewards. Suppliers are used to long term planning, it takes time to build brands, 
expressed a business development director interviewed in KSA. For this purpose, 
embracing a long term culture might not be an easy task, especially for distributors. The 
cases explored confirm, however, that some distributors have started looking beyond the 
benefits that are generated today.  
 
“I do not expect to achieve the return on my investments tomorrow. I know that I have 
to pay higher salaries than multinational companies to attract good calibre employees, 
but I believe that these investments will pay off in the future.” (Interview, Distributor 
KSA). 
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Suppliers seemed more assertive when distributors do not lock themselves in the 
present, but instead explore future opportunities. Cases 1, 2, 9, 12 and 15 show that the 
profitability of dyadic relationships should be measured over an extended period of 
time. It is then that one can judge whether the investment behind trust pays off or not. A 
CEO of an FMCG supplier notes:  
 
“When distributors start creating friction because they only look at how much money 
they will make this year, it is then when the relationship starts taking undesired routes 
for everybody.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
Table 4.5 provides a summary of the trust development themes in association with 
opportunism. The table shows that all discussed themes provide evidence of benefits 
that are long term and mutual (opposite to private benefits) and some themes 
demonstrate that information symmetry (opposite to information asymmetry) may exist 
between suppliers and distributors. Such findings confirm that for specific dyadic cases 
in the Middle East, trust development is positioned as a strategy that complements 
formal contracting and integration.  
 
If trust has such importance, then it is valid to assume that a lack of trust may lead to a 
review of the relationship or even to relationship failure. Evidence was gathered from 
antagonist cases where a lack of trust has led to negative relational outcomes.  
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4.6.2 Cases where trust led to the reassessment of the relationship 
Six cases explored revealed relationships that can be described as unstable (Cases 3, 6, 
7, 8, 10, and 11). In these cases, trust needed some restoration, mainly from the 
distributors’ side. Trust might positively evolve at a later stage if suppliers and 
distributors adapt the trust development actions presented in the above, or deteriorate to 
lower levels otherwise. From the cases analysed, specific themes were detected that 
make suppliers reassess their current relationship with their distributors.  
 
It is not enough for a distributor to be recognised as one of the best if he fails to give the 
same level of attention to all the suppliers he contracts with. The lack of focus has been 
positioned as a first theme of trust deterioration. Suppliers are apprehensive if they feel 
that their distributors favour other suppliers over them. The behaviour of the distributors 
is, however justified: 
 
“It is normal that they obtain more focus, they represent 85% of his business, but we 
[the supplier] want focus as well.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).  
 
Lack of focus led suppliers to consider various options, one of which was the move to 
other distributors where their business has higher contribution weight, as happened with 
Case 11. Some have given their distributors a final chance to review their organisation 
and give them a dedicated team. This action required certain sacrifices from both 
members of the dyad. The general manager notes: 
 
“We [the supplier] know that a dedicated structure will cost us more, we agreed to 
increase the distributor margin and he deployed a dedicated sales force for our 
business in return.”(Interview, Supplier KSA).  
 
Suppliers and distributors mutually agreed that trust comes at a cost.  Each of the two 
parties presented signals of trust by agreeing to be less opportunistic.  Had this not been 
done, the relationship would have almost certainly taken a downturn. Some distributors 
refused to make such extra efforts, which led suppliers to consider other alternatives 
outside the existing relationship (Case 11).   
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Some suppliers are currently undergoing transformations to their distribution models 
(Cases 6, 8, and 10) with the purpose of shifting to a distributor able to cater for their 
growth ambitions. The lack of trust in the distributor’s capabilities has been viewed as a 
second theme that leads to the reassessment of the relationship between suppliers and 
distributors.  
 
“We are now consolidating our distributors; we want to move from six to two 
distributors. The distributor who proves incapable of driving our category share in 
UAE will be phased out.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).  
 
Some distributors failed to build their suppliers’ confidence in their capabilities. Such 
action is vital to restore trust, notes a general manager interviewed:   
 
 “To gain back our trust, he [the distributor] simply needs to build our confidence in his 
capabilities.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
The third theme that drives suppliers to reassess their relationship includes actions 
associated with a distributor’s resistance to change.   As shown earlier, some suppliers 
believe that cost plus contracting is the optimal solution to mitigate dyadic risks. A cost 
plus contract will have dual benefits, the control of costs and the control of the quality 
of capabilities deployed to manage the business. If the distributor is aligned with these 
conditions and is ready to invest in dedicated capabilities, issues of trust will not be 
faced. Some distributors only capture the private benefits of their supplier’s actions and 
do not believe in the concept of mutuality (Cases 8 and 10). The move to a cost plus 
contract is thus negatively perceived as distributors might focus solely on the possible 
reduction in their margins. Suppliers are faced with a high resistance to change, as noted 
by a CEO interviewed: 
 
“Some distributors are afraid to change.  This is understandable, but if they continue to 
do so, this will work to their disadvantage.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
Such behaviour is common to short-term oriented distributors who only seek immediate 
personal benefits.  Sustaining such behaviour may lead to further deterioration in the 
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levels of trust, which consequently results in relationship failure, as has been witnessed 
by the three cases explored in the following section. Restoring the levels of trust entails 
overcoming the notice period that is given by their suppliers. During this period, 
distributors have to re-establish their relationships with suppliers by considering trust 
development actions through learning from what other distributors did (Cases 1, 2, 9, 12 
and 15 analysed previously). Issues faced by the second set of cases are summarised in 
Table 4.6. 
 
 
 
 
4.6.3 Cases where the lack of trust led to relationship failure. 
These cases are in contrast to the dyadic cases explored that have succeeded in building 
trust, and include suppliers who have terminated their relationships with distributors due 
to a lack of trust (Cases 4, 13, and 14).  
 
“We [the supplier] were not able to obtain the smallest piece of information from him; 
he simply does not believe in information sharing” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
These relationships may have lasted for a long period of time, e.g. Case 13 lasted more 
than 60 years, during which no concrete actions were taken to strengthen the levels of 
trust. The decision to terminate the relationship was taken in 2012 due to the recurrence 
of dyadic risks.  
 
Another similar case (Case 14) is observed by a distributor who failed to upgrade its 
team’s capabilities after being given the chance to do so. The supplier decided to shift to 
cost plus contracting, which exposed the fact that the costs incurred by the distributor 
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were exaggerated. The distributor was presenting fictitious investments that he claimed 
to have made.  
 
“We [the supplier] discovered that we were paying for costs that are not actually 
spent.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
Although the supplier has adopted a cost plus contract to mitigate dyadic risks, the 
actions taken by the distributor led to contract failure.   
 
“When I [the supplier] give my distributor a million dollars to spend on an activity 
there is a possibility that our distributor spend the money differently than the agreed 
plan. This presented an issue. Although we would audit them, you can only audit what 
they show you.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
Suppliers may lose their trust in the ability of distributors to meet their ambitions in the 
market.  
 
“A central concern was that we [the supplier] did not think they were fit for the future. 
Friction was increasing, people were not focused on our business, and they were not 
willing to invest.”(Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
The cases that witnessed a relationship discontinuation are those that considered the 
shift to a vertically integrated model to mitigate dyadic risks. This demonstrates that the 
failure of the relational approach drives suppliers to consider extreme transactional 
alternatives. Only one exceptional case was encountered where no association was 
traced between the relational approach and the transactional approach. A neutral effect 
of trust is hence depicted.  
 
 
4.6.4 Cases where trust had a neutral effect on the relationship. 
Some suppliers give little importance to the role of trust when considering dyadic risk 
mitigation strategies. It can be assumed that this is a very rare situation in the Middle 
East, as only one case (Case 5) of a supplier who vertically integrated the sales and 
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distribution activities without taking into account the historical relationship with its 
distributor was explored.  
 
“Trust in our previous distributor had nothing to do with our integration decision. We 
decided to integrate and take over the operation because it was a strategic direction 
from the group, we made sure that we paid him a reasonable indemnity nonetheless.” 
(Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
This case confirms that suppliers may consider unpredictable Dyadic Risk Mitigation 
actions.  
 
 
4.6.5 Relational approach versus the transactional approach 
 
The majority of the cases confirm that FMCG suppliers in the Middle East view trust as 
a dyadic risk mitigation strategy that complements formal contracting. Specific themes, 
some of which were predicted by the research while others emerged from interviews, 
contribute to the development of trust in the Middle East (See Table 4.7).  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8 shows that trust is a complement to both Partial Integrated Models and 
Advanced Control Systems. Five cases explored show that trust contributes to the 
evolution of the relationship between suppliers and distributors. Six cases examined 
show that suppliers are reassessing their relationships with distributors based on trust. 
Three cases confirm that VIM is considered in situations of lack of trust, showing that 
relationship failure may lead to alternative governance structures. 
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The 14 cases examined addressed the issue about whether trust influences the 
relationship between suppliers and distributors or not. Trust is presented as a dyadic risk 
mitigation strategy, since the cases that exhibit high levels of trust are those that are 
least affected by dyadic risks. As suggested by the literature, this confirms that trust is a 
way of countering opportunism. While trust appears to be important across the three 
contexts explored, it is positioned as a complement to formal contracting in partially 
integrated governance structures in KSA and UAE. It is noted in P4 that partially 
integrated governance structures combine the AT and the TCE. For a partially 
integrated model to work effectively, both parties have to congruently develop trust, as 
shown by the dyadic Cases 12, 15, and 9. The PIM thus combines the AT (ACS), the 
TCE (PIM) and trust. 
 
The cases of relationship failure led to the conclusion that the transactional approach 
can take the place of the relational one where trust does not exist (Cases 13, 14, and 4). 
The antagonist cases analysed do not neglect the importance of trust in mitigating 
dyadic risks. They show that a supplier starts by considering a mitigation strategy based 
on trust, the failure of which leads him to either integrate or consider other mitigation 
options.  
 
 
 
 
As suggested by relational theorists, the cases explored confirm that the mitigation of 
dyadic risks are not only explained by the transactional perspective, but also consider 
the relational perspective.  The relational perspective is supported by 14 cases where 
trust plays three different roles (relationship evolution, relationship restoration and 
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relationship failure). Only one exceptional case that shows that trust may have a neutral 
effect (Case 5) was noted. 
 
The dynamic nature of trust development is illustrated in Figure 4.2. The figure maps 
the 14 cases analysed based on the three different roles that trust appears to play. The 
figure shows that the failure to restore the levels of trust (6 cases) drives the dyad to the 
left side of the framework, ultimately leading to relationship failure, driving suppliers 
towards alternative governance structures, as confirmed by the three VIM cases.  The 
same member may succeed in restoring the levels of trust, which drive him towards 
further integration and collaboration, moving to the right side of the framework.  
 
 
 
The findings associated with the DRM strategies adopted by suppliers (P3, P4, P5, and 
P6) confirm the relevance of the theories that were chosen by the research to understand 
how suppliers react to dyadic risks.  
 
The examination of multiple dyadic cases across three different contexts shows that the 
DRM strategies adopted by suppliers are not static in nature. The research confirms the 
assumption raised by evolutionary theorists related to the adaptation of the firm through 
market adaptive processes to changes in the environment (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
TCE positions vertical integration and centralisation as the most optimal governance 
structure. The current research demonstrates that vertical integration is one (P5), but not 
the only, option (P3 and P4) available.  According to TCE,  a fair comparison between a 
full outsource and a vertical integrated governance structure should account for the 
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various outsourcing costs, such as agency costs, monitoring costs, coordination costs, 
and opportunity costs (Williamson, 1975; Alchian and Demstez, 1972). Therefore, 
suppliers in the Middle East appear to favour vertical integration only when they can 
afford the related costs, and when their relationships with their distributors have reached 
deteriorating levels.  
 
The vertically integrated cases explored considered the option of VIM only after critical 
scale was reached, allowing them to absorb the costs of integration, and after failing to 
restore their relationships with distributors. The research has also shown that a variety 
of DRM strategies can be considered by FMCG suppliers, though some were more 
dominant than others, depending on the context of the relationship. A control system 
DRM strategy based on the propositions of the agency theory is perceived to be the 
optimal strategy in Iraq, whereas in UAE and KSA the choice is between a PIM and a 
VIM strategy. In dyadic relationships in the Middle East, trust has been positioned as a 
pivotal force, which confirms the importance of cultural diversity in relation to trust 
(Bohnet et al., 2010).  
 
The research shows that the dyadic relationship between suppliers and distributors in the 
Middle East is socially embedded, which supports the arguments made by relational 
theorists (Macneil, 1983; Noordwewier et al., 1990; Granovetter, 1985; Dyer & Singh, 
1998). Relational contracting proves to be of strategic importance in the Middle East. It 
is inaccurate to assume that trust (P6) fully takes the place of formal contracting (P3, 
P4, P5), but the research shows that the failure to build trust will lead to relationship 
termination. Cases witnessing high levels of dyadic risks are those witnessing low levels 
of trust and vice versa, which confirms that trust can be perceived as a way of 
countering opportunism. Moreover, a partially integrated model has been presented as a 
dominant DRM strategy in UAE and KSA, which shows that suppliers favour surviving 
alongside their distributors instead of terminating the existing relationships. This, 
however, must be based on the mutual development of trust since the dyadic cases 
explored that adopted a PIM have exhibited high trust levels. This confirms that the 
transactional and relational approaches can be explored in conjunction as a PIM dyadic 
risk mitigation strategy combines integration (TCE), outsource (AT), and collaboration 
(trust).  This might justify why advocates of the agency theory are becoming more open 
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towards considering the role of trust in agency types of relationships (Fayezi et al., 
2012).  Although the development of trust entails incurring non safeguarded 
investments, the return is translated into sustaining and reinforcing the dyadic 
relationship. Such return on investment is of strategic importance mainly for distributors 
in the Middle East, who pay the higher costs of relationship discontinuation. The supply 
network in the Middle East is structured by means of formalisation (P3) and 
centralisation (P4, P5), which conforms to the propositions of Choi and Hong (2002).  
 
Failure to address dyadic risks can be viewed as failure to adapt to the evolution in the 
environment, as suggested by the evolutionary theory (Nelson and Winter, 1983). This 
will lead to further vulnerability across the supply chain (Svensson, 2000) as suppliers 
will lose their control over the value adding activities. A supplier who has already 
reacted to one of the DRM strategies proposed for the three contexts might thus be in a 
more resilient competitive position compared to another supplier who has not yet 
addressed such issues.  
 
The cases explored show that the strategies adopted by distributors to mitigate dyadic 
risks do not differ between one country and another. Some strategies have been 
presented as more dominant in one country and less dominant in another, but this did 
not seem to affect the overall strategic direction of distributors in mitigating dyadic 
risks. Section 4.7 examines the similarities between the cases that adopted specialisation 
strategies to mitigate dependency risks and those that adopted diversification strategies 
respectively.  
 
 
 
4.7 Dyadic Risks Mitigation: Distributors  
 
P7: FMCG distributors in the Middle East mitigate dyadic risks through A- 
specialisation and B- diversification strategies 
 
This section covers the evidence gathered regarding the specialisation and 
diversification strategies adopted by distributors in the Middle East. 
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4.7.1 Dyadic risk mitigation distributors: Specialisation strategies 
As examined by the agency theory, distributors should be specialised in what they do to 
justify their role in an agency relationship. Without specialisation, the reasons that 
justify outsourcing the sales and distribution activities are no longer valid. 
Specialisation increases the dependency of a supplier on the distributor’s services. 
Accordingly, the question that arises is not whether distributors should be more 
specialised, but about the type of specialisation perceived to be most effective to 
mitigate dyadic risks. Insights gathered show that distributors adopting specialisation 
strategies do not seek to introduce new capabilities to their model, but strengthen 
specific existing capabilities. The findings disclose four types of specialisation 
strategies: 
 Specialisation in logistics and other services. 
 Specialisation by channel. 
 Specialisation by region.  
 Specialisation by category. 
 
Distributors mitigate dyadic risks resulting from their dependency on suppliers by 
positioning themselves as specialised service providers. They strive to split the sales and 
distribution chain into a set of services, as noted by a vice president interviewed.  
 
“We look at the sales and distribution operation as a menu of services.  The objective is 
to be specialised mainly in the activities that we know our suppliers are interested in 
outsourcing.” (Interview, Distributor KSA).  
 
The cases explored show that some distributors aim to upgrade their logistical 
capabilities by establishing independent companies specialised in delivering logistical 
services.  
 
“We established a company called ‘ABC’ that is specialised in providing logistical 
services, not only for our supplier but for other companies as well.” (Interview, 
Distributor KSA). 
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Similarities are found between distributors in Iraq, KSA and UAE, incurring heavy 
investments in logistical capabilities and upgrading their physical infrastructure 
(warehousing and delivery), or their systems and processes to mitigate dyadic risks.  
 
When interviewed, these distributors revealed that they no longer refer to themselves as 
distributors, but rather as service providers. An interviewed CEO notes: 
 
“Today I do not want to be called a distributor, distribution is part of what I do but I 
am also selling other services to my supplier and other suppliers.” (Interview, 
Distributor UAE). 
Being positioned as service providers drives these distributors to seek different forms of 
collaboration with suppliers based on efficiency, cost competitiveness, and quality. This 
is not only confirmed by the insights collected during interviews, but also by the 
distributors’ communication messages on their websites.  Below are some examples that 
are extracted from their websites.  
 
“As an organisation, our strategic differentiation lies in our ability to work 
collaboratively with our partners for cost efficiencies, speed to market, and capitalizing 
on business opportunities. We are committed to the pursuit of excellence”. (Website, 
Distributor UAE). 
 
“One of our core competences is the area of logistics. Our aim is to provide our 
customers with excellent service levels and short delivery response. Our commitment to 
ourselves and to our business partners is to provide optimal storage facilities, ensure 
the quality of our products, and manage a best in class operation.” (Website, 
Distributor UAE). 
 
A general manager interviewed stressed the commitment of the company’s shareholders 
to investing in state of the art logistical capabilities. 
 
“The warehouses that we are now building are fully automated following the latest 
logistics standards; they will allow us to provide excellent services at competitive 
costs” (Interview, Distributor UAE).  
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This is how a vice president interviewed describes a competitive distribution model in 
KSA:  
 
“The right distribution model is not only about having a robust sales organisation, but 
the right equipment and processes with the right back office support like logistics and 
transport, and the right methodologies and science behind it... It is about balance 
between the back office and the front office functions to make sure that the sales teams 
are focused on the execution in the market … I call this a ‘menu approach’ where our 
suppliers do not come to us because we are a good distribution company, but because 
we can provide them with all sorts of services required…” (Interview, Distributor KSA). 
 
Distributors may also consider a joint venture with multinational service providers who 
wish to expand in the Middle East (Case 14). This will allow them to build on existing 
experience in the field and help them to access additional suppliers more quickly, notes 
the general manager of a reputable distribution company that signed a joint venture with 
a multinational logistics provider.  
 
Investments made to convert into specialised service providers are not restricted to 
upgrading logistical capabilities, but also include other secondary services such as 
merchandizing and asset management services. Some distributors have introduced 
specialised services in merchandizing (Case 15) that are not exclusive to their suppliers. 
Others have established a dedicated asset management unit to manage the 
merchandizing equipment (such as freezers) deployed for their suppliers (Case 12). 
 
“Over the past 20 years, our supplier dealt with one specialised company to manage its 
freezers in the market, but was not satisfied with the quality of its service.  This is where 
we [the distributor] intervened and informed our supplier that we are ready to have a 
specialised asset management entity.  We used this entity for other suppliers as well.” 
(Interview, Distributor KSA).  
 
The cases explored illustrate how specialised distributors succeeded in attracting new 
suppliers. By being specialised, the interviewed distributors built their scale further, 
which allowed them to reduce their dependency on suppliers.   
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The market for service providers is expected to grow in the future, as confirmed by the 
suppliers and distributors interviewed. Since suppliers are not apprehensive about 
integrating the logistical capabilities, this is an important signal for distributors to invest 
more in logistics. A CEO of a distribution company in UAE notes:  
 
“Many distributors in the Middle East will evolve to service providers: this is where 
they can add value and where suppliers cannot beat them in terms of costs and 
infrastructure. Specialisation gives us scale and focus; this is what suppliers want.” 
(Interview, Distributor UAE). 
 
Channel specialisation has been positioned as the second type of specialisation strategy. 
Some distributors interviewed in KSA and UAE (Cases 9, 12, and 15) are aware that 
suppliers are requiring higher levels of expertise to manage the various channels in the 
market. As suppliers are more concerned with integrating key account management 
capabilities, the dependency on distributors to manage modern trade will thus be very 
low. This is true when distributors do not have the right capabilities to manage the 
modern trade channel.  As seen earlier (PIM cases), some suppliers interviewed are 
confident about their distributor’s capabilities in managing the modern trade channel 
because their distributors have succeeded in building the required levels of expertise to 
manage modern trade customers.  Thus, channel specialisation is not only restricted to 
the management of the modern trade channel, but can include building specialised 
capabilities in the execution functions that are mid to low management positions 
considered more labour intensive. The VIM cases considered integrating the execution 
functions, unlike the FOM and PIM cases. The market for outsourcing the sales 
execution functions still exist as most of the cases explored (11 cases) do not consider 
integrating these functions.  
 
Distributors who succeeded in building competent execution capabilities may have an 
advantage in mitigating dyadic risks, as the level of specialisation they achieved will 
make suppliers reconsider before integrating these functions, highlights a regional sales 
director interviewed. 
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In addition to the hypermarket and supermarket trade channels, specialisation can also 
include the food service channel. A distributor interviewed established a specialised 
operation to manage the food service (Case 9). This is a major need for certain 
suppliers, as highlighted by the regional sales director of a supplier seeking access into 
the food service channel:   
 
“We require an expert in managing specific channels which are considered small today, 
but have the potential to become bigger tomorrow.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
A specialisation strategy in specific channels where suppliers have neither the know-
how nor the scale to manage helps distributors mitigate dependency risks. 
 
“The main advantage that we provide is our ability to have the right portfolio and the 
right infrastructure to be able to access this channel. The food service business in UAE 
is very promising and we need to capture its potential.” (Interview, Distributor UAE). 
 
By investing in an infrastructure that can cater to the specific needs of the food service 
channel, distributors are able to attract several small suppliers, the combined size of 
which cannot be underestimated. 
 
“The food service channel used to represent 3% of our [the distributor] sales 10 years 
ago. Today, it represents more than 20% of our sales; this is a step change for us.” 
(Interview, Distributor UAE). 
 
Distributors also seek to build specialised capabilities to manage the convenience and 
direct sales delivery channels. There are 7,000 self-service stores and 18,000 grocery 
stores in KSA, as noted by a vice president interviewed.   
 
“Suppliers will always need a specialised distributor who has the infrastructure and 
scale to reach these outlets.  We need to be the distributor who has an efficient route to 
market to effectively cover the entire retail universe.” (Interview, Distributor KSA). 
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Building specialisation entails investments in the appropriate human and technical skills 
to achieve an efficient coverage. Some distributors have succeeded in playing this role 
in KSA (Cases 12 and 15), while others have not (Cases 13 and 14).  
 
Another channel where distributors are building specialised capabilities is the school 
channel.  
 
“We [the supplier] need to follow our consumer’s journey; our products have to be 
where our consumers are…” (Interview, Supplier UAE).  
To meet this strategy’s requirements, some suppliers (Case 5) outsourced the 
management of the schools channel to a niche distributor specialised in reaching the 
school universe.  
 
One conclusion drawn was that distributors who followed a channel specialisation 
strategy to mitigate dyadic risks succeeded in establishing a regional specialisation 
strategy. This is applicable to distributors mainly in KSA and Iraq.   
Specialisation by region was emphasised during the interviews conducted in KSA and 
Iraq.  
 
“In most of the countries in the region you have two dimensions; brand and channel; in 
KSA, you have the regional dimension” (Interview, Distributor KSA). 
 
Distributors who built regional specialisation succeeded in turning the geographical 
complexity challenge in KSA into an opportunity by strengthening their physical 
presence in various regions (Cases 12 and 15). Establishing several regional branches 
enables distributors to shorten lead times and enhance customer satisfaction. 
Specialisation by region can also include assigning rural areas to sub distributors. 
Effectively allocating and utilising resources has direct implications for optimizing the 
cost to serve, as explained by a general manager interviewed. When the physical 
presence in a specific region becomes costly for a distributor, outsourcing the sales and 
distribution activities to a smaller sub distributor specialised in the region becomes a 
more feasible option.  
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Specialised regional distributors position themselves as experts in route to market 
design. Their objective is to effectively cover as many regions as possible by 
concentrating their resources in the main geographical regions and relying on 
specialised sub regional distributors in others. A business development director with 
regional experience in the Middle East notes:  
 
“This practice is common in countries like Egypt, Turkey, and Iran, and will become 
more common in KSA in the near future” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
Distributors and suppliers are now collaborating (Cases 12 and 15) to purchase satellite 
images to assist in the reconfiguration of their route to markets.  
 
“Building regional capabilities is a must. We are expected to be present in all the 
regions; this is our role as a distributor” (Interview, Distributor KSA).  
 
If a distributor wishes to operate on a national level, he must prove his capability in 
effectively covering all the regions. Some suppliers who followed a vertically integrated 
model (Cases 5 and 13) decided to concentrate their operations in core regions and to 
outsource other regions to specialised regional distributors.  
 
The portfolio specialisation strategy emerged from suppliers favouring operations with 
distributors that are specialised by category (food products, non-food products, chilled 
categories, ambient categories). Specialisation by category of products is more 
important in modern trade dominated markets like UAE, as noted by the CEO of a 
supplier interviewed.  
 
Some distributors are specialised in freezer products, others in fresh products. It is very 
difficult for a supplier who does not have the scale to manage short shelf-life products 
that are sourced from Europe or USA for example. Some distributors, called niche or 
boutique distributors, are specialised in grouping different products from different 
suppliers in one sourcing destination, which helps them optimise shipping costs.  
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A distributor interviewed (Case 12) developed a specialised business unit, called 
Consumer Product Development unit, which consolidates the fragmented food portfolio. 
Prior to the creation of such a unit, these products were diluted in the business. 
Consolidation brought along the scale which allowed the distributor to invest in 
dedicated capabilities to drive the growth of the business unit as a whole.  
 
“The creation of the Consumer Product Development division had a main contribution 
in attracting small scale suppliers like we did with ABCD and ABCE” (Vice president, 
Distributor KSA).   
 
The cases explored show that suppliers do not always favour working with big 
distributors. Some prefer to operate with small boutique distributors that are specialised 
by category. Suppliers are showing more willingness to work with these types of 
distributors (Cases 6, 8, 10, and 11).  
 
“We want to have two distributors in UAE; one specialised in the destination categories 
and the other specialised in the impulse categories and will be distributing our impulse 
product portfolio.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).  
 
“After acquiring a brand, we [the supplier] required that our distributors be expert in 
the snacking category, now that we have a full snacking portfolio.” (Interview, Supplier 
UAE). 
 
Evidence gathered from the four specialisation strategies confirms that FMCG 
distributors in the Middle East mitigate dyadic risks by developing specialised 
capabilities.  Channel specialisation is viewed as the strategy that plays the biggest role 
in developing trust between FMCG suppliers and distributors.  This is confirmed by the 
cross analysis conducted between the cases that adopted specialisation strategies and the 
cases that witnessed high levels of trust. The cross analysis shows that four of the five 
cases that adopted channel specialisation strategies observed an evolution in their 
relationships.   
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This analysis confirms that the four examined specialisation strategies contribute to 
mitigating dyadic risks in general, but the channel specialisation strategy is the one that 
is mostly valued by suppliers. Distributors may build specialisation through service 
management, regional management, and portfolio management to attract new suppliers 
but if they fail to build specialised capabilities by channel, it will be difficult to retain 
their existing suppliers. By upgrading their channel management capabilities, 
distributors can enhance the levels of trust and consequently mitigate dyadic risks. This 
finding also confirms that the relationship perspective complements the DRM strategies 
adopted by distributors to mitigate dyadic risks. The investment in specialised 
capabilities drives distributors to retain existing suppliers and attract new ones.   
 
4.7.2 Dyadic risk mitigation distributors: diversification strategies 
Evidence gathered from distributors shows that diversification strategies also play a role 
in mitigating dyadic risk. Three types of diversification strategies have been identified 
following the cases explored:  
 Diversification through geographical expansion 
 Diversification through backward integration into manufacturing 
 Diversification through forward integration into retail 
 
The diversification through geographical expansion is presented as a major dyadic risk 
mitigation strategy. The cases explored, as well as other examples shared during 
interviews, show that a distributor who concentrates all his operations in one market is 
bound to face higher dyadic risks than another who is present in several markets. Over 
the years, distributors were able to accumulate specific know-how in distribution which 
they can invest in countries where the distribution business still has room to grow. A 
general manager interviewed notes:  
 
“It would be a loss if we do not invest our know-how in other countries” (Interview, 
Distributor UAE).  
 
Rather than rely on a business model that depends on one or a few suppliers in one 
country, distributors can diversify into other countries, enabling them to grow their scale 
and spread their risks (Cases 1, 2, 9, 12, and 15). 
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Data collected gives indications about the profile of the geographical destinations 
perceived attractive to the distributors interviewed. Distributors avoid expanding into 
modern trade countries where they cannot play a holistic role in the supply chain. 
 
“In a modern trade country, we are not able to provide much added value as our 
competitive advantage is limited to logistics but in traditional trade countries this is 
where our services are needed the most.” (Interview, Distributor Iraq). 
 
Most distributors interviewed agree that the costs of entering modern trade countries are 
very high. Substantial investments are needed in order to differentiate themselves from 
other historically established distributors. Moreover, they believe their role would be 
limited to providing logistical services as the trend shows that suppliers are moving 
further towards controlling the relationship with the end customer. On the other hand, 
interviews conducted with suppliers in traditional trade countries confirm that 
distributors will continue to play an important holistic role in the future. Outsourcing 
the sales and distribution activities to a distributor willing to invest to reach a 
fragmented traditional trade universe is the typical model considered by the suppliers 
interviewed (FOM cases). For this reason, traditional trade countries are more attractive 
for distributors willing to diversify into new markets to mitigate dyadic risks. The cases 
explored show that the distributors who succeeded in expanding into new markets were 
those who maintained successful relationships with their suppliers in the markets where 
they originally operate.  
 
“If we want to enter Syria, it is better to go with someone we know who has strong 
financial credentials than to enter with someone we do not know.” (Interview, Supplier 
UAE).  
 
The distributors that were able to geographically expand their operation show how a 
successful relationship with a supplier in one market can help a distributor diversify into 
new markets. The second type of diversification strategy involves backward integration.   
Investment in manufacturing capabilities appeared to be a strategic direction considered 
by distributors in the Middle East to mitigate dyadic risks. A CEO interviewed notes,                     
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“The only way to eliminate our dependency on suppliers is by becoming a supplier 
ourselves.” (Interview, Distributor UAE). 
 
Distributors considering diversification into manufacturing are split into two categories. 
The first category includes distributors who established their own private label brand 
without relying on their relationships with their suppliers (Cases 1, 2, 7, 8, 11, and 13). 
A distributor who significantly depended on a supplier has lost more than 70% of its 
businesses in one day (Case 13). The concerned distributor was able to absorb this loss 
by diversifying into manufacturing and creating his own private label brand. Although 
the creation of a brand is risky, the rewards can outweigh the costs if distributors 
succeed in such diversifications, notes a CEO interviewed.  
 
“We lost the distribution of these brands in UAE, but the impact was very minimal 
because we were able to compensate part of the loss with our own private label brands” 
(Interview, Distributor UAE). 
 
Evolving from playing a distributor role to a supplier role helped distributors export to 
new markets, thus mitigating dyadic risks by finding an alternative business that can be 
as big as their original business, if not bigger.   
 
The second category includes distributors who built on their relationships with suppliers 
to establish joint alliances to locally manufacture their suppliers’ brands.  
 
The growing importance of the Middle Eastern countries led suppliers to consider 
establishing factories mainly in KSA and UAE. Distributors build on their access to 
capital and position themselves as potential partners in manufacturing. Suppliers and 
distributors thus join forces by venturing into manufacturing together (Cases 15 and 13). 
A joint venture gives distributors long term safeguards that help mitigate dyadic risks, 
while offering suppliers full management control and partnership in sharing the risks 
involved. This win-win situation shows how distributors can evolve their relationships 
with suppliers from a modest supplier distributor relationship to a strategic alliance 
relationship.  
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“The investment capabilities of the distributor are very high; they are not expected to 
have the know-how as we have full management control in the joint venture, they just 
provide the investment in CAPEX, and we manage.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
The third category groups distributors who diversified into retail. Some distributors 
have already adapted this strategy (Cases 1, 2, 7, and 12). Some have invested in 
hypermarket and supermarket retail store formats (Cases 7 and 2), while others bought 
the franchise of international restaurant chains (Case 12) or the franchise of fashion 
brands (Case 1).  
 
The interviewees shared other examples of distributors investing in downstream 
strategies. One distributor in Oman owns a chain of convenience stores, and another in 
Jordan has diversified into home appliances. Forward integration thus presents a viable 
option for distributors to mitigate dyadic risks. A CEO notes:  
 
“With the on-going increase in retail power, venturing into retail is not a bad option.” 
(Interview, Distributor UAE).  
 
It is important to note that the three diversification strategies explored by the research 
are those that can be associated with the dyadic relationship in one way or another. 
Evidence gathered shows that distributors who used their relationships with suppliers to 
diversify into new markets or new models (such as manufacturing or retail) have 
succeeded in mitigating dyadic risks while evolving the form of their relationships with 
suppliers, as shown in Table 4.9.  
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The evolutionary theory presents a relevant theoretical foundation to understand the 
evolution of the supplier distributor relationship in the Middle East. The cases analysed 
show that distributors use diversification strategies, both internal and external to the 
dyad, to mitigate dyadic risks. Those who relied on their existing relationships with 
their suppliers succeeded in evolving the relationship to new levels, and others who 
diversified independently of suppliers proved to have taken the right strategic direction 
in critical times. 
 
“Suppliers are unpredictable; they can come to us at any point in time, thank us for 
doing business together, and leave, like what happened with us with “YZA”. Because 
we were well prepared with our manufacturing businesses, the impact was minimal.” 
(Interview, Distributor UAE). 
 
Interviewed experts share the same point of view and confirm that distributors with the 
necessary financial means should explore diversification strategies with or without their 
suppliers to secure their continuity and mitigate dyadic risks.  
 
P7-A is confirmed by six cases that adopted logistics and other service specialisation 
strategies, five cases that chose channel specialisation strategies, 12 cases that chose 
regional specialisations, and five cases that focused on category specialisation 
strategies. P7-B is confirmed by five geographical diversification cases, eight of which 
moved into manufacturing and four into retail. Iraq is presented as the main destination 
targeted by distributors who adopted a geographical expansion diversification strategy 
(three out of five diversification cases). On the other hand, KSA and UAE are the main 
destinations for distributors who explored diversification strategies into manufacturing 
with their suppliers.  
 
Due to the unpredictability of suppliers, the cases explored confirm that long-term 
oriented distributors tend to adopt diversification strategies that are internal to the 
relationship, and others that are external to the relationship. The research confirms that 
specialisation and diversification both play an important role in mitigating dyadic risks. 
P7 also confirms that the evolutionary theory is an adequate theoretical avenue to 
understand the behaviour of distributors regarding dyadic risks mitigation. The findings 
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confirm that distributors tend to evolve their model in response to the opportunities that 
are brought by the external environment and the risks arising from their dependency on 
suppliers.  
 
Unlike suppliers who can diversify their risks across many brands and multiple 
countries, the agency theory assumes that agents or distributors are assumed to be risk 
averse due to their limited ability to diversify their risks (Eisenhardt, 1989; Wiseman 
and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Strategies adopted by distributors in the Middle East 
(specialisation and diversification) exhibit a risk neutral behaviour. Distributors who 
increase investments in specialised capabilities with the expectations of retaining or 
attracting suppliers are taking risky decisions. Those who decide to access new markets 
or invest in manufacturing capabilities expecting to spread their risks are also taking 
risky decisions. The association between taking risks (investments in specialisation and 
diversification) and the mitigation of dyadic risks shows that distributors in the Middle 
East may have no other alternative except to remain risk neutral. Risk averse 
distributors are those who resist undertaking long term investments and fail to evolve 
their models.  As presented by the agency theory, such an opportunistic behaviour is 
associated with their position as they do not exhibit any efforts to reduce or strengthen 
their dependencies on principals. Distributors who reveal outcomes and share 
performance based information may lose their autonomy and reveal their weaknesses 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Abrahamson and Park, 1994).   Hiding information as shown 
by the research decreases the level of trust and puts the relationship at risk. According to 
Hardin (2002), trusting a person entails demonstrating trustworthy behaviour. 
According to this research, such behaviour entails the unconditional sharing of 
information as well as investing in the capabilities that matter for suppliers without 
expecting anything in return. The research shows that such behaviour pays off as it 
leads to increasing trust levels in the future.  Although the research demonstrates that 
the behaviour of the agent/distributor, as described by the TCE and agency theories, is 
applicable to distributors in the Middle East (see dyadic risks affecting suppliers, P1); 
tolerating such behaviour is fatal for distributors in the Middle East.  
 
The research also shows that resilient distributors in the Middle East are those who give 
importance to assets of high specificity for suppliers (such as key account management 
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and multi-channel expertise). They also specialise in those assets that the suppliers are 
not willing to integrate (logistics). The specificity level of brand assets cannot be the 
same between traditional and modern trade countries; in traditional trade countries 
where suppliers are fully convinced of a full outsource model with certain control (P3) 
and where dyadic risks affecting distributors are low (P2), brand assets should be of 
high specifity for distributors. In other words, distributors in traditional trade countries 
should dedicate resources to strengthen the level of the supplier’s dependency. In 
modern trade countries, on the other hand, where suppliers are considering other 
alternative governance structures (P4,P4) and where their behaviour is unexpected (P2), 
treating brands as assets of high specifity may not be optimal for distributors. Supplier 
brands must remain important, but distributors should also focus on more sustainable 
assets such as logistics and private labels. It should be noted that asset specificity 
requires significant levels of specialisation (Williamson, 1985).  
 
The agency and TCE theories both focus on the behaviour of suppliers and pay little 
attention to the expected behaviour of distributors. The novelty brought by this research 
is its ability to show how distributors react to potential risks associated with their 
dependency on suppliers. The reaction of distributors is, however, explained by 
adopting the evolutionary approach, not the transactional approach.  As shown in the 
literature review chapter, specialisation or disintegration strategies have been attributed 
to various evolutionary mechanisms.  
 
The use of an evolutionary lens shows that the suppliers and distributors adopt similar 
strategies to mitigate dyadic risks. While the transactional approach advocates vertical 
integration, it has been shown in P5 that cases of disintegration and moves to further 
specialisation strategies have been identified.  
 
As recommended by the evolutionary approach and confirmed by one of the 
interviewees, ‘menu of services’ distributors need to disintegrate their models (Agarwal, 
1997) and move from a generalist model (a distributor who does everything), to a 
specialised model (a distributor specialised in a few things). This helps distributors in 
the Middle East build distinctive capabilities and scale up their business (Teece et al., 
1997; Klepper, 1997). 
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If specialisation/disintegration is one of the options available for suppliers, evidence 
gathered in P7 shows that such strategies are transformative for distributors, especially 
in UAE and KSA. The research finds that an evolution in the environment, such as 
channel evolutions, drives distributors to seek further specialisation, as noted by Teece 
(2011).  A convergence is found between the transformative behaviour of distributors in 
reaction to dyadic risks and the concept of routine defined by the evolutionary theory. 
Routine is defined by the evolutionary theorists as a recurrent pattern of behaviour 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). The research shows that distributors who maintain their 
routines are those who take their relationships with their suppliers for granted and do 
not see the need to change. The model proposed by Feldman and Pentland (2005) 
explains the reaction of distributors to dyadic risks. A causal relationship is drawn by 
Feldman and Pentland (2005) between how things are done and how things should be 
done. The performative aspect relates to distributors who seemed neutral to dyadic risks 
and have not altered their behavioural pattern. The ostensive aspect, on the other hand, 
illustrates the cases of distributors who adopted specialisation and diversification 
strategies to mitigate dyadic risks. The latter cases of distributors have invested in the 
dyad and outside it by disintegrating their capabilities and being specialised in each 
disintegrated entity, while accessing new capabilities. The multiple cases explored show 
that distributors who fail to adopt such strategies are more vulnerable to dyadic risks. 
The cases also show that distributors in the Middle East should leverage their access to 
capital and increase their investments. No dyadic cases have been explored of 
distributors whose investments in building their capabilities did not bring benefits in the 
long term.  
 
It can be concluded that TCE and the agency theories describe what distributors in the 
Middle East are (P1), but trust and the evolutionary theories describe what the 
distributors in the Middle East should be (P6 and P7). 
 
Figure 4.3 shows that a variety of strategies to mitigate dyadic risks are adopted by 
FMCG suppliers and distributors in the Middle East. Network risks are not only caused 
by the inter-organisational relationship of a focal company with its upstream partners 
(Choi and Krause, 2006) but by its relationship with its downstream partners, as 
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demonstrated by this research. By exploring the DRM strategies adopted by both 
members of the dyad, this research has treated both suppliers and distributors as focal 
firms. For suppliers, the research has looked into the dyadic risks caused by the 
downstream relationship, and for distributors the research has explored the dyadic risks 
caused by the upstream relationship.  
 
 
 
Evidence gathered does not support one approach independently of the other. The 
findings do not conform with the transactional approach, which prevails over the 
relational and evolutionary approaches and vice versa. On the other hand, they show 
that both approaches complement each other to understand the mitigation of the dyadic 
risks in the Middle East. The theoretical mix that combines the transactional, relational, 
and evolutionary approaches appears to prevail. Although higher levels of complexities 
are associated with networks composed of many members rather than smaller networks 
(Choi and Krause, 2006), the research shows that the level of interdependency between 
two dyadic members might cause serious disruption to the network. It may be less 
complex to develop trust between two dyadic members than to develop it between many 
members. Trust plays an important role, not only because of the complexity level of the 
network, but also because of the social embeddedness of the network (Middle East). 
Different results may have been obtained if the same network had been explored in 
different contexts with different cultures (Brown Johnson and Droege, 2004). As 
multiple dyadic cases have been identified to mitigate dyadic risks, the findings of the 
research also confirm the assumptions of evolutionary theorists who consider that 
governance structures are dynamic and adapt to changes in the environment. The 
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adaptation process includes assessing and reviewing current routines (Feldman & 
Pentland, 2005) and considering transformative actions.  
 
It can be concluded that the agency and TCE theories are able to explain how suppliers 
and distributors are most likely to act in a dyadic relationship. The relational theory, on 
the other hand, demonstrates that the same reasons that may drive dyadic members to 
act opportunistically may drive them to look after each other’s benefits. The 
evolutionary theory proves that multiple strategies can be adopted to mitigate dyadic 
risks. These strategies vary with the evolution in the environment. A partial integrated 
model is viewed as a model that can host the transactional, relational, and evolutionary 
approaches.  
 
The findings of the 15 multiple dyadic cases explored in this research have been 
presented in Chapter 4. As predicted by the research, the chapter has clarified how 
suppliers and distributors in the Middle East do not adopt similar strategies to mitigate 
dyadic risks. Major similarities have been found between strategies adopted by dyadic 
members in Iraq, showing that, in a static traditional trade context, suppliers tend to 
fully outsource the downstream sales and distribution activities. In such a context, the 
deployment of a control system (P3) is presented as the optimal DRM strategy. In 
evolutionary contexts like KSA and UAE, on the other hand, suppliers and distributors 
select different DRM strategies, including partial (P4) and full (P5) integration of their 
sales and distribution activities. The chapter also showed that a major difference 
between partial and full integration cases is associated with the scale of the supplier and 
the level of trust achieved with the distributor. The development of trust has been 
presented as a major dyadic risk mitigation strategy across the three contexts. In 
evolutionary contexts, where dyadic risks reached higher intensity levels, trust plays an 
eminent role. The findings of Chapter 4 confirm that the transactional perspective 
cannot independently explain dyadic risks in the Middle East. Dyadic cases witnessing 
high levels of trust are more resilient to dyadic risks than those witnessing trust issues. 
Moreover, some dyadic cases confirmed that the failure to restore the levels of trust in 
the Middle East will lead to relationship termination. The contribution of this research 
to both theory and practice is presented in Chapter 5. The chapter also concludes with 
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the limitations of the research and some propositions are highlighted for future research 
avenues.  
  
The seven propositions helped address the questions raised by the research, added to the 
existing body of knowledge and contributed to bridging the gaps identified earlier: 
 
 Gap: The literature is rich in understanding supply chain risks but there is a 
scarcity of research exploring the sources and consequences of dyadic risks in a 
controversial and diversified business context like the Middle East.  
o Finding: The current research explores dyadic risks in three diversified business 
contexts (Iraq, UAE, and KSA). 
 
 Gap: No academic research has been found in the literature addressing the issue 
of whether dyadic risks should be given strategic importance for FMCG 
companies (supplier and distributors) in the Middle East, or whether it is enough 
to merely acknowledge their existence.  
o Finding: The current research shows that dyadic risks should be given a strategic 
important for FMCG suppliers and distributors in the Middle East, mainly those 
in UAE and KSA.  
 
 Gap: Supply chain risks have been explored in single or homogeneous contexts, 
but there is a scarcity of studies addressing these risks in evolutionary 
environments.  
o Finding: The current research shows that dyadic risks are dynamic and vary with 
the variation in the context. 
 
 Gap: The literature that used the TCE and agency theories to understand supply 
chain dyadic risks focused on one member of the dyad (the supplier or principal 
in most of the cases). Examining the implications of dyadic risks on both 
members of the dyad helps in understanding how dyadic members can 
collaborate together to mitigate them.  
o Finding: The current research shows that dyadic risks affect suppliers as much as 
they affect distributors. Dyadic risks may, however, have greater implications 
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for distributors, as their network is larger than that of suppliers. Moreover, 
concrete cases have been explored showing relationship termination. A 
distributor losing a supplier who represents 30% of his business means that he is 
losing 30% of his turnover while his costs remain the same, which brings about 
serious implications affecting his survival. 
 
 Gap: Governance structures are dynamic and evolve with the evolution in the 
institutional environment: the transactional approach considers that governance 
structures are static and do not consider learning and adaptation processes in 
changing environments.  
o Finding: The research shows that the reaction of suppliers to dyadic risks varies 
with the variation in the context. Various dyadic cases have been explored in 
Iraq, UAE, and KSA, showing a diversity of DRM strategies from basic and 
advanced control systems (P3) to partial control systems (PIM, P4) and full 
control systems (VIM, P5).  
 
 Gap: The literature emphasises hierarchal and market structures; there is little 
understanding of hybrid structures, specifically in the FMCG industry: hybrid 
governance structures (such as partial integration) can be presented as alternative 
forms of governance structure and can provide good examples of inter-firm 
collaboration.  
o Finding: A hybrid governance structure (PIM) that combines the transactional 
and the relational approaches has been positioned as a dominant DRM strategy 
in UAE and KSA. Some cases have already adopted such an approach and 
others are willing to adopt it in the near future. A PIM dyadic risk mitigation 
strategy also demonstrates that the trend in the Middle East is moving towards 
further collaboration between supply chain members following the trends in 
developed markets.   
 
 Gap: The transactional approach provides strong evidence on the costs of market 
transactions, but many hidden costs can also be associated with hierarchal 
transactions. These hidden costs may affect make or buy decisions, favouring 
markets or other forms of governance structure over hierarchal forms. 
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o Finding: The cases explored show that suppliers only tend to consider a VIM 
dyadic risk strategy when they can afford the costs of integration. The hidden 
costs of integration are associated with market, financial (credit, inflation risks), 
and legal risks (compliance).  These costs have been presented as significant 
obstacles that drive suppliers away from full integration.  
 
 Gap: No evidence has been found supporting the use of TCE and agency 
theories to understand dyadic risk mitigation strategies in a dynamic context like 
the Middle East: this exploration may provide evidence of how the industry is 
evolving and what form of governance structure will dominate the future of 
supplier distributor relationships in the Middle East. 
o Finding: The research provides clear answers related to the dominant DRM 
strategies in traditional trade markets in the Middle East like Iraq (CS, P3) and in 
modern trade markets like KSA and UAE (PIM,VIM, P4, and P5). Suppliers 
adopting these strategies are resilient to dyadic risks and those who are not may 
be more vulnerable to dyadic risks.  
 
 Gap: TCE and agency theories give little importance to the role of trust in social 
exchange.  
o Finding: Trust is positioned as a response to dyadic risks, the development of 
which can be viewed as a dyadic risk mitigation strategy that complements 
formal contracting. Trust plays a strategic role in dyadic FMCG relationships in 
the Middle East.  
 
 Gap: The transactional approach focuses on the DRM strategy of one member of 
the dyad (supplier or principal); little attention is paid to the reaction of the other 
dyadic member (distributors or agent).  
o Finding: Only one study has been found in the literature (published in 1979) that 
provides basic apprehensions of distributors in the Middle East. The research 
explores the reaction of distributors to dyadic risks and shows that distributors 
adopt various specialisation and diversification strategies to mitigate them. The 
strategies adopted by distributors present a transformation of distributors’ 
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models from generalist models (1979) to specialized and diversified models 
(2014).   
 
A table summarising the evidence gathered for each of the proposition is presented in 
Appendix V. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses the conclusion of the research and is split into five sections. A 
summary of the research findings is presented in Section 5.1 before discussing the 
findings from the angle of the literature in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 covers the 
contribution of the research to theory and practice. The chapter concludes with the 
generalisability of the research (Section 5.4), its limitation and a recommendation on 
future research (Section 5.5).  
 
5.1 Summary of Research Findings 
Table 5.1 illustrates the key issues addressed by the research.  
 
 
 
Fifteen multiple cases were analysed in three countries of the Middle East to address the 
above questions, each of which is summarised in this section. Data was gathered from 
30 in depth interviews conducted with senior professionals from multinational FMCG 
suppliers and distributors. 
 
5.1.1 Notion of dyadic risks in the Middle East 
The cases analysed confirm that suppliers and distributors are affected by dyadic risks. 
The findings reveal that the probability of these risks occurring differs based on the 
sales and distribution model adopted by suppliers. FMCG suppliers who are fully 
outsourcing their sales and distribution activities are negatively affected by dyadic risks 
as suggested by the 1
st
 proposition raised by this research. The research shows that cases 
fully outsourcing the sales and distribution activities are mostly affected by dyadic risks 
(Cases 7, 8, 10, and 11). On the other hand, the cases that are vertically integrating the 
sales and distribution activities (Cases 4, 5, 13, and 14) are not affected by dyadic risks.  
The exceptions noted were two fully outsourced cases in Iraq (Cases 1 and 2), and the 
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partially integrated cases in UAE and KSA (Cases 9, 12, and 15). The multiple case 
analysis confirms that suppliers in Iraq who are fully outsourcing their sales and 
distribution activities to distributors are not significantly affected by dyadic risks as is 
the case with suppliers adopting the same model in UAE and KSA. Similarly, suppliers 
who are partially integrating the sales and distribution activities are not significantly 
affected by dyadic risks as is the case with suppliers who are fully outsourcing the sales 
and distribution activities in the said countries.  
 
The research thus confirms that suppliers in the Middle East who are outsourcing their 
sales and distribution activities are negatively affected by dyadic risks. The severity of 
the implications of these risks and their probability of occurrence diverge with the 
variation in the contexts. Suppliers in Iraq are not as concerned with these risks as are 
suppliers in UAE and KSA. This shows that the more evolved the trade, the less 
effective is the decision to outsource the sales and distribution activities.  
 
Distributors are also affected by dyadic risks resulting from their dependency on 
suppliers. The two most serious dyadic risks affecting distributors are the loss of legal 
protection (9 applicable cases), and the erosion of their market know-how (8 applicable 
cases).  
 
Important advantages that distributors had in the past no longer exist today.  Physical 
proximity to markets and the hiring of local experts led suppliers to become less 
dependent on distributors. The main power that ties suppliers to distributors is their 
scale advantage and their ability to absorb risks. Despite distributors losing a big share 
of their knowledge power, they can still build on their financial power. Distributors are 
also affected by the unpredictable behaviour of suppliers. Five explored cases show that 
at any point in time, a supplier can terminate the relationship with the distributor. This is 
an important indication for distributors to avoid taking their relationships with suppliers 
for granted.  
 
Unlike the dyadic risks affecting suppliers, dyadic risks affecting distributors are neither 
context nor model specific. Distributors across the three countries feel insecure, even 
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the ones who presume they have solid relationships with suppliers do not neglect the 
possibility of relationship termination.  
 
FMCG distributors in the Middle East are thus negatively affected by dyadic risks (P2). 
These risks make them live in a world of uncertainty that drives them to act 
opportunistically, making the most out of today because no one knows what tomorrow 
holds.  
 
The notion of dyadic risks in the Middle East is perceived differently between suppliers 
and distributors. For suppliers, dyadic risks are caused by their inability to control 
outcome and behaviour based performance, which limits their ability to improve and 
optimise their performance. Dyadic risks for distributors are caused by their dependency 
on suppliers, which leads them to operate under constantly uncertain conditions. 
 
5.1.2 Dyadic risk mitigation strategies in the Middle East  
The cases explored show that most suppliers and distributors interviewed are aware of 
the dyadic risks affecting their businesses. Some have reacted to these risks, while 
others are still considering the notion.  
 
This research confirms that there are multiple DRM strategies to mitigate dyadic risks in 
the Middle East (see Table 5.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 265 
 
The table shows that suppliers in Iraq adopt a basic control system based on fixed price 
contracting to mitigate dyadic risks. This strategy responds to the limited implications 
of dyadic risks in Iraq. In KSA and UAE, some suppliers are still adopting a basic 
control system (2 cases), while others have moved to advanced control systems (3 
cases). Neither of the control systems is sufficient to mitigate dyadic risks in mixed 
channel markets like KSA, and modern trade markets like UAE. Although an ACS is 
preferable to a BSC since it is based on cost plus contracting, suppliers adopting either 
system do not see the benefits of outsourcing the management of key accounts to 
distributors. For this purpose, concerned suppliers still perceive themselves as 
negatively affected by dyadic risks.  
 
The table also shows that three suppliers have adopted a PIM to mitigate dyadic risks, 
and four others opted for a VIM. These findings can be misleading as they might 
indicate that a PIM is not an effective model to mitigate dyadic risks. Although Table 
5.2 shows only three cases adopting a PIM, data gathered show that three other cases 
are willing to consider such a model in the future (Cases 6, 7, 8 in UAE), as illustrated 
in Table 5.3. 
  
 
 
“The direct control of key account negotiation is in our mid-term plan, which we [the 
supplier] will activate after we finish consolidating our distributors in UAE.” 
(Interview, Supplier UAE). 
 
This finding shows that the partial integration of the sales and distribution activities may 
be considered as the dominant DRM strategy for suppliers in UAE and KSA. This 
indicates that suppliers are oriented to move towards further collaboration with 
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distributors, which will give them better control over dyadic risks regarding monitoring 
the outcome and behaviour based performance in modern trade. It also does not obligate 
them to absorb the financial risks associated with full integration (credit risks, 
complexity risks), thus maintaining a low risk model by outsourcing activities not 
deemed fundamental (invoicing, execution functions, logistics), and internalizing the 
functions that are (market management, key account management, capabilities 
development, systems and processes). By partially integrating these functions, suppliers 
anticipate reducing the probability of dyadic risks occurring. On the other hand, 
suppliers adopting a VIM perceive the value adding functions differently, and prefer 
integrating the sales execution and invoicing functions (4 cases). Thus, the DRM 
strategy adopted by these suppliers is based on eliminating dyadic risks, not reducing 
them. 
 
To conclude, a DRM strategy based on deploying a control system (P3) seems more 
applicable in countries where suppliers are not significantly affected by dyadic risks 
(Iraq). On the other hand, a DRM strategy based on partially integrating the sales and 
distribution activities (P4) is positioned as the dominant strategy in mixed and modern 
trade markets (KSA and UAE). Decisions in vertically integrated models depend on the 
supplier’s scale and their relationship with distributors. Suppliers who have the required 
critical scale, and have endured negative dyadic risks with distributors, seem more 
oriented to adopt VIM (P5) strategies in UAE and KSA.  
 
Distributors are affected by the DRM strategies adopted by suppliers. A distributor 
considers a PIM as a potential threat to a reduction in his role (the part related to 
managing the key account), and a VIM as a threat to the entire loss of his role (Cases 5 
and 13). The DRM strategies adopted by distributors in the Middle East are based on 
building specialised capabilities while diversifying into new businesses (P7). 
Specialisation assists distributors in protecting their roles in terms of capabilities and 
cost competitiveness.  The cases explored show that not all specialisation strategies 
adopted by distributors have the same impact on mitigating dyadic risks. The strategies 
that have greater positive impact on the dyadic relationship are those based on building 
specialised capabilities by channel. The adoption of such strategies appears to positively 
impact on the level of trust between suppliers and distributors. Distributors also 
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consider diversification strategies by either building on their relationships with their 
suppliers (geographical expansion and manufacturing) and/or by considering step 
changing investments outside the relationship (own brand and retail). Specialisation and 
diversification strategies prove to be efficient for distributors. Those who failed to retain 
suppliers that once represented a big share of their turnover were able to reduce their 
losses through specialisation or diversification strategies.  
 
5.1.3 Role of trust 
The cases explored confirm that trust plays a pre-eminent role in the Middle East, and is 
positioned as an essential DRM strategy.  Fourteen of the 15 cases explored show that 
trust can play three different roles in the Middle East: 
 Cases where lack of trust led to relationship failure: three cases 
 Cases where trust led to relationship restoration: six cases 
 Cases where trust led to relationship evolution: four cases 
 
The three roles show that DRM strategies in the Middle East from both sides of the 
dyad are not comprehensive unless they take account of the role of trust in building 
relationships. Trust may drive the relationship backward or forward Relationships based 
on trust appear to be more resilient than others as they drive suppliers away from 
vertically integrated options (without distributors) to partially integrated options (with 
their distributors). As suppliers are more oriented towards partially integrated models, 
trust has been positioned as a prerequisite for the success of such a model.  
 
“The lack of trust between a supplier and a distributor in a partially integrated model is 
similar to a married couple living in the same house but with no communication.” 
(Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
Three of the four vertically integrated cases demonstrate that the lack of trust leads 
suppliers to consider DRM strategies without distributors. The decision of suppliers in 
UAE and KSA to move from FOM to PIM is based on the trust development actions 
taken by distributors. This is why a similarity among these cases (6 cases) is associated 
with the notification period given by suppliers to distributors to reinforce the levels of 
trust through concrete actions.  
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Trust is undoubtedly a strategic driver of supplier distributor relationships in the Middle 
East. The cases explored confirm that contract failure is due to a lack of trust and 
contract success is an outcome of high levels of trust.   
 
5.2 Research Gaps and Findings 
The research relied on the agency and TCE theories to understand dyadic risks in the 
Middle East. Following the gaps presented in the literature, the research argues that the 
transactional approach may not give a complete explanation of DRM strategies in the 
Middle East, suggesting complementing it with relational and evolutionary approaches.  
 
5.2.1 Dyadic risks and supply chain  
The findings of this research show that the transactional approach (TCE and AT) can 
help explain the nature of dyadic risks in the Middle East. Dyadic risks affecting 
suppliers are based on the assumptions raised by the TCE and agency theories 
(opportunism, information asymmetry). The propositions raised by the TCE and agency 
theories provide a good understanding of the dyadic risks affecting suppliers and 
distributors. The themes derived from the research, and those that emerged from the 
interviews conducted, provided a good understanding of the issues affecting suppliers 
and distributors in the Middle East. This has been confirmed by analysing the 
similarities and differences between the different cases.  
 
TCE and agency theories accordingly provide a comprehensive base to understand 
dyadic risks but the cases analysed show that opportunistic behaviour is not exclusive to 
one member of the dyad (distributor) but can apply to both members. As shown by five 
dyadic cases, a supplier may decide to randomly review his model and internalise 
certain or all of the sales and distribution activities. The reasons behind such a 
behaviour may either be internal to the dyad (lack of trust: Cases 4, 13, and 14) or 
external (strategic direction: Case 5). In either case, such behaviour puts the distributor 
in a world of uncertainty and drives him to act opportunistically. This resulting 
behaviour may accordingly be either an outcome of the potential opportunistic 
behaviour of the supplier, or embedded in his nature as a distributor.  
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By exploring the risks affecting both members of the dyad (P1 and P2), the research 
succeeded in exploring the issues from a supply chain point of view. Had the research 
only explored risks affecting one dyadic member, it would have been limited in terms of 
knowledge and would have failed to reflect a supply chain orientation (Juttner, 2005). 
The research supports the transactional approach in explaining the nature of dyadic risks 
in the Middle East, focusing on the cause and effect relationship between the behaviour 
of a member in the supply chain and the consequent reaction of the other. The research 
focuses on such a relationship being deemed critical, not only for understanding dyadic 
risks, but also for exploring the DRM strategies adopted by each dyadic member.  
 
5.2.2 Dyadic risk mitigation strategies: the mix prevails  
The transactional approach alone is not sufficient to explain the DRM strategies used in 
the Middle East. With each proposition raised by the transactional approach, a cause 
and effect relationship that takes into account both the relational and the evolutionary 
approach should also be considered.  
 
The transactional approach does not account for the impact of changes in the 
environment on governance structure. This research shows that suppliers in Iraq 
mitigate dyadic risks by adopting a control system, not the case in either UAE or KSA. 
Suppliers adapt their DRM strategy based on changes in the environment, or might even 
adopt different DRM strategies in the same environment. Choosing to explore several 
cases in three different contexts reveals that suppliers evolve their model based on the 
evolution in the context as well as the learning they accumulate from more experienced 
suppliers. Some suppliers adopted vertically integrated models because of the perceived 
benefits these models have brought to others (Case 14).  
 
“If you hold an interview with X [the supplier of Case 13 who adopted a VIM], go and 
tell them that we [the supplier of Case 14] are encouraged by what they achieved.  I am 
sure that other suppliers will be encouraged as well; it is like a domino effect.” 
(Interview, Supplier KSA). 
 
Asking suppliers questions like what best describes a competitive sales and distribution 
model in their countries and how they see the evolution of their model led to the 
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conclusion that a partially integrated model is the dominant model in KSA and UAE. 
Although PIMs and VIMs are based on integrating assets of high specificity (as 
suggested by the TCE), the research shows that assets of low specificity today may be 
of high specificity in the future, depending on the supplier’s scale and evolution in the 
environment. Key account management functions are not of high specificity in Iraq, for 
example, but are of high specificity for some suppliers and of low specificity for others 
in countries like UAE and KSA. Suppliers who are considering moving to a PIM 
anticipate that key account management assets will be of high specificity for them in the 
future, and accordingly their integration decision will assist in mitigating dyadic risks 
and adapting to channel evolution. 
  
The dominant DRM strategy in KSA and UAE is a PIM, which consolidates three 
perspectives: 
 Transactional perspective (TCE and AT): suppliers integrate assets of high 
specificity (key account management), and outsource assets of low specificity 
(logistics, invoicing), which are controlled through either a BSC or an ACS.  
 Relational perspective: the success of this model depends on the level of trust 
between suppliers and distributors. A PIM is positioned as the outcome of the 
various actions considered by suppliers and distributors to develop trust between 
them.  Trust is positioned as a prerequisite for partially integrated models. 
 Evolutionary perspective: the decisions taken by suppliers are based on the 
evolution of the modern trade channel and the learning acquired from other 
suppliers. This makes this model specific to UAE and KSA. Moreover, a PIM is 
positioned as an evolution in the level of trust between suppliers and 
distributors.  
 
Each of the DRM strategies adopted by suppliers is influenced by its associated context.  
 Full outsource models are dominant in traditional trade countries like Iraq. 
Suppliers adopting a FOM opt to operate through distributors who act as local 
representatives of suppliers in their market, as seen in Cases 1, 2, and 3. The 
balance of power is skewed towards distributors who play a generalist role by 
managing and coordinating all the sales and distribution activities. Suppliers 
play a supervisory role by deploying a basic control system based on fixed 
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margin contracting, and a market manager who sets objectives, supports 
distributors in meeting these objectives, and monitors performance.  The agency 
costs incurred by suppliers to deploy such systems are far less than the costs of 
integration (financial and market risks). Suppliers here do not have a direct 
relationship with trade; their downstream supply chain participation stops at the 
distributor tier.  
 Partially integrated models are dominant in mixed channel markets like KSA 
and modern trade markets like UAE. Suppliers adopting a PIM operate in the 
markets alongside their distributors. Suppliers aim to drive effective supply 
chain collaboration when each member of the dyad takes over the capability 
where he can add value the most, thus contributing to the overall performance of 
the chain. Here, the power is balanced between suppliers and distributors. 
Suppliers internalise key account management functions, and outsource 
invoicing and execution functions to distributors. Such a governance structure 
necessitates daily coordination, integrated planning and processes. It holds 
suppliers accountable for the development of their distributors’ capabilities. The 
partial integration costs incurred by suppliers (integrating market management, 
key account management, system and processes, capability development) remain 
less than full integration costs, which might justify the reason suppliers favour 
this model following the cases that have already adopted it (Cases 9, 12, and 15) 
and those willing to deploy it (Cases 6, 7, and 8). Even though suppliers in a 
PIM are still playing a supervisory role, they are more engaged with the 
distributors’ teams. The market manager and the key account manager are based 
in the offices of the distributor, in most cases. Their responsibilities include 
aligning the distributors on objectives and strategies motivating the distributor’s 
sales force, controlling trade investments and negotiating with key accounts.  
This model is based on reducing the probability of dyadic risks occurring but not 
eliminating them. Less backward information asymmetry is expected. Suppliers 
have a direct relationship with trade, which is restricted to managing the 
negotiation, initiation of category management programmes, and transfer of 
shopper research.  The downstream supply chain participation stops at the 
distributor tier for traditional trade channel management, and reaches the retail 
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tier for modern trade retailers specifically on the level of key account 
negotiation.  
 Vertically integrated models are restricted to suppliers who have experienced a 
bad relationship with their distributors (lack of trust), and can afford the 
resulting costs of integration. This is applicable to three of the four VIM cases 
explored. Suppliers adopting VIMs decide to operate in the markets without 
distributors, and favour managing most of the sales and distribution activities. 
Apart from logistical assets, suppliers do not differentiate between the 
specificity of assets. Power is skewed to the suppliers, leaving distributors with a 
very specific role restricted to logistics. Some cases explored demonstrate how 
suppliers are reducing the role of their distributors from a generalist role to a 
service provider role (Case 4). Other cases show how suppliers have decided to 
discontinue their existing relationships, and outsource only the logistical 
activities to specialised service providers (Cases 5, 13, and 14).  A VIM dyadic 
risk mitigation strategy is based on the total elimination of dyadic risks and is 
more applicable to risk neutral suppliers. Suppliers are, however, faced with 
other types of risks associated with the costs and complexities of vertical 
integration.  The concerned suppliers acknowledge the implications of these 
costs and other hidden costs (legal complexity, credit risks, inflation), which 
may question the sustainability of VIM in the Middle East. The downstream 
supply chain participation reaches all supply chain tiers. Decisions are 
centralised to the supplier, and service providers are given a transactional role. 
 
The majority of suppliers in the Middle East are not willing to take uncalculated risks. 
The PIM provides a trade-off between the benefits achieved from integrating certain 
functions (reducing the probability of dyadic risks occurring), and those achieved from 
outsourcing others (low exposure to financial, complexity and market risks).  
 
A PIM accordingly represents a theoretical mix between the transactional, relational, 
and evolutionary approaches and thus confirms that the scope covered by TCE and 
agency theories should be widened when exploring supply chain issues (Wever et al., 
2012). 
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The research shows that the intensity of dyadic risks is influenced by the corresponding 
institutional environment. In mixed channel and modern trade countries like KSA and 
UAE, higher levels of dyadic risks are identified. Suppliers in these countries find it 
difficult to control their outcome and behaviour based performance due to the nature of 
the sales and distribution activities (unprogrammable tasks following Eisenhardt (1988)) 
and the potential opportunistic behaviour of distributors. Distributors in modern trade 
countries face substantial uncertainties due to the possibility of losing their role at any 
point in time (as seen with five dyadic cases).  Such a possibility drives distributors to 
make the most of the present, as predicted by the agency theory. The opportunistic 
behaviour of distributors is also driven by the erosion of power (know-how) due to the 
physical presence of suppliers in KSA and UAE, and the hiring of local resources. This 
leads them to conceal information (information asymmetry) that could reveal their 
weaknesses, as assumed by TCE and the agency theories. On the other hand, lower 
levels of dyadic risks are identified in traditional countries. Suppliers are not 
apprehensive about the opportunistic behaviour of distributors. The cases explored show 
that the opportunistic behaviour exercised by suppliers in traditional trade countries 
(transfer of market and financial risks) outweighs similar actions by distributors.   
 
The DRM strategies adopted by suppliers are based on the propositions raised by the 
transactional approach (P3, P4, P5), and complemented by the relational approach (P6). 
Trust plays an evolutionary role in supplier distributor relationships in the Middle East 
due to the fact that building trust takes time (Anderson and Weitz, 1992), during which 
suppliers and distributors engage in various learning processes. The dynamic role of 
trust was demonstrated in P6, showing that the failure to build trust may lead to 
relationship failure, and the evolution of a supplier’s model to VIM when critical scale 
exists (P5). Trust may also lead to relationship restoration, driving suppliers to move 
from basic or advanced control systems (P3) to further collaboration and partial 
integration (P4). The DRM strategies adopted by suppliers are based on the agency (P3) 
and TCE (P4 and P5) theories. Cases explored show that suppliers in the Middle East 
are risk averse, which is not in line with the predictions of the theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Suppliers favour a relational mix based on trust and control over vertical integration 
strategies. Suppliers that opted for vertically integrating the sales and distribution 
activities made their decisions based on relational failure (cases of low levels of trust).    
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The multiple cases analysed illustrate different cause and effect relationships. Dyadic 
risks and the corresponding DRM strategies are adapted to changes in the environment, 
as proposed by the evolutionary theory. The DRM strategy is set based on the 
probability of dyadic risks occurring (high probability in modern trade contexts, low 
probability in traditional trade contexts).  The relationship between suppliers and 
distributors is dynamic in nature, showing that suppliers and distributors engage in 
learning processes that influence the way they perceive dyadic risks and the choices 
they make to mitigate them. It can also be concluded that the identification of dyadic 
risks is affected by the risk awareness of dyadic members. This is supported by the fact 
that some suppliers adopted DRM strategies (PIM, VIM, trust) earlier than others. Some 
have learned from what others underwent, and are currently considering different DRM 
options.  
 
The current and expected behaviour of suppliers in evolutionary channel contexts 
(UAE, KSA) places distributors in uncertain situations. Distributors whose businesses 
significantly depend on suppliers in KSA and UAE face higher levels of dyadic risks. 
This is not the case in Iraq, as suppliers are comfortable with outsourcing their sales and 
distribution activities. The cases explored show that distributors mitigate dyadic risks by 
investing in the relationship as well as outside it.  Investments in the relationship 
include adopting specialisation DRM strategies that contribute to gaining the trust of 
suppliers. Distributors who have succeeded in building trust with suppliers were able to 
explore different diversification strategies with them (backward integration into 
manufacturing: Cases 13, 14, and 15, and geographical expansion: Cases 1, 2, 9, 12, and 
15). Following the cases explored, the research shows that trust is an outcome of 
specialisation strategies, but is a prerequisite for diversification strategies.  
 
Some distributors, however, have not only relied on investing in the relationship but 
have also considered divesting outside the relationship. The research shows that the 
divestment strategies adopted by distributors include building specialised logistical 
services that can be sold to other suppliers (Cases 4 and 7), diversifying into 
manufacturing by creating their own brands (Cases 1, 7, 11, 2, and 8), as well as 
diversifying into retail (Cases 7,2,12, and 1). Strategies adopted by distributors to 
mitigate dyadic risks transform the role of distributors in the Middle East from local to 
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regional distributors, or perhaps to strategic partners. The research confirms that 
suppliers who have succeeded in building trust will be affected by lower levels of 
dyadic risks, which contributes to further collaboration across the supply chain (Dekker, 
2013; Nyaga et al., 2009). 
 
 
5.3 Research Contribution 
This section discusses the contribution of the research to both theory and practice.  
 
5.3.1 Contribution of the research to theory 
The supply chain literature is rich in exploring the sources and consequences of supply 
chain and outsourcing risks (Christopher and Lee, 2004; Laeequddin et al., 2010; 
Whipple at al., 2010; Bourlakis and Melewar, 2011). However, there is a scarcity of 
research exploring supply chain issues in the Middle East; also no research has been 
found specifically examining dyadic risks between FMCG suppliers. The findings of 
this research bring the Middle East to the valuable pool of knowledge exploring supply 
chain issues. By building on existing theories, the research is able to demonstrate that 
the transactional approach cannot explain DRM strategies independently from the 
evolutionary and the relational approaches, in a context like the Middle East.   
 
Trust and commitment play significant roles in driving effective collaboration across the 
supply chain and attenuating supply chain issues (Dekker, 2013). TCE is criticised for 
neglecting the social embeddedness of transactions. Trust proved to have a prominent 
role in relationships in the Middle East on the inter-personal and inter-organisational 
fronts, thus supporting the literature that considers trust as the single most important 
variable influencing interpersonal and inter-organisational behaviour (Kiessling et al., 
2004). Cases explored show that the differentiation between trust as a prerequisite and 
trust as an outcome provide clearer explanations for the understanding of dyadic risk 
mitigation strategies. By acknowledging this differentiation, the research shows that 
suppliers and distributors collaborate together to achieve a certain prerequisite level of 
trust that the distributor can use to explore diversification strategies with suppliers. By 
jointly developing trust, suppliers and distributors engage in learning processes that 
drive them to adapt their capabilities to the evolution in the environment. DRM 
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strategies adopted by suppliers in the Middle East confirm the necessity to consider the 
role of trust, which supports the authors who suggest taking the cultural and social 
context into account when examining governance structures (Steenkamp and Geyskens, 
2012). This implies an association between the learning processes and the trust 
development processes, which shows that the evolutionary and relational approaches are 
explored in conjunction. 
 
Another criticism of TCE is associated with the dichotomy between two types of 
governance structure: pure hierarchy and pure markets (Perrow, 1986). Although TCE 
suggests hybrid structures as an intermediary form of governance, not enough focus is 
given to this structure form (Hennart, 1993).  Cases explored show that a partially 
integrated model is best practice for successful supplier-distributor relationships in the 
Middle East, and provide a good example of effective supply chain coordination 
(Whipple at al., 2010). This shows that suppliers and distributors in KSA and UAE 
mitigate dyadic risks by further building on their relationships. The human assets in 
charge of the collaboration have a dual responsibility: one is linked to the mitigation of 
dyadic risks and the other is linked to gaining the distributor’s trust by developing his 
capabilities, noting that one might conflict with the other, depending on how the 
distributor evaluates the controlling actions adopted by the supplier (Laeequddin et al., 
2012). The sales person is supposed to build rapport, being close to end consumers in 
order to drive all the sales efforts towards value creation and partnership development 
(Rackham and DeVincentis, 1999). The existence of trust is also positioned as a 
prerequisite for the successful deployment of a partially integrated model.  
 
The integration of the evolutionary approach proved to be of great value to theory for 
several reasons. Firstly, the only study (which is also non empirical) that was found in 
the literature examining distributors or agents in the Middle East dates from 1979 
(Dunn, 1979). The research confirms that the identity of the relationship between 
suppliers and distributors between 1979 and 2014 has dramatically changed.  
Distributors then were positioned as sole representatives of suppliers’ brands in local 
markets (Dunn, 1979). As predicted by the research, changes in the institutional 
environment led to several change processes across the supply chain. A relationship is 
depicted between the institutional environment and the intensity of dyadic risks, which 
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supports the epistemological stance adopted by the researcher. The findings across the 
three contexts trace the evolution of supplier-distributor relationship in the Middle East 
from what it was in 1979 to what it is today, and to what it should be in the future 
(PIM). The nature of the collaboration between suppliers and distributors has thus 
evolved from a model where suppliers have a minimal role in sales and distribution 
activities (FOM) to a model where decisions and responsibilities are mutually shared 
(PIM), and then to a model where all decisions and responsibilities are centralised with 
the supplier (VIM). This shows that formalisation and centralisation help suppliers in 
reducing the complexities associated with their network, as proposed by Choi and 
Krause (2006). 
 
The transactional theory is mostly concerned with the opportunistic behaviour of the 
distributor (agent). This research confirms that suppliers can be as opportunistic as their 
distributors, unlike what is proposed by the agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1988). The 
unpredictability of suppliers and the existence of VIM cases place distributors under 
recurrent uncertainties, which drives them to act opportunistically. Another signal of a 
supplier’s opportunistic behaviour is explained by the evolution of the models from 
FOM to VIM. In FOMs suppliers are not willing to absorb risks, which are transferred 
to distributors in return for a compensation fee (fixed margin contract). Because most 
responsibilities related to the supplier’s growth in terms of scale are in the hands of the 
distributor (regional distribution, availability), it can be noted that a significant share of 
the former’s success in traditional trade markets is attributed to the latter. With the 
evolution in trade and the growth of suppliers’ scale, suppliers find it less risky to 
internalise part of the sales and distribution activities. In PIMs, they internalise 
responsibilities that are less complex to manage and that bring them more value, while 
transferring financial and complexity risks to distributors. Suppliers adopting PIMs to 
grow their businesses in modern trade will be able to reach the critical scale that drives 
them to integrate more activities in the future (invoicing, execution functions). This has 
been confirmed by the VIM cases explored. A distributor, positioned as an active 
partner in a PIM, may witness erosion in his role tomorrow once the supplier is able to 
afford integration costs. This shows that suppliers start by relying significantly on 
distributors when this serves their best interests (traditional trade fragmented markets, 
risk transfers), and then reduce this dependency based on the evolution in the market, 
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the growth in scale, and the know-how accumulated. Such an opportunistic behaviour is 
confirmed even by distributors that are well perceived by suppliers. Moreover, the 
agency theory assumes that agents/distributors are risk averse, whereas 
suppliers/principals are risk neutral (Jensen and Mecking, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The research confirms that 
risk averse behaviour may be fatal for distributors as this may prevent them from taking 
courageous investment decisions about specialisation and diversification.  It may also 
block them from engaging in dedicated investments to restore or reinforce their 
relationship with their suppliers.  
 
This research shows that the theoretical perspective to understand DRM strategies in the 
Middle East embraces the agency, TCE, relational, and evolutionary theories. As 
suggested by Leavy (2004), the research shows that outsourcing the sales and 
distribution activities in modern trade markets may drive suppliers to lose the skills they 
require to compete in the future. The research confirms that outsourcing activities are 
justified in traditional trade markets, but take into account industry evolution in mix 
channel and modern trade markets, as noted by Leavy (2004).  The research shows that 
a model that was justifiable in the past might no longer be so in the present or in the 
future. Suppliers and distributors react to the changes in the environment by 
dynamically evolving their models (Argyres, 2011). The evolution of the distributor’s 
model is driven by investments in dedicated capabilities that enhance the levels of trust 
and increase the levels of specialisation following the dynamic capability and the 
relational approaches. The evolution of the supplier’s model is driven by the integration 
of assets of high specificity (mainly human assets) following the transactional approach. 
The role of these assets is important in further enhancing the levels of inter-
organisational and intra-organisational trust. Intangible assets such as knowledge 
sharing processes, frequent and consistent communication, and goal congruence 
promote understanding and mitigate opportunistic behaviour (Malhotra and Majchrzak, 
2004). 
 
Lastly, TCE has been criticised for its generality (Dore, 1983), yet this research 
provides additional evidence about the universality of TCE, notwithstanding that there 
is a scarcity of relevant work conducted in the Middle East.  
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5.3.2 Contribution of the research to practice 
The research provides a valuable practical contribution for both suppliers and 
distributors. Table 5.4 depicts eight areas of contribution to practice connected together 
along a transformation road map (red arrow). Each of the areas results in tangible 
managerial implications and is supported by solid tools that can be used by managers 
(suppliers and distributors) in practice. The red arrow shows that the thesis ignites a 
transformation process that mainly focuses on the ante transformation phases (Phases 1 
to 5) but also covers the post transformation phases (Phases 6 to 8). Suppliers and 
distributors significantly affected by dyadic risks who have not yet considered 
transforming their models may benefit from all eight phases of the transformation 
process. Others in more advanced phases, who need to sustain or improve their 
positions, may find the need to pay greater attention to specific phases of the process. 
This section covers each of the eight phases of the transformation process. The ante 
transformation phases are presented each in separate subsections below.  
 
 
 
Data gathered to address the research question proposed provides concrete evidence of 
how leading multinational companies and major distributors identify and react to dyadic 
risks. The interviewed companies are considered industry benchmarks and trend setters, 
and their reactions (past, present and future) to dyadic risks is a representation of how 
the FMCG business is likely to evolve in the Middle East in response to threats and 
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opportunities. Cases analysed segment multinational companies and their distributors 
into two clusters: 
 Resilient cluster: companies that have the critical scale and who have 
succeeded in mitigating dyadic risks using one of the DRM strategies proposed 
by the research. They have adapted their capabilities to the evolution in the 
market and are considered industry benchmarks in mitigating dyadic risks.  
 Vulnerable cluster: companies that have failed to adapt their capabilities to the 
evolution in the market, and might have faced scale issues blocking them from 
evolving at the pace of resilient cases. Nevertheless, critical scale is not a 
requirement for all DRM strategies proposed by the research (BCS, ACS), 
making these companies highly vulnerable to dyadic risks.   
 
The research findings help managers (suppliers and distributors) compare their models 
to those of competitors, thus building a comprehensive SWOT analysis based on the 
analysis of leading suppliers and distributors in the Middle East. Before building such a 
SWOT, a manager needs to position his case relative to competitors. 
 
The figure shows that companies in a disadvantaged position versus competitors are 
substantially vulnerable to dyadic risks. This has been supported by the research, as 
companies who succeed in mitigating dyadic risks are able to better control their 
performance (outcome and behaviour based performance) versus competitors.  
 Situation I: highly vulnerable to dyadic risks as my company is adopting an 
ACS, whereas competitors are adopting a PIM. Here, competition has better 
control over its performance, which will ultimately result in higher growth rates 
and higher market share. Moreover, the integration of the key account 
management function, a pillar of PIM as presented earlier by the research, gives 
competition an edge in key account negotiation, cost optimisation, category 
management and new product introduction. This will also result in better 
performance, mainly in the modern trade channel, making the competition 
model a significant threat.  
 Situation II: is an acceptable situation as my company is adopting a model that is 
at parity with the competition’s model.  
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 Situation III: is a resilient situation as my company is adopting a model 
representing the benchmark in the market, which gives an advantage in better 
controlling performance across all channels.  The full control of my cost 
structure also helps in optimizing my costs and fuelling my growth, making my 
model a threat for competitors, a situation opposite to Situation I.  
 
A manager (distributor side) would interpret Figure 5.1 as follows: 
 Situation I: highly vulnerable to dyadic risks as I am still following a generalist 
distribution model whereas my competitors are more specialised. Specialisation 
gives an advantage in terms of costs and capabilities and helps attract new 
suppliers. Competitors can even attract suppliers from my own portfolio, which 
puts me at greater risk. Here, the model of competitors poses a major threat to 
my organisation.  
 Situation II: is an acceptable situation as I have the same level of specialisation 
as my competitor.  
 Situation III: is a resilient situation as my company is adopting a model 
considered the benchmark in the market. I am as specialised as my competitors, 
but I have also diversified into manufacturing, retail, or new areas. 
Diversification makes me less dependent on suppliers, and specialisation makes 
the latter more dependent on my services. My model is a threat for competitors, 
a situation opposite to Situation I.  
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A typical SWOT analysis of the analysed cases is presented in Table 5.5, which 
differentiates between companies that succeeded in mitigating dyadic risks (resilient 
cases) and those that failed (vulnerable cases). Companies in UAE and KSA who have 
the scale but have not yet considered a PIM (benchmark model following the cases 
analysed) might be in a disadvantaged position. Managers in these companies should 
consider the transformation of their distribution models as they are severely affected by 
dyadic risks. Their distributors are benefiting from such a situation and are acting 
opportunistically by taking the relationship for granted and not investing in the business. 
In markets highly dominated by modern trade retailers, where transaction costs are 
increasing, the inability to control operating costs and identify alternative investment 
sources may be detrimental. In these countries, distributors who highly depend on 
suppliers, and have not considered any of the mitigation strategies followed by industry 
benchmarks, may also face distressing situations. A SWOT analysis is a universal tool 
adopted by managers to frame their weaknesses and strengths relative to the threats and 
opportunities in the markets. The SWOT analysis depicted in Table 5.5 can be used by 
managers (suppliers and distributors) to situate their companies (column in yellow) 
relative to typical resilient and vulnerable cases. By knowing where they stand, 
managers can set strategies allowing them to reach the desired targets (T). The research 
drives managers to select between two strategies: 
 Sustain and grow strategies: applicable to resilient companies where Situation 
I (or II) mostly describes their competitive positioning. Managers from these 
companies should focus their resources on sustaining their elements of strength, 
pursue driving the levels of trust, and accelerating their growth.   
 Step change strategies: applicable to companies vulnerable to dyadic risks.  
Here, managers should consider igniting a transformation process to develop 
their capabilities, evolve their model, and restore the levels of trust. If these 
companies fail to use their elements of strength (including critical scale) to drive 
the relationship forward, the probability of relationship termination will 
increase.  
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The research suggests that the last recourse for dyadic risk mitigation considered by a 
supplier would be to terminate the relationship with the distributor and operate in the 
market independently. This is confirmed by the cases in Iraq, but less so by the cases in 
KSA and UAE. Vertical integration in KSA and UAE is perceived as either a 
consequence of relationship failure in cases where suppliers terminated the relationship 
with distributors due to lack of trust, or a consequence of relationship success in cases 
where suppliers entered into strategic alliances with their distributors.  
 
This notion is fundamental for multinational suppliers, specifically in the Middle East, 
where companies like P&G, Mondelez, and Nestle are considering partnering with local 
companies like Olayan & IATCO through joint venture arrangements. In volatile and 
legally complex markets, the availability of local companies willing to share risks can 
be viewed as an opportunity that drives multinational suppliers to expand their industrial 
presence, optimise their supply chain costs, accelerate their growth, and enhance their 
competitiveness. For shareholders (supplier side), it is always faster to approve an 
investment plan with a partner willing to share the risk, especially when distributors (the 
ones interviewed at least) do not show interest in intervening in the management aspect 
of the relationship. Distributors are willing to be placed as silent partners as long as they 
are safeguarded against hazard. The research shows that distributors may seek long term 
sustainable safeguards from suppliers and become more resilient to dyadic risks. The 
option of strategic alliances is available and has been confirmed by four cases explored. 
Trust is positioned as a prime prerequisite for such an option to materialise. The 
research shows that investment behind trust brings about short term benefits (successful 
collaboration through partially integrated model) as well as long term benefits (strategic 
alliance through vertical integration).  
 
The importance of such a notion may also be specific to eastern areas like the Middle 
East, where trust is given a pronounced cultural role. The fact that some suppliers and 
distributors view trust as a substitute for formal contracting should encourage managers 
from both sides of the dyad to focus on the mutual development of trust.  
 
The research engages the various stakeholders on collaboration themes rather than 
separation themes. Cases analysed demonstrate that suppliers and distributors, who 
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consider strategies individually without assessing the implication of their behaviour on 
the dyad, are more vulnerable to dyadic risks. Those who invested in trust, on the other 
hand, considered strategies that made the relationship more resilient to dyadic risks.  
 
By reading the research, managers in supplier type organisations might not be surprised 
by some of the findings, especially those related to integration. On the other hand, 
findings associated with the role that trust plays in dyadic relationship in the Middle 
East will drive them to focus on trust development strategies. The research also provides 
them with trust development tools that will be explored in the dyadic risk mitigation 
phase.  
 
Distributors who only focus on the fact that suppliers are unpredictable and may 
terminate the relationship at any point in time will moderately benefit from the research 
findings. On the other hand, those who acknowledge that suppliers are unpredictable, 
yet conversely position trust as a strategic transformation driver, will benefit from the 
research the most.  
 
The research tells managers (suppliers and distributors) to go ahead and invest in trust. 
It is up to suppliers to drive this engagement and transmit these concepts. A presentation 
kit can be derived from the research that helps managers (from the supplier side) in 
summarizing these key trends, focusing on the strategic importance of building trust to 
mitigate dyadic risks and drive successful and sustainable supplier distributor 
relationships. Such a kit drives risk awareness and should not only be perceived as a 
tranquiliser, but rather as a catalyser that helps suppliers and distributors ignite the 
transformation process. The process is based on mitigating the threats and exploring the 
opportunities by analysing the current relational situation (dyadic risks diagnosis), 
committing to a mutual relational vision, and agreeing on the optimal DRM strategy to 
achieve the vision. These phases are presented in the sections that follow.  
 
The first two phases of the transformation process are preparatory phases. Phase 1 
guides a manager in building a SWOT analysis following an in-depth industry study 
presented in the research. The second phase, which is initiated by suppliers, joins dyadic 
members in a forum that helps build awareness on the notion of dyadic risks and the 
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mitigation strategies adopted by leading companies (suppliers and distributors) to 
develop the level of trust built and evolve their models accordingly.  
 
The third phase is a stepping stone in the transformation process, as it moves away from 
generalities and market trends and closer to the internal issues and risks that dyadic 
members are facing. An important contribution of the research is assessing dyadic risks 
from the perspective of both members of the dyad in order to have a common 
understanding of the issues facing each member. Conducting interviews with one 
member only would have resulted in a skewed analysis, leading the other to block the 
transformation process as a result. 
 
Gathering insights from both members of the dyad contributes to reducing the level of 
bias that is bound to occur in agency type relationships. It also helps in mitigating the 
resistance to change, as it puts each member of the dyad in the place of the other.  
 
The themes derived from the research help managers (suppliers and distributors) 
diagnose the dyadic risks involved in the relationship, thus allowing them to frame the 
issues faced and assess their intensity levels to be able to set the appropriate mitigation 
strategies at a later stage. Diagnosing dyadic risks helps members understand each 
other’s interests and achieve a common comprehension of the challenges facing the 
relationship. Without such a diagnosis, dyadic members may be accumulating issues of 
minor implications in the present that could potentially have serious consequences in the 
future. The immediate identification of such issues pre-empts their amplification and 
orients dyadic members toward relationship evolution instead of relationship 
termination. The research provides tangible evidence of cases that have witnessed 
relationship termination, others that witnessed relationship development, and others that 
underwent relationship restructuring.  
 
To help managers assess dyadic risks, the research presents a set of tools; the first tool is 
a dyadic risk identification grid, the objective of which is to help managers (suppliers 
and distributors) identify the sources of dyadic risks. The research presents a set of 
themes that guides managers in identifying the sources of dyadic risks. These themes 
have been derived from the multiple cases analysed, but their relevance needs to be 
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validated for the specific case under study. The grid helps managers determine the 
relevance level of each theme and suggests new themes deemed valid for their 
organisations. The Excel template worksheet that can be used by managers to identify 
dyadic risks is presented in Table 5.6 for suppliers and Table 5.7 for distributors. 
Managers can use these grids to identify the sources of dyadic risks affecting their 
relationships. The supplier grid (Table 5.6) can be extended to cover multiple cases in 
different countries (add columns) and new dyadic risk themes relevant to the concerned 
case (add rows). The distributor grid for (Table 5.7) can be extended to cover multiple 
suppliers (add columns) and new dyadic risk themes relevant to the concerned case (add 
rows).  
 
The supplier grid is designed based on a regional dimension, allowing suppliers to 
assess the impact of the context (channel evolution) on the intensity level of dyadic 
risks. The research indicated that some sources of dyadic risks are more relevant for 
modern trade countries, like UAE, than for traditional trade countries, like Iraq. The 
distributor grid, on the other hand, cannot be designed based on regional dimensions as 
distributors lack regional presence and are more interested in identifying the sources of 
dyadic risks for each supplier. Data presented in these grids is gathered through 
meetings where dyadic members agree on the key themes affecting their relationships 
and evaluate the relevance of these themes.  
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The second tool is a dyadic risk mapping matrix that helps managers (suppliers and 
distributors) map the probability of occurrence and implications of dyadic risks 
identified earlier in the grid. The cases analysed in the research revealed that dyadic 
risks have higher intensity levels in modern trade countries than in traditional trade 
countries. To protect and improve their margins and adapt to retail evolution, suppliers 
in modern trade countries should consider transforming their distribution models to 
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control their businesses. Any transformation action taken by a supplier puts the 
distributors at risk, particularly vertical integration strategies that may erode the latter’s 
role. The research contributes by providing benchmarks that are different between 
modern trade and traditional trade countries and which can be used by managers to 
evaluate the choices made when measuring the intensity level of dyadic risks. The 
research also provides an Excel worksheet that helps managers measure their dyadic 
risk intensity levels and visualise their implication. Risk heat maps are common Excel 
templates used to register and map risks. The sources of risks integrated in the heat map 
are the ones identified by the research and derived from the grid. Figure 5.2 aims at 
mapping dyadic risks based on their likelihood of occurrence and their expected impact.  
 
 
 
 
After understanding the current situation, suppliers and distributors should align on their 
mutual paths. Setting a relational vision helps clarify intentions and determine the future 
of the relationship. The cases analysed have been classified into four sets: 
 Set 1: cases where trust contributed to the evolution of the relationship between 
suppliers and distributors: (resilient cluster/sustain and grow strategies-see Phase 
1) 
 Set 2: cases where trust led to the assessment of the relationship between 
suppliers and distributors: (vulnerable cluster/step change strategies-see Phase 1) 
 Set 3: cases where the lack of trust led to relationship failure: (vulnerable 
cluster/step change strategies-see Phase 1) 
 Set 4: cases where trust had a neutral effect on the relationship. 
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The dyadic risk matrix developed earlier helps managers set their relational vision as the 
research establishes that the cases experiencing low trust levels are the ones most 
affected by dyadic risks. Managers can assume that if the dyadic risk matrix illustrated 
earlier shows high levels of dyadic risks it will be more difficult to set a relational 
vision.  
 
To understand how trust levels can be restored and dyadic risk mitigated, the research 
proposes different dyadic risk mitigation strategies. The strategies presented in the next 
phase help managers orient their strategic choice to identify the optimal approach 
adapted to their dyadic cases. It is important to note that these DRM strategies are 
considered to be step change strategies that mainly assist managers whose cases 
resemble the vulnerable cluster (see SWOT analysis Phase I). Managers whose cases 
conform to the resilient cluster can use these DRM strategies to validate their strategic 
directions, as well as sustain and potentially grow their businesses.  
 
The research proposes different dyadic risk mitigation strategies adopted by leading 
suppliers and their distributors in the Middle East. The research primarily assists 
managers concerned with restoring or evolving their dyadic relationships, and who are 
willing to set a joint relational vision. The DRM strategies proposed are dynamic and 
vary with the variation in the context. The research shows that the strategic choices 
available for managers in traditional trade countries are not similar to the ones in 
modern trade countries. Managers in traditional trade countries cannot expect to have 
the same reaction to dyadic risks as those in modern trade countries. Managers can 
assume that a full integration of highly specific assets (VIM) can result in the complete 
elimination of dyadic risks. However, it is important to model the costs and benefits of 
integration to ensure that solving one issue would not result in the formation of another.  
 
Any dyadic risk mitigation strategy should take into account the benefits and the costs 
involved. An optimal DRM strategy is one where the benefits of integration outweigh 
the costs.  
 
Subsequent to illustrating how the research contributes to preparing and igniting a 
transformation process to mitigate dyadic risks, the next steps exhibit how the 
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transformation is executed. The current research does not only focus on the 
identification and mitigation of dyadic risks, but also on the execution of the DRM 
strategies. The research confirms that companies which succeeded in mitigating dyadic 
risks were able to better control their outcome and behaviour based performance. Issues 
that may be faced during the execution are presented as opportunities for future 
research. It is important to note, however, that for successful execution to take place, 
suppliers and distributors need to assign dedicated managers who can lead the execution 
process and manage the resistance to change. These managers could be internal to the 
organisation or external consultants who supervise the transformation process and 
deploy capability development programmes.  
 
A manager should also be equipped with tracking tools to monitor dyadic risks. The 
dyadic risk mapping matrix has to be periodically reviewed. Managers are advised to 
conduct yearly diagnosis exercises to monitor the performance of their DRM strategies. 
A performing DRM strategy is one where dyadic members have succeeded in 
developing the levels of trust. Such a dyadic relationship has been step changed, 
attaining the set vision. On the other hand, a non performing strategy does not show 
major improvements in trust levels. Such a dyadic relationship will ultimately be 
discontinued, similar to the discontinuation cases explored by the research.  
 
The last phase of the proposed transformation process is the learning phase. Following 
the frequent tracking of their DRM strategies, managers should evaluate their 
experiences, deduce key learning, and revise their SWOT analysis accordingly. 
Performing DRM strategies are those which succeed in turning weaknesses into 
strengths and migrating from the vulnerable to the resilient cluster of cases.   
 
5.3.3 Focus on partially integrated models 
The practical contribution of the research is the awareness it raises regarding dyadic 
risks affecting suppliers and distributors by showing a mosaic of cases in three varied 
contexts.  Awareness might be enough to stimulate change, but not enough to direct 
change. The research provides guidelines for suppliers and distributors concerning the 
DRM strategies that need to be deployed to mitigate dyadic risks. The research also 
assures dyadic members that the DRM strategies deployed in traditional trade markets 
 292 
 
like Iraq are not the same as in modern trade markets like UAE and KSA. The research 
shows that DRM strategies are based on key transformations in their downstream supply 
chains. In Section 5.3.2, a transformation road map is provided guiding managers (from 
supplier and distributors) who wish to consider dyadic risk mitigation strategies.  
 
The research also shows how suppliers and distributors can work independently on their 
own supply chain priorities without neglecting trust, a major aspect that brings them 
closer. The research provides a list of themes (Section 4.6.5) that contribute to the 
development of trust between suppliers and distributors. Managers from both sides of 
the dyad, who are not orienting their resources to trust development themes presented in 
the research, should not expect an effective collaboration based on trust but rather issues 
arising from opportunism and information asymmetry. The research also shows that 
suppliers and distributors have equal responsibilities for the development of trust. 
Investing in trust is not investing in abstract ideas and concepts, but in concrete trust 
development actions: organisation structure, capability development, information 
system integration, and fair margins. The fact that the majority of the models presented 
in the research are FOMs and PIMs shows that the costs of monitoring and collaborating 
with a distributor are lower than the costs of integration. The research should drive 
managers to invest in trust without expecting direct, immediate financial returns from 
these investments. A supplier investing in training and information systems should not 
expect a miraculous, short-term improvement in distributor's capabilities. Such benefits 
will be realised in the long term, and may remain less risky than investments in vertical 
integrated structures.  
 
As presented in Section 4.4 a partially integrated model stands as a best practice model 
for this research and is based on accepting each other’s strengths and on the mutual 
sharing of responsibilities. Distributors need to accept that suppliers have an advantage 
in negotiating with key retailers in modern trade markets. Suppliers can use their 
category management expertise to sell retailers’ solutions that help them enhance 
category profitability and drive more shoppers to their stores. In this hypercompetitive 
market, retailers are expecting this type of information which can only be given by 
suppliers. In addition, funds to retailers originate from suppliers who have the financial 
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interest of managing these funds better than distributors. On the other hand, distributors 
are more powerful in managing the transactional and logistical activities.  
 
On the transactional front, distributors have both the systems and the people. The 
research provides evidence (Section 4.4.1) that in partially integrated models, suppliers 
are not willing to absorb credit risks. Distributors have succeeded in adapting the 
management of their cash flow to the complexities of their markets, thus retaining their 
legitimate rights over the invoicing functions. This entails investments in the right 
number of people to perform the different transactional activities (order to cash, 
merchandising, etc.).  
 
Distributors have also invested in the physical logistical infrastructure (warehousing, 
delivery fleet) which gives them an advantage in retaining the logistical activities. 
Accepting each other’s power in partially integrated models is the starting point for 
effective collaboration. The division of responsibilities between suppliers and 
distributors is based on joining forces, eliminating duplications, and setting mutual 
strategies to serve the end customer in the most effective way.  The research shows 
(Section 4.6.5) that managers from the suppliers’ side should initiate such collaboration 
by balancing economic rewards and non-economic rewards. Economic rewards entail 
providing distributors with fair margins that cover their operating costs and secure their 
sustainability. Non-economic rewards include investments in distributors’ capabilities, 
the transfer of know-how, and more importantly recruiting people based on their 
aptitude to build successful collaboration. This is how suppliers gain the trust of their 
distributors within a partially integrated system.  
 
Distributors may hesitate to invest in trust as they operate in uncertain conditions that 
might deter them from making such decisions.  The research shows that long-term 
oriented distributors are those who balance between investing inside and outside the 
relationship. The themes that the research gives to distributors in the Middle East are of 
great value for their survival in the future. Distributors in Iraq are less at risk as their 
role will remain integral in the future. The cases explored show that distributors should 
not take their relationships with suppliers for granted, even in Iraq. Suppliers in Iraq, 
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who realise they are operating with distributors that are blocking their growth 
ambitions, will certainly move to other more competent distributors in the future. 
 
Managers who have not yet built a strategic specialisation and diversification road map 
may be putting their long-term future at risk.  Such an assumption also conveys to 
distributor shareholders the message that they should consider a partner who can 
support them in driving change. Some have hired senior executives with extensive 
supplier experience (Cases 7, 9, 12, and 15) who can build a risk awareness culture and 
establish a DRM road map.  Shareholders can also consider hiring consultants to 
enhance their distribution capabilities, upgrade their systems, and help them succeed in 
a partially integrated model. Investing in the relationship entails being experts in the 
activities that suppliers are not willing to integrate. The different specialisation 
strategies presented by the research are the strategies that are required to succeed in 
partial integration. Suppliers do not want to outsource their logistics activities to any 
distributor but to a specialised, trusted service provider. The research shows that such 
specialisation is giving the distributor the scale, and the supplier the cost leadership. 
Distributors are able to gain their suppliers’ trust with such win/win collaboration, 
which is considered to be the basis of partially integrated models. Distributors are also 
responsible for recruiting people based on their collaborative capabilities. The people 
who are managing the day to day relationship are the ones who are driving this partial 
integration. If these people do not work in harmony and with transparency, partial 
integration is bound to fail, as had been experienced by one of the cases explored (Case 
14).  
 
The transformation process proposed by the research includes tangible tools that can be 
used by managers to ignite a transformation process based on partial integration.  
 
The contribution of the research to practice started to take effect as findings of the 
research were used by the researcher to initiate a transformation road map within his 
organisation. The transformation toolkit guided the researcher and helped him to 
smoothly and collaboratively identify and proceed with transforming vulnerable dyadic 
cases for Group Bel in the Near and Middle East region. A collaboration model based 
on partial integration has been defined based on the findings of this research.  
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5.4 Research Generalisability 
One of the drawbacks of qualitative research is associated with the generalisability of 
data, as presented in chapter 3. This research used both lateral and theoretical 
replications to validate data. Lateral replication is used by exploring the similarities and 
differences between the cases, focusing on the themes that are redundant among the 15 
cases. Theoretical replication is adopted by correlating the findings with the theory.  
 
The research chose three markets that are representative of the different channel 
environments in the Middle East. A relationship was established between the context, 
the identification of dyadic risks, and the corresponding DRM strategies. A full 
outsource model can be generalised to other countries in the Middle East and Africa 
with similar trade structures to Iraq (Yemen, Syria, Libya). A partially integrated model 
can be generalised to other countries that have the same trade structure as KSA 
(Lebanon, Jordan, Oman, and Egypt) and UAE (Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait).  The 
generalisability of vertically integrated models can also be explored in markets similar 
to KSA and UAE, though the scale, the predisposition to risk and the relationship status 
with distributors are factors that seem to influence integration decisions. Some suppliers 
interviewed are adopting VIMs and PIMs in several markets in the Middle East with the 
same trade structure as KSA and UAE (VIM: Cases 5 and 13, PIM: Cases 9 and 12). 
Conducting the research in three representative countries in the Middle East thus 
reinforces its generalisability.  
 
 
5.5 Research Limitations and Future Research  
The propositions derived from the research were discussed with 30 key informants 
covering 15 multiple cases across Iraq, UAE, and KSA. The findings need to be 
considered with the following limitations, which can serve as research agendas for 
future research.  
 
Although the research confirms that the theories chosen to understand the topic are 
relevant, other theories can also be considered to shed light on specific issues that stem 
from this research.  For instance, a partially integrated model is based on sharing 
resources between suppliers and distributors. The resource based view theory (Barney, 
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1991) may be relevant to understanding the issues associated with sharing tangible and 
intangible resources between supply chain members in order to enhance the 
competitiveness of the supply chain as a whole. Allred et al. (2011) used the resource 
based view theory and dynamic capability theory to identify how firms can exploit 
inter-firm resources to enhance their competitive advantages. Specific enablers to 
enhance an organisation’s collaborative capability were identified by the authors. The 
research also highlights the importance of knowledge sharing between dyadic members, 
whether in FOMs or to a larger extent in PIMs. The knowledge based theory of the firm 
is considered an extension of the resource based view theory. It distinguishes between 
different knowledge based capabilities, by treating knowledge as a strategic resource 
that enhances the firm’s competitive advantage (Nonaka, 1994), instead of a generic 
resource, as proposed by resource based view theorists. By exploring the risks and 
benefits of outsourcing, Harland et al. (2005) find that knowledge is lacking inside 
organisations on moving from a ‘doing’ to an ‘outsourcing’ operation, with the 
associated creation, management and assessment of collaborative outsource 
relationships and contracts. Cao and Zhang (2011) identify seven interconnecting 
dimensions that make up effective supply chain collaboration: information sharing, goal 
congruence, decision synchronisation, incentive alignment, resource sharing, 
collaborative communication, and joint knowledge creation.  
 
Suppliers and distributors may resist change. The dynamic capability perspective is 
founded on the relationship between the individual, organisation, and environment. 
Changes in the economic environment are captured by individuals within the 
organisation whose role is to initiate organisational transformation projects that adapt 
the organisation to the environment. The individual (or group) within the organisation 
has a prime role, not only in capturing external changes, but in leading internal changes 
within the organisation. Future research may focus on how leaders (suppliers and 
distributors) unblock these barriers and lead transformation road maps to mitigate 
dyadic risks. Hauschildt (2004) refers to these leaders as champions, who are 
outstanding individuals to whom the success of any change is attributed. According to 
Hauschildt (2004), process promoters are project leaders who use their negotiation skills 
to mediate between the involved and affected parties. Looking at the dynamic capability 
perspective, process promoters initiate transformation projects that consider breaking 
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the routines and overcoming administrative barriers. They can be external experts, such 
as third party consultants, that mediate between suppliers and distributors or internal 
experts. 
 
This research aimed at understanding the why and how behind the issues proposed. A 
qualitative methodology that stems from an interpretivist epistemology has been used to 
gather and analyse data. Now that reality is observable, quantitative methodologies can 
be used to test the model using a wider sample not limited to senior executives, but 
including operational managers involved in the daily operations. The sample need not 
be restricted to FMCG companies, but can include other industries in the Middle East 
that are also outsourcing the sales and distribution activities, such as pharmaceuticals 
and electronics. A quantitative methodology will address the criticism of this research 
with respect to its generalisability.  
 
Some suppliers were initiating their DRM strategies during the course of the data 
collection phase, and others just a while before it. At such an early stage of 
implementation, the research was unable to capture the impact of such transformations 
on firm performance. Future research could consider exploring the same topic but by 
focusing on a single or a few cases and exploring the post impact of the DRM strategy 
on firm performance. This will help in evaluating the DRM strategy adopted by 
suppliers and distributors.  
 
The research dealt with dyadic risks resulting from opportunism and information 
asymmetry, and focused on the strategic directions adopted by suppliers and 
distributors. Future research could focus on specific operational issues between dyadic 
members: supply chain disruptions, information sharing via EDI, and system 
integration.  
 
The Middle East is a volatile region affected by various environmental risks. This 
research focuses on network/dyadic risks, but while conducting interviews, many 
interviewees brought up the environmental risks affecting their supply chains. In such 
an uncertain context, future research could focus more on environmental risks 
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(insecurities, volatilities) and assess the actions taken by suppliers and distributors to 
mitigate these risks.  
 
The research shows that distributors mitigate dyadic risks through specialisation and 
diversification strategies. The cases explored demonstrated that both strategies 
contribute to the mitigation of these risks, without taking the financial implications into 
account, which can be unjustified at times. This could also serve as a topic for future 
research.  
 
The specialisation strategies in logistics and the evolution of distributors to service 
providers pave the way to further understanding of how the service provider model 
works in the Middle East. Bourlakis and Melewar (2011) provide an extensive literature 
review on outsourcing to service providers that can be used as a basis for future 
research.  
 
This research shows that the opportunistic behaviour of suppliers, and the possibility of 
relationship discontinuation at any point in time, is a high risk affecting distributors. 
This research did not explore the legal protection that distributors should have, but only 
shows how distributors are losing this protection in some countries. Future research 
could focus on how distributors are or should be protected by the legal system. The 
sample should accordingly include legal experts from different countries of the Middle 
East.   
 
The current research focuses on existing relationships and does not cover how new 
relationships can be built. This includes covering the criteria for partner identification 
and selection. Ding et al. (2013) find that, when confronted with greater risk from the 
transaction context, firms place more emphasis on trust-based and reputation-based 
selection criteria for partner choice and develop more complex contracts to manage the 
collaboration. Looking at the criteria on which partnerships are formed in the Middle 
East will be of great value to suppliers who wish to replace their existing distributors 
with new ones. It will also serve for international suppliers who wish to expand to the 
Middle East by appointing local distributors. Many multinational companies, for 
instance, are interested in expanding into white spaces in the Middle East like Iran. How 
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these companies will enter the market, using which model, and what the criteria used to 
select partners will be are some questions that need to be addressed. 
 
The research shows that the AT and the TCE theories are relevant to understanding 
dyadic risks in the Middle East but are not sufficient to explore the dyadic risk 
mitigation strategies on their own. An integrated theoretical approach that incorporates 
the transactional, relational and evolutionary perspectives has been presented by the 
research. This proposition shows that in a hypercompetitive and relationally intensive 
context, a theoretical domain that does not consider the collaboration between supply 
chain members and their adaptation to changes in the environment may not be relevant 
to understanding the different risks. In such a context, a hybrid model such as a PIM is 
presented as a resilient model that explains the mitigation of dyadic risks. This model is 
not only hybrid in its governance structure, but also in its theoretical structure as it puts 
the transaction, relational, and evolutionary approaches under one roof. From a practical 
perspective, the research has already started to contribute to practice, as has been 
illustrated in Chapter 5. The findings of this research were used to diagnose the dyadic 
risks affecting Groupe Bel in the Middle East and to identify the appropriate dyadic risk 
mitigation strategies. A relational vision based on a win/win collaboration model 
through a partial integration model has been defined. Such a model has confirmed the 
direction of Groupe Bel in mitigating dyadic risks with its distributors in the Middle 
East. The tools used to assess dyadic risks, evaluate the levels of trust, and position the 
optimal DRM strategy have also been presented in the chapter. Although the questions 
raised by the research have been answered, other questions can be raised to further 
deepen the understanding of dyadic risk relationships in the FMCG or in other 
industries in the Middle East. Chapter 5 has presented how the limitations of the current 
research can guide future researchers who wish to extend their understanding of the 
notion of risks (dyadic, networks and environmental) in the Middle East or in other 
areas. 
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Appendices 
 
I. Interview guide 
 
Interview Guide   Date: ---/---
/---- 
Hady Khalaf Doctorate Research 
Supplier – Distributor Relationship in the Middle East 
 
Full Name:  __________________ 
Company:   __________________  
Position:   __________________  
  
 
 
Can you please describe your sales and distribution model? (FOM, PIM, VIM) 
 
1- What are the key risks that affect your sales and distribution model 
“You mentioned __________, tell me more about: 
- Your view on opportunism  
- Control actual price to trade 
- Control actual trade funds 
- Control actual Cost to serve 
- Control actual distributor Margin 
- Information Sharing 
- Dependency on supplier (if interviewee is a distributor) 
 
 Iraq KSA UAE 
#    
Case    
Fully integrated: No Dist    
Partially integrated     
Fully outsource    
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2- What type of arrangement with your distributor will allow you to mitigate those 
risks? Elaborate on control system.  
“You mentioned __________, tell me more about: 
a. The formal contract with your distributor/supplier  
b. Cost Plus Contract with/without incentives   
c. Fixed Price Contract with/without incentives  
d. Special incentives to optimize cost  
e. Information system  
 
3- Can you elaborate on the integration of Sales and distribution activities ?  
You mentioned __________, tell me more about: 
a. Integration of Key Account Managers  
b. Integration of Regional Managers 
c. Process and System Integration 
d. Integration of Invoicing  
e. Integration of Logistics 
 
4- Can you elaborate on the outsource of Sales and distribution activities ?  
You mentioned __________, tell me more about: 
a. Outsource of Sales Execution: Modern Trade 
b. Outsource of Sales Execution: Traditional Trade  
c. Outsource Invoicing  
d. Outsource Logistics  
 
5- What are the risks that you associate with the integration of the sales and 
distribution activities?  
You mentioned __________, tell me more about: 
a. Financial risks  
b. Costs of integration versus cost of outsource 
 
6- What contributes to the development of trust between suppliers and distributors? 
You mentioned __________, tell me more about: 
a. Fair Margins 
b. Investments in human assets (training)Cost sharing   
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c. Investments in physical assets (logistics)  
d. Investments in systems: transparency 
 
7- What role does trust play in the relationship between suppliers and distributors? 
“You mentioned __________, tell me more about: 
a. The importance of trust in the relationship.  
b. Whether trust substitute formal contracting 
c.  Whether the trust in your distributor capabilities substitute the necessity to integrate these 
capabilities  
 
8- How do you think distributors can mitigate dependency risks? 
You mentioned __________, tell me more about: 
a. How do you reduce your dependency on your supplier  
b. The investments that you are incurring or planning to incur in the future  
c. The capabilities that you are building  
 
9- Can you elaborate on the specialisation strategies you are considering? 
You mentioned __________, tell me more about: 
a. Logistics and other services Specialisation  
b. Channel Specialisation   
c. Regional Specialisation  
 
10- Can you elaborate on the diversification strategies you are considering? 
You mentioned __________, tell me more about: 
a. Geographical Expansion  
b. Manufacturing   
c. Retail  
 
11- How do you see the evolution of the sales and distribution models in the Middle 
East?  
You mentioned __________, tell me more about: 
a. Supplier trends: Integration versus outsource 
b. Distributor trends: specialisation versus diversification  
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II. Screen shots from NVivo  
 
The following screen shots illustrate the coding of the seven propositions explored 
during the semi-structured interviews. Different colour codes have been given for each 
proposition. 
 
The below screen shot is taken from NVivo and shows, for example, the themes 
associated for P1 and P2 (secondary coding is used).  
 
To analyse the key themes for each proposition, the researcher ran a query search in 
NVivo, which helped locate the theme that the researcher is interested in analysing, as 
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seen in the screen shot below.  The query also helps identify the relevance of the theme 
for each of the cases explored, depending on the frequency of its redundancy in the text.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The condensation exercise helps in identifying the key pieces of evidence that agree or 
disagree with the proposition being explored. This data is crossed with the data display 
tables filled in at the end of each interview during the formulation of the summary 
interview report for each case analysed.    
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III. Sample invitation letter sent to participants 
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IV. Summary letter sent of main topics to be discussed during interview 
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V. Sources of evidence summary table  
P Case Informant Question Theme Comment/Quotes
P1 14 Business 
Development 
Director
“When we [the supplier] were managing the business from a distance, we did not know what was happening…but when we deployed a Country Manager in KSA, he was able to see what was going 
wrong in the business.  The friction with the distributor increased when we discovered that he was making higher margins by selling at prices higher than the recommended ones.” (Interview, Supplier 
KSA).
15 General Manager “We always thought that he had this number of vans, but when we started going into the details of the information
 we discovered that the number of vans was much lower than our expectations.”(Interview, Supplier KSA).
6 CEO “A distributor can say that he has a dedicated team but how can you make sure that this team is actually dedicated, how you can control it?”(Interview, Supplier UAE).
13 General Manager “We were growing lower than market growth; our market share for the past two years is on downward trends.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
11 CEO “They [the distributor] were not focusing on the right channels. They were doing things without aligning with us, we had different agendas” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
14 Business 
Development 
Director
“Our [the supplier] agenda was to grow the business, his [the distributor] agenda was to sell as much as possible and with the least amount of costs incurred, to take as much marketing money as 
possible and improve his profit margin” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
11 CEO “Competition is increasing, everyone is becoming more active in the market … I [The Supplier] know that to improve my performance, I need to increase my coverage but the distributor is resisting 
investing in additional vans.”(Interview, Supplier KSA).
14 Business 
Development 
Director
“You [the supplier] cannot divorce them [the distributor], even if you no longer love them. You still need them because the foreign investment law does not allow you to operate on your own.” 
(Interview, Supplier KSA). 
13 General Manager “Our previous distributor was simply refusing to give us [the supplier] detailed information … We had visibility over the macro sales figures only … but when we asked for more details, we were 
facing an unjustified resistance” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
12 Vice President “If I am a distributor, for me information is power, and giving out this information is like giving out art of my power” (Interview, Distributor KSA).
8 Regional Sales 
Director
“If we [the supplier] know such information, there is a possibility that we use it against them, by challenging the way they do things.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
10 CEO “We [the supplier] were giving the distributor a budget that has to be invested in the trade, but we did not have any visibility over how the money was being spent.  The distributor refused to give us a 
copy of contracts with retailers; with the rise of modern trade and the continuous inflation of costs, we could no longertolerate such behaviour.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
14 Business 
Development 
Director
“The inability to control information means a difficulty in achieving an accurate forecast, which puts all the supply planning at risk... we sell food products with expiry dates in a vast market and in 
unconventional climatic conditions.  How can we grow further if we are not able to forecast precisely?” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
9 General Manager “If my supplier asks me to share information about costs, such as working on a certain project to improve efficiency, I do not mind sharing it if the benefits are mutual.” (Interview, Distributor UAE).
4 Regional Sales 
Director
“I mean we expect our customers to be open to us and give us information, we must therefore understand when our suppliers ask information from us; we are their customers.” (Interview, Distributor
UAE).
11 CEO We [the supplier] felt diluted in his [the distributor] portfolio. His main interest was to drive the beverage business while our interest was to grow our own business.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
11 CEO “We [the supplier] were growing by 15% in a market where we have the potential to grow by 40%.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
11 CEO “We feel like a small fish in a big ocean. The only thing that was dedicated to us was a channel we called Van Sales Operation, which was the only channel where we had certain control, vision,
transparency … In modern trade we do not have any focus and we were drowning in the distributor’s vast portfolio.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
6 Regional Sales 
Director
“I [the supplier] do not know very much about the coverage capability, the type of equipment that they use, the information systems they have, and how relevant their portfolio is. In our opinion, we
would ideally look at having two distributors in a market like UAE, but with different focus portfolios; one would be very much impulse portfolios, and one would be the destination portfolio. That is
very much what we are doing at the moment.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
12 Vice President “We are aware that our suppliers need focus and dedication, we need to build our capability while making sure to have the right business model that makes each supplier feel important in our
portfolio” (Interview, Distributor KSA).
Issue of Control
Allignment on 
objectives
Information 
Sharing
Level of focus 
and
dedicated 
capabilities
What are the key risks that 
affect
 your sales and distribution 
model: as suppliers
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P Case Informant Question Theme Comment/Quotes
P1 4 Regional Sales 
Director
“Retailers in UAE realised that it’s not about opening new stores, but rather about attracting more shoppers. In order to do so, they needed to achieve better profits to fund their growth.” (Interview,
Supplier UAE).
8 Regional Sales 
Director
“There is a strategic need for collaboration between suppliers and retailers to exchange category and shopper expertise … retailers rely on suppliers profoundly as they are the brand experts.”
(Interview, Supplier UAE).
10 CEO “Distributors who cannot cater to the needs of modern trade retailers in terms of capabilities and information systems will find no place in UAE in the future.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
6 Regional Sales 
Director
“They [the distributors] feel privileged knowing everything about the customer… if we go and negotiate and try to build relationships with retailers, then why should we need them anymore?”
(Interview, Supplier UAE).
8 Regional Sales 
Director
“Because a distributor is fully representing your brand, you will not be taken seriously within the local retail environment. At times, distributors do not want you to speak to retailers because they are
very protective and they want to hold on to this relationship as long as possible.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
6 CEO “The name of the game is: if we are not able to make that change ourselves and evolve with the retailers and deliver on their expectations, then there is a risk of being made obsolete.” (Interview,
Supplier UAE).
6 CEO “Distributor development is an important risk blocking us [the supplier] from acquiring the necessary capabilities to grow in UAE. We know that we have to either move to a more capable distributor
whose cost is going to be higher, or invest in driving the capabilities of our current distributor, who we believe has an inefficient cost structure. We are now verifying our options.” (Interview, Supplier
UAE).
11 Vice President “If I'm getting the right quality of execution at the right cost, I will be meeting with the needs of my suppliers, otherwise I will be causing them issues in the market versus their competitors.” (Interview,
Distributor KSA).
7 CEO “Our suppliers do the marketing and we are their operational arm in the market. We have a responsibility to drive the competitiveness of our supplier’s brands, they count on us in building physical
availability as much as we count on them in building mental availability.” (Interview, Distributor UAE).
1 General Manager “In traditional trade countries, you need a minimum amount of systems and infrastructure, because your operation is simplified. You are doing the basics. You are taking this package, putting it on the
checkout counter or in the fridge, making sure the stock is available.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq).
5 Regional Sales 
Director
“We look at freshness, competition, the quality of the display, the range, are we overselling, or are we underselling? The whole operation is more complicated because you have done the
fundamentals and you are moving beyond the sales operation.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
9 General Manager “In a traditional trade country, the salesperson is an order taker.  But in a modern trade country like UAE, the salesperson is an order maker” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
2 Country Manager “Our distributor has to ensure proper distribution routes, reaching the 30,000 grocery stores in Iraq either directly or through wholesalers. He needs to invest in vans and manage the transactions
from A to Z, and we are not anxious about how this is being done.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq).
1 General Manager “We spend in trade offers, but our investments are negligible compared to investments in modern trade markets.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq).
3 General Manager “If you ask me today whether we would go and invest US$ 100 million in Iraq, my answer would be ‘maybe not’. Why, because of the environmental risk factors in the country. I think that over the
coming 10 years, the future prospect of distributors is very bright in Iraq because international suppliers will be very careful regarding the security of lives, their personnel, security of assets, and the
security of cash.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq).
2 Country Manager “Our distributor acts as if he is the supplier in the country. When you go to the grocery and you ask about our products, they will tell you the name of the distributor, we do not mind that because
they are representing us in the field” (Interview, Supplier Iraq).
15 General Manager “Priority number one for us is growth, we [the supplier] have brands that we think have the potential to grow by 15% to 17%, which is much higher than our current growth rates, and we will not
allow our distributor to block us from meeting our growth ambition.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
3 General Manager “We absorb all the risks that they are not willing to absorb; it is a winning situation for them.” (Interview, Distributor Iraq).
P2 10 CEO Legal protection “In the Gulf region, suppliers are legally obligated to work with distributors. If I want to set up my own sales force, I might not always be able to do so as I have to be tied up with a local distribution
company.” (Interview, Supplier, Middle East).
14 Business 
Development
 Director
 “It is like a Catholic marriage which makes it almost impossible to end by divorce, and too costly if divorce is being considered.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
Cases tolerating 
dyadic risks
Capability of sales 
teams and quality 
of execution
What are the key risks that 
affect
 your sales and distribution 
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P2 7 CEO Legal protection “Any multinational company must be in partnership with a local company that has a majority share of 51%, this protected us as distributors.” (Interview, Distributor UAE).
14 Business 
Development
 Director
“In KSA, we [the supplier] followed exactly what Case 13 experienced, and we even used the latter as an example to encourage our shareholders to exit the relationship with our existing distributor.
We could not tolerate his behaviour anymore, and we needed to find a solution. I think that many other FMCG companies will follow, it is like a domino effect and distributors should truly consider
these trends.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
5 Regional Sales 
Director
“Our [the supplier] local partner is a silent partner; we manage the operations as if we were operating alone.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
4 Regional Sales 
Director
“As long as we [the supplier] give an acceptable notice period to our distributor, there is no legal obligation to pay him a compensation fee. It all depends on the exit arrangement reached as well as
our business ethics to ensure that we were fair till the very end.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
15 General Manager “We needed someone who knows the market and is familiar with the local culture” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
11 CEO “The Middle East represents a good share of our international business; there is a need to be physically present in the market.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
12 Vice President “It is not difficult for me [the supplier] to know what it would cost me to operate in UAE in KSA or any other country in the Middle East. I have teams comprised of individuals who used to manage
the day to day operations in leading distribution companies in the Middle East. Now we know better than before.” (Interview, Supplier Middle East).
8 Regional Sales 
Director
“With the increasing pressure on costs and the change in the retail scene, we [the supplier] had to adapt our distributor margin to the actual situation in the market.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
14 Business 
Development
 Director
“Our distributors know how to sell, but with the evolution taking place, our expectations from our distributors have changed. They really need to know what kind of value they can add to our
business.” (Interview, KSA).
12 Vice President “I used to work with ABC (supplier type of organization); this has helped me introduce new ways of thinking. I even coached my people in how suppliers operate and what the priorities are that
matter for them.” (Interview, Distributor KSA).
15 General Manager “First, distributors with large scale have a cost advantage as they can spread their fixed costs over a bigger business, and second they have the negotiation advantage as they can go to the trade with a
bigger portfolio.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
11 CEO “We [the supplier] want to work with someone who makes us feel important to his portfolio … This is how we can draw his attention and dedication.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
13 General Manager “If you had asked me [the supplier] this question 15 or 20 years ago, I would have told you that I was obliged to outsource because it makes financial sense for me; it is not the case today as I have
the scale to be on my own.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
4 Regional Sales 
Director
“If we [the distributor] have the scale to absorb financial risks, it will be more risky if we keep outsourcing all the sales and distribution activities to a distributor. If our distributors have the scale, they
cannot treat us with mediocrity anymore, regardless of our size”. (Interview, Supplier UAE).
7 CEO “We [the distributor] have access to capital; we offer our suppliers a risk free model in which we are absorbing the biggest share of the risk. But our suppliers have their growth ambitions, and to
grow we need to give them enough focus and make them feel important in the way we allocate our resources and set our plans.” (Interview, Distributor UAE).
12 Vice President “My supplier can decide at any point in time to put an end to the relationship, even if we are the best in town. They did it in other countries, and the possibility that they do it in KSA will always
remain in our calculations, although we are on very good terms with them.” (Interview, Distributor KSA).
9 General Manager “The second our supplier feels that we are not evolving with the market and we are not maintaining a level of capabilities that is up to the standards in the various trade channels, he might reconsider
the relationship even if we are among the best in the market today.” (Interview, Distributor UAE).
5 Regional Sales 
Director
“It has been decided that we [the supplier] need to directly control the downstream supply chain activities; we do not find the need for distributors anymore.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
P3 Dyadic risk 
mitigation:
Agency Theory
1 General Manager Basic Control 
System
“We used to deal with parallel import products from Syria and Jordan; some of our distributors in Iraq are also selling to other markets.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq).
3 General Manager “Having more than one distributor adds a lot of complexities to the business. This might be the right solution in big countries like Egypt and Iran, but I do not see it in Iraq and definitely not in UAE.”
(Interview, Supplier Middle East).
Market know-
how and threat of 
substitute
Scale and risk 
absorption
Unpredictability 
of suppliers
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P3 1 General Manager How are you mitigating 
these risks:
Elaborate on control 
system
Basic Control 
System
“We [the supplier] had two distributors; one was covering Baghdad and Erbil and the other was covering the remaining regions in Iraq. It was not the right go-to-market because some distributors
were dropping their prices to sell more volumes outside their territories, so we decided to consolidate with one main distributor.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq).
2 Managing 
Director
“We signed a contract which specifies the margins that should be made, but whether the distributor is respecting the contract is another story,” (Interview, Supplier Iraq).
1 General Manager “A distributor can benefit from this complexity in various ways and there is only little that we can do to control the distributor’s action. We know that the contract alone does not provide enough
assurance. However, our priority is not to control whether the distributor is making more money than he is supposed to, but to make sure that he has the prerequisites to grow the business.”
(Interview, Supplier Iraq).
2 Country Manager “Today we have recruited someone based in Iraq who manages the distributor on the ground versus us managing it remotely from Lebanon …his role is to define our key priorities in Iraq, our four
must-win battles in Iraq, and ensure that we’re deploying all the actions. He also has a prime role in bringing market insights about competitors and customers.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq).
2 Country Manager “The market manager adds value to the distributor business by agreeing on the efficient route to market strategy, bringing know-how and expertise to deploy the strategy, and demonstrating how the
distributor can generate more sales by investing better in the business.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq).
1 General Manager “The market manager is our ambassador in the market; he brings us market insight but more importantly, he gives us the ‘why’ behind our performance” (Interview, Supplier Iraq).
1 General Manager “Having a market manager allowed us to obtain information and access to the distributor’s information systems. In the past, we did not have the visibility that we have today.” (Interview, Supplier
Iraq).
1 General Manager “The market manager had a prime role in transferring the yearly plans and building the capabilities of our teams.” (Interview, Distributor Iraq).
2 Country Manager “The message from my CEO was clear: ‘Go and implant our culture in the distributor’s organisation. Let them deal with the trade the way we do’. I coach their teams, conduct weekly meetings with
them to review objectives, align on plans and identify opportunities… I conduct frequent market visits with them to identify the gaps and give them feedback” (Interview, Supplier Iraq).
1 General Manager “Before we decide to place someone in Iraq, we need to make sure that the distributor with whom we are currently dealing will be our choice in the future.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq).
6 Regional Sales 
Director
“In UAE, I am in favour of cost plus contracting as I believe that margin contracts (fixed price contract) will soon become obsolete.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
14 Business 
Development 
Director
“In 2011, we decided to move to a cost plus contract because we had no visibility over the cost to serve structure of our distributor.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
8 Regional Sales 
Director
“A cost plus contract does not necessarily mean looking for savings, but it’s about a more effective allocation of costs to improve your service, to have better capabilities, and above all it drives your
level of control far up. You have to be in a position of believing that it will drive growth.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
7 General Manager
“A cost plus contract gives a supplier [the supplier] full visibility, but as the same time it leads him to absorb certain risks associated with cost inflation.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
9 Regional Sales 
Director
“If we [the supplier] implement a cost plus contract, we will have more visibility over costs, and we will be more certain of what we want and what resources to deploy. We are going to do this
together with our distributor; we will take inefficient costs out of our system and invest in value driving activities.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
14 Business 
Development 
Director
“We told our distributor that a cost plus model means two things: ‘you will disclose your costs, and we will reimburse you for your costs plus a certain margin’. When we asked them to share their
cost structure, they resisted at first but then accepted to do so … We then discovered that the actual costs incurred were much less than the costs we thought they had incurred.” (Interview, Supplier
KSA).
7 CEO “We need to agree together on the payroll and the number of employees, this is number one. Number two, we need to agree on the petrol cost and selling cost and track cost and warehousing cost
and others. If we agree together on those cost components and on the yearly inflation, which is on increasing trends, then cost plus contract may work but this is debatable”. (Interview, Distributor
UAE).
12 Vice President “Many suppliers have people coming on assignments of two to three years, who want to demonstrate their innovative achievements by challenging the costs of their distributors on a daily basis, which
is not healthy for the relationship; If they need visibility, we [the distributor] can give it to them without the need for a cost plus arrangement” (Interview, distributor KSA).
12 CEO “The distributor shared with us all the financial information, and we make investment decisions jointly. If there is room for optimisation, we propose our point of view, they present their view, and we
reach an agreement together.  Our information systems are integrated; we have access to all types of information.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
9 Regional Sales 
Director
“Controlling costs has to be coupled with improving capabilities, recruiting higher levels of talent, investing in technology, investing in training, buying more vans, placing another 50
merchandisers…etc. You can make these decisions if they make more sense for the business” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
6 Regional Sales 
Director
“We need our distributor to take responsibility for growth, profitability, and cost savings. To engage distributors, a cost saving incentive has to be associated with a cost plus contract which will drive
them to effectively seek cost optimisation opportunities.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
Advanced control 
system
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P4 Partial Integration
13 General Manager Outsource 
Invoicing
“To control the selling price to trade, I have to either invoice directly to trade, or gain full access to the distributor’s invoicing system” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
15 General Manager Outsource 
Invoicing
“Direct invoicing to trade means managing and absorbing credit risks, something not all suppliers are willing to do.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
14 Business 
Development 
Director
Outsource 
Invoicing “Some customers have a 45 days credit limit, while others operate on a 75 days credit limit. We do not want to bear those charges.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
9 Regional Sales 
Director
Outsource of
Execution 
functions
“I [the supplier] consider myself as having 1,500 sales employees working for my brand who are financed by the distributor. If I want to run this operation myself, I have to hire 1,500 employees, pay
them indemnities, manage their bonuses, and have a full human resources team on board to make sure that we are complying with local regulations…etc. Why would I do all that when I have
someone who can do it on my behalf?” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
15 General Manager Outsource Sales
Execution
“The worst nightmare we have is related to employment compliance law. There is a big difference between having a team of 10 and a team of 100 in the market. Recruiting is not easy, and making
sure that we are abiding by the law is not easy either, especially if we are dealing with a big team …” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
11 CEO Outsource
Logistics
“They have the infrastructure, and the know-how; this is where they can add value the most.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
4 Regional Sales 
Director
“We [the supplier] handle the key accounts and we give the distributor all the rest. What does the rest comprise of? Grocers shops, wholesalers, and even supermarkets though not the big ones. So in 
my opinion, it depends on the country and on the weight of the modern trade business.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
4 Regional Sales 
Director
“Carrefour looks at me [the supplier] as this guy who sells chocolate. I am powerful, because I represent that % of the chocolate market in UAE. If he sees me as the chocolate guy who represents a
much lower % of the business, I am not that powerful and thus it is preferable that a distributor represents me.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
13 General Manager
“We [the supplier] sign the contracts with major key customers and we decide how much we want to spend, depending on the targets set and the market’s potential.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
15 General Manager
“Controlling funds means controlling the sources of growth in a big share of the market, since modern trade is now on growing trends.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
12 Vice President “We [the distributor] look together at how we are going to build the business for the future, what our challenges are, and what we are going to do about them.” (Interview, Distributor KSA).
9 Regional Sales 
Director
“If there is an idea with the marketing department, they are talking to each other on a daily basis. For me [the supplier], it does not matter who is creating the demand, where the idea is coming from,
whether it’s from the marketing guy or from the sales guy because they work together daily. So while a marketing guy might do a better job in Carrefour by understanding shopper profile and so on,
he will pass the knowledge to the sales guy, who happens to be from the distributor side.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
12 Vice President “The sales director of our supplier came and told us that he wants us to invest in an additional 100 employees. We sat with him, looked at the benefits and expected return on this investment. We
gave our feedback and aligned on the steps to go forward. By doing so, the supplier did not feel that we are over or under investing because we were mutually aligned on what to invest and why.”
(Interview, Distributor KSA).
12 Vice President Our supplier is able to obtain whatever is required from our sales system. We deployed a joint S&OP process, which led us to discover that there is lot of cash tied up in our warehouses. We
collaborated with our supplier to optimise our inventory levels, improve our cash flow, while providing them with fresher products in the market.” (Interview, Distributor KSA).
9 Regional Sales 
Director
“Our supplier helped us [the distributor] in orienting our plans to achieve better results. A promotion on Brand A can yield better results in certain areas than a promotion on Brand B, and we can
only obtain this kind of information from our supplier.”(Interview, Distributor UAE).
9 Regional Sales 
Director
“We give them quarterly news on our brands, what is happening, we provide them with sales guidelines and competition news, and we share with them shoppers' data so that they are aligned on our
sales strategies by channel and what we want to achieve with them on a monthly basis.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
12 Vice President “We [the distributor] signed the contract with a the leading training companies in the Middle East, and we are now building our own training entity, which will provide full talent development programs
from induction to functional trainings.” (Interview, Distributor KSA). 
9 Regional Sales 
Director
“We [the supplier] have a dedicated training college. We attend all the trainings together with our distributors and we therefore develop and grow together.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
9 Regional Sales 
Director
“We [the supplier] tell them what their supply chain should look like, how their sales organisation can be designed, how they can optimise their route to market. This is all done based on sharing best
practices with them, and in return we develop an efficient operation” (Interview, Distributor UAE). 
9 Regional Sales 
Director
“We have talent exchange programs; for instance I worked at the distributor’s offices on a special assignment in the past. We also receive people from the distributor working with us on special
projects. By doing so, we enhance the integration of our organisations.”  (Interview, Supplier UAE).
Integration of key
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P4 11 CEO How are you mitigating 
these risks:
Elaborate on partial 
integration
Dedicated 
capabilities and
focus:Category
“You cannot have a distributor who is actually good at everything. Suppliers may prefer giving different components of the business to different distributors; milk business to Distributor A,
confectionery business to Distributor B. The decision is driven by the core competencies of the distributor, and his willingness to show the supplier that he is giving the brands the necessary attention.”
(Interview, Supplier KSA).
9 Regional Sales 
Director
Dedicated 
capabilities and
focus:Channel
 “The merchandisers of our distributors are dedicated for us, we are sure that they are spending 100% of their time on our products in the store, not on other products.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
12 Vice President Dedicated 
capabilities and
focus:Regional
“We [the distributor] might not have strong presence in a specific region in KSA, so we must have to go and liaise with sub distributors to ensure that the supplier’s products are available in all the
regions; we invest in regional branches to cater for these sub distributors” (Interview, Distributor KSA).
Vertical 
Integration
4 Regional Sales 
Director
“The integration of the key account manager is not just about having direct negotiation with the trade; it’s about business development, joint business planning, category management, and so on.”
(Interview, Supplier UAE).
5 Regional Sales 
Director
“It is very unlikely that our distributor will do a better job than we do in key account management today. With the level of expertise that we have or can attract, there is no way he can do better
unless we, as a company, admit that we cannot have such expertise in-house.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
4 Regional Sales 
Director
“Distributors have limited capabilities to attract good people. That was acceptable in the past but it is not the case today as I [the supplier] need to have a competent person who knows how to
negotiate with Carrefour or Spinneys, for example. This is how I can optimise my spending and ensure that I am receiving the right return.”(Interview, Supplier UAE).
4 Regional Sales 
Director
“You [the supplier] have to make sure that you have a good grasp of the value added responsibilities like key account management, and be able to let go of others like warehousing and delivery,
when there is a cheaper way of doing it” (Interview, Supplier UAE).  
5 Regional Sales 
Director
“I [the supplier] will give you an example; today if I want to add one delivery van in Abou Dhabi and we are now in February, I have to wait till May to request for additional CAPEX. The process
will take time and approval would not be obtained before October or November. I can then buy the van, but it will take me another few months before the process is complete and the van is
delivered to us. On the other hand, I can ask my distributor to purchase the van over the phone by showing him the added value this will bring to his business and the return it will generate. The van
will be bought in a month’s time at latest.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
14 Business 
Development 
Director
“I [the supplier] do not have to worry any more about whether the distributor is invoicing at higher prices and consequently achieving higher margins. I invoice directly to trade and I control the entire
margin structure.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
5 Regional Sales 
Director
“If the financial charges and the additional costs are 2% and we are able to save 2% or even 3% by controlling the price structure, the financial risks are thus diminished” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
13 General Manager
“Merchandising is a core function that gives you control over the quality of your execution and your availability at point of sale. Third party merchandising is more difficult to manage and motivate. In
reality, you have a lot of employee turnover in third party merchandizing, which means you have to retrain and re-evaluate and track and so on. It’s a big headache.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
5 Regional Sales 
Director
“Having a bigger sales force means having a bigger human resources team to manage the large number of employees. It is worth considering the benefits achieved in terms of efficiency and focus.”
(Interview, Supplier UAE).
13 General Manager “We [the supplier] have installed the SAP system, which enables us to control all the information from shipment to invoicing; it is also integrated to the WMS (Warehouse Management System) so we
know we control all the sales and supply processes.” (Interview, supplier KSA). 
4 Regional Sales 
Director
“As the business grows and becomes more complex, the control of the quality of the execution across channels becomes important. We track quantitative KPIs, but recently we started setting
qualitative targets.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
7 General Manager “We are coming closer and closer to the information available. It is just the immediacy of it. You want to know what's on the shelves in the marketplace every day, you want to know your shelf share,
you want to know what your distribution is, and you want to know how to make better decisions and react better.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
8 Regional Sales 
Director
“You have to be able to capture what is beyond the numbers, whether it’s insights on pricing, planograms, or competitor information. We are in the FMCG business, which is about speed, so the
information has to be quick, relevant, and insightful. Personally, I think this is where we have to assist our distributors.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
4 Regional Sales 
Director
“You have the choice of being a service provider and completely divorce the concept of account management. You just let it go and do service providing. You’re like a logistics operator, and you
just let us have a direct relationship with the trade, it’s a different business model with different margins. Your investment is just in facilities and in efficiencies. You will lose part of the margin cake, but
you do not have to carry the same level of overhead that you would otherwise need.”(Interview, Supplier UAE). 
5 Regional Sales 
Director
“We [the supplier] look at small companies who can perform a specialised service. For instance, we are now seeking distributors specialised in pharmacies, schools, and the food service channels.
These represent small channels and are better outsourced to distributors.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
15 General Manager Critical scale
“You [the supplier] need to be a business with US$ 150M turnover to start thinking about operating on your own in KSA.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
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P6 1 General Manager
“We ask our distributor to absorb all the risks in Iraq. How can we motivate him to do that if we are not compensating with an acceptable margin?” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
11 CEO “I [the supplier] am with a cost plus contract because it covers the costs incurred by my distributor. Because we might not agree on how costs are calculated, we opted for a margin contract that is
close to the market average, and in return the distributor is giving us the necessary capabilities to meet with the competitive environment” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
9 Regional Sales 
Director
“We [the supplier] do not differentiate between employees; they receive the same learning. We have one content and we share the same message, so that the distributor’s employees become
qualified like our employees and thus operate similarly, which is a dream come true.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
4 General Manager “We have an organisation that fits the need of a modern trade market. We always refresh our team with fresh talent to show our suppliers that we are very active on people related topics; we know
that this is important for them” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
9 General Manager “Due to our fully automated best in class warehouses we were able to improve our service level by 30%. We want to make sure that we are offering the best storage conditions that will benefit our
suppliers and any other company seeking logistical services.” (Interview, Distributor UAE). 
15 General Manager “If we do not want to invest in logistics this does not mean that logistics is not important to us. When our distributors seek state of the art logistical infrastructure, they are indirectly telling us that they
care about our products.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
12 Vice President Economic 
rewards:
Investment in 
systems
“They can access our system from their offices through a web EDI interface, they basically see everything.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
14 Business 
Development 
Director
“Transparency is important in the development of trust, specifically in a context where information is abundantly available everywhere and in different forms.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
9 General Manager “We [the distributor] are clearly aligned on the objectives of our supplier in the market and we are aware that we need to reinforce our capabilities to meet the needs of our supplier. As long as the
supplier shares with us the why and how, it is enough.” (Interview, Distributor UAE).
1 General Manager
“Many multinational companies have values that can be found on their websites, but only a few are able to apply them in reality.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq).
12 Vice President “It tells us [the distributor] that our supplier will support us in good times and bad times. We celebrate success together; in fact we are going to South Africa tomorrow to celebrate our achievements
in 2012. …We identify solutions together; we share certain risks, we are now in a discussion to see how we can minimise the financial impacts of certain laws set by the government.” (Interview,
Distributor KSA).
12 CEO “The model we [the supplier] have in KSA is not a model that we use exclusively in KSA. Given that one of our values is mutuality, or win-win, if we feel that the distributor is making too much
money, then we intervene and we say: ‘You just have to be more mutual and give back’. Similarly, if he is not making enough money, we intervene to make sure we dissect his income statement to
find inefficiencies, or we decide to sacrifice some of our profits to compensate his margins.”(Interview, Supplier KSA).
9 Regional Sales 
Director
“Who said that integrating certain capabilities means we can do a job better than our distributor?”(Interview, Supplier UAE). 
12 Vice President Non-economic 
rewards:
Quality of the 
team
managing the 
relationship
“It’s all about synergy and day to day harmony.” (Interview, Distributor KSA).
12 Vice President Non-economic 
rewards:
Long term 
orientation
“I do not expect to achieve the return on my investments tomorrow. I know that I have to pay higher salaries than multinational companies to attract good calibre employees, but I believe that these
investments will pay off in the future.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
6 Regional Sales 
Director
Non-economic 
rewards:
Long term 
orientation
“When distributors start creating friction because they only look at how much money they will make this year, it is then when the relationship starts taking undesired routes for everybody.” (Interview,
Supplier UAE).
11 CEO “It is normal that they obtain more focus, they represent 85% of his business, but we [the supplier] want focus as well.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
15 General Manager “We [the supplier] know that a dedicated structure will cost us more, we agreed to increase the distributor margin and he deployed a dedicated sales force for our business in return.”(Interview,
Supplier KSA). 
6 Regional Sales 
Director
“We are now consolidating our distributors; we want to move from six to two distributors. The distributor who proves incapable of driving our category share in UAE will be phased out.” (Interview,
Supplier UAE). 
10 CEO  “To gain back our trust, he [the distributor] simply needs to build our confidence in his capabilities.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
Economic 
rewards:
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Economic 
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P6 1 General Manager
“We ask our distributor to absorb all the risks in Iraq. How can we motivate him to do that if we are not compensating with an acceptable margin?” (Interview, Supplier Iraq). 
11 CEO “I [the supplier] am with a cost plus contract because it covers the costs incurred by my distributor. Because we might not agree on how costs are calculated, we opted for a margin contract that is
close to the market average, and in return the distributor is giving us the necessary capabilities to meet with the competitive environment” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
9 Regional Sales 
Director
“We [the supplier] do not differentiate between employees; they receive the same learning. We have one content and we share the same message, so that the distributor’s employees become
qualified like our employees and thus operate similarly, which is a dream come true.” (Interview, Supplier UAE). 
4 General Manager “We have an organisation that fits the need of a modern trade market. We always refresh our team with fresh talent to show our suppliers that we are very active on people related topics; we know
that this is important for them” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
9 General Manager “Due to our fully automated best in class warehouses we were able to improve our service level by 30%. We want to make sure that we are offering the best storage conditions that will benefit our
suppliers and any other company seeking logistical services.” (Interview, Distributor UAE). 
15 General Manager “If we do not want to invest in logistics this does not mean that logistics is not important to us. When our distributors seek state of the art logistical infrastructure, they are indirectly telling us that they
care about our products.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
12 Vice President Economic 
rewards:
Investment in 
systems
“They can access our system from their offices through a web EDI interface, they basically see everything.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
14 Business 
Development 
Director
“Transparency is important in the development of trust, specifically in a context where information is abundantly available everywhere and in different forms.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
9 General Manager “We [the distributor] are clearly aligned on the objectives of our supplier in the market and we are aware that we need to reinforce our capabilities to meet the needs of our supplier. As long as the
supplier shares with us the why and how, it is enough.” (Interview, Distributor UAE).
1 General Manager
“Many multinational companies have values that can be found on their websites, but only a few are able to apply them in reality.” (Interview, Supplier Iraq).
12 Vice President “It tells us [the distributor] that our supplier will support us in good times and bad times. We celebrate success together; in fact we are going to South Africa tomorrow to celebrate our achievements
in 2012. …We identify solutions together; we share certain risks, we are now in a discussion to see how we can minimise the financial impacts of certain laws set by the government.” (Interview,
Distributor KSA).
12 CEO “The model we [the supplier] have in KSA is not a model that we use exclusively in KSA. Given that one of our values is mutuality, or win-win, if we feel that the distributor is making too much
money, then we intervene and we say: ‘You just have to be more mutual and give back’. Similarly, if he is not making enough money, we intervene to make sure we dissect his income statement to
find inefficiencies, or we decide to sacrifice some of our profits to compensate his margins.”(Interview, Supplier KSA).
9 Regional Sales 
Director
“Who said that integrating certain capabilities means we can do a job better than our distributor?”(Interview, Supplier UAE). 
12 Vice President Non-economic 
rewards:
Quality of the 
team
managing the 
relationship
“It’s all about synergy and day to day harmony.” (Interview, Distributor KSA).
12 Vice President Non-economic 
rewards:
Long term 
orientation
“I do not expect to achieve the return on my investments tomorrow. I know that I have to pay higher salaries than multinational companies to attract good calibre employees, but I believe that these
investments will pay off in the future.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
6 Regional Sales 
Director
Non-economic 
rewards:
Long term 
orientation
“When distributors start creating friction because they only look at how much money they will make this year, it is then when the relationship starts taking undesired routes for everybody.” (Interview,
Supplier UAE).
11 CEO “It is normal that they obtain more focus, they represent 85% of his business, but we [the supplier] want focus as well.” (Interview, Supplier KSA). 
15 General Manager “We [the supplier] know that a dedicated structure will cost us more, we agreed to increase the distributor margin and he deployed a dedicated sales force for our business in return.”(Interview,
Supplier KSA). 
6 Regional Sales 
Director
“We are now consolidating our distributors; we want to move from six to two distributors. The distributor who proves incapable of driving our category share in UAE will be phased out.” (Interview,
Supplier UAE). 
10 CEO  “To gain back our trust, he [the distributor] simply needs to build our confidence in his capabilities.” (Interview, Supplier UAE).
Economic 
rewards:
Investment in 
human
Economic 
rewards:
Investment in 
physical assets
Non-economic 
rewards:
Transparency
Non-economic 
rewards:
Value transfer
Reassess 
relationship:
Lack of focus
Reassess 
relationship:
Lack of trust in 
Economic 
rewards:
Fair Margins
What contributes to the 
development of trust 
between suppliers and 
distributors
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P Case Informant Question Theme Comment/Quotes
P7 9 General Manager Geographical 
Expansion
“It would be a loss if we do not invest our know-how in other countries” (Interview, Distributor UAE). 
1 General Manager Geographical 
Expansion
“In a modern trade country, we are not able to provide much added value as our competitive advantage is limited to logistics but in traditional trade countries this is where our services are needed the
most.” (Interview, Distributor Iraq).
7 CEO Backward 
integration
“The only way to eliminate our dependency on suppliers is by becoming a supplier ourselves.” (Interview, Distributor UAE).
8 CEO Backward 
integration
“We lost the distribution of these brands in UAE, but the impact was very minimal because we were able to compensate part of the loss with our own private label brands” (Interview, Distributor
UAE).
13 General Manager Backward 
integration
“The investment capabilities of the distributor are very high; they are not expected to have the know-how as we have full management control in the joint venture, they just provide the investment in
CAPEX, and we manage.” (Interview, Supplier KSA).
8 CEO Backward 
integration
“Suppliers are unpredictable; they can come to us at any point in time, thank us for doing business together, and leave, like what happened with us with “YZA”. Because we were well prepared with
our manufacturing businesses, the impact was minimal.” (Interview, Distributor UAE).
7 CEO Forward 
integration
“With the on-going increase in retail power, venturing into retail is not a bad option.” (Interview, Distributor UAE). 
How distributors mitigate 
dependency risks?
Elaborate on diversification 
strategies
 
